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


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THE
STOICS, EPICUREANS,
AND
SCEPTICS.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF

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PROFESSOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG

BY

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TO THE
PROVOST AND FELLOWS OF THE QUEEN'S COLLEGE
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD,

TO WHOSE PAST CARE AND PRESENT KINDNESS
THE TRANSLATOR OWES THE PREFERMENT WHICH HE NOW HOLDS,

This Volume is Dedicated

GRATEFULLY AND RESPECTFULLY.

PREFACE.

THE FAVOUR with which a previous attempt to render one portion of Dr. Zeller's work accessible to English readers has been received, induces the translator to offer a further instalment. The former translation dealt with that part of Dr. Zeller's *Philosophie der Griechen* which treats of Socrates and the Socratic Schools, thus supplying an introductory volume to the real philosophy of Greece as it found expression in the systems of Plato and Aristotle. The present volume, taking up the history of philosophy at a time when the real philosophy of Greece was over, and the names of Plato and Aristotle had become things of the past, aims at supplying an introductory volume to another portion of the history of mind—the portion, viz. which may be collectively described as the *post-Aristotelian*. To the moralist and theologian no less than to the student of philosophy this portion is one of peculiar interest; for the post-Aristotelian philosophy supplied the scientific mould into which Christianity in the early years of

its growth was cast, and bearing the shape of which it has come down to us. No complete history therefore of either morals or theology is possible, which does not know something of the systems cotemporary with the first ages of the Church.

In the present volume the translator has followed the same method of translation as in ‘Socrates and the Socratic Schools.’ In the hope of rendering it as intelligible as possible, he has made it his aim throughout to eschew all unnecessary technicalities. He wishes in conclusion to express his obligations to the Rev. Claude Delaval Cobham, of University College, Oxford, for his kind assistance in taking the MS. through the press.

CHEVIN HOUSE, HAZLEWOOD :

January, 1870.

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PART I.

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

CHAPTER I.

THE INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL STATE OF GREECE AT THE CLOSE OF THE FOURTH CENTURY.

GREEK PHILOSOPHY had reached its greatest perfection in Plato and Aristotle—the Socratic theory of conceptions having, in their hands, reached its most perfect development. The whole range of contemporary knowledge had been brought within its compass, and grouped around definite centres, thus affording a connected view of the world. The study of nature had been supplemented by stringent enquiries into morals; whilst, at the same time, natural science in all its branches had been sensibly altered and enlarged. The concentration of all existing speculations had strengthened the intellectual foundation for a science of metaphysics. A multitude of phenomena, which had escaped the notice of earlier thinkers—in particular the phenomena of mental life—had been impressed into the service of science; new questions had been raised; new answers given.

CHAP.
I.

*A. Merits
and defects
of the sys-
tems of
Plato and
Aristotle.*

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

CHAP. I.

Into every branch of knowledge new ideas had penetrated. The clearest and most characteristic expression of the intellectual life of Greece—Idealism—after being set forth by Plato with extraordinary brilliancy, had been brought into harmony with the most careful results of experience by Aristotle. Thanks to this union of theory and practice, constructive criticism had become an art. The machinery of thought had been improved by an invaluable addition in the scientific use of names, a use of which Aristotle was the real originator. In short, within a few years the intellectual treasures of Greece had been increased manifold, both in extent and value. Who would have recognised in the mighty system left by Aristotle to his successors, the scanty store of philosophic ideas which Socrates inherited from his predecessors?

Great, no doubt, had been the progress made by Greek philosophy in the fourth century before Christ. Not less great, however, were the hindrances with which that philosophy had perpetually to contend; not less difficult the questions which were ever presenting themselves to it for solution. Already Aristotle had pointed out weak points in the system of Plato, with which he had found it impossible to agree; nor had their number been diminished by the criticism of advancing science. Even in the system of Aristotle himself, inconsistencies on some of the most important points were discovered; concealed, it is true, under a certain indefiniteness of expression, but fatal, if once brought to light, to the soundness of his entire

system. With all his skill, Aristotle had not succeeded in blending into one harmonious whole all the elements out of which his system was composed; and therein lay the cause of the difference between Aristotle's own teaching and that of his immediate successors.

Nor was the defect of a kind that could be easily removed. On the contrary, the more it was investigated, the stronger became the conviction that these weak points were embedded in the foundations of the systems both of Plato and Aristotle; in short, that they underlay the whole tendency of previous philosophic thought. Leaving details and minor points out of consideration, these weak points might be referred to two main sources. They either arose from an imperfect knowledge and experience of the world, or they were flaws caused by an over-hasty attempt to enthrone Idealism as the knowledge of conceptions. To the former cause may be attributed the mistakes in natural science into which Plato and Aristotle fell, and the limited character of their view of history; to the latter, the Platonic theory of ideas, with all that it involves—the antithesis of ideas and appearances, of the intellect and the senses, of knowledge and ignorance, of the present world and the world to come—and not less truly the corresponding points in the system of Aristotle, such as the difficulties in the relation of what is particular and what is general, of form and matter, of God and the world, of the theory of final causes and of natural explanations,

STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.

CHAP.
I.

of the reasoning and the irrational parts of the soul, of speculative theory and practice.

Both causes are, however, closely connected. The two great thinkers of Greece had been content with an uncertain and defective knowledge of facts. They had trusted to conceptions because the study of nature was yet in its infancy. Trusting implicitly to conceptions, they had failed to enquire how conceptions arose, and whether they would stand. The knowledge of history was as yet so limited that they were not aware of any difference between the results obtained by rigid observation and those obtained by ordinary unmethodical experience. They had failed to recognise how arbitrary most of their traditional principles were, and how necessary a more stringent method of induction had become. The fault common to them both, which Plato and Aristotle had inherited from Socrates, lay in attaching undue prominence to mental criticism, in neglecting observation, and in supposing that out of ordinary beliefs and current language conceptions expressing the very essence of things could be obtained by pure logic. In Plato this fault appears more strongly than in Aristotle, and finds expression in a theory characteristically known as the theory of recollection. And certainly if all our conceptions are inherent from the moment of birth, needing only the agency of sensible things to make us conscious of their existence, it may be legitimately inferred that, to know the essence of things, we must look within, and not without, obtaining our ideas by development from

the mind rather than by abstraction from experience. It may be inferred, with equal reason, that the ideas drawn from the mind are the true standard by which experience must be judged. Whenever ideas and experience disagree, instead of regarding ideas as at fault, we ought to look upon the data of experience as imperfect, and as inadequately expressing the ideas which constitute the thing as it really exists. The whole theory of ideas, in short, and all that it implies, is a natural corollary from the Socratic theory of conceptions. Even those parts of this theory which seem most incongruous are best explained by being referred to the principles on which the constructive criticism of Socrates is primarily based, and the onesidedness of which Aristotle only very imperfectly overcame. Undoubtedly he attempted to supply the defects in the Socratic and Platonic theory of conceptions by deriving knowledge from observation, although Plato's knowledge of the external world cannot for one moment be compared with Aristotle's use of observation, either in accuracy or extent. Undoubtedly Aristotle's attempt changed the whole character of the Platonic theory of conceptions, ultimately securing for individual things a footing by the side of general conceptions, just as a footing had been already secured for experience by the side of intellectual speculation. But Aristotle did not go far enough. In his theory of knowledge he could not wholly repudiate the notion that the soul gains its knowledge by a process of development from within, being not only endowed by nature with

CHAP.
I.

the capacity of thinking, but possessing innate ideas. In his scientific method he frequently substituted enquiries into the uses of words, and into current opinions, in short, what he himself would call proof by probabilities, in the place of strict induction. His endeavours to harmonise the two antagonistic currents in Plato's teaching may have been undertaken in all sincerity, but the antagonism was too deep-seated to yield to his efforts, and not only reappears in the fundamental ideas, but colours the minutest details of his system. At one time it shows itself in the antithesis between *form* and *matter*; at another, in the antithesis between the *world* and a *soul* above the world. At another time, Reason is regarded as something external to man, which can never be brought into harmony with the lower parts of our nature.

B. Con-
nection be-
tween the
theories of
Aristotle
and Greek
character.

The above peculiarities are more immediately connected with the Socratic theory of conceptions. In many respects, however, they express the character of the nation to which Socrates belonged. The common characteristic of the Greeks consists in a harmonious union of the outer and the inner world, in a simple belief that mind and matter were originally connected, and are still in perfect harmony with one another. When the whole social life of a people bears this impress, its intellectual life may be expected to reproduce it also. Whilst the mind reaps many advantages from the close connection of the inner and outer world, it will feel the defects unavoidably connected with any view

which makes their intimacy so close as to ignore a real distinction between them. A long period will have to elapse before the mind will be able to regard itself as something distinct from the notions it receives; before it will rise to the notion of personality; before it will feel that moral right and duty are independent of external circumstances; before it will believe that our ideas are the creations of our own will. And yet, until this result is attained, there will be no hesitation in applying what is felt within the sphere of mind to the sphere of the world without. There will be a tendency to regard the world from ideal heights reared within the domain of our own minds; to accept our own notions of things as really true and actual, without sufficient enquiry, and even to treat them as the most trustworthy when they are opposed to the experience of the senses. We shall be constantly confounding the critical analysis of a notion with the experimental investigation of an object. Confusions such as these characterised the philosophy of Greece, even at the time when it was most flourishing. They were the cause of all the important mistakes in the systems of Plato and Aristotle. Ought, then, the framers of these systems and their immediate successors to bear the whole blame of their mistakes? Ought not the chief blame to fall on the national peculiarity of the Greek tone of thought, Plato and Aristotle being only regarded as the exponents of that tone of thought?

In proportion as the close connection of the faults

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of the Platonic and Aristotelian systems with the Greek character becomes apparent, it will be felt how difficult and almost impossible it was for a Greek mind to rise superior to these faults. To compass this purpose, an entire change of the whole type of thought would necessarily have to take place. It would be necessary to institute a rigid enquiry into the origin of ideas, and into their original meaning; to make a sharp distinction between what is supplied from without and what is supplied from within; and to test far more carefully than had yet been done the truth of several axioms ordinarily accepted in metaphysics. It would be necessary for thinkers to accustom themselves to accuracy of observation, and to strict processes of induction, which were never realised in Greece. It would be necessary to bring the sciences resting on observation to a pitch of completeness which it was vain to hope to reach by the methods and means then in vogue. The poetical way of looking at nature, which allowed questions as to facts to be answered by speculations on final causes, and vague language about the desire of nature to realise beauty, would have to disappear altogether. Enquiries into man's moral nature and functions would have had to be dis severed from simple considerations as to what is according to nature. There is ample evidence of the disturbing influence of these considerations, leading, as they did, to the national exclusiveness of the Greeks, giving to their morality a political character, and making them accept slavery as a state agreeable to nature.

How great, however, was the change necessary before such a strict division of morality and nature would be possible! Could it be expected that a strict science of nature would ever carry the day, so long as the tendency to look upon the life of nature as analogous to the life of man was kept alive by a religion such as that of Greece? Or could moral science shake off the trammels of the Greek propriety of conduct, whilst in all practical matters those trammels were in full force? Or could sharp distinctions be made between what comes from without and what from within in the formation of ideas—a distinction which we vainly look for in Aristotle—before an intensity had been given to the inner life, and the duty and value of the individual, as such, had been recognised in a way which it required the combined influence of Christianity and the peculiar Germanic character to bring about? The more vividly we realise the national character of the Greek philosophy, with all the characteristics of the national life, the more we become convinced that nothing short of an actual revolution in the mental tone of Greece would avail to heal its defects—defects which are apparent even in its greatest and most brilliant achievements. Vain would be all attempts short of a mental revolution, which history has at length seen elsewhere accomplished, after many vicissitudes and an interval of nearly three thousand years. On the platform of the ancient life of Greece such a change would have been impossible. Under more favourable circumstances, there was no

reason, however, why a further expansion of Greek thought should not take place, in the same course of purely intellectual enquiry, which had previously been struck out by its earlier representatives, and in particular by Aristotle. Nor can we estimate the results which might possibly have been attained in this way. Speculation is, however, useless. We cannot, in point of fact, ignore the historical circumstances under which thought had to grow. The Socratic theory of conceptions, and the Ideal theory of Plato, presuppose the high culture of the age of Pericles and the brilliant career of Athens, which ensued after the Persian war. Not less do they presuppose the political degradation and the moral exhaustion of Greece during and after the Peloponnesian war. With his purely intellectual attitude, despairing of anything like practical activity, with his broad view of things, with his knowledge of every kind, with a system, matured and elaborate, embracing all the results of previous enquiry, Aristotle appears as the child of an age which was bearing to its grave a period of great historical development. Henceforth intellectual labour was to take the place of political action.

The bloom of Greek philosophy was short-lived, but not more so than the bloom of national life. A closer examination shows that the one depended on the other, and that both were due to the operation of the same causes. With a high appreciation of freedom, with a ready aptitude for politics, with a genius for artistic creations, the Greeks produced,

within the sphere of politics, results unrivalled for greatness. They neglected, however, to lay their foundations broad and deep. No sufficient permanence was secured for delicate and elastic institutions. Communities limited in extent and simple in arrangement sufficed for a Greek. But how could such simplicity include all branches of the Greek family, satisfying at once the legitimate interests of peoples so diverse? Within the range of science the very same observation holds good. Advancing from isolated facts at once, without any mediating links, to the most general conceptions, they constructed theories upon foundations of limited and imperfect experience—theories such as the foundation was wholly inadequate to bear. Whether, and in how far, the intellect of Greece, if left to itself, might have remedied these defects as it grew older, is a question which it is impossible to answer. That intellect was far too intimately bound up with the political, the moral, and the religious life of the nation, in short with the whole external culture of the people, not to be seriously affected by any changes in these departments. The character too, and historical progress of the Greeks, was one adapted to have only a brief period of splendour; and that period was soon over. At the time that the philosophy of Greece was being raised to its highest point by Plato and Aristotle, Greece was in all other respects in a hopeless state of decline. Notwithstanding all the efforts of individuals to resuscitate it, the old morality and propriety of

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I.

conduct had disappeared since the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Together with them, too, the old belief in the gods was gone. To the bulk of the people, the ethics of the rising philosophy afforded no substitute for the loss of their religious creed. Art, though carefully cultivated, could no longer come up to the excellence of the strictly classic period. Politics became more unsatisfactory every day. In the fifth century B.C. the rivalry of Athens and Sparta had, at any rate, ranged the states of Greece into two groups; in the succeeding century disunion continually increased. It was in vain that the Theban Epaminondas attempted to found a new united confederation. His attempt only ended in a still further breaking up of Greece. Destitute of a political centre of gravity, the Greeks, of their own choice, drifted into a disgraceful dependence on the now declining Persian empire. Persian gold wielded an influence which Persian arms had never been able to exercise. The petty jealousies of little states and tribes wasted in endless local feuds resources which, had they been united, might have moved the world. With the decline of civil order the well-being and martial prowess of the nation declined also; and the technicalities of the art of war continually increasing, the decision of a battle was more and more taken out of the hands of free citizens, and placed in those of mercenary troops. The system of mercenaries became one of the most injurious institutions of this age, and a sure sign of the decline of freedom—a portent of the approach of a military

despotism. When in imminent danger of such a despotism from the threatening rise of the Macedonian power, patriots in Greece might still console themselves with the hope that their self-devotion would avert the danger; it needed, however, but an unbiassed glance at history to predict the failure of their attempts, that failure being the natural and inevitable consequence of causes intimately connected with the Greek character and the course of Greek history. Hence not even the most heroic exertions of individuals, nor the resistance of the divided states, which came too late, could for one moment render the final issue doubtful.

By the battle of Chæronea the doom of Greece was sealed. Never since then has Greece been really free. All attempts to shake off the Macedonian supremacy ended in disastrous defeat. In the subsequent struggles Greece, and Athens in particular, was the toy of changing rulers, the scene of perpetual warfare. In the second half of the third century a purely Grecian power was formed—the Achæan League—round which the hopes of the nation rallied. How inadequate was the attempt to meet the real wants of the country! How inevitable the disappointment when the league proved, in the issue, powerless to heal the prevailing ills! That old hereditary failing of the Greeks—internal discord—rendered it still impossible to be independent of foreign interference, and to be united and settled within. The best resources were lavished in perpetual struggles between Achæans, Ætolians,

*C. Greece
after the
battle of
Chæronea.*

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I.

and Spartans. The very individual who had led the Achæans against the Macedonians, in the cause of independence, summoned the Macedonians back to the Peloponnesus, to gain their support against Sparta. At length, the supremacy of Macedonia was broken by the arms of Rome, when a more avowed dependence on Italian allies succeeded; and when, in the year 146 B.C., the province of Achaia was incorporated under Roman rule, even the shadow of freedom, which had been previously enjoyed, vanished for ever.

Sad as was the state of Greece at this period, the decline of its internal resources being palpable, a single redeeming feature may be found in the extension of its mental horizon, and the more general diffusion of its culture. The Macedonian ascendancy, whilst dealing a death-blow at the independence of Greece, also broke down the boundaries which had hitherto separated Greeks from foreigners. It opened out a new world before the gaze of Greece, and offered a vast territory for her energies to explore. It brought her into manifold contact with the Eastern nations belonging to the Macedonian monarchy, and secured for her culture the place of honour among the nations of the East, producing at the same time a tardy, but, in the long run, important back-current of Oriental thought, traces of which appeared in the philosophy of Greece a few centuries later. By the side of the old famed centres of learning in the mother country of Hellas, new centres arose, suited by position, inhabitants, and

peculiar circumstances, to unite the culture of East and West, and to fuse into one homogeneous mass the intellectual forces of different races. By the number of emigrants who left her shores to settle in Asia and Egypt, the population of Greece became sensibly diminished ; but, at the same time, by their agency intellectual victories were secured to Greece abroad over nations before whom she had politically succumbed at home. .

CHAPTER II.

CHARACTER AND CHIEF FORMS OF THE POST-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY.

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II.

*A. Causes
forming
the post-
Aristote-
lian philo-
sophy.*

(1) *Politi-
cal causes.*

THE circumstances which have been hastily sketched in the preceding chapter, were of the greatest influence as affecting the character of the post-Aristotelian philosophy. Greek philosophy, like Greek art, is the offspring of Greek political freedom. In the activity of political life, in which every one was thrown on himself and his own resources, in the rivalry of unlimited competition at every step in life, the Greeks had learned to bring all their powers into free use. The consciousness of dignity—which a Greek connected far more closely with the privilege of citizenship than we do—and the feeling of independence in the daily affairs of life, had engendered in his mind a freedom of thought which could boldly attack the problem of knowledge, reckless of ulterior results. With the decline of political independence, however, the mental powers of the nation received a fatal blow. No longer knit together by a powerful *esprit de corps*, the Greeks lost the habit of working for the common weal; and, for the most part, gave themselves up to the petty interests of home life and

their own personal troubles. Even the better disposed were too much occupied in opposing the low tone and corruption of the times, to be able to devote themselves, in their moments of relaxation, to a free and speculative consideration of things. What could be expected in such an age, but that philosophy would take a decidedly practical turn, if indeed it were studied at all? And yet such were the political antecedents of the Stoic and Epicurean systems of philosophy.

An age like this did not require theoretical knowledge. What it did want was moral uprightness and moral strength. But these desiderata were no longer to be met with in the popular religion; and amongst all the cultivated circles the popular faith had been gradually superseded by philosophy. Hence it became necessary to look to philosophy to supply the pressing want; to enquire of philosophy what course it was alone possible for moral energy to take under the circumstances, and what course was then especially needed. Nor was it difficult for philosophy to reply. There was no need of creative ingenuity, but there was a need of resolute self-devotion; no demand for outward actions, but for inward feeling; no opportunity for public achievements, but for private reforms. So utterly hopeless had the public state of Greece become, that even the few who made it their business to provide a remedy, could only gain for themselves the honour of martyrdom. No other course seemed open for the best-intentioned, as matters then stood, but to withdraw

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entirely within themselves, to entrench themselves behind the safe barrier of their own inner life, and, ignoring the troubles raging without, to make happiness dependent on their own inward state alone.

Stoic apathy, Epicurean self-satisfaction, and Sceptic imperturbability, were the doctrines which responded to the political helplessness of the age. They were the doctrines, too, which met with the most general acceptance. The same political helplessness produced the sinking of national distinctions in the feeling of a common humanity, and the separation of morals from politics which characterise the philosophy of the Alexandrian and Roman period. The barriers between nations, together with national independence, had been swept away. East and West, Greeks and barbarians, were united in large empires, being thus thrown together, and brought into close contact on every possible point. Philosophy might teach that all men were of one blood, that all were equally citizens of one empire, that morality rested on the relation of man to his fellow men, independently of nationalities and of social ranks; but in so doing she was only explicitly stating truths which had been already realised in part, and which were in part corollaries from the existing state of society.

(2) *Intellectual causes forming the post-Aristotelian philosophy.*

The same result was also involved in the course which philosophy had taken during the last century and a half. Socrates and the Sophists, in different ways no doubt, had each devoted themselves to the practical side of philosophy; and more definitely

still the Cynic School had paved the way for Stoicism, the Cyrenaic for Epicureanism, although it is true that these two Schools were of minor importance in the philosophy of the fourth century taken as a whole, and that sophistry by the close of the same century was already a thing of the past. Nor can Socrates be at all compared with the post-Aristotelian philosophers. The desire for knowledge was still strong in Socrates, although he turned away from physical enquiries; and although he professed to busy himself only with subjects which were of practical use in life, his theory of knowledge involved a reformation of the speculative as well as of the practical side of philosophy—a reformation which was accomplished on a grand scale by Plato and Aristotle. On the whole, then, the course of development taken by Greek philosophy during the fourth century was far from being the course of its subsequent development.

And yet the speculations of Plato and Aristotle helped to prepare the way for the coming change. The chasm between the ideal and phenomenal worlds which Plato brought to light, and Aristotle vainly attempted to bridge over, leads ultimately to an opposition between thought and the object of thought, between what is within and what is without. The generic conceptions or forms, which Plato and Aristotle regard as most truly real, are, after all, fabrications of the human mind. The conception of reason, even in its expanded form as the divine Reason, or reason of the world, is an idea formed by abstraction

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from our inner life. And what is really meant by identifying form in itself with what *is*, and matter with what is only *possible*, or even (as Plato does) with what *is not*, or by placing God over against and in contrast to the world, except that man finds in his own mind a higher and more real existence than any which he finds outside of it in the world, and that what is truly divine and unlimited must be *in* the mind in its ideal nature, apart from and independent of all impressions from without? Plato and Aristotle, in fact, declared that reason constitutes the real essence of man—reason coming from above and uniting itself with the body, but being in itself superior to the world of sense and life in time—and that man's highest activity is thought, turned away from all external things, and meditating only on the inner world of ideas. It was only one step further in the same direction for the post-Aristotelian philosophy to refer man back to himself, thus severing him most completely from the outer world, that he may find that peace within which he can find nowhere in the world besides.

B. Character of the post-Aristotelian philosophy.

This step was taken by the Schools of the Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, which appeared in the first half of the third century before Christ. Asserting their supremacy over the older Schools, while in the main they preserved their teaching unaltered, these Schools continued to exist until the beginning of the first century; and, however else they may differ, they at least agree in two fundamental points—in subordinating theory to practice,

and in the peculiar character of their practical philosophy.

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The former point appears most clearly, as will be seen, in the School of Epicurus. It is nearly as clear in the case of the Sceptics, who, denying all possibility of knowledge, left as the only ground of action conviction based on probabilities; and both these Schools agree in considering philosophy as only a means for securing happiness. By the Stoics, on the other hand, the need of a scientific theory was felt more pressingly; but in their case this need was not felt simply and for its own sake, but was subordinated to practical considerations, and determined by practical wants. The Stoics, like the Epicureans, restricted themselves, in the theoretical part of their system, to the more ancient views—a fact of itself significant, and proving that speculation was not the cause of their philosophical peculiarities, but that other points, in which they considered themselves proficient, were looked upon as of greater importance. Moreover, they expressly stated that the study of nature was only necessary as a help to the study of virtue. It is also beyond question, that their chief peculiarities, which give them an importance in history, are ethical—the other parts of their system, in which their distinctive teaching appears, being only regulated by practical considerations. Hereafter, these statements will be substantiated in detail. It may therefore suffice to observe here, that the most important question in the logic of the Stoics—the question of a standard of truth

(1) *Theory subordinated to practice.*

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—was decided by a practical postulate. The fundamental principle of the Stoic metaphysics is only intelligible from an ethical point of view. For natural science the Stoics did very little, preferring to explain nature by moral considerations, and by that theory of final causes on which they so much insisted; even their theology bears ample testimony to the practical tone of their system. Standing in advance of the Epicureans by their higher intellectual position, and decidedly opposing the dogmatism of the Sceptics, the Stoics nevertheless agree with both these Schools in the essentially practical character of their teaching.

(2) *Peculiar mode of treating the practical problem.*

This agreement is strikingly seen in the way in which they approached the practical problem. The Epicurean imperturbability is akin to the imperturbability of the Sceptics; both resemble the Stoic apathy. All three Schools are agreed that the only way to happiness consists in peace of mind, and in avoiding all disturbances—disturbances sometimes arising from external causes, at other times from internal emotions; they are only divided as to the means by which peace of mind may be secured. They are also agreed in making moral activity independent of external circumstances, and in separating morals from politics, although the Stoics were the first who avowedly taught the original unity of the whole human family, and insisted on being citizens of the world. Through all the Schools runs the common trait of referring everything to the subject, of withdrawing everything within the sphere of mind

and of the inner life, one consequence of which is to attach prominence to practice over theory. But, at the same time, practice was made to depend on an internal self-consciousness, and on a peace of mind which could only be attained by the exercise of the will and the cultivation of the intellect.

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In the centuries succeeding the rise of these three schools, philosophy still retained the same characteristics; nor were the circumstances out of which they arose materially altered. In addition to the followers of the old Schools, Eclectics were now to be met with, gathering from every system what was true and probable. In this process of selection, their decision was swayed by regard to the practical wants of man, and the ultimate standard of truth was placed in our own immediate consciousness, everything being referred to the subject as its centre. For their ethics and natural theology the Eclectics were also greatly indebted to the Stoics. A new School of Sceptics also arose, not differing in its tendencies from the older one. Neopythagoreans and Platonists appeared, not satisfied with human knowledge, but aspiring to higher revelations. All these philosophers appealed to the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle. Their connection with the post-Aristotelian Schools is clear, however, not only because they borrowed extensively from the Stoics the material for their theology and ethics, but far more from the general character of their beliefs. Knowledge is for them far less even than for the Stoics an end in itself, and they are further from

(3) *Their peculiarities illustrated by subsequent philosophy.*

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natural science than the Stoics. Philosophy is subservient to the interests of religion, its aim being to bring men into proper relation with God. The religious needs of mankind are the highest authority for science.

The same remark applies also to Plotinus and his successors. These philosophers do not lack a broad basis for their metaphysics. The care, too, with which they cultivate metaphysics leaves no doubt as to the lively interest they took in scientific completeness and systematic correctness. But with Plotinus the scientific side of philosophy bears the same relation to the practical side as with the Stoics, who in point of learning and logical treatment are otherwise not at all inferior to the Neoplatonists. Undoubtedly a real interest in science was one of the contributing causes which brought Neoplatonism into existence, but it was not strong enough to counterbalance other elements—the practical and religious motives. The mind was not sufficiently independent to be able to get on without appealing to intellectual and theological authorities; the scientific procedure was too unsettled to lead to a simple study of things as they are. The ground on which Neoplatonism actually rests is, as in the case of the Neopythagoreans, a religious one. The divine world of which they speak is, after all, only a portion of human thought projected out of the mind, and incapable of being fully grasped by the understanding. The highest business of philosophy is to reunite man to the divine world external to his

mind. To attain this end, all the means which science supplies are employed. Their philosophy endeavours to explain the steps by which the finite gradually came to be separated from the original infinite being; it seeks to bring about a return by a regular and systematic course; and in this attempt the philosophic spirit of Greece, by no means extinct, proved its capabilities by a result of its kind unrivalled. No doubt, in the first instance, the problem was so raised as to impress philosophy into the service of religion; but, in the long run, it could not fail to be seen that, with the premises assumed, a scientific solution of the religious question was impossible. The Neoplatonic notion of an original being was a conception which reflected certain religious sentiments, without their being based upon scientific research. The doctrine of a mystical union with a transcendental being assumed a religious postulate, the incomprehensibility of which betrays its origin in the mind of the thinker. Neoplatonism, therefore, in its whole bearing, stands on the same ground as the other post-Aristotelian systems. It is hardly necessary to point to this relationship to show how, in other respects, it agrees with Stoicism, and especially in ethics. These two systems standing the one at the beginning the other at the end of the post-Aristotelian philosophy, and differing therefore widely in their subject-matter, nevertheless both display one and the same attitude of thought; and we pass from one to the other by a continuous series of intermediate links. The character of the post-Aristotelian

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philosophy naturally assumed various modifications in course of time, passing from School to School; but, nevertheless, it reproduced certain common elements. Such was the neglect of intellectual originality, which drove some thinkers to a sceptical denial of all knowledge, and induced others to take their knowledge at second hand from older authorities. Such was the prominence given to practical over speculative questions. Such was the disregard for natural science, and, in comparison with former times, the greater importance attached to theology, appearing not only in the controversy between the Epicureans and Stoics, but also in the apologetical writings of the Stoics and Platonists. Such, too, was the negative morality which aimed at independence of the outer world, at mental composure, and philosophic contentment; the habit of separating morals from politics; the distinguishing a morality suited for all from a citizenship of the world; and the going within ourselves into the depths of our souls, our will, and thinking powers. There was, on the one hand, a widening of the mental horizon; but there was, at the same time, also a narrowing of it, since mental isolation was accompanied by a loss of lively interest in the world without.

C. *Development of post-Aristotelian philosophy.*
(1) *Dogmatic Schools.*

This mental habit, first of all, found a dogmatic expression in philosophy. But soon not only moral science, but logic and natural science were treated in a corresponding way, though partially built on the older teaching. In the treatment of moral science in particular, two Schools, markedly different and

decided in their peculiarities, stand opposed to each other—that of the Stoics who insisted almost exclusively on the universal element, and that of the Epicureans who gave prominence to the individual element in man, pursuing happiness by looking within. The Stoics regarded man exclusively as a thinking being, the Epicureans as a creature of feeling. The Stoics, again, made happiness consist in a subordination to a general law, in a suppression of all personal feelings and inclinations, in virtue; the Epicureans in the independence of the individual, in the unruffled serenity of the inner life, in being proof against pain. The theoretical assumptions on which this teaching was based corresponded with its ethical principles.

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(a) *Stoics
and Epi-
cureans.*

Violent as was the contest between these two rival Schools, both, nevertheless, rest on the same foundation. Absolute composure of mind, freedom of the inner life from every external disturbance, was the goal at which both Schools hoped to arrive, although they followed most different courses. This use of different means, however, whilst the aim is the same, proves that the common aim must be regarded as the essential part of the philosophy of this period. If the speculative axioms of these systems contradict one another whilst they have a common aim, it follows that the aim may be attained independently of any definite dogmatic view, and that we may despair of knowledge in order to pass from the knowledge of our ignorance to a general indifference, and to an unconditional repose of mind. Thus

(b) *Dog-
matic scept-
icism.*

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Scepticism is connected with Stoicism and Epicureanism, constituting by their side a third system—a Scepticism distinct, however, from that of Pyrrho, and most influential in the form which it subsequently assumed in the New Academy.

(2) *Sceptical Schools.*
(a) *Influences producing Scepticism.*
(a) *Political influence of Rome.*

The history of the rise, growth, and conflict of these three Schools, by the side of which the older Schools sink down to a position of secondary importance, occupies the first portion of the period of post-Aristotelian philosophy, extending from the end of the fourth to the beginning of the first century before Christ. The distinctive features of this epoch consist partly in the predominance of the above tendencies, and partly in their separate existence, without being modified by intermixture. After the middle of the second century a gradual change took place. Greece was then a Roman province, and the intellectual intercourse between Greece and Rome was continually on the increase. Many learned Greeks resided at Rome, frequently as the companions of families of high birth; others living in their own country, were visited by Romans. How, in the face of the clearly defined and sharply expressed Roman character, could the power and independence of the Greek intellect, already unquestionably on the decline, assert its ancient superiority? How could Greeks become the teachers of Romans without accommodating to their requirements, and experiencing in turn a reflex influence? Nor, indeed, was the philosophy of Greece exempt from such an influence. With its originality—long since in abeyance

ance—it now openly avowed Scepticism, declaring that it could not depend even on itself. To the practical sense of a Roman no philosophical system could afford satisfaction which did not lead to practical results by the shortest possible route. To a Roman practical needs were the ultimate standard of truth. Little did he care for rigid logic in a scientific procedure. The difference between one system and another was for him unimportant, so long as it had no practical bearing. No wonder that Greek philosophy bent under the influence of Rome, and lent itself to Eclecticism.

Whilst on the one side of the world the Greeks were experiencing the influence of the nation that had subdued them, on the other they were assimilating the views of the Oriental nations whom they had conquered alike in the conflict of warlike and intellectual power. For two centuries, in philosophy at least, Greece had held her own against Oriental modes of thought. Now, as her internal incapacity continually increased, those modes of thought gained for themselves a hearing in her philosophy. Alexandria was the place where first and most completely the connection of Greece with the East was realised. In that centre of commerce, for three centuries, East and West entered into a connection more intimate and more lasting than in any other centre; nor was this connection a mere accident of circumstances; far more was it the result of political forecast. From its founder, Ptolemy Soter, the Ptolemæan dynasty inherited as its principle of government the maxim

(β) *Intellectual influence of Alexandria.*

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of always combining what is native with what is foreign, and of clothing things new in the old and venerable forms of Egyptian custom and religious ceremony. At Alexandria, accordingly, there arose, towards the beginning of the first century before Christ, a philosophical school calling itself at first Platonic, afterwards Pythagorean, and still later, gaining, in the shape of Neoplatonism, a supremacy over the whole domain of philosophy. The very fact, however, that such a change in philosophic views did not appear before, is of itself enough to prove that this School of philosophy was occasioned and called for by external circumstances. At the same time, unless in the course of its own development the intellect of Greece had been ripe for the change, such a School could never have come into existence at all.

(b) *Scepticism and Eclecticism.*

The same remark holds good of that practical Eclecticism which we have before traced to the influence of Rome. Even in the period of its greatest decline, Greek philosophy, far from being reduced by the force of its surroundings to utter helplessness, was, under the aid of those very surroundings, developing in a direction to which its previous course pointed. If we except the lingering remains of a few small Schools, which soon expired, there existed, after the beginning of the third century before Christ, only four great philosophic Schools—the Peripatetic, the Stoic, the Epicurean, and the School of Platonists, converted to Scepticism by Arcesilaus. These four Schools were all permanently established at

Athens, and thus a lively interchange of thought, and a thorough comparison of each other's teaching were rendered comparatively easy among them. That they would not long exist side by side without making some overtures towards union and agreement was a perfectly natural prospect; and these overtures were hastened by Scepticism, which, denying the possibility of knowledge, only allowed a choice between probabilities, leaving that choice to be decided by the standard of practical needs. Hence, towards the close of the second century before Christ, these philosophic Schools may be observed to emerge more or less from their exclusiveness. An eclectic tendency stole over philosophy, aiming not so much at scientific knowledge as at attaining certain results of a practical kind. The distinctive doctrines of each School were suffered to drop; and in the belief that infallibility resided solely in the mind itself, such portions were selected from each system as seemed most in harmony with the selecting mind. In Scepticism this eclectic mode of thought was concealed in germ. On the other hand, Eclecticism also involved doubt, and suggested a new phase of doubt, which appeared soon after the Christian era, in a peculiar sceptical School, and continued until the third century. Thus Scepticism and Eclecticism, the one openly, the other secretly, betrayed the need which was felt by philosophers of scientific knowledge in the interests of morals and religion. At the same time they also disclosed a feeling of distrust towards the existing knowledge, and, in fact, towards

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knowledge in general. When brought into mutual relation, they further suggested the thought that truth, which could not be attained in the form of intellectual knowledge, might be discovered by some other means. Possibly it might exist concealed among the religious traditions of the early days of Greece and the East, or it might be reached by immediate divine revelation. Connected with this thought, a notion of God, and of His relations to the world, had gained ground, which confirmed the belief in the possibility of revelation. Regarding truth as something external to themselves, and doubting their own capacities to attain to truth, men had come to look upon God as far removed from themselves, and to look up to Him as the absolute source of truth. Convinced, moreover, that truth to be known must be revealed, they had peopled the interval between God and the world with intermediate beings, who were sometimes conceived of as purely metaphysical entities, and at others appeared, according to the popular belief, as demons. This mental habit, connected with the Platonic and Pythagorean systems more immediately than with any other ancient system, forms the transition to Neoplatonism, Neoplatonism itself being the last stage in the historical development of the philosophy of Greece.

(3) *Religious
School of
Neoplatonists.*

Yet even this last phase of Greek philosophy was not uninfluenced by the circumstances of history. The decline of the Roman Empire, the dangers which threatened it on all sides, the pressure and the necessity of the time, were steadily advancing since the

end of the second century after Christ. All means of defence hitherto employed had proved unavailing to stem destruction. With ruin everywhere staring in the face, the desire and longing for some higher assistance increased. Such assistance could no longer be obtained from the old Gods of Rome or the religious faith of the day, notwithstanding the existence of which circumstances were daily becoming more hopeless. Stronger and stronger became the longing, which had been gradually spreading over the Roman world since the last days of the Republic, and which the circumstances of the Empire had greatly favoured, to have recourse to foreign forms of worship. The highest power in the state had, moreover, favoured this longing under the Oriental and half Oriental emperors who for nearly half a century after Septimius Severus occupied the imperial throne. The state and the Gods of the state were continually losing their hold on the respect of men, whilst Oriental worships, mysteries new and old, and foreign heathen religions of the most varying kinds, were ever gaining fresh adherents. Above all, Christianity was rapidly advancing to an extent which would enable it to enter the lists for supremacy, and to claim a recognised position as the religion of the state. The attempts of a series of powerful monarchs about the middle of the third century to build up the Empire afresh, could not have for their object a restoration of a specifically Roman form of government. Their only aim could be to bring the various elements which composed the Empire under one sovereign will by

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fixed forms of administration; a result which was actually reached under Diocletian and Constantine. The Roman character asserted itself, indeed, as a ruling and regulating power, but it was at the same time subordinate to another of an originally foreign character. The Empire was a congeries of nations artificially held together, and arranged on a carefully-designed plan; not concentrated round a national centre, but round the will of a prince, standing above all rules and laws of state, and deciding everything without appeal and without responsibility.

In a similar manner Neoplatonism united all the elements of existing philosophical Schools into one comprehensive and well-arranged system, in which each class of existences had its definite place assigned it. The initial point in this system, the all-embracing unity, was a being lying beyond it, soaring above every notion that experience and conception can supply, unmixed with the process of life going on in the world, and from his unattainable height causing all things, but himself subject to no conditions of causality. Neoplatonism is the intellectual reproduction of Byzantine Imperialism. As Byzantine Imperialism combines Oriental despotism with the Roman idea of the state, so Neoplatonism fills out with Oriental mysticism the scientific forms of Greek philosophy.

It is clear that in Neoplatonism the post-Aristotelian philosophy had lost its original character. Self-dependence, and the self-sufficingness of thought, have made way for a resignation to higher powers.

for a longing for some revelation, for an ecstatic departure from the domain of conscious mental activity. Man has resigned the idea of truth within for truth to be found only in God. God has been removed into another world, and stands over against man and the world of appearances, in an abstract spiritual world. All the attempts of thought have but one aim—to explain how it was that the finite proceeded from the infinite, and under what conditions its return to God is possible. But neither the one nor the other of these problems could meet with a satisfactory intellectual solution. That even this form of thought bears undeniably the personal character of the post-Aristotelian philosophy has been already seen, and will be seen still more in the sequel. With it the creative powers of the Greek mind set for ever. After defending her national existence for centuries, after losing her intellectual prestige step by step, Greece saw the last remaining fragments torn from her grasp by the victory of Christianity. But these fragments she did not surrender before she had made one more futile attempt to rescue the forms of Greek culture from her mighty rival. With the failure of that attempt Greek religion and Greek philosophy set together.

PART II.

THE STOICS.

CHAPTER III.

HISTORY OF THE STOICS UNTIL THE END OF THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

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*A. Causes
of post-
Aristote-
lian philo-
sophy.
(1) His-
torical
causes.*

A STRIKING feature characteristic of the history of the post-Aristotelian philosophy, and one which at the same time brings home most forcibly to us the altered circumstances of Greece, is the fact that so many philosophers come from countries situated towards the East, in which Greek and Oriental modes of thought had already met and mingled. Nevertheless, for centuries Athens still continued to have the glory of being the chief seat of Greek philosophy; nor did she renounce her claim to be the most important seminary of philosophy, even when she had to share that glory with other cities, such as Alexandria, Rome, Rhodes, and Tarsus. Yet even at Athens there were many teachers whose foreign extraction proved that the age of pure Greek philosophy was over; and such teachers, besides being found amongst the Neoplatonists, were in particular

to be met with in the ranks of the Stoics. An occurrence so characteristic of the then state of the world, it might seem natural to attribute purely to external circumstances. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to do so. Nay, more, it deserves notice how frequently the absence of national feeling is found in connection with the Stoic philosophy. Nearly all the most important Stoics before the Christian era belong by birth to Asia Minor, to Syria, and to the islands of the Eastern Archipelago. Then follow a line of Roman Stoics, among whom the Phrygian Epictetus occupies a prominent place; but Greece proper is exclusively represented by men of third or fourth rate capacity.

The founder of the Stoic School, Zeno¹ by name, A. Zeno. was the son of Mnaseas,² and a native of Citium³ in Cyprus. Leaving his home, he repaired to Athens,⁴

¹ For the life of Zeno, Diogenes is the chief authority. Diogenes appears to be chiefly indebted for his information to Antigonus of Carystus, who lived about 250 B.C. In proof of this, compare the account of Diogenes with the extracts given by Athenæus (viii. 345, d; xiii. 563, e; 565, d; 603, e; 607, e; and, in particular, ii. 55, f) from Antigonus' life of Zeno. Of modern authorities, consult *Wagenmann*, in *Pauly's Realencyclop.*

² *Diog.* vii. 1. *Suid.* Ζήνων. *Plut.* Plac. i. 3, 29. *Pausan.* ii. 8, 4. He is called by others Demeas.

³ Citium, which the ancients unanimously call the native city

of Zeno, was, according to *Diog.* vii. 1, a πόλισμα Ἑλληνικὸν Φοινίκας ἐποίκους ἐσχηκός, i.e. Phœnician immigrants had settled there by the side of the old Greek population, whence its inhabitants are sometimes called 'e Phœnicia profecti' (*Cic.* Fin. iv. 20, 56), and Zeno is himself called a Phœnician (*Diog.* vii. 3; 15; 25; 30; ii. 114. *Suid.* Ζήν. *Athen.* xiii. 563, e. *Cic.* l. c.).

⁴ The details are differently given by *Diog.* 2-5; 31; *Plut.* Inimic. Util. 2; and *Sen.* Tranq. An. 14, 3. Most accounts relate that he came to Athens for trading purposes, and accidentally became acquainted with Crates and philosophy after

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about the year 320 B.C.,¹ where he at first joined the Cynic Crates,² but not till he had been previously disgusted by the extravagances of the Cynic mode of life.³ With a keen desire for knowledge, he could find no satisfaction in a teaching so scanty as that of the Cynics.⁴ To supply its defects he had repaired to Stilpo, who united to the moral teaching of the Cynics the logical accuracy of the Megarians.

being shipwrecked. According to other accounts, he remained at Athens, after disposing of his merchandise, and devoted himself to philosophy. Demetrius of Magnesia (*Themist. Or. xxiii. 295, D*) further relates that he had already occupied himself with philosophy at home, and repaired to Athens to study it more fully—a view which seems most likely, because the least sensational.

¹ The dates in Zeno's life are very uncertain. He is said to have been thirty when he first came to Athens (*Diog. 2*). Persæus, his pupil and countryman, however, says twenty-two. But these statements are of little use, since the date of his coming to Athens is unknown. If it is true that he was for ten years a pupil of Xenocrates, who died 314 B.C. (*Diog. 2*), he must have come to Athens not later than 328 B.C. But this fact may be doubted. Zeno's whole line of thought resembles that of Crates and Stilpo. How then can he have been for ten years a pupil in the Academy? He is moreover said to have frequented the schools of different philosophers for twenty years in all before opening his own (*Diog.*

4). According to Apollon. in *Diog. 28*, he presided over his own school for fifty-eight years, which is hardly reconcileable with the above data, even if he attained the age of ninety-eight (*Diog. 28; Lucian. Macrob. 19*). According to Persæus (*Diog. 28*), he only attained the age of seventy-two, and was altogether only fifty years in Athens. In his own letter to Antigonus (*Diog. 9*), however, he distinctly calls himself eighty; but the genuineness of this letter may perhaps be doubted. The year of his death is likewise unknown. His relations to Antigonus Gonatas prove at least that he was not dead in 278 B.C., and probably not till long afterwards. It would appear from the calculation of his age, that his death did not take place till 260 B.C. He may, then, have lived circa 350 to 260 B.C.; but these dates are quite uncertain.

² *Diog. vii. 2; vi. 105.*

³ *Diog. 3: ἐντεῦθεν ἤκουσε τοῦ Κράτητος, ἄλλως μὲν εὐτονος πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, αἰδήμων δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὴν κυνικὴν ἀνασχυσίαν.*

⁴ *Conf. Diog. 25 and 15: ἦν δὲ ζητητικὸς καὶ περὶ πάντων ἀκριβολογούμενος.*

He had also studied under Polemo; it is said likewise under Xenocrates and the captious Diodorus, and he was on terms of intimacy with Philo¹ the pupil of Diodorus. After a long course of intellectual preparation, he at last appeared as a teacher, soon after the beginning of the third, or perhaps during the last years of the fourth century B.C. From the Stoa ποικιλῇ, the place which he selected for delivering his lectures, his followers derived their name of Stoics, but previously they were called after their master Zenonians.² The universal respect inspired by his earnestness, moral strictness,³ and simplicity of life,⁴ and the dignity, modesty, and affability of his conduct,⁵ was such that Antigonus Gonatas vied

¹ *Diog.* vii. 2; 4; 16; 20; 24; ii. 114; 120. Numen. in *Eus. Pr. Ev.* xiv. 5, 9; 6, 6. Polemo is called his teacher by *Cic. Fin.* iv. 16, 45; *Acad.* i. 9, 35. *Strabo*, xiii. 1, 67. How ready he was to learn from others is proved by *Diog.* 25; *Plut. Fragm.* in *Hesiod.* ix.

² *Diog.* 5, according to whom, he gave instruction walking to and fro, like Aristotle. It is not probable that he gave any formal lectures.

³ Which, however, must be judged by the standard of that time and of Greek customs. Conf. *Diog.* 13; *Athen.* xiii. 607, e; 563, e.

⁴ See Musonius in *Stob. Serm.* 17, 43. His outward circumstances also appear to have been very simple. According to one account (*Diog.* 13), he brought to Athens the fabulous sum of 1000

talents, and put it out to interest. *Themist.* Or. xxi. says that he forgave a debtor his debt. He is said to have paid a logician 200 drachmas, instead of the 100 which he asked for (*Diog.* 25). Nor is there any mention of a Cynical life or of poverty. According to *Diog.* 5, *Plut.* and *Sen.*, however, he had lost his property nearly altogether. According to *Sen. Consol. ad Helv.* 12, 5, he had no slave. Had he been well to do, he would hardly have accepted the presents of Antigonus.

⁵ Conf. *Diog.* 13; 16; 24; 26; *Athen.*; *Suid.*; *Clem. Strom.* 413, a. It is mentioned as a peculiarity of Zeno, that he avoided all noise and popular display (*Diog.* 14); that, though generally grave, he relaxed over the wine; and that he was very fond of epigrams. He is said to have carried his parsimoniousness too far

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with the city of Athens in showing his appreciation of so estimable a philosopher.¹ Although lacking smoothness of style and using a language far from pure,² Zeno had nevertheless an extensive following. By a life of singular moderation he reached an advanced age untouched by disease, although he naturally enjoyed neither robust health nor an attractive person.³ A slight injury having at length befallen him, which he regarded as a work of destiny, he put an end to his own life.⁴ His numerous writings⁵ have

(*Diog.* 16). He bore the loss of his property with the greatest composure (*Diog.* 3; *Plut.* 1; *Sen.*).

¹ Antigonus (conf. *Athen.* xiii. 603, e; *Arrian*, *Diss. Epict.* ii. 13, 14; *Simpl.* in *Epict. Enchir.* 283, c; *Æl.* V. H. ix. 26) was fond of his society, attended his lectures, and wished to have him at court—an offer which Zeno declined, sending two of his pupils instead. The Athenians honoured him with a public panegyric, a golden crown, a statue, and burial in the Ceramicus. The offer of Athenian citizenship he declined (*Plut. Sto. Rep.* 4, 1). Nor did his countrymen in Citium fail to give signs of their appreciation (*Diog.* 6; *Plin.* H. N. xxxiv. 19, 32), and Zeno always insisted on being a Citian.

² He himself (*Diog.* vii. 18) compares the λόγοι ἀπηρτισμένοι of the ἀσδόλοι to the elegant Alexandrian coins, which, instead of being better, were often lighter than the Athenian coins. He is charged in particular with using words in a wrong sense, and with inventing new ones, whence *Cic.* *Tusc.* v. 11, 34, calls him 'igno-

bilis verborum opifex,' and Chrysippus has a treatise *περὶ τοῦ κυρίως κεχρησθαι Ζήνωνα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν*. He is also charged with maintaining that nothing should be concealed, but that even the most indelicate things should be called by their proper names. He is further charged with having propounded no new theory, but with having appropriated the thoughts of his predecessors, concealing his plagiarism by the use of new terms. In *Diog.* vii. 25, Polemo says: κλέπτων τὰ δόγματα Φοινικῶς μεταμφιευνός; and Cicero frequently repeats the charge (*Fin.* v. 25, 74; iii. 2, 5; iv. 2, 3; 3, 7; 26; 72; v. 8, 22; 29, 88. *Acad.* ii. 5, 15. *Legg.* i. 13, 38; 20; 53. *Tusc.* ii. 12, 29).

³ *Diog.* 28, 1. The statement that he was ἄνσρος must be taken with some limitation, according to *Diog.* vii. 162; *Stob. Floril.* 17, 43.

⁴ *Diog.* 28; 31. *Lucian*, *Macro.* 19. *Lactant.* *Inst.* iii. 18. *Stob. Floril.* 7, 45. *Suid.*

⁵ The list of them in *Diog.* 4, to which additions are made *Diog.* 34; 39; 134. The Διατριβαί

been lost, with the exception of a few fragments. Some of them no doubt date from the time when he was a pupil of Crates, and was more deeply imbued with Cynic ideas than was afterwards the case,¹ nor ought this point to be forgotten in sketching his teaching.

The successor to the chair of Zeno was Cleanthes,² a native of Assos in the Troad,³ a man of a strong and solid character, of unusual perseverance, laboriousness, and contentment, but also slow of apprehension, and somewhat heavy in intellect. Resembling Xenocrates in mind, Cleanthes was in every way well adapted to uphold his master's teaching, and to recommend it by the moral weight of his own character, but he was incapable of expanding it more completely, or of establishing it on a wider basis.⁴

Besides Cleanthes, the best known among the

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B. *Pupils
of Zeno.*

(1) *Cleanthes.*

(*Diog.* 34; *Sext.* *Pyrrh.* iii. 205; 245; *Math.* xi. 90) may perhaps be identical with the Ἀπομνημονεύματα Κράτητος (*Diog.* 4), the Τέχνη ἑρωτική (*Diog.* 34), with Τέχνη (*Diog.* 4). An exposition of Hesiod, which had been inferred to exist, from *Cic.* *N. D.* i. 14, 36, *Krische*, *Forsch.* 367, rightly identifies with the treatise περὶ τοῦ ὅλου, and this with the treatise περὶ τῆς φύσεως (*Stob.* *Ecl.* i. 178). Other authorities are given by *Fabric.* *Bibl. Gr.* iii. 580.

¹ This appears at least probable from *Diog.* 4: ἕως μὲν οὖν τινὸς ἤκουσε τοῦ Κράτητος· ὅτε καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν αὐτοῦ γράψαντος, τινὲς ἔλεγον παίζοντες ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ κυνὸς οὐράς αὐτὴν γεγραφέναι.

² *Mohnike*, *Cleanthes d. Sto.*: Greifsw. 1814. *Cleanthis Hymn.* in *Jovem*, ed *Sturz*, ed. nov. cur. *Merzdorf.*: Leips. 1835.

³ *Strabo*, xiii. 1, 57. *Diog.* vii. 168. *Ælian*, *Hist. Anim.* vi. 50. How *Clemens*, *Protrept.* 47, A, comes to call him Πισαδεὺς, it is hard to say, nor is it of any moment. *Mohnike*, p. 67, offers conjectures. *Mohnike* also rightly maintains that Cleanthes ὁ Ποντικὸς in *Diog.* ix. 15 must be the same as this Cleanthes.

⁴ According to Antisthenes, in *Diog.* i. c., Cleanthes was a pugilist, who came to Athens with four drachmas, and entered the school of Zeno, in which he studied for nineteen years (*Diog.*

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pupils of Zeno are Aristo of Chios,¹ and Herillus of

(2) *Aristo*
and
Herillus.

176), gaining a maintenance by working as a labourer (*Diog.* 168; 174; *Plut. Vit. Ær. Al.* 7, 5; *Sen. Ep.* 44, 3; *Krische*, Forsch.). A public maintenance, which was offered him, Zeno induced him to refuse (*Diog.* 169). On the simplicity of his life, his permanent diligence, his adherence to Zeno, &c., see *Diog.* 168; 170; 37; *Plut. De Audi.* 18; *Cic. Tusc.* ii. 25, 60. He also refused to become an Athenian citizen (*Plut. Sto. Rep.* 4). He died of self-imposed starvation (*Diog.* 176; *Lucian*, *Macrob.* 19; *Stob. Floril.* 7, 54). His age is stated by *Diog.* 176, at eighty; by *Lucian* and *Valer. Max.* viii. 7, at ninety-nine. *Diog.* 174, gives a list of his somewhat numerous writings, mostly on moral subjects, which is supplemented by *Fabric. Bibl.* iii. 551, and *Mohnike*, p. 90. Cleanthes was held in great esteem in the Stoic School, even in the time of Chrysippus (*Diog.* vii. 179; 182; *Cic. Acad.* ii. 41, 126). At a later time, the Roman Senate erected a statue to him at Assos (*Simpl. in Epict. Enchir.* c. 53, 329, b).

¹ Aristo, son of Miltiades, a Chian, discussed most fully by *Krische*, Forsch. 405, known as the Siren, because of his persuasiveness, and also as the Bald-head, was a pupil of Zeno (*Diog.* 37; 160; *Cic. N. D.* i. 14, 37; *Acad.* ii. 42, 130; *Sen. Ep.* 94, 2), but is said to have afterwards joined Polemo (*Diocl. in Diog.* 162). It is a better established fact that his attitude towards pleasure was less indifferent than it ought to have been, ac-

cording to his principles (Eratos, and Apollophanes in *Athen.* vii. 281, c); but the charge of flattery appears not to be substantiated (*Athen.* vi. 251, c). His letters show that he was on intimate terms with Cleanthes (*Themist. Or.* xxi.). His loquacity is said to have been displeasing to Zeno (*Diog.* vii. 18). He appeared as a teacher in the Cynosarges, Antisthenes' old locality (*Diog.* 161). Of his numerous pupils (*Diog.* 182; *Plut. C. Princ. Philos.* i. 4), two are mentioned by Diogenes: Miltiades and Diphilus. Athenæus names two more: Apollophanes, and the celebrated Alexandrian sage, Eratosthenes. The latter is also named by *Strabo*, i. 2, 2; *Suid.* 'Επαροσθ. Apollophanes, whilst adopting Aristo's views of virtue in *Diog.* vii. 92, did not otherwise adopt his ethics. His natural science is mentioned by *Diog.* vii. 140, his psychology by *Tertul. De An.* 14. Since Eratosthenes was born 276 B.C., Aristo must have been alive in 250 B.C., which agrees with his being called a cotemporary and opponent of Arcesilaus (*Strabo*, l. c.; *Diog.* vii. 162; iv. 40). According to *Diog.* vii. 164, he died of sunstroke. Not only had his School disappeared in the time of Strabo and Cicero (*Cic. Legg.* i. 13, 38; *Fin.* ii. 11, 35; v. 8, 28; *Tusc.* v. 30, 85; *Off.* i. 2, 6; *Strabo*, l. c.), but no traces of it are found beyond the first generation. The writings enumerated by *Diog.* vii. 163, with the single exception of the letter to Cleanthes, are said to have been attributed by Panætius and Sosi-

Carthage,¹ who in their teaching diverged in the most opposite directions, Aristo confining himself rigidly to the Cynic teaching, Herillus approximating to the leading positions held by the Peripatetic School.

The remaining pupils of Zeno were Persæus, Aratus, Dionysius, and Sphærus. Persæus was a countryman and companion of Zeno;² Aratus the

(3) *Other pupils.*

crates to the Peripatetic; but Krische's remarks raise a partial doubt as to the accuracy of this statement. The fragments, at least, of the *Ῥοιόματα* preserved by Stobæus seem to belong to a Stoic. Perhaps to the *Ῥοιόματα* belong the statements in *Sen. Ep.* 36, 3; 115, 8; *Plut. De Aud.* 8; *De Sanit.* 20, 1; *De Exil.* 5; *Præc. Per. Reip.* 9, 4; *Aqua an Ign. Util.* 12, 2.

¹ Herillus's native place was Carthage (*Diog.* vii. 37; 165), but he came as a boy under Zeno (*Diog.* 166; *Cic. Acad.* ii. 42, 129). *Diog.* l. c. enumerates the writings of Herillus, calling them, however, *ὀλιγόστιχα μὲν δυνάμει δὲ μετὰ*. *Cic. De Orat.* iii. 17, 62, speaks of a School bearing his name, but no pupil belonging to it is known.

² Citium was his birthplace. His father's name was Demetrius (*Diog.* 6; 36), and his own nickname Dorotheus (*Suid. Περσ.*). According to *Diog.* 36; Sotion and Nicias in *Athen.* iv. 162, d; *Gell.* ii. 18, 8; *Orig. C. Cels.* iii. 483, d; he was first a slave of Zeno's, which agrees with his being a pupil and inmate of his house (*Diog.* 36; 13; *Cic. N. D.* i. 15, 38; *Athen.* xiii. 607, e;

Pausan. ii. 8, 4). It is less probable that he was presented by Antigonus to Zeno as a copyist (*Diog.* 36). He subsequently lived at the court of Antigonus (*Athen.* vi. 251, c; xiii. 607, a; *Themist. Or.* xxxii.), whose son Halcyoneus (*Ælian.* V. H. iii. 17) he is said to have instructed (*Diog.* 36), and with whom he stood in high favour (*Plut. Arat.* 18; *Athen.* vi. 251, c). He allowed, however, the Macedonian garrison in Corinth to be surprised by Aratus, in 243 B.C., and, according to *Pausan.* ii. 8, 4; vii. 8, 1, perished on that occasion. The contrary is asserted by *Plut. Arat.* 23, and *Athen.* iv. 162, c. In his teaching and manner of life, he appears to have taken a very easy view of the Stoic principles (*Diog.* 13; 36; *Athen.* iv. 162, b; xiii. 607, a). It is therefore probable that he did not agree with Aristo's Cynicism (*Diog.* vii. 162), and his pupil Hermagoras wrote against the Cynics (*Suid. Ἑρμαγ.*). Political reasons were at the bottom of Menedemus' hatred for him (*Diog.* ii. 143). Otherwise, he appears as a genuine Stoic (*Diog.* vii. 120; *Cic. N. D.* i. 15, 38; *Philodem.* De Mus., Vol. Herc. i.

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well-known poet from Soli.¹ Dionysius belonged to Heraclea in Pontus, and afterwards joined the Cyrenaic or Epicurean School;² and Sphærus from the Bosphorus, after studying first in the School of Zeno, and afterwards in that of Cleanthes, was the friend and adviser of Cleomenes the unfortunate Spartan reformer.³ The names of a few other pupils of Zeno are also on record;⁴ but nothing is known

col. 14). The treatises mentioned by *Diog.* 36, are chiefly ethical and political. In addition to these, there was a treatise on Ethics (*Diog.* 28); the *συμποτικά ὑπομνήματα*, from which *Athen.* (iv. 162, b; xiii. 607, a) gives some extracts; and the *ἱστορία* (in *Suid.*).

¹ According to the sketch of his life in *Buhle* (*Arat. Opp.* i. 3), Aratus was a pupil of Persæus at Athens, in company with whom he repaired to Macedonia, which can only mean that he was, together with Persæus, a pupil of Zeno. Another writer in *Buhle* (ii. 445) calls him so. Other accounts (*Ibid.* ii. 431; 442; 446) describe him as a pupil of Dionys of Heraclea, or of Timon and Menedemus. A memorial of his Stoicism is the introduction to his 'Phænomena,' a poem resembling the hymn of Cleanthes. Asclepiades, in calling him a native of Tarsus, is only preferring a better-known Cilician town to one less known.

² Hence his name *ὁ Μεραθέμενος*. On his writings, consult *Diog.* vii. 166; 37; 23; v. 92; *Athen.* vii. 281, d; x. 437, e; *Cic. Acad.* ii. 22, 71; *Tusc.* ii. 25, 60; *Fin.* v. 31, 94. Previously

to Zeno, he is said to have studied under Heraclides *ὁ Ποντικός*, Alexinus, and Menedemus.

³ *Diog.* 177; *Plut.* Cleomen. 2; 11; *Athen.* viii. 354, e. Sphærus' presence in Egypt seems to belong to the time before he became connected with Cleomenes. He was a pupil of Cleanthes (*Diog.* vii. 185; *Athen.* l. c.) when he went to Egypt, and resided there, at the court of Ptolemy, for several years. He had left him by 221 B.C., but was then himself no longer a member of the Stoic School at Athens. It is possible that Sphærus may first have come to Cleomenes on a commission from the Egyptian king. In that case, the Ptolemy referred to must have been either Ptolemy Euergetes or Ptolemy Philadelphus. If, however, the view is taken that it was Ptolemy Philopator, it may be supposed that Sphærus repaired to Egypt with Cleomenes in 221 B.C. Sphærus' numerous writings refer to all parts of philosophy, and to some of the older philosophers. According to *Cic. Tusc.* iv. 24, 53, his definitions were in great esteem in the Stoic School.

⁴ Athenodorus, a native of Soli (*Diog.* vii. 38; 100); Callippus

of them beyond their names, nor did any one of them expand the Stoic doctrine to an appreciable extent.

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It was therefore no slight good fortune for Stoicism that Cleanthes was followed in the presidency of the School by so able a man as Chrysippus, who possessed at once great learning and great power of argument.¹ In the opinion of the ancients, Chrysippus was the second founder of Stoicism.² Born³ in the year 280 B.C.,⁴ at Soli in Cilicia,⁵ after being a pupil of, and instructed under Cleanthes,⁶ and it is said even under Zeno⁷ himself, he succeeded, on the

C. Chrysippus and the later Stoics.

(1) Chrysippus.

of Corinth (*Diog.* 38); Philonides of Thebes, who went with Persæus to Antigonos (*Diog.* 9; 38); Posidonius of Alexandria (*Diog.* 38); Zeno of Sidon, a pupil of Diodorus Cronus, who joined Zeno (*Diog.* 38; 16; *Suid.*).

¹ *Baguet*, De Chrysippo. Annal. Lovan. vol. iv. Lovan. 1822.

² Εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἦν Χρύσιππος οὐκ ἂν ἦν στοά (*Diog.* 183). *Cic.* Acad. ii. 24, 75: Chrysippum, qui fulcire putatur porticum Stoicorum. *Athen.* viii. 335, b: Χρύσιππον τὸν τῆς στοᾶς ἡγεμόνα.

³ It is recorded (*Diog.* 179) that he was brought up in early life as a racer, which is an exceedingly suspicious statement; and that his paternal property was confiscated (Hecato in *Diog.* 181). Subsequently, his domestic establishment was scanty, and consisted of one old servant (*Diog.* 185; 181; 183); but whether this was the result of Stoicism or of poverty is not known.

⁴ According to Apollodorus in

Diog. 184, he died c. 205 B.C., in his 73rd year, which would give 281 to 276 as the year of his birth. According to *Lucian*, *Macrob.* 20, he attained the age of 81, and, according to *Valer. Max.* viii. 7, completed the 39th book of his logic in his eightieth year.

⁵ This is the view of *Diog.* 179; *Plut.* De Exil. 14; *Strabo*, xiii. 1, 57; xiv. 4, 8, and most writers. Alexander Polyhistor, however, in *Diog.* and *Suid.* Ζήν. call him a native of Tarsus; and since his father Apollonius migrated from Tarsus to Soli, it is possible that Chrysippus may have been born in Tarsus.

⁶ On this point, all authorities are agreed. When and how he came to Athens is not recorded. He subsequently obtained the rights of a citizen (*Plut.* Sto. Rep. 4, 2).

⁷ *Diog.* 179. This statement cannot be tested by chronology. Authorities, however, do not look promising.

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death of Cleanthes, to the presidency of the Stoic School.¹ He is also said to have attended the lectures of Arcesilaus and Lacydes, philosophers of the Middle Academy;² and so thoroughly had he appropriated their critical methods, that later Stoics accused him of furnishing Carneades with the necessary weapons for attacking them,³ by having raised philosophical doubts in a masterly manner, which he was not always able to meet satisfactorily. This critical acuteness and skill, more than anything else, entitle him to be regarded as the second founder of Stoicism.⁴ In learning, too, he was far in advance of his predecessors, and has been considered the most laborious and learned man of antiquity.⁵ In many respects, however, he deviated from the teaching of Zeno and Cleanthes,⁶ following an independent

¹ *Diog.* Pro. 15. *Strabo*, xiii. 1, 57.

² *Diog.* vii. 183. It is possible, as *Ritter*, iii. 524, supposes, that he was for some time doubtful about Stoicism, under the influence of the Academic Scepticism, and that during this time he wrote the treatise against *συνήθεια*; but that he separated from Cleanthes, setting up a school in the Lyceum in opposition to him, is not contained in the words of *Diog.* 179; 185.

³ *Diog.* 184; iv. 62. *Cic.* Acad. ii. 27, 87. *Plut.* Sto. Rep. 10, 3. These passages refer particularly to Chrysippus' six books *κατὰ τῆς συνηθείας*. On the other hand, his pupil Aristocreon, in *Plut.* l. c. 2, 5, commends him as being τῶν Ἀκαδη-

μακῶν στραγγαλίδων κοπίδα (*Plut.* Comm. Not. i. 4).

⁴ When a learner, he is said to have used these words to Cleanthes: 'Give me the principles; the proofs I can find myself.' Subsequently it is said of him: 'If the Gods have any logic, it is that of Chrysippus' (*Diog.* 179). See *Cic.* N. D. i. 15, 30; ii. 6, 16; iii. 10, 25; *Divin.* i. 3, 6. *Senec.* Benefic. i. 3, 8; 4, 1, who complains of his captiousness. *Dionys.* Hal. Comp. Verb. p. 68. *Krische*, Forsch. i. 445.

⁵ *Diog.* 180. *Athen.* xiii. 565, a. *Damasc.* V. Isid. 36. *Cic.* Tusc. i. 45, 108.

⁶ *Cic.* Acad. ii. 47, 143. *Diog.* 179. *Plut.* Sto. Rep. 4, 1. According to the latter passage, Antipater had written a special

'course in speculation, as he had done in other ways,¹ and allowing himself to be led on by his own intellectual impulse.² Still, the basis of the system remained the same, though it was somewhat deepened by his intellectual treatment. In fact, the Stoic doctrine was expanded by him on all sides with such completeness, that hardly a gleanings of details was left for his successors to gather up.³ In multitude of writings⁴ he exceeded Epicurus;⁵ their titles, and a comparatively small number of fragments, being all that have come down to us.⁶ It will be easily understood of such a vast quantity of writings, that their artistic value is not very high. The ancients are unanimous in complaining of their careless and impure language, of their dry and often obscure style, of their prolixity, their endless repetitions, their lengthy citations, and their too frequent appeals to etymologies, authorities, and other irrelevant proofs.⁷ But by Chrysippus the Stoic teaching

treatise *περὶ τῆς Κλεάνθους καὶ Χρυσίππου διαφορᾶς*.

¹ *Diog.* 185, mentions it as deserving of especial notice, that he refused the invitation of Ptolemy to court, and dedicated none of his numerous writings to a prince.

² *Diog.* 179; 183.

³ Quid enim est a Chrysippo prætermisum in Stoicis? *Cic.* *Fin.* i. 2, 6.

⁴ According to *Diog.* 180, there were not fewer than 750. Conf. *Valer. Max.* viii. 7; *Lucian*, *Hermotim.* 48.

⁵ This appeared to the Epicureans disparaging to the honour

of their master. Hence the charge that Chrysippus had written against Epicurus in rivalry (*Diog.* x. 26, and the criticism of Apollodorus in *Diog.* vii. 181).

⁶ *Baguet*, p. 114-357, discusses the subject very fully, but omitting several fragments. On logical treatises, of which alone there were 311 (*Diog.* 198), see *Nicolai*, *De logicis Chrysippi libris*: *Quedlinb.* 1859. *Prantl*, *Gesch. d. Log.* i. 404. *Petersen* (*Philosoph. Chrysip. Fundamenta*: Hamburg, 1827) attempts a systematic arrangement of all the known books.

⁷ See *Cic.* *De Orat.* i. 11, 50.

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was brought to completeness; and when he died, in the year 206 B.C.,¹ the form was in every respect fixed in which Stoicism would be handed down for the next following centuries.

(2) *Later
Stoics.*

A cotemporary of Chrysippus, but probably somewhat his senior, was Teles, a few extracts² from whose writings have been preserved by Stobæus,³ in the shape of popular moral considerations written from a Cynic or Stoical point of view. The same age also produced the Cyrenaic Eratosthenes,⁴ a man distinguished in every branch of knowledge, but particularly celebrated for his mathematical attainments, who was gained for Stoicism by Aristo. Another cotemporary of Chrysippus, and perhaps his fellow-student,⁵ who in many respects approximated

Dionys. Hal. Diog. vii. 180; x. 27. Galen, Differ. Puls. ii. 10; vol. viii. 631; Hippocr. et Plat. Plac. ii. 2; iii. 2; and Baguet. See also Plut. Sto. Rep. 28, 2; and Bergk, Commentat. de Chrys. lib. περὶ ἀποφατικῶν: Cassel, 1841.

¹ The circumstances of his death are related differently in *Diog. 184*; but both authorities are untrustworthy. The story of the ass is also found in *Lucian, Macrob. 25*; the other version in *Diog. iv. 44; 61*. On the statue of Chrysippus in the Ceramicus see *Diog. vii. 182; Cic. Fin. i. 11, 39; Pausan. i. 17, 2; Plut. Sto. Rep. 2, 5*.

² In 40, 8, mention is made of the honourable position enjoyed by the Athenian Chremonides, who had been banished from his country. The banishment of

Chremonides being in the year 263 B.C., Teles' treatise *περὶ φύγης* must have been written between 260 and 250 B.C. Nor is there any reference in the fragments preserved to persons or circumstances later than this date. The philosophers to whom reference is made are the Cynics Diogenes, Crates, Metrocles, Stilpo, Bio the Borysthenite, Zeno, and Cleanthes (95, 21), the latter being called *δ' Ἀσσιος*.

³ Floril. 5, 67; 40, 8; 91, 33; 93, 31; 98, 72; 108, 82 and 83.

⁴ According to *Suid.*, born c. 275 B.C. He died in his 80th year.

⁵ Conf. *Diog. 54: δ δὲ Χρύσιππος διαφερόμενος πρὸς αὐτόν. . . κριτήριά φησιν εἶναι αἰσθάναι καὶ πρόληψιν*. That he was junior to Aratus appears by his commentary on Aratus' poem. The Vita

to the teaching of the Peripatetics,¹ was the Stoic Boëthus. The proper scholars of Chrysippus were without doubt numerous;² but few of their names are known to us.³ The most important among them appear to have been Zeno of Tarsus,⁴ and Diogenes of Seleucia,⁵ who succeeded Chrysippus in the presi-

Arati, probably confounding him with the Peripatetic Boëthus, calls him a native of Sidon.

¹ We shall have occasion to prove this in speaking of his views of a criterion, and of his denial of a conflagration and destruction of the world. Nevertheless, he is frequently appealed to as an authority among the Stoics. *Philo*, Incorruptib. M. 947, c, classes him among ἄνδρες ἐν τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς δόγμασιν ἰσχυρότες.

² This follows from the great importance of Chrysippus, and the esteem in which he was held from the very first, and is confirmed by the number of persons to whom he wrote treatises. *Diog.* 189; *Fabric* Bibl. iii. 549. It is, however, ambiguous whether πρὸς means to or against.

³ Aristocreon, the nephew of Chrysippus, is the only pupil who can be definitely mentioned by name. See *Diog.* vii. 185; *Plut.* Sto. Rep. 2, 5.

⁴ What is known of this philosopher is limited to the statements in *Diog.* 35; *Suid.* Ζήν. Διοσκ.; *Eus.* Pr. Ev. xv. 13, 7; Arius Didymus, *Ibid.* xv. 17, 2; that he was a native of Tarsus; that he was the son of Dioscorides, the pupil and follower of Chrysippus; that he left many pupils,

but few writings; and that he doubted a conflagration of the world.

⁵ According to *Diog.* vi. 81; *Lucian*, *Macrob.* 20, he was a native of Seleucia on the Tigris; but he is sometimes called a native of Babylon (*Diog.* vii. 39; 55; *Cic.* N. D. i. 15, 41; *Divin.* i. 3, 6; *Plut.* De Exil. 14). *Cic.* *Divin.* i. 3, 6, calls him a pupil of Chrysippus; and *Acad.* ii. 30, 98, the instructor of Carneades in dialectic. *Plut.* Alex. Virt. 5, calls him a pupil of Zeno of Tarsus. Zeno, he says, Διογένη τὸν Βαβυλώνιον ἔπεισε φιλοσοφεῖν. *Diog.* vii. 71, mentions a διαλεκτικὴ τέχνη of his; and, vii. 55 and 57, a τέχνη περὶ φωνῆς. *Cic.* *Divin.* i. 3, 6, speaks of a treatise on divination. *Athen.* iv. 168, e, of a treatise περὶ εὐγενείας, xii. 526, d, of a work περὶ νόμων—the same work probably which, according to *Cic.* Legg. iii. 5, 14, was written ‘a Dione Stoico.’ *Cic.* Off. iii. 12, 51, calls him ‘magnus et gravis Stoicus;’ *Seneca*, De Ira, iii. 38, 1, mentions a trait showing great presence of mind. Diogenes was, without doubt, aged in 156 B.C. (*Cic.* De Senec. 7, 23). According to *Lucian*, he attained the age of 88, and may therefore have died 150 B.C.

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dency of the School.¹ The pupil and successor of Diogenes, in his turn, was Antipater of Tarsus,² who is mentioned along with his countryman Archedemus.³ Under Panætius, Antipater's scholar, Stoicism entered the Roman world, and there underwent internal changes, to which attention will be drawn in the sequel.⁴

¹ It was often supposed, on the strength of *Cic. N. D.* i. 15, 41, *Divin.* i. 3, 6, that Diogenes was the *immediate* successor of Chrysippus. The words, however, by no means necessarily imply it. On the authority of Arius, Eusebius, and Suidas, it would seem that Zeno was the successor of Chrysippus, and that Diogenes followed Zeno.

² *Cic. Off.* iii. 12, 51, only calls him his pupil; but it is clear that he taught in Athens from *Plut. Ti. Gracch.* c. 8 (*Zumpt*, Ueber die philos. Schulen in Athen.), and *Plut. Tranq. An.* 9, seems to imply that he continued to live at Athens after leaving Cilicia. The same fact is implied by the mention of Diogenists and Panætiasts at Athens (*Athen.* v. c. 2); by the charge brought against Antipater (*Plut. Garrul.* c. 23; *Numen.* in *Eus. Pr. Ev.* xiv. 8, 6; *Cic. Acad.* ii. 6, 17), that he never ventured to dispute with Carneades; and by *Diog.* iv. 65; *Stob. Floril.* 119, 19. According to these two authorities, he voluntarily put an end to his own life. In *Acad.* ii. 47, 143, Cicero calls him and Archedemus 'duo vel principes dialecticorum, opiniosissimi homines.' It appears from *Off.* iii. 12, 51, where he is also called 'homo acutis-

simus,' that he pronounced a severer judgment on several moral questions than Diogenes. *Sen. Ep.* 92, 5, reckons him among the magnos Stoicæ sectæ auctores. *Epictet. Diss.* iii. 21, 7, speaks of the *φορὰ Ἀντιπάτρου καὶ Ἀρχεδήμου*. See *Van Lynden*, De Panætio, 33; and *Fabric. Biblioth.* iii. 538.

³ *Cic.* l. c.; *Strabo* xiv. 4, 14; *Epictet.* l. c.; *Diog.* vii. 55. It does not follow that they were cotemporaries, but only that their writings and philosophy were the same. We have no accurate information as to the date of Archedemus. In *Diog.* 134, he appears to be placed between Chrysippus and Posidonius. In *Plut. De Exil.* 14, 605, he follows Antipater. According to this authority, he established a school in Babylon.

⁴ Apollodorus of Athens, the compiler of the *Βιβλιοθήκη*, a well-known grammarian, is also mentioned as a pupil of Diogenes (*Scymnus*, Chius Perieges. v. 20). His chronicle, dedicated to Attalus II., Philadelphus of Pergamum (158–138 B.C.), and probably drawn up 144 B.C., would seem to corroborate this assertion. Panætius, whose pupil he is elsewhere called (*Suid.* Ἀπολλόδ.), was himself a pupil of Diogenes'

successor, Antipater (*Cic. Divin.* i. 3, 6), and can hardly have been older than Apollodorus.

Another grammarian belonging to the School of Diogenes is Zenodotus (*Diog.* vii. 30), supposing him to be identical with the Alexandrian Zenodotus (*Suid. Ζηνόδ.*). A third is perhaps the celebrated Aristarchus, whom Scymnus calls a fellow-disciple of Apollodorus. A fourth, Crates of Mallos, called by *Strabo*, xiv. 5, 16, the instructor of Panætius, by *Suid.* a Stoic philosopher, who in *Varro*, Lat. ix. 1, appeals to Chrysippus against Aristarchus.

Antipater's pupils are Heraclides of Tarsus (*Diog.* vii. 121); Sosigenes (*Alex. Aphr. De Mixt.* 142); C. Blossius of Cumæ (*Plut. Ti. Gracch.* 8, 17 and 20; *Val. Max.* iv. 7, 1; *Cic. Læ.* 11, 37). Eudromus, mentioned by *Diog.* vii. 39, appears to belong to the time between Chrysippus and Panætius. Between Zeno of Tarsus and Diogenes, *Diog.* vii. 84, names a certain Apollodorus, the author, probably, of the

fragments in *Stob. Ecl.* i. 408 and 520. Possibly, however, he may be identical with the Apollodorus mentioned by *Cic. N. D.* i. 34, 93, and consequently a contemporary of Zeno. In *Diog.* vii. 39, he is called Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ Ἐφίλλος. Apollodorus the Athenian, mentioned by *Diog.* vii. 181, is without doubt the Epicurean, known to us also from *Diog.* x. 2 and 25. *Krische*, Forsch. 26, thinks even that the passages in Cicero refer to him.

The age of Diogenes of Ptolemais (*Diog.* vii. 41), of Cænopides (*Stob. Ecl.* i. 58; *Macrob. Sat.* i. 17), of Nicostratus, and of Artemidorus, is quite unknown. Nicostratus, however, must have written before the middle of the first century before Christ. He is probably distinct from the Nicostratus mentioned by *Simpl.* in *Categ. Schol.* in *Arist.* 40, a; 24, b, 16; 41, b, 27; 47, b, 23; 49, b, 43; 72, b, 6; 74, b, 4; 81, b, 12; 83, a, 37; 84, a, 28; 86, b, 20; 87, b, 30; 88, b, 3 and 11; 89, a, 1; 91, a, 25; b, 21.

CHAPTER IV.

AUTHORITIES FOR THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY : ITS
PROBLEM AND DIVISIONS.CHAP.
IV.A. Au-
thorities.(1) *Review
of authori-
ties.*

To give a true exposition of the Stoic philosophy is a work of more than ordinary difficulty, owing to the circumstance that all the writings of the earlier Stoics, with the exception of a few fragments, have been lost.¹ Those Stoics whose complete works are still extant—Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Heraclitus, Cornutus—lived under the Roman Empire, and therefore belong to a time in which all Schools alike, exposed to foreign influences, had either surrendered their original peculiarities, or else had thrown them into the background, and substituted new ones in their place. The same remark applies to writers like Cicero, Plutarch, Diogenes, Sextus Empiricus, and the commentators on Aristotle, who may be considered as authorities at second hand for the teaching of the Stoics; but it is more than doubtful whether everything which they mention as Stoic teaching really belongs to the older

¹ *Simpl.* in Cat. Schol. in Arist.
49, a, 16, says: παρὰ τοῖς Στωϊ-
κοῖς, ὧν ἐφ' ἡμῶν καὶ ἡ διδασκαλία

καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν συγγρομμάτων
ἐπιλέλοιπεν.

members of that School. That teaching can, however, be ascertained with sufficient certainty on most of the more important points, partly by comparing accounts when they vary, partly by looking to definite statements on which authorities agree, for the teaching and points of difference between individual philosophers, such as Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus; partly too by consulting such fragments of their writings as are still extant. Yet, when the chief points have been settled in this way, many points still remain, which are involved in obscurity. In general it will be found that only isolated points of their teaching, with at most a few arguments on which to base them, are recorded; but the real connection of those tenets, and the motives which gave rise to them, can only be known by conjecture. Had the writings of Zeno and Chrysippus come down to us in their entirety, we should have had a much surer foundation on which to build, and far less would have been left to conjecture. An opportunity, too, would have been afforded us of tracing the inward growth of the Stoic teaching, and of deciding how much of that teaching was due to Zeno, and how much to Chrysippus. Now, from the nature of the case, this work of arrangement can only be done very imperfectly. It may be ascertained without difficulty what the teaching of the Stoics has been since the time of Chrysippus, but the differences between Chrysippus and his predecessors on a few points only are known. For the most part, historians did not hesitate to attribute to the founder of the School all that was

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known to them as belonging to its later members, just as everything Pythagorean was directly attributed to Pythagoras, and everything Platonic to Plato. Still, there can be no doubt that the Stoic teaching was very considerably expanded by Chrysippus, and that it was altered in more than one respect. Whether the alterations were extensive; and if so, in what they consisted, are questions, however, upon which there is little direct evidence.

(2) *Use to
be made of
authorities.*

The path is thus marked out, which must be followed in giving an exposition of the Stoic philosophy. It would be most natural to begin by reviewing the motives which led Zeno to his peculiar teaching; and this would be the best course to adopt if only full information could be obtained respecting the rise of the Stoic system, and the form it assumed under each one of its supporters. After describing the system as it grew out of the originating motives, it would then be right to trace step by step the changes and expansions which it received in the hands of each succeeding teacher. But, in default of the necessary information for such a treatment of the subject, it will be better to pursue another course. The Stoic teaching will have to be treated as a whole, in which the contributions of individuals can no longer be distinguished. It will have to be set forth in the form which it assumed after the time of Chrysippus. Nor can the share of individuals in constructing the system, nor their deviations from the general type, be considered, except in cases where they are placed beyond doubt by the statements of

the ancients, or by well-founded historical surmises. Stoicism will have to be described in the first place as it is traditionally known, without having its principles explained or resolved into their component factors; without even considering how they grew out of previous systems. Not till this has been done will it be possible to analyse the purport and structure of the system, so as to fathom its leading motives, to understand the connection of its various parts, and thus to ascertain its true position in history.

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Proceeding next to ask in what form the problem of philosophy presented itself to the Stoics, three points deserve to be specially noticed. In the first place, philosophy was regarded as entirely regulated by practical considerations. Those practical considerations were further shaped to accord with the idea of conformity with reason; and the idea of conformity with nature again supplied an intellectual basis for the Stoic philosophy.

B. Problem
proposed to
the Stoic
philosophy.

(1) Its
practical
character.

8

The real business of all philosophy, according to the Stoics, is the moral conduct of man. Philosophy is the exercise of art, and therefore of the highest art—the art of virtue:¹ it is in short the learning to be virtuous. Now virtue can only be learnt by exercise, and therefore philosophy is at the same time the exercise of virtue,² and the several parts of

¹ *Plut. Plac. Pro.* 2: οἱ μὲν οὖν Στωϊκοὶ ἔφασαν τὴν μὲν σοφίαν εἶναι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων ἐπιστήμην· τὴν δὲ φιλοσοφίαν ἄσκησιν τέχνης ἐπιτηδείου· ἐπιτηδείου

δ' εἶναι μίαν καὶ ἀνωτάτω τὴν ἀρετήν· ἀρετὰς δὲ τὰς γενικωτάτας τρεῖς, φυσικὴν, ἠθικὴν, λογικὴν, κ.τ.λ. See also *Diog.* vii. 92.

² In *Seneca*, *Ep.* 89, 4, wis-

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philosophy correspond each to some distinct virtue.¹ Morality is the central point towards which all other inquiries converge: even natural science, although lauded as the inmost shrine of philosophy, is, according to Chrysippus, only necessary for the philosopher to enable him to distinguish between things good and evil, between what should be done, and what should be left undone.² Far from approving of the pure speculation which Plato and Aristotle had commended as the height of human happiness, Chrysippus plainly asserted that to live for speculation is equivalent to living only for pleasure.³ With this view of Chrysippus most of the statements of the Stoics as to the relation of various branches of

dom is the highest good for the human mind, and philosophy is a striving after wisdom: wisdom is defined to be the knowledge of things human and divine; philosophy to be *studium virtutis*, or *studium corrigendæ mentis*. This striving after virtue cannot be distinguished from virtue itself: *Philosophia studium virtutis est, sed per ipsam virtutem*. Seneca further observes (Fr. 17, in *Lactant. Inst.* iii. 15): *Philosophia nihil aliud est quam rectæ vivendi ratio, vel honeste vivendi scientia, vel ars rectæ vitæ agendæ*. Non errabimus, si dixerimus philosophiam esse legem bene honesteque vivendi, et qui dixerit illam regulam vitæ, suum illi nomen reddidit.

¹ See *Diog.* vii. 46: αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἀναγκαίαν εἶναι καὶ ἀρετὴν ἐν εἴδει περιέχουσαν ἀρετᾶς, κ.τ.λ.

² *Chrys.* in *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 9, 6: δεῖ γὰρ τοῦτοῖς [sc. τοῖς φυσικοῖς] συνάψαι τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον, οὐκ οὐσης ἑλλης ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν ἀμείνωνος οὐδ' ἀναφορᾶς, οὐδ' ἕλλου τινὸς ἔνεκεν τῆς φυσικῆς θεωρίας παραληπτῆς οὐσης ἢ πρὸς τὴν περὶ ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν διάστασιν.

³ *Chrys.* in *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 3, 2: ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσι φιλοσόφοις ἐπιβάλλειν μάλιστα τὸν σχολαστικὸν βίον ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, οὗτοί μοι δοκοῦσι διαμαρτάνειν ὑπονοοῦντες διαγωγῆς τινος ἔνεκεν δεῖν τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ ἑλλου τινὸς τοῦτω παραπλησίον, καὶ τὸν ὅλον βίον οὕτως πως διελκύσαι· τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν, ἂν σαφῶς θεωρηθῇ, ἡδέως. Διαγωγὴν ἡδ, it is true, been treated by Aristotle as an end in itself, and the reference here meant is to Aristotle; but Aristotle had carefully distinguished διαγωγὴν from ἡδονή.

philosophy to each other agree, although there is a certain amount of vagueness about them, owing to reasons which will shortly be mentioned. Indeed, on no other hypothesis but that of a belief in the identity of philosophy and virtue can the internal structure and foundation of their system be satisfactorily explained. It is enough to remark here that the most important and most peculiar principles established by the Stoic School belong to the domain of ethics. In logic and natural science that School displays far less independence, for the most part following older teachers; and it is expressly noted, as a deviation from the ordinary teaching of the School, that Herillus, the pupil of Zeno, declared knowledge to be the highest good, thus raising knowledge rather than virtue to the chief rank in philosophy.¹

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A further illustration of this view of the business of philosophy is to be found in the Stoic doctrine of virtue. Philosophy should lead to right actions and to virtue. But right action is, according to the

(2) *Necessity for intellectual knowledge.*

¹ *Cic. Acad. ii. 42, 129*: Herillum, qui in cognitione et scientia summum bonum ponit: qui cum Zenonis auditor esset, vides quantum ab eo dissenserit, et quam non multum a Platone. *Fin. ii. 13, 43*: Herillus autem ad scientiam omnia revocans unum quoddam bonum vidit. *iv. 14, 36*: In determining the highest good, the Stoics act as one-sidedly, as if ipsius animi, ut fecit Herillus, cognitionem amplexarentur, actionem relinquerent. *v. 25, 73*:

Sæpe ab Aristotele, a Theophrasto mirabiliter est laudata per se ipsa rerum scientia. Hoc uno captus Herillus scientiam summum bonum esse defendit, nec rem ullam aliam per se expetendam. *Diog. vii. 165*: "Ἡρίλλος . . . τέλος εἶπε τὴν ἐπιστήμην. *Ibid. vii. 37*. With less accuracy, it is asserted by *Iamb. in Stob. Ecl. i. 918*, that we are raised to the society of the gods, κατὰ Ἡρίλλον, ἐπιστήμῃ.

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Stoics, only rational action, and rational action is action which is in harmony with human and inanimate nature. Virtue consists therefore in bringing man's actions into harmony with the rest of the universe, and with the general order of the world. In order to render this possible, man must know the order and law of the universe; and thus the Stoics are brought back to the principles of Socrates, maintaining that virtue may be learnt; that knowledge is indispensable for virtue, or rather that virtue is identical with right knowledge. They define virtue in so many words as knowledge, vice as ignorance. If sometimes they seem to identify virtue with strength of will, it is only because they consider strength of will to be inseparable from knowledge, so that the one cannot be conceived of without the other. The practical conceptions of the business of philosophy conducts us of itself to its intellectual aspect; philosophy being not only virtue, but all virtue being impossible without philosophy.¹ The attainment of virtue, and the happiness of a moral life are the chief ends which the Stoics propose to themselves; but the possession of a comprehensive scientific knowledge is the only, and yet an indispensable, means thereto.

(3) *Position towards logic and natural science.*

(a) *Aristo's views.*

From these remarks it is clear that the Stoics regarded that kind of scientific knowledge as more immediately necessary which has to do with life, the morals, and the actions of mankind. As to the ne-

¹ *Sen. Ep. 89, 8: Nam nec philosophia sine virtute est nec error: sola autem nos philosophia excitabit . . . illi te totum dedica*

cessity of further scientific knowledge in addition to ethics, the earliest adherents of the Stoic teaching expressed different opinions. Zeno's pupil, Aristo of Chios, held that the sole business of man is to pursue virtue,¹ and that the sole object of speech is to purify the soul.² This purifying process, however, is neither to be found in logical subtleties nor in natural science. Logic, as doing more harm than good, he compared to a spider's web, which is as useless as it is curious;³ or else to the mud on a road.⁴ Those who studied it he likened to people eating lobsters, who take a great deal of trouble for the sake of a little bit of meat enveloped in much shell.⁵ Convinced, too, that the wise man is free from every deceptive infatuation;⁶ and that doubt, for the purpose of refuting which logic had been invented, can be more easily overcome by a healthy tone of mind,⁷ than by argument, he felt no particular necessity for logic. Nay, more, he considered that excessive subtlety transforms the healthy action of philosophy into an unhealthy one.⁸ Just as little was Aristo disposed to favour the so-called *encyclical* knowledge: those who devote themselves to this

¹ *Lact. Inst.* vii. 7: Ad virtutem capessendam nasci homines, Ariston disseruit. See *Stob. Ecl.* 4, 111.

² *Plut.* De Audiendo, c. 8, p. 42: οὔτε γὰρ βαλανείου, φησὶν ὁ Ἀρίστων, οὔτε λόγου μὴ καθάρματος ὑφελός ἐστιν.

³ *Stob. Floril.* 82, 15. *Diog.* vii. 161.

⁴ *Stob. Floril.* 82, 11.

⁵ *Ibid.* 7.

⁶ *Diog.* vii. 162: μάλιστα δὲ προσεῖχε Στωϊκῷ δόγματι τῷ τὸν σόφον ἀδόξαστον εἶναι.

⁷ See *Diog.* vii. 163.

⁸ Aristo (in the *Ὁμοιώματα*) in *Stob. Floril.* 82, 16: ὁ ἐλλέβορος ὀλοσχερέστερος μὲν ληφθεὶς καθαίρει, εἰς δὲ πάνυ σμικρὰ τριφθεὶς πνίγει· οὕτω καὶ ἡ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λεπτολογία.

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knowledge instead of to philosophy he compared to the suitors of Penelope, who won the maids but not the mistress.¹ Natural science would probably have received a more favourable treatment at the hands of Aristo, had he not shared the opinion of Socrates that it is a branch of knowledge which transcends the capacity of the human mind;² and having once embraced this notion, he was inclined to pronounce all physical inquiries useless. His attitude towards science has therefore been generally expressed by saying that he excluded from philosophy both logic and natural science, on the ground that both are useless; the former being irrelevant, and the latter transcending our powers.³ Even ethics was limited by Aristo to most fundamental notions—to inquiries as to good and evil, as to virtue and vice, as to wisdom and folly. The special application of these notions to the moral problems suggested by particular relations in life, he declared to be useless and futile; proper for nursemaids and trainers of young children, but not becoming for philosophers.

¹ *Stob.* 4, 110.

² *Cic.* *Acad.* ii. 39, 123: Aristo Chius, qui nihil istorum (sc. physicorum) sciri putat posse.

³ *Diog.* vii. 160: τὸν σε φυσικὸν τόπον καὶ τὸν λογικὸν ἀνῆρει, λέγων τὸν μὲν εἶναι ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, τὸν δ' οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, μόνον δὲ τὸν ἡθικὸν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς. *Stob.* *Floril.* 80, 7: Ἀριστῶν ἔφη τῶν ζητουμένων παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις τὰ μὲν εἶναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τὰ δὲ μηδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τὰ δ' ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς. πρὸς ἡμᾶς μὲν τὰ ἡθικὰ, μὴ πρὸς ἡμᾶς

δὲ τὰ διαλεκτικά· μὴ γὰρ συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν βίου ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς δὲ τὰ φυσικά· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἐγνώσθαι καὶ οὐδὲ παρέχειν χρείαν. *Minuc. Fel.* *Octav.* 1 and *Lactant.* *Inst.* iii. 20, attributing this utterance to Socrates. According to *Cic.* *De Nat. D.* Aristo expressed doubts about the existence of a God.

⁴ *Sext.* *Math.* vii. 13: καὶ Ἀριστῶν δὲ ὁ Χῖος οὐ μόνον, ὥς φασί, παρητέτο τὴν τε φυσικὴν καὶ λογικὴν θεωρίαν διὰ τὸ ἀνωφελὲς ἔ

wherever there is a proper knowledge and a right disposition, such particular applications will come of themselves without teaching; but when these are wanting, all exhortations are useless.¹

These views are mentioned as peculiar to Aristo, and as points in which he differed from the rest of his School; and, to judge from Aristo's controversial tone, the opposite views were those almost universally entertained by Stoics. That controversial tone, in fact, appears to have been directed not only against assailants from without—such as the Peripatetics and Platonists—but far more against those members of the Stoic School, who attached greater importance than he did to the application of moral maxims to particular relations in life, and to logical and

(b) *Views of Zeno and Cleantes.*

πρὸς κακοῦ τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ ἡθικοῦ τόπου τινὰς συμπεριέγραψε καθάπερ τὸν τε παραινετικὸν καὶ τὸν ὑποθετικὸν τόπον· τούτους γὰρ εἰς τίτθας ἂν καὶ παιδαγωγοὺς πίπτειν.—(almost a literal translation is given of these words by *Seneca*, Ep. 89, 13)—ἀρκεῖσθαι δὲ πρὸς τὸ μακαρίως βίωσαι τὸν οἰκειοῦντα μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν λόγον, ἀπαλλοτριοῦντα δὲ κακίας, κατατρέχοντα δὲ τῶν μεταξὺ τούτων, περὶ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ πτοηθέντες κακοδαιμονοῦσιν. *Seneca*, Ep. 94, 1: Eam partem philosophiæ, quæ dat propria cuicque personæ præcepta . . . quidam solum receperunt . . . sed Ariston Stoicus e contrario hanc partem levem existimat et quæ non descendat in pectus usque; ad illam habentem præcepta [? ad vitam beatam] plurimum ait proficere ipsa de-

creta philosophiæ constitutionemque summi boni, quam qui bene intellexit ac didicit, quid in quaque re faciendum sit, sibi ipse præcepit.

¹ *Seneca*, § 12, asks for whom should such exhortations be necessary—for him who has right views of good and evil, or for him who has them not? Qui non habet, nihil a te adjuvabitur; aures ejus contraria monitionibus tuis fama possedit; qui habet exactum judicium de fugiendis petendisque, scit, quid sibi faciendum sit, etiam te tacente; tota ergo pars ista philosophiæ submoveri potest. In § 17, he continues: A madman must be cured, and not exhorted; nor is there any difference between general madness and the madness which is treated medically.

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physical inquiries. Among their number must have been Zeno and Cleanthes; for had not Zeno set the example to his School of dividing philosophy into logic, ethics, and natural science?¹ Do not the titles of his logical and physical treatises² prove this fact; as also statements in reference to theoretical knowledge and natural science which are expressly attributed to him? Moreover, Zeno himself recommended to others, and himself pursued, logical inquiries.³ Indeed, his whole mental habit, with its keen appreciation of even the subtleties of the Megarians, bears testimony to an intellectual line of thought which is far removed from that of Aristo.⁴ It was, moreover, Zeno who chose that dry and unadorned logical way of giving his teaching, which is found in its greatest perfection in Chrysippus.⁵ Logical and scientific treatises are also known to have been written by Cleanthes,⁶ who allotted separate

¹ *Diog.* vii. 39.

² Logical treatises, those *περὶ λέξεων, λύσεις καὶ ἔλεγχοι, περὶ λόγου*—physical treatises, those *περὶ ὅλου* and *περὶ οὐσίας*.

³ *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 8, 2: ἔλυε δὲ σοφίσματα καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν, ὡς τοῦτο ποιεῖν δυναμένην, ἐκέλευε παραλαμβάνειν τοὺς μαθητάς.

⁴ According to *Diog.* 32, he declared the ἐγκρίσιος παιδεία to be useless—a testimony worth very little; for it is a moot point, in what sense Zeno made this statement. Perhaps he was only anxious to exclude those studies from the narrower sphere of philosophy.

⁵ Proofs will be given later.

⁶ The Catalogue in *Diog.* 174, mentions logical treatises *περὶ λόγου, περὶ ἐπιστήμης, περὶ ἰδίων, περὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, περὶ διαλεκτικῆς, περὶ κατηγορημάτων*. To these may be added, from *Athen.* 467, d; 471, b, the rhetorical treatises *περὶ τρόπων* and *περὶ μεταλήψεως*. Of greater importance were the physical and theological treatises: *περὶ τῆς τοῦ Ζήνωνος φυσιολογίας* (2, B.); *τῶν Ἡρακλείτου ἐξηγήσεις* (4, B.); *πρὸς Δημόκριτον, περὶ θεῶν, περὶ μαντικῆς* (*Cic. Divin.* i. 3, 6); *περὶ γιγάντων* (in *Plut. De Flum.* 5, 3); and the *μυθικὰ* (*Athen.* xiii. 572, e), which is probably identical with the ἀρχαιολογία of Diogenes.

parts to logic, to rhetoric, and to natural science, in his division of philosophy. The name of Cleanthes is one otherwise of frequent occurrence in discussing the natural science, but more particularly the theology, of the Stoics. Still more exhaustive inquiries into logic and natural science appear to have been set on foot by Sphærus;¹ all proving that the energies of the Stoic School must have been directed to this subject before the time of Chrysippus, although these branches of science were no doubt subservient to ethics, and ethics held the most important and highest place in their philosophy. At a later time, when Chrysippus had expanded the system of the Stoics in every direction, especial attention was devoted to logic; and the necessity for logic and natural science came to be generally recognised. More especially was this the case with regard to natural science, including 'theology.' All ethical inquiries must start, according to Chrysippus, with considering the universal order and arrangement of the world. Only by a study of nature, and of what God is, can anything really satisfactory be stated about good and evil, and other kindred topics.²

¹ *Diog.* vii. 178, mentions (1) logical and rhetorical writings: *περὶ τῶν Ἑρετικῶν φιλοσόφων, περὶ ὁμοίων, περὶ ὕρων, περὶ ἔξεως, περὶ τῶν ἀντιλεγομένων* (3, B), *περὶ λόγου, τέχνη διαλεκτικῇ* (2, B), *περὶ κατηγορημάτων, περὶ ἀμφιβολιῶν*; (2) treatises on science: *περὶ κόσμου* (2, B), *περὶ στοιχείων, περὶ σπέρματος, περὶ τύχης, περὶ ἐλαχίστων, πρὸς τὰς ἀτόμους καὶ*

τὰ εἶδωλα, περὶ αἰσθητηρίων, περὶ Ἡρακλείτου (5, B), *περὶ μαντικῆς.*

² *Chrys.* in the 3rd B, *περὶ θεῶν* (in *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 9, 4): *οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν εὐρεῖν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἄλλην ἀρχὴν οὐδ' ἄλλην γένεσιν ἢ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τὴν ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ δεῖ πάν τὸ τοιοῦτον τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχειν, εἰ μέλλομέν τι ἐρεῖν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.* The same writer, in

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The connection between logic and the real aim of all philosophical inquiry is less obvious. Logic is compared by the Stoics to the shell of an egg, or to the wall of a city or garden;¹ and is considered to be of importance, because it contributes towards the discovery of truth and the avoiding of error.² The value attached to logic was, therefore, due to its scientific method; logic, according to them, being limited to the art of technical reasoning; and thus, following Aristotle, an unusually full treatment was allowed by the Stoics to the theory of the syllogism.³ That the value must have been considerable is proved by the extraordinary care which Chrysippus devoted to the subject;⁴ hence, the Stoics would

φυσικὰ θέσεις (Ibid. 5): οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλως οὐδ' οἰκειότερον ἐπελθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν λόγον οὐδ' ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς οὐδ' ἐπὶ εὐδαιμονίαν, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου διοικήσεως.

¹ *Sext. Math.* vii. 17; *Diog.* 40.

² The chief divisions of the logic of the Stoics (*Diog.* 42, 46) are considered important for special purposes. The doctrine περὶ κανόνων καὶ κριτηρίων is of use, helping us to truth, by making us examine our notions; δρικν, because it led to the knowledge of things by means of conceptions; διαλεκτική (which includes the whole of formal logic), because it produced ἀπρωτωσία (= ἐπιστήμη τοῦ πότε δεῖ συγκατατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ), ἀνειακότης (= ἰσχυρὸς λόγος πρὸς τὸ εἶκδς, ὥστε μὴ ἐνδιδόναι αὐτῷ), ἀνελεγξία (= ἰσχυρὸς ἐν λόγῳ, ὥστε

μὴ ἀπάγεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἀντικείμενον), ἀματαιότης (= ἔξις ἀναφέρουσα τὰς φαντασίας ἐπὶ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον). Its value was therefore chiefly negative, preserving from error. See *Seneca*, Ep. 89, 9: Proprietates verborum exigit et structuram et argumentationes, ne pro vero falsa subrepant. *Sext. Math.* vii. 23: ὀχυρωτικὸν δὲ εἶναι τῆς διανοίας τὸν διαλεκτικὸν τρόπον; *Pyrrh.* ii. 247: ἐπὶ τὴν τέχνην τὴν διαλεκτικὴν φασὶν ὠρμηκέναι οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ (the Stoics), οὐχ ἁπλῶς ὑπὲρ τοῦ γινῶναι τι ἐκ τίνος συνάγεται, ἀλλὰ προηγουμένως ὑπὲρ τοῦ δι' ἀποδεικτικῶν λόγων τὰ ἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ ψευδῆ κρίνειν ἐπίστασθαι.

³ This may be seen in *Sext. Pyrrh.* ii. 134–203, 229; *Math.* viii. 300; as well as from the catalogue of the writings of Chrysippus in *Diogenes*.

⁴ The only part which incurs

never allow, in dispute with the Peripatetics, that logic was only an instrument, and not a part of philosophy. To later writers the rigid logical mode of treating subjects regardless of all beauty of language appeared to be a peculiarity of the Stoic school,¹ and hence that school was characteristically known as the School of the Reasoners.² Frequent instances will be found hereafter of the Stoic preference for dry argument and formal logic;³ in Chrysippus this fondness degenerated to a dry formalism devoid of taste.

The foregoing remarks have already established the three main divisions of philosophy⁴ which were universally acknowledged by the Stoics⁵—Logic,

C. Divisions of philosophy.
(1) Three-fold division.

the blame of Chrysippus (in *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 10, 1) is the sceptical logic, which leaves contradictions unsolved: τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐποχὴν ἄγουσι περὶ πάντων ἐπιβάλλει, φησί, τοῦτο ποιεῖν, καὶ συνεργόν ἐστι πρὸς ὃ βούλονται· τοῖς δ' ἐπιστήμην ἐνεργαζομένοις, καθ' ἣν ὁμολογουμένως ἐπισώμεθα τὰ ἐναντία στοιχειοῦν.

¹ *Cic. Parad. Proœm.*: Cato autem perfectus mea sententia Stoicus . . . in ea est hæresi, quæ nullum sequitur florem orationis neque dilatat argumentum: minutis interrogatiunculis, quasi punctis, quod proposuit efficit. *Cic. Fin. iv.* 3, 7: Pungunt quasi aculeis interrogatiunculis angustis, quibus etiam qui assentiuntur nihil commutatur animo. See also *Diog. vii.* 18, 20.

² In Sextus Empiricus, *Λιαλεκτικοί* is their ordinary name. It is also found in *Plut. Qu. Plat.*

x. 1, 2. *Cic. Top.* 2, 6; *Fin. iv.* 3, 6.

³ After the example of the Megarians, the Stoics were in the habit of couching their arguments in the form of a question. Hence the terms λόγον ἐρωτᾶν (*Diog. vii.* 186), *interrogatio* (*Sen. Ep.* 82, 9; 85, 1; 87, 11), *interrogatiuncula* (*Cic.*), which are employed even when their arguments were not in this form.

⁴ Called μέρη, τόποι, εἶδη, γένη.

⁵ *Diog.* 39: τριμερῇ φασιν εἶναι τὸν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λόγον· εἶναι γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν τι φυσικὸν, τὸ δὲ ἡθικὸν, τὸ δὲ λογικόν. οὕτω δὲ πρῶτος διέιλε Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεὺς ἐν τῷ περὶ λόγου καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ α' περὶ λόγου καὶ ἐν τῇ α' τῶν φυσικῶν, καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ Ἐφίλλος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν εἰς τὰ δόγματα εἰσαγωγῶν, καὶ Εὐδρόμος ἐν τῇ ἡθικῇ στοιχειώσει, καὶ Διογένης ὁ Βαβυλώνιος, καὶ Ποσειδών-

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Natural Science, and Ethics. As regards the relative worth and sequence of these divisions, very opposite views may be deduced from the principles of the Stoic teaching. There can be no doubt, and, indeed, all are agreed in allowing, that in position logic was subservient to the other two branches of science, logic being only regarded as an outpost of the system. If, therefore, in arranging the parts the advance is from below to above, logic will hold the first place. It will occupy the last place if the opposite mode of procedure is followed. But the relations existing between ethics and natural science are all open questions. On the one hand ethics appears to be the higher science, the completion of the system, the subject towards which the whole philosophical activity of the school was directed; for was not philosophy practical knowledge? and was not its object to lead to virtue and happiness? On the other hand, what becomes of virtue and the destiny of man unless they are brought into harmony with these laws of nature, it being the province of science to investigate these laws? Natural science has, therefore, the higher object; it lays down the universal laws which in ethics are applied to man; to it, therefore, in the graduated scale of sciences, belongs the higher rank.

(2) *Relative importance of each part.*

In attempting to harmonise these opposite considerations the Stoics did not always succeed. At one

Stoics. *Sext.* Math. vii. 16. *Sen.* 41)—Dialectic, Rhetoric, Ethics, Ep. 89, 9; 14. The six divisions enumerated by Cleanthes (*Diog.* easily reducible to three.

time natural science is preferred to ethics, at another time ethics to natural science,¹ in the enumeration of the several branches of philosophy. In the comparisons by means of which their relations to each other were explained,² ethics appears at one time, at another time natural science, to be the object and leading thought of the whole system. Different views were even entertained in reference to the order to be followed in teaching these sciences.³ In describing the Stoic system preference will be here

¹ According to *Diog.* 40, the first place was assigned to Logic, the second to Science, the third to Ethics, by Zeno, Chrysippus, Archedemus, Eudemus, and others. The same order, but inverted, is found in Diogenes of Ptolemais, and in *Seneca*, Ep. 89, 9. The latter, however, observes (*Nat. Qu. Prol.* 1) that the difference between that part of philosophy which treats about God, and that which treats about man, is as great as the difference between philosophy and other departments, or even as between God and man. On the other hand, Apollodorus places Ethics in the middle, as also Cleanthes does, and also Panætius and Posidonius, if it is certain that they began with Science. See *Sext. Math.* vii. 22. A few (*Diog.* 40) asserted that the parts could not be separated, but must be always treated at the same time. The statement of Chrysippus (in *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 9, 1), that Logic must come first, and be followed by Ethics and Science, so that the theological part may form the conclusion,

only refers to the order in which they ought to be taught.

² In *Diog.* 39; *Sext. Math.* vii. 17; *Philo.* Mut. Nom. p. 1055; *De Agricul.* 189, D., philosophy is compared to an orchard, Logic answering to the fence, Science to the trees, Ethics to the fruit; so that Ethics is the end and object of the whole. Philosophy is also compared to a fortified town, in which the walls are represented by Logic, but in which the position of the other two is not clear; to an egg, Logic being the shell, and, according to Sextus, Science being the white and Ethics the yolk, but the reverse according to Diogenes. Dissatisfied with this comparison, Posidonius preferred to compare philosophy to a living creature, in which Logic constituted the bones and muscles, Science the flesh and blood, and Ethics the soul. But Diogenes has another version of this simile, according to which Science represents the soul; and Ritter, iii. 432, considers the version of Diogenes to be the older of the two.

³ See *Sext. Pyrrh.* ii. 13.

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given to that arrangement which begins with logic and goes on to natural science, ending with ethics; not alone because that arrangement has among its supporters the oldest and most distinguished adherents of the Stoic School, but far more because in this way the internal relation of the three parts to each other can be most clearly brought out. No doubt, in many respects, natural science is modified by ethical considerations; but, nevertheless, in the development of the system, the chief results of science are used as principles on which ethical doctrines are founded; and logic, although introduced later than the other two branches of study, is the instrument by means of which they are put into scientific shape. If the opportunity were afforded of tracing the rise of the Stoic teaching in the mind of its founder, it would probably be possible to show how the physical and logical parts of the system gradually gathered about the original kernel of ethics. But knowing Stoicism only as we do from the intellectual development which it attained after the time of Chrysippus, it will be enough, in analysing the form which it then assumed, to proceed from without to within, and to advance from logic through natural science to ethics. When this has been done it will be time to attempt to retrace our steps backwards, and to explain the peculiar speculative tenets of the Stoics by observing how they bear upon ethics.

CHAPTER V.

LOGIC OF THE STOICS.

UNDER the head of Logic, in the Stoic use of the term, after the time of Chrysippus, a number of intellectual enquiries were included which would not now be considered to belong to philosophy at all. One common element, however, characterised them all—they all referred to the formal conditions of thought and speech. Logic was primarily divided into two parts, sharply marked off from each other, and dealing with distinct branches of art—the art of speaking continuously and the art of conversing—the former being known as Rhetoric, the latter as Dialectic.¹ To these two parts was added, as a third part, the doctrine of a standard of truth, or the

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A. General
remarks.

(1) Field
of logic.

¹ *Diog.* 41: τὸ δὲ λογικὸν μέρος φασὶν εἶναι εἰς δύο διαιρεῖσθαι ἐπιστήμας, εἰς ῥητορικὴν καὶ διαλεκτικὴν . . . τὴν τε ῥητορικὴν ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν τοῦ εἰς λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἐν διεξόδῳ λόγων καὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν τοῦ ὁρθῶς διαλέγεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐν ἐρωτήσει καὶ ἀποκρίσει λόγων. *Sen.* Ep. 89, 17. Superest ut rationalem partem philosophiæ dividam: omnis oratio aut continua est aut inter respondentem et interrogantem discissa; hanc δια-

λεκτικὴν, illam ῥητορικὴν placuit vocari. *Cic.* Fin. ii. 6, 17; *Orat.* 32, 113. *Quintil.* Inst. ii. 20, 7. According to these passages, Rhetoric was by Zeno compared to the palm of the hand, and Dialectic to the fist: quod latius loquerentur rhetores, dialectici autem compressius. The Stoics agree with Aristotle in calling rhetoric ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ (*Sop.* in *Hermog.* v. 16). See *Prantl*, *Gesch. der Log.* i. 413.

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theory of knowledge; and, according to some authorities,¹ a fourth part, consisting of enquiries into the formation of conceptions. By others, these enquiries were regarded as the third main division, the theory of knowledge being included under rhetoric.² By rhetoric little else was meant but a collection of artificial rules, without philosophical worth;³ and dialectic was in great measure occupied

¹ *Diog.* 41: Some divide logic into rhetoric and dialectic: *τινες δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ δρικὸν εἶδος, τὸ περὶ κανόνων καὶ κριτηρίων· ἔνιοι δὲ τὸ δρικὸν περιαιροῦσι.* According to this passage, *δρικὸν* must be identical with the doctrine of a criterium. In a subsequent passage, however, a distinction is made; the doctrine of a criterium is said to be useful for the discovery of truth: *καὶ τὸ δρικὸν δὲ ὁμοίως πρὸς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀληθείας· διὰ γὰρ τῶν εὐνοϊῶν τὰ πράγματα λαμβάνεται.* We may therefore suppose that in the passage first quoted the words should be *τὸ δρικὸν μέρος καὶ τὸ περὶ κανόνων, κ.τ.λ.* In this case, we may understand by *δρικὸν* not only the theory of definition—a theory to which Aristotle devoted a separate section at the end of his *Analytics* (*Anal. Post.* ii.)—but a collection of definitions of various objects. Such a collection is implied in the treatise of Chrysippus: *περὶ τῶν ὄρων ζ'.* ὄρων διαλεκτικῶν στ'. ὄρων τῶν κατὰ γένος ζ'. ὄρων τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας αβ'. ὄρων τῶν τοῦ ἀστείου β'. ὄρων τῶν τοῦ φαύλου β'. ὄρων τῶν ἀναμέσων β'; besides the further treatises *περὶ τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς τοῖς ὅροις ἀντιλεγομένων ζ'.*

Πιθανὰ εἰς τοὺς ὅρους β'; and probably also those *περὶ εἰδῶν καὶ γενῶν*, and *περὶ τῶν κατηγορημάτων πρὸς Μητροδώρον ι'.* *πρὸς Πάσυλον περὶ κατηγορημάτων δ'.*

² No description of their system can dispense with this fundamental enquiry, which had been already instituted by Zeno. It appears, however, to have been treated by several writers as a branch of dialectic. *Diog.* 43, says that the branch of dialectic which treats of *σημαινόμενα* may be divided *εἰς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν τόπον καὶ τῶν ἐκ τούτων ὀφισταμένων λεκτῶν.* Compare with this the words of *Diocles*, in *Diog.* 49: *ἀρέσκει τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς περὶ φαντασίας καὶ αἰσθήσεως προτάττειν λόγον, καθότι τὸ κριτήριον ᾧ ἡ ἀλήθεια τῶν πραγμάτων γινώσκεται, κατὰ γένος φαντασία ἐστὶ καὶ καθότι ὁ περὶ συγκαταθέσεως καὶ ὁ περὶ καταλήψεως καὶ νοήσεως λόγος προάγων τῶν ἄλλων οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας συνίσταται.* According to this passage, the branch of dialectic which treated of *φαντασία* included the theory of knowledge.

³ Our information on this head is very small. In the words *ῥητορικὴ verba curat et sensus et ordinem*, a division of rhetoric is

with enquiries referring only to precision of expression. Dialectic was defined, in short, as the science or art of speaking well.¹

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Now, since speaking well consists in saying what is becoming and true,² dialectic is used to express the knowledge of what is true or false, or what is neither one nor the other,³ correctness of expression being considered inseparable from correctness of thought. Words and thoughts are, according to

(2) *Words*
and
thoughts.

implied by Seneca, little differing, except in the position of the chief parts, from that of Aristotle. A fourth part is added to the three others by *Diog.* 43—on Delivery—*εἶναι δ' αὐτῆς τὴν διαίρεσιν εἰς τε τὴν εὐρεσιν καὶ εἰς τὴν φάσιν, καὶ εἰς τὰξιν καὶ εἰς τὴν ὑπόκρισιν*. Diogenes also claims for the Stoics the Aristotelian distinction between three ways of speaking—*συμβουλευτικὸς, δικανικὸς, ἐγκωμιαστικὸς*—and four parts in a speech: *προσίμιον, διήγησις, τὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιδίκους, ἐπίλογος*. Definitions of *διήγησις* and *παράδειγμα* are given from Zeno by the anonymous author in *Spengel*, *Rhet. Gr.* i. 434, 23; 447, 11. The same author (*Ibid.* 454, 4) says that, according to Chrysippus, the *ἐπίλογος* must be *μονομερὴς*. The Stoic definition of rhetoric has been already given. Another—*τέχνη περὶ κόσμου καὶ εἰρημένου λόγου τάξις*—is attributed to Chrysippus by *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 28, 1. *Cic. Fin.* iv. 3, 7, observes, in reference to the Stoic rhetoric, and in particular to that of Chrysippus, that, *si quis obmutescere concupierit; nihil aliud legere debeat—*

that it dealt in nothing but words, being withal scanty in expressions, and confined to subtleties.

¹ *Alex. Aphr. Top.* 3: *οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ὀρίζόμενοι τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ εὖ λέγειν ὀρίζονται, τὸ δὲ εὖ λέγειν ἐν τῷ ἀληθῇ καὶ προσήκοντα λέγειν εἶναι τιθέμενοι, τοῦτο δὲ ἴδιον ἡγουμένοι τοῦ φιλοσόφου, κατὰ τῆς τελειότητος φιλοσοφίας φέρουσιν αὐτὸ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μόνος ὁ φιλόσοφος κατ' αὐτοὺς διαλεκτικός*. Aristotle had used the term dialectic in another sense, but with Plato it expressed the mode of procedure peculiar to a philosopher.

² See Anon. *Prolegg. ad Hermog. Rhet. Gr.* vii. 8: *οἱ Στοῖκοι δὲ τὸ εὖ λέγειν ἔλεγον τὸ ἀληθῇ λέγειν*.

³ *Diog.* 42: *ἥθεν καὶ οὕτως αὐτὴν [τὴν διαλεκτικὴν] ὀρίζονται, ἐπιστήμην ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων*. The same in *Posidonius*, in *Sext. Math.* xi. 187, and in *Suid.* *Διαλεκτική. οὐδετέρων* is probably added, because dialectic deals not only with judgments, but with conceptions and interrogations. *Conf. Diog.* 68.

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their view, the very same things regarded under different aspects. The same idea (λόγος), which is a thought as long as it resides within the breast, is a word as soon as it comes forth.¹ Accordingly, dialectic consists of two main divisions, those divisions treating respectively of expression and the means of expression, or of thoughts and words.² Both divisions, again, have several subdivisions,³

¹ This is the meaning of the Stoic distinction between λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικὸς, a distinction subsequently employed by Philo and the Fathers, and really identical with that of Aristotle (Anal. Post. i. 10, 76): οὐ πρὸς τὸν ἔξω λόγον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. On this distinction, see *Heraclit.* Alleg. Hom. c. 72: διπλοῦς ὁ λόγος· τούτων δ' οἱ φιλόσοφοι (the Stoics are meant) τὸν μὲν ἐνδιάθετον καλοῦσι, τὸν δὲ προφορικόν. ὁ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἔνδον λογισμῶν ἔστιν ἐξάγγελος, ὁ δ' ὑπὸ τοῖς στέρνοις καθείρκεται. φασὶ δὲ τούτῳ χρῆσθαι καὶ τὸ θεῖον. *Sext. Math.* viii. 275: οἱ δὲ Δογματικοὶ . . . φασὶν ὅτι ἄνθρωπος οὐχὶ τῷ προφορικῷ λόγῳ διαφέρει τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων . . . ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνδιαθέτῳ. The Stoics alone can be meant by the νεώτεροι in *Theo. Smyrn.* Mus. c. 18, who are contrasted with the Peripatetics for using the terms λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and προφορικὸς. They are also referred to by *Plut.* C. Prin. Phil. 2, 1: τὸ δὲ λέγειν, ὅτι δύο λόγοι εἰσὶν, ὁ μὲν ἐνδιαθετὸς, ἡγεμόνος Ἑρμοῦ δῶρον, ὁ δ' ἐν προφορᾷ, διὰ κτορος καὶ ὀργανικὸς ἑωλὸν ἔστι. The double form of Hermes is explained by *Heraclitus* as referring to the twofold λόγος—Ἑρμῆς Χθόνιος representing λόγον ἐνδιά-

θετον, and the heavenly Hermes (διδάκτορος) representing the προφορικόν. The distinction passed, from the Stoics to others, like *Plut.* Solert. An. 19, 1; *Galen*, *Protrept.* i. 1.

² *Diog.* 43: τὴν διαλεκτικὴν διαιρεῖσθαι εἰς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν σημαινόμενων καὶ τῆς φωνῆς τόπον. *Ibid.* 62: τυγχάνει δ' αὖτις, ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππος φησι, περὶ σημαίνοντα καὶ σημαινόμενα. *Seneca*: διαλεκτικὴ in duas partes dividitur, in verba et significationes, i.e. in res, quæ dicuntur, et vocabula, quibus dicuntur. The distinction between τὸ σημαῖνον and τὸ σημαινόμενον, to which τὸ τυγχάνον (the real object) must be added as a third, will be hereafter discussed in another place. A much narrower conception of dialectic, and more nearly approaching to that of the Peripatetics, is to be found in the definition given by *Sext. Pyrrh.* ii. 213. The division there given is also found in the Platonist *Alcinous*, *Isag.* c. 3, as *Fabricius* pointed out. It appears, therefore, not to belong to the Stoic School, but, at most, to a few of its later members.

³ *Seneca* continues: Ingens deinde sequitur utriusque divisio, without, however, giving it.

which are only imperfectly known to us.¹ The part of dialectic dealing with the means of expression, which was generally placed before the part dealing with the ideas expressed,² included, according to the Stoics, not only the theory of the voice and of utterance, but also the theories of poetry and music, these arts being ranked under the head of sound on purely external considerations.³ The teaching of the Stoics on this part of dialectic consisted solely of a series of definitions, differences, and divisions; and has so little philosophical value, that it need not detain our attention longer.⁴ Two parts only of the Stoic logic

¹ There is much which is open to doubt in *Petersen's* attempt (Phil. Chrys. Fund. 221) to settle these divisions. At the very beginning, his referring the words of *Sext.* Math. viii. 11, to the parts of logic is unhappy. *Nicolai* (De Logic. Chrys. Lib. 21) has acted with greater caution, but even much of what he says is doubtful.

² *Diog.* 55.

³ *Diog.* 44: εἶναι δὲ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἴδιον τόπον καὶ τὸν προεῖρημένον περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς φωνῆς, ἐν ᾧ δέικνται ἡ ἐγγράμματος φωνὴ καὶ τίνα τὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρη, καὶ περὶ σολοικισμοῦ καὶ βαρβαρισμοῦ καὶ ποιημάτων καὶ ἀμφιβολιῶν καὶ περὶ ἐμμελοῦς φωνῆς καὶ περὶ μουσικῆς καὶ περὶ ὄρων κατὰ τινὰς καὶ διαιρέσεων καὶ λέξεων.

⁴ Further particulars may be obtained in *Schmidt's* *Stoicorum Grammatica* (Halle, 1839); *Lersch*, *Sprachphilosophie der Alten*; *Steinthal*, *Gesch. der Sprachwissenschaft*, i. 265-363; *Nicolai*, De Log. Chrys. Lib. 31.

This part of dialectic began with enquiries into sound and utterance. Sound is defined to be air in motion, or something hearable — ἀήρ πεπληγμένος ἢ τὸ ἴδιον αἰσθητὸν ἀκοῆς; the human voice, as ἔναρθρος καὶ ἀπὸ διάνοιας ἐκπεπομένη, is distinguished from the sounds of other animals, which are ἀήρ ὑπὸ ὀρμῆς πεπληγμένος (*Diog.* 55; *Simpl.* Phys. 97; *Sext.* Math. vi. 39; *Gell.* N. A. vi. 15, 6). That sound is something material is proved in various ways (*Diog.* 55; *Plut.* Plac. iv. 20, 2; *Galen*, Hist. Phil. 27). Sound, in as far as it is ἔναρθρος, or composed of letters, is called λέξις; in as far as it expresses certain notions, it is λόγος (*Diog.* 56; *Sext.* Math. i. 155). A peculiar national mode of expression (λέξις κεχαραγμένη ἔθνικῶς τε καὶ Ἑλληνικῶς ἢ λέξις ποταπῇ) was called διάλεκτος (*Diog.* 56). The elements of λέξις are the 24 letters, divided into 7 φωνήεντα, 6 ἄφωνα, and 11 semivowels (*Diog.* 57); the λόγος has 5 parts,

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possess for us any real interest—the part which discusses the theory of knowledge, and that part of dialectic which treats of ideas, which in the main agrees with our formal logic.

B. *Theory
of know-
ledge.*

(1) *General character of this theory.*

The Stoic theory of knowledge turns about the enquiry after a criterion or standard by which what is true in our notions may be distinguished from what is false. Since every kind of knowledge, no matter what be its object, must be tested by this standard, it follows that the standard cannot be sought in the object of our notions, but, on the contrary, must be sought in their form. The enquiry after a standard becomes therefore identical with another—the enquiry as to what *kind* of notions supply a knowledge that may be depended upon, or what activity of the power of forming conceptions carries in itself a pledge of its own truthfulness. It is impossible to answer these questions without investigating the origin, the various kinds, and the value and importance of our notions; and hence the

called *στοιχεῖα* by Chrysippus—*ὄνομα, προσηγορία, ῥῆμα, σύνδεσμος, ἄρθρον*—to which Antipater added the *μεσότης*, or adverb (*Diog.* 57; *Galen*, De Hippocrat. et Plat. viii. 3; *Lersch*, ii. 28; *Steinthal*, 291). Words were not formed by caprice, but certain peculiarities of things were imitated in the chief sounds of which they are composed. These peculiarities can therefore be discovered by etymological analysis (*Orig.* c. Cels. i. 24; *Augustin.* Dialect. c. 6). Chrysippus, how-

ever, observes (in *Varro*, L. Lat. ix. 1) that the same things bear different names, and vice versâ, and (in *Gell.* N. A. xi. 12, 1) that every word has several meanings. See *Simpl.* Cat. 8, ζ. Five advantages and two disadvantages of speech are enumerated *Diog.* 59; *Sext.* Math. i. 210; and poetry (*Diog.* 60), various kinds of amphibolia (*Diog.* 62; *Galen*, De Soph. P. Dict. c. 4), the formation of conceptions, and division, are treated of.

problem proposed to the Stoics is reduced to asking how, by an analysis of our notions, a universally valid standard might be obtained, by which their truth might be tested.

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Whether this enquiry was pursued by the older Stoics in all its comprehensiveness is a point on which we have no information. Boëthius, whose views on this subject were attacked by Chrysippus, had assumed the existence of several standards, such as Reason, Perception, Desire, Knowledge. Others, in the vaguest manner, had spoken of Right Reason (*ὁρθὸς λόγος*) as being the standard of truth.¹ Hence it may be inferred that before the time of Chrysippus the Stoics had no distinctly developed theory of knowledge. But nevertheless there are expressions of Zeno and Cleanthes still extant which prove that the essential parts of the later theories were already held by these philosophers,² although it is no doubt true that it first received that scientific form in which alone it is known to us at the hands of Chrysippus.

The influence of this theory of knowledge appears mainly in three particulars:—(1) In the importance attached by the Stoics to the impressions of the

(2) *Prominent points in the theory of knowledge.*

¹ *Diog.* vii. 54.

² The statements of Zeno and Cleanthes, for instance, in reference to *φαντασία*, prove that these Stoics deduced their theory of knowledge from general principles respecting notions. They therefore started from the data supplied by the senses. A pas-

sage in Zeno, explaining the relations of various forms of knowledge, shows that even Zeno required progress to be from perception to conception and knowledge, and that he distinguished these states only by the varying strength of conviction which they produced.

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senses. This feature they inherited from the Cynics, and shared with the Epicureans. (2) In their construction of conceptions on a basis of sense-impressions—a trait peculiar to themselves, and distinguishing them from either of the two other cotemporary schools. (3) In their allowing practical considerations to interpose to settle the question of a criterion or standard for testing the truth of conceptions. We proceed to the expansion of this theory in detail.

(a) *Perceptions the result of impressions from without.*

All perceptions (*φαντασίαι*) may be originally explained as the result of the action of some object (*φανταστών*) on the soul,¹ the soul at birth resembling a blank page, and only receiving a definite character by experience from without.² The action of objects on the soul was by the elder Stoics conceived of as being grossly material: Zeno defined a perception to be an *impression* (*τύπωσις*) made on the soul,³ and Cleanthes

¹ *Plut. Plac.* iv. 12. *Diog.* vii. 50. *Nemes.* Nat. Hom. 76. *Φαντασία* is πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενον, ἐνδεικνύμενον ἑαυτό τε καὶ τὸ πεποιηκός, in the same way, it is added, that light shows other things as well as itself; *φανταστών* is τὸ ποιοῦν τὴν *φαντασίαν*, and therefore πᾶν ὃ τι ἂν δύνηται κινεῖν τὴν ψυχὴν. *Φαντασία* is distinguished from *φανταστικόν*, because no *φανταστών* corresponds to *φανταστικόν*: it is διάκενος ἑλκυσμός, πάθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀπ' οὐδενος *φανταστοῦ γινόμενον*: and the object of such an empty perception is a φάντασμα. Impressions wholly unfounded, which give the impression of being

actual perceptions, are called by *Diog.* 51, ἐμφάσεις αἱ ὡσανεὶ ἐπὶ ὑπαρχόντων γινόμεναι. In a wider sense, *φαντασία* means any kind of notion.

² *Plut. Plac.* iv. 11: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ φασιν· ὅταν γεννηθῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς ὡσπερ χάρτης, ἐνεργῶν εἰς ἀπογραφὴν. εἰς τοῦτο μίαν ἐκάστην τῶν ἐννοιῶν ἐναπογράφεται· πρῶτος δὲ ὁ τῆς ἀπογραφῆς τρόπος ὁ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων. *Orig.* c. Cels. vii. 37, 720, b, says that they taught αἰσθήσει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τὰ καταλαμβανόμενα καὶ πᾶσαν κατάληψιν ἡρτῆσθαι τῶν αἰσθήσεων.

³ *Plut. Comm. Not.* 47: φαν-

understood this definition so literally, that he compared the impression on the soul to the impression made by a seal on wax.¹ In this comparison he was probably correctly rendering the views of Zeno, since he was himself one of his most careful followers. The difficulties of this view were recognised by Chrysippus, who accordingly defined a perception to be the *change* (ἐτεροίωσις) produced on the soul by an object, or, more accurately, the change produced in the ruling part of the soul;² and whereas his predecessors had only considered sensible things to be objects, he included among objects, states and activities of the mind.³ The mode, however,

τασία τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ. The same in *Diog.* vii. 45 and 50.

¹ *Sext.* Math. vii. 228: Κλεάνθης μὲν γὰρ ἤκουσε τὴν τύπωσιν κατὰ εἰσοχὴν τε καὶ ἐξοχὴν ὥσπερ καὶ διὰ τῶν δακτυλίων γινομένην τοῦ κηροῦ τύπωσιν. Conf. *Ibid.* vii. 372; viii. 400.

² *Sext.* vii. 229, continues: Χρύσιππος δὲ ἄτοπον ἡγεῖτο τὸ τοιοῦτον—according to this view, it would be necessary for the soul to receive at once many different forms, if it had to retain different notions at the same time—αὐτὸς οὖν τὴν τύπωσιν εἰρησθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος ὑπενόει ἀντὶ τῆς ἐτεροιώσεως, ὥστε εἶναι τοιοῦτον τὸν λόγον· φαντασία ἐστὶν ἐτεροίωσις ψυχῆς. Objection had, however, been raised to this definition, on the ground that not every change of the soul gave rise to a perception, and therefore the Stoics had defined a perception more accurately: φαντασία ἐστὶ τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ ὡς ἂν

ἐν ψυχῇ, which was equivalent to saying φαντασία ἐστὶν ἐτεροίωσις ἐν ἡγεμονικῷ· or else in Zeno's definition of φαντασία as τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ they had taken ψυχῇ in a restricted sense for τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, which really came to the same thing. Even this definition had, however, been found too wide, and hence ἐτεροίωσις was limited to mean change in feeling (ἐτεροίωσις κατὰ πείσιν). But the definition is still too wide, as Sextus already remarked; for a perception is not an isolated feeling of change in the soul. The statements in *Sext.* Math. vii. 372; viii. 400; *Diog.* vii. 45 and 50; *Alex. Aphro.* De Anim. 135, b; *Boëth.* De Interpret. ii. 292 (Schol. in Arist. 100), are in agreement with the above remarks.

³ Chrys. in *Plut.* Sto. Rep. 19, 2: ὅτι μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητὰ ἐστὶ τὰ γαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ, καὶ τοῦτοις ἐκποιεῖ λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ πάθη

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(b) *Con-
ceptions
formed
from per-
ceptions.*

in which the change was produced in the soul did not further engage his attention.

It follows, as a necessary corollary from this view, that the Stoics regarded sensation as the only source of all our perceptions: the soul is a blank leaf, sensation is the hand which fills it with writing. But this was not all. Perceptions give rise to memory, repeated acts of memory to experience,¹ and conclusions derived from experience form conceptions which carry us beyond the immediate objects of sense. These conclusions rest either upon the comparison of perceptions or upon actual combination of them, or else upon analogy;² some add, upon

ἔστιν αἰσθητὰ σὺν τοῖς εἶδεσιν, οἷον λύπη καὶ φόβος καὶ τὸ παραπλήσια, ἀλλὰ καὶ κλοπῆς καὶ μοιχείας καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἔστιν αἰσθῆσθαι· καὶ καθόλου ἀφροσύνης καὶ δειλίας καὶ ἄλλων οὐκ ὑλίων κακιῶν· οὐδὲ μόνον χαρᾶς καὶ εὐεργεσιῶν καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν κατορθώσεων, ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀρετῶν. This passage must not be understood to mean that the *conceptions* of good and evil, as such, were objects of sense (*Ritter*, iii. 558). The only objects of that kind are *individual* moral states and activities. The general conceptions derived from them are, according to the Stoic theory of knowledge, only obtained by a process of abstraction.

¹ *Plut.* Plac. iv. 11, 2: αἰσθανόμενοι γὰρ τινος οἶον λευκοῦ ἀπελθόντος αὐτοῦ μνήμην ἔχουσιν, ὅταν δὲ ὁμοειδὲς πολλὰ μνημαὶ γένωνται τότε φασὶν ἔχειν ἐμπειρίαν.

² *Diog.* vii. 52: ἡ δὲ κατάληψις γίνεται κατ' αὐτοὺς αἰσθήσει μὲν,

ὡς λευκῶν καὶ μελάνων καὶ τραχέων καὶ λείων· λόγῳ δὲ τῶν δι' ἀποδείξεως συναγομένων, ὥσπερ τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι καὶ προνοεῖν τούτους· τῶν γὰρ νοουμένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ περίπτωσιν (immediate contact) ἐνοήθη, τὰ δὲ κατ' ὁμοιότητα, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ μετάθεσιν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ σύνθεσιν, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἐναντίωσιν . . . νοεῖται δὲ καὶ κατὰ μετάβασιν (transition from the sensuous to the supersensuous) τινὰ, ὡς τὰ λεκτὰ καὶ ὁ τόπος. *Cic.* Acad. i. 11, 42: *Comprehensio [= κατάληψις] facta sensibus et vera illi [Zenoni] et fidelis videbatur: non quod omnia, quæ essent in re, comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam posset relinqueret, quodque natura quasi normam scientiæ et principium sui dedisset, unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur. Ibid.* Fin. iii. 10, 33: *Cumque rerum notiones in animis fiant, si aut usu (experience) aliquid cognitum sit, aut*

contact and transposition.¹ The formation of conceptions by means of these agencies sometimes takes place methodically and artificially, and at other times naturally and spontaneously.² In the latter way are formed the primary conceptions, *προλήψεις* or *κοινὰ ἔννοιαι*, which were regarded by the Stoics as the natural types of truth and virtue, and as the distinctive possession of rational beings.³ To judge by many expressions, it might seem that by primary conceptions, or *κοινὰ ἔννοιαι*,⁴ *innate ideas* were meant; but this view would be opposed to the whole character and connection of the system. In

(α) Κοινὰ
ἔννοιαι
formed
naturally.

conjunctione, aut similitudine, aut collatione rationis: hoc quarto, quod extremum posui, boni notitia facta est. *Sevt.* (Math. vii. 40; ix. 393) also agrees with the Stoic doctrine of the origin of conceptions, in saying that all our ideas arise either κατ' ἐμπέλασιν τῶν ἐναργῶν or κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν μετάβασιν (cf. *Diog.* vii. 53), and in the latter case either by comparison, or actual contact, or analogy.

¹ *Diog.* and *Sen.*

² *Plut.* Plac. iv. 11: τῶν δ' ἐννοιών αἱ μὲν φυσικαὶ γίνονται κατὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους τρόπους (according to the context, this must mean by memory and experience) καὶ ἀνεπιτεχνήτως· αἱ δ' ἤδη δι' ἡμετέρας διδασκαλίας καὶ ἐπιμελείας· αὐταὶ μὲν οὖν ἔννοιαι καλοῦνται μόναι, ἐκείναι δὲ καὶ προλήψεις. *Diog.* vii. 51: [τῶν φαντασιῶν] αἱ μὲν εἰσι τεχνικαὶ, αἱ δὲ ἄτεχνοι.

³ *Plut.* Plac. iv. 11: ὁ δὲ λόγος καθ' ὃν προσαγορευόμεθα λογικοὶ ἐκ τῶν προλήψεων συμπληροῦσθαι

λέγεται κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐβδομάδα (the first seven years of life). Comm. Not. 3, 1, says that to the Stoics belonged τὸ παρὰ τὰς ἐννοίας καὶ τὰς προλήψεις τὰς κοινὰς φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀφ' ὧν μάλιστα τὴν αἵρεσιν . . . καὶ μόνην ὁμολογεῖν τῇ φύσει λέγουσιν. *Sen.* Epist. 117, 6: multum dare solemus presumptioni (πρόληψις) omnium hominum; apud nos argumentum veritatis est, aliquid omnibus videri. Frequent instances will occur of appeals to communes notitiæ and consensus gentium.

⁴ *Diog.* vii. 53: φυσικῶς δὲ νοεῖται δίκαιόν τι καὶ ἀγαθόν. 54: ἔστι δ' ἡ πρόληψις ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου. In the same strain Chrysippus (in *Plut.* Sto. Rep. 17) speaks of ἐμφυτοὶ προλήψεις of good and evil. In *Plut.* Frag. De Anim. vii. 6, the question is asked, How is it possible to learn what is not already known? The Stoics reply, By means of φυσικὰ ἔννοιαι.

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V.(B) Knowledge
formed
artificially.

reality, these primary conceptions, or *κοινὰ ἔννοιαι*, are only those conceptions which, from the nature of thought, can be equally formed by all men out of experience; and even the highest ideas, those of good and evil, have no other origin.¹ Knowledge arises from the artificial formation of conceptions, and is defined by the Stoics to be a fixed and immoveable conception, or a system of such conceptions.² On the one hand, they persistently maintained that scientific knowledge is a system of artificial conceptions, impossible without a logical process. On the other hand, occupying the ground

¹ Compare *Cic. Fin. iii. 10*: hoc quarto [collatione rationis] boni notitia facta est; cum enim ab iis rebus, quæ sunt secundum naturam, adscendit animus collatione rationis, tum ad notitiam boni pervenit. *Sen. Ep. 120, 4*, replying to the question, Quomodo ad nos prima boni honestique notitia pervenerit, observes, Hoc nos natura docere non potuit: semina nobis scientiæ dedit, scientiam non dedit. . . . nobis videtur observatio collegisse [speciem virtutis], et rerum sæpe factarum inter se collatio: per analogiam nostri intellectum et honestum et bonum judicant. The notion of mental health and strength had grown out of the corresponding bodily notions; the contemplation of virtuous actions and persons had given rise to the conception of moral perfection, their good points being improved upon, and defects being passed over, the experience of certain faults which resemble virtues serving to make the dis-

tinction plainer. Even belief in a God was produced, according to *Diog. vii. 52*, by ἀπόδειξις. See *Stob. Ecl. i. 792*: οἱ μὲν Στωϊκοὶ λέγουσι μὲν εὐθὺς ἐμφύεσθαι τὸν λόγον, ὕστερον δὲ συναθροίεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ φαντασιῶν περὶ δεκατέσσαρα ἔτη.

² *Stob. Ecl. ii. 128*: εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου· ἑτέραν δὲ ἐπιστήμην σύστημα ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν το οὐτῶν, οἷον ἡ τῶν κατὰ μέρος λογικῇ ἐν τῷ σπουδαίῳ ὑπάρχουσα· ἄλλην δὲ σύστημα ἐξ ἐπιστημῶν τεχνικῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἔχον τὸ βέβαιον ὥς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἀρεταί· ἄλλην δὲ ἔξιν φαντασιῶν δεκτικὴν ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου, ἡτινὰ φασιν ἐν τόνῳ καὶ δυνάμει κείσθαι. *Diog. vii. 47*: αὐτὴν τε τὴν ἐπιστήμην φασὶν ἢ κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ ἢ ἔξιν ἐν φαντασιῶν προσδέξει ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου. (This explanation, which Herillus used on the authority of *Diog. vii. 165*, certainly belongs to Zeno.) οὐκ ἄνευ δὲ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς θεωρίας τὸν σοφὸν ἄπτωτον ἔσεσθαι ἐν λόγῳ.

they did, they must have felt it to be a matter of primary necessity that knowledge should agree in its results with primary conceptions, agreement with nature being their watchword in every department. Their own system, moreover, pretended to derive no small support from its agreement with nature, although it was easy for opponents to show that their agreement with nature was imaginary, and not real, and that, on the contrary, many of their assertions were diametrically opposed to opinions generally entertained.¹

Perceptions, and the conclusions based upon them,² being thus, according to the Stoics, the two sources of all notions, the further question arises, How are these two sources related to each other? It might have been expected that perceptions would have been declared to be alone originally and absolutely true, since all general conceptions are based on them. Nevertheless, the Stoics are far from doing so. To knowledge alone they would allow an absolute certainty of conviction, and therefore declared that the truth of perceptions depends on their relation to thought.³ Truth and error do not

(γ) *Relation of perceptions and conceptions.*

¹ This was the object of Plutarch's treatise *περὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν*. In the same way, the Peripatetic Diogenianus (in *Euseb. Pr. Ev. vi. 8, 10*) casts it in the teeth of Chrysippus that, whilst appealing to generally-received opinions, he was always going contrary to them, and that he considered all men, with one or two exceptions, to be fools and madmen.

² *Diog. 52*: ἡ δὲ κατάληψις γίνεται κατ' αὐτοὺς αἰσθήσει μὲν λευκῶν, κ.τ.λ. λόγῳ δὲ τῶν δι' ἀποδείξεως συναγομένων, ὥσπερ τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι, κ.τ.λ.

³ *Sext. Math. viii. 10*: οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς λέγουσι μὲν τῶν τε αἰσθητῶν τινα καὶ τῶν νοητῶν ἀληθῆ, οὐκ ἐξ εὐθείας δὲ τὰ αἰσθητὰ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ἀναφορὰν τὴν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ παρακείμενα τοῦτοις νοητά.

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belong to disconnected notions, but to notions combined in the form of a judgment, and a judgment is produced by the faculty of thought; hence, by themselves, perceptions are the source of no knowledge, knowledge being first obtained when the activity of the understanding is allied to sensation.¹ Or, starting from the relation of thought to its object, since like can only be known by like, according to the well-known adage, the reason of the universe can only be known by the reason in man.² On the other hand, however, the understanding has no other material to work upon but perceptions, and general conceptions are only obtained by conclusions derived from perceptions. The mind, therefore, has the power of working into shape the materials supplied by the senses, but it is limited to this material. Still, it can progress from perceptions to notions not immediately given in sensation, such as the con-

¹ *Sext.* continues: ἀληθὲς γάρ ἐστι κατ' αὐτοὺς τὸ ὑπάρχον καὶ ἀντικείμενόν τινι, καὶ ψεύδος τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον καὶ μὴ ἀντικείμενόν τινι, ὅπερ ἀσώματον ἀξίωμα καθεστὼς νοητὸν εἶναι· every sentence containing an assertion or negative, and therefore being opposed to every other. *Ibid.* viii. 70: ἡξίουσι οἱ Στωϊκοὶ κοινῶς ἐν λεκτῷ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἶναι καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος· λεκτὸν δὲ ὑπάρχειν φασὶ τὸ κατὰ λογικὴν φαντασίαν ὑφιστάμενον· λογικὴν δὲ εἶναι φαντασίαν καθ' ἣν τὸ φαντασθέν ἐστὶ λόγῳ παραστήσαι. τῶν δὲ λεκτῶν τὰ μὲν ἑλλιπῆ καλοῦσι τὰ δὲ αὐτοτελῆ (conceptions and proposition; conf. *Diog.* vii. 63) . . . προσ- αγορεύουσι δὲ τινα τῶν αὐτοτελῶν

καὶ ἀξιώματα, ἅπερ λέγοντες ἦτοι ἀληθεύομεν ἢ ψευδόμεθα. *Ibid.* 74; *Diog.* vii. 65: ἀξίωμα δὲ ἐστίν, ὃ ἐστὶν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος ἢ πρᾶγμα αὐτοτελὲς ἀποφαντὸν ὅσον ἐφ' ἐαυτῷ· ὥς ὁ Χρυσίππος φησὶν ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ὅροις. Aristotle had already observed that the distinction between false and true first appeared in judgment.

² *Sext.* *Math.* vii. 93: ὥς τὸ μὲν φῶς, φησὶν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὸν Πλάτωνα Τιμαῖον ἐξηγούμενος, ὑπὸ τῆς φωτοειδοῦς ὕψους καταλαμβάνεται, ἡ δὲ φωνὴ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀεροειδοῦς ἀκοῆς, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῶν ὄλων φύσις ὑπὸ συγγενοῦς ὀφείλει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου. Conf. *Plato*, *Rep.* vi. 508, B.

ceptions of what is good and of God. And since, according to the Stoic teaching, a material object alone possesses reality, the same inconsistent vagueness may be also observed in their teaching, which has also been noticed in Aristotle—reality attaching to individual objects only, truth to general notions only. This inconsistency, however, assumes a much cruder form with the Stoics than it did with Aristotle, for, adhering to the Cynic nominalism, they resolutely asserted that no reality attached to thoughts.¹ Such an assertion makes it all the more difficult to conceive how greater truth could belong to conceptions, conceptions of unrealities included, than to perceptions caused by actual and material objects.

¹ *Diog.* 61: ἐννόημα δὲ ἐστὶ φάντασμα διανοίας, οὔτε τί ἦν οὔτε ποῖον, ὥσανεὶ δὲ τί ἦν καὶ ὥσανεὶ ποῖον. *Stob. Ecl.* i. 332: τὰ ἐννοήματα φησὶ μήτι τινὰ εἶναι μήτι ποῖα, ὥσανεὶ δὲ τινὰ καὶ ὥσανεὶ ποῖα φαντάσματα ψυχῆς· ταῦτα δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων ιδέας προσαγορεύεσθαι . . . ταῦτα δὲ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ φιλόσοφοι φασὶν ἀνυπάρχτους εἶναι, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐννοημάτων μετέχειν ἡμᾶς, τῶν δὲ πτώσεων, ὥς δὴ προσηγορίας καλοῦσι, τυγχάνειν. *Plut. Plac.* i. 10, 4: οἱ ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος Στωϊκοὶ ἐννοήματα ἡμέτερα τὰς ιδέας ἔφασαν. *Simpl. Categ.* 26, e: Χρύσιππος ἀπορεῖ περὶ τῆς ιδέας, εἰ τὸδε τι ῥηθήσεται. συμπαραληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὴν συνήθειαν τῶν Στωϊκῶν περὶ τῶν γενικῶν ποιῶν πῶς αἱ πτώσεις κατ' αὐτοὺς προφέρονται καὶ πῶς οὕτινα τὰ κοινὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς λέγεται. *Syrian* on *Met.* p. 59: ὥς ἄρα τὰ εἶδη . . . οὔτε πρὸς τὴν ῥῆσιν τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων συνηθείας παρήγετο,

ὥς Χρύσιππος καὶ Ἀρχέδημος καὶ οἱ πλείους τῶν Στωϊκῶν ὕστερον φήθησαν . . . οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ νοήματά εἰσι παρ' αὐτοῖς αἱ ιδέαι, ὥς Κλεάνθης ὕστερον εἴρηκε. It does not appear to be intended by Stobæus and Plutarch that the Stoics regarded their conception of the ἐννόημα as identical with the ideas of Plato, but that they asserted that these ideas were only ἐννοήματα—an assertion which had also been made by Antisthenes. *Sext. Math.* vii. 246, quotes, as belonging to the Stoics: οὔτε δὲ ἀληθεῖς οὔτε ψευδεῖς εἰσιν αἱ γενικαὶ [φαντασίαι]. ὦν γὰρ τὰ εἶδη τοῖα ἢ τοῖα τοῦτων τὰ γένη οὔτε τοῖα οὔτε τοῖα· if mankind were divided into Greeks and barbarians, the γενικὸς ἄνθρωπος would be neither one nor the other. The more a conception dispenses with individual limitations, the further it is removed from truth.

actuality?

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Accordingly, if they were asked in what the peculiar character of conceptions consisted, the Stoics, following Aristotle, reply that, in thinking a conception, the idea of universal application is present; whereas perceptions are only of particular application.¹ More importance was attached by them to another point of difference between conceptions and perceptions—the greater certainty which the thinking of conceptions carries with it than the mere presence of a perception. All the definitions given above point to the unassailable strength of conviction as the characteristic of knowledge. The same strength of conviction is implied in the language attributed to Zeno,² according to which, he compared sensation to the extended fingers, assent, as being the first activity of the power of judgment, to the closed hand, conception to the fist, and knowledge to one fist firmly grasped by the other. According to this story, the whole difference between sensation and knowledge is one of degree, depending on the greater or less strength of conviction, on the straining and attention of the mind.³ It is not an absolute difference of kind, but a relative difference, a gradual shading off of one into the other.

(c) *The
standard
of truth.*

It follows from these considerations, that the existence of a standard by which, in the last resort,

¹ *Diog.* vii. 54: ἔστι δ' ἡ πρόληψις ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου. *Exc. c. Joan. Damasc.* (Stob. Floril. ed. Mein. iv. 236), Nr. 34: Χρύσιππος τὸ μὲν γενικὸν ἤδὺ νοητὸν, τὸ δὲ εἰδικὸν καὶ προσπίπτον ἤδη αἰσθητόν

² *Cic. Acad.* ii. 47, 145.

³ *Stob. Ecl.* ii. 128: Knowledge is defined to be ἐξίς φαντασιῶν δεκτικὴ ἀμετάπτωτος ὑπὸ λόγου, ἡντινὰ φασιν ἐν τόνῳ καὶ δυνάμει κεῖσθαι.

the truth of notions may be tested, is assumed as a matter of practical necessity. The general line of argument, by which the Stoics argued that knowledge must be possible, proceeds by practically taking something for granted. Without failing to bring intellectual objections against Scepticism, as might naturally have been expected since the time of Chrysippus¹—and those objections often of a most telling description²—the Stoics nevertheless took up their stand on one point in particular, arguing that, unless the knowledge of truth were possible, it would be impossible to act on fixed principles and convictions.³ Thus, as a last bulwark against doubt, practical need was resorted to.

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(α) *Practical need of such a standard.*

¹ Chrysippus opposed Arce-silas, according to the view of the Stoic School, with such success, that Carneades was refuted by anticipation; and it was considered a special favour of Providence that the labours of Chrysippus had occupied an intermediate place between two of the most important Sceptics, *Plut. Sto. Rep.* i. 4.

² Amongst other objections to the Sceptics, two may be noticed. The one is mentioned by *Sext. Math.* viii. 463; *Pyrh.* ii. 186: The Sceptics cannot deny the possibility of arguing without proving their assertion, and thereby practically contradicting themselves, by making use of argument. The other, raised by Antipater against Carneades (*Cic. Acad.* ii. 9, 28; 34, 109), is as follows: He who asserts that nothing can be known with certainty must, at least, believe that

he can with certainty make this assertion. The replies of the Sceptics will be found in *Sext. Math.* vii. 433.

³ *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 10; *Ibid.* 47, 12: καὶ μὴν ἐν γε τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς Ἀκαδημαϊκοὺς ἀγῶσιν ὁ πλεῖστος αὐτῷ τε Χρυσίππῳ καὶ Ἀντιπάτρῳ πόνος γέγονε περὶ τοῦ μήτε πράττειν μήτε ὁρμῶν ἀσυγκαταθέτως, ἀλλὰ πλάσματα λέγειν καὶ κείας ὑποθέσεις τοὺς ἀξιούντας οἰκείας φαντασίας γενομένης εὐθὺς ὁρμῶν μὴ εἰζαντας μηδὲ συγκατατιθεμένους. *Ibid.* adv. Col. 26, 3: τὴν δὲ περὶ πάντων ἐποχὴν οὐδ' οἱ πολλὰ πραγματευσάμενοι καὶ καταλείναντες εἰς τοῦτο συγγράμματα καὶ λόγους ἐκίνησαν· ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς Ἰστοῦς αὐτῆς τελευτώντες ὥσπερ Γοργόνα τὴν ἀπραξίαν ἐπάγουσαν ἀπηγόρευσαν. *Epicl.* (Arrian. *Diss.* i. 27, 15) quietly suppresses a Sceptic by saying: οὐκ ἔγω σχολὴν πρὸς ταῦτα. It is also following the Stoic line that *Cic. Acad.*

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(β) *Irresistible perceptions the standard of truth.*

Their special enquiries into the nature of this standard of truth point to the same mode of procedure. If the question is raised, How are true perceptions to be distinguished from false ones? the immediate reply given by the Stoics is, that a true perception is one which represents a real object as it really is.¹ From such an answer little is, however, gained; and the question has again to be asked, How may it be known that a perception faithfully represents a reality? The Stoics can only reply by pointing to a relative, but not to an absolute, test—the degree of strength with which certain perceptions force themselves on our notice. A perception by itself does not carry conviction or assent (*συγκατάθεσις*); for there can be no assent until the faculty of judgment is directed towards the perception, either for the purpose of admitting or of rejecting it, since truth and falsehood reside in judgment. In general, the power of assent rests

ii. 10–12, says that Scepticism makes all action impossible.

¹ *Sext. Math.* vii. 244: ἀληθεῖς φαντασίαι are, first of all, virtually explained as being φαντασίαι, ὧν ἔστιν ἀληθῆ κατηγορίαν ποιήσασθαι: then, under the head of true φαντασίαι, the καταληπτικαὶ and οὐ καταληπτικαὶ are distinguished, i. e. notions which give a clear impression of being true, and such as do not; and, in conclusion, φαντασία καταληπτική is defined: ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη, ὅποια οὐκ ἔν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρ-

χοντος. This definition is afterwards more fully explained. The same explanation is given *Ibid.* 402 and 426; viii. 85; *Pyrrih.* ii. 4; iii. 242; *Augustin.* c. Acad. ii. 5, 11; *Cic. Acad.* ii. 6, 18. *Diog.* vii. 46: τῆς δὲ φαντασίας τὴν μὲν καταληπτικὴν τὴν δὲ ἀκατάληπτον· καταληπτικὴν μὲν, ἣν κριτήριον εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων φασί, τὴν γινομένην ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναποσφραγισμένην καὶ ἐναπομεμαγμένην· ἀκατάληπτον δὲ τὴν μὴ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, ἢ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μὲν, μὴ καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον, τὴν μὴ τρανῇ μὴδὲ ἔκτυπον. *Ibid.* 50.

with us, in the same way that we possess the power of deciding our will; and a wise man differs from a fool quite as much by his convictions as by his actions.¹ Some of our perceptions, however, are of such a kind that they oblige us to bestow on them our assent, and compel us not only to regard them as probable, but also to regard them as true,² and corresponding to the actual nature of things. Such perceptions produce in us that firmness of conviction which the Stoics denominated irresistibleness, and

¹ *Sext. Math. viii. 397*: ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀποδείξις, ὥς ἔστι παρ' αὐτῶν ἀκούειν, καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις, ἥτις διπλοῦν ἔοικεν εἶναι πρῶγμα καὶ τὸ μὲν τι ἔχειν ἀκούσιον, τὸ δὲ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ κρίσει κείμενον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φαντασιωθῆναι ἀβούλητον ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ πάσχοντι ἔκειτο ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ φαντασιούντι τὸ οὕτως διατεθῆναι. . . . τὸ δὲ συγκαταθέσθαι τοῦτ' αὖτε κινήματι ἔκειτο ἐπὶ τῷ παραδεχομένῳ τὴν φαντασίαν. *Diog. vii. 51*; *Cic. Acad. i. 14, 40*: [Zeno] ad hæc quæ visa sunt, et quasi accepta sensibus assensionem adjungit animorum: quam esse vult in nobis positam et voluntariam. *Ibid. ii. 12, 37*; *De Fato, 19, 43*, Chrysippus affirms: visum objectum imprimet illud quidem et quasi signabit in animo suam speciem sed assensio nostra erit in potestate. *Piut. Sto. Rep. 47, 1*: τὴν γὰρ φαντασίαν βουλούμενος [ὁ Χρῦσιππος] οὐκ οὔσαν αὐτοτελῇ τῆς συγκαταθέσεως αἰτίαν ἀποδεικνύειν εἴρηκεν ὅτι· βλάψουσιν οἱ σοφοὶ ψευδεῖς φαντασίας ἐμποιοῦντες, ἂν αἱ φαντασίαι ποιῶσιν αὐτοτελῶς τὰς συγκαταθέσεις, κ.τ.λ. *Id.*

13: αἰσθῆς δὲ φησι Χρῦσιππος, καὶ τὸν θεὸν ψευδεῖς ἐμποιεῖν φαντασίας καὶ τὸν σοφὸν . . . ἡμᾶς δὲ φαύλους ὄντας συγκατατίθεσθαι ταῖς τοιαύταις φαντασίαις. *Id. Fragm. De An. 2*: οὐχ ἡ ψυχὴ τρέπει ἑαυτὴν εἰς τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων κατάληψιν καὶ ἀπάτην, κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς. *Epictet. in Gell. N. A. xix. 1, 15*: visa animi, quas φαντασίας philosophi appellant . . . non voluntatis sunt neque arbitrarie, sed vi quadam sua inferunt sese hominibus noscitantæ; probationes autem, quas συγκαταθέσεις vocant, quibus eadem visa noscuntur ac dijudicantur, voluntariæ sunt fiuntque hominum arbitratu: the difference between a wise man and a fool consists in συγκατατίθεσθαι and προσεπιδόξάζειν. The freedom of approbation must of necessity be so understood as to harmonise with the Stoic doctrine of freedom.

² The difference between the conception of εὐλογον and that of καταληπτικὴ φαντασία consists in the fact that the latter alone never fails. See *Athen. viii. 354, e*; *Diog. vii. 177*.

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they are accordingly termed irresistible perceptions. Whenever a perception forces itself upon us in this irresistible form, we are no longer dealing with a fiction of the imagination, but with something real; but whenever the strength of conviction is wanting, we cannot be sure of the truth of our perception. Or, expressing the same idea in the language of Stoicism, these irresistible perceptions, or *φαντασίαι καταληπτικαί*, are the standard of truth.¹

(γ) *Primary conceptions a standard as well as irresistible perceptions.*

The test of irresistibility (*κατάληψις*) was intended to apply more immediately to perceptions derived from without, such perceptions, according to the Stoic view, alone supplying the material for knowledge. But an equal degree of certainty was

¹ *Cic. Acad. i. 11, 41*: [Zeno] visis (= *φαντασίαις*) non omnibus adjugebat fidem, sed iis solum, quæ propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum, quæ viderentur: id autem visum, cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehensibile (*καταληπτική φαντασία*). *Ibid. ii. 12, 38*: ut enim necesse est lancem in libra ponderibus impositis deprimi, sic animum perspicuis cedere . . . non potest objectam rem perspicuam non approbare. Conf. *Fin. v. 26, 76*: percipiendi vis ita definitur a Stoicis, ut negent quidquam posse percipi nisi tale rerum, quale falsum esse non possit. *Diog. vii. 54*; *Sext. Math. vii. 227*: κριτήριον τοίνυν φασὶν ἀληθείας εἶναι οἱ ἄνδρες οὗτοι τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν. It was a perversion of the older Stoic teacher, when later Stoics would only allow a rational notion to be considered a test of truth, on the proviso

that no argument could be adduced against its truth. *Sext. 253*: ἀλλὰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἀρχαιότεροι τῶν Στωϊκῶν κριτήριόν φασιν εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν καταληπτικὴν ταύτην φαντασίαν· οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι προσετίθεισαν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχουσιν ἐνστηματα, since cases could be imagined in which a faulty view presented itself with the full force of truth. This was equivalent to overthrowing the whole doctrine relative to a test; for how could it be known in a particular case that there was not a negative instance? But it is quite in harmony with the Stoic teaching for a later Stoic (*Ibid. 257*) to say: αὕτη γὰρ ἐναργὴς οὖσα καὶ πληκτικὴ μονονουχὶ τῶν τριχῶν, φασί, λαμβάνεται κατασπῶσα ἡμᾶς εἰς συγκατάθεσιν καὶ ἄλλου μηδενὸς δευμένη εἰς τὸ τοιαύτην προσπίπτειν, κ.τ.λ. Hence *Simpl. Phys. 20, b*: ἀνήρουν τὰ ἄλλα . . . πλην τὰ ἐναργή.

allowed to attach to notions deduced from data originally true, either by the primary and natural activity of the mind, or by scientific processes of proof. Now, since among these derivative notions some—the primary conceptions (*κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι*), for instance—serve as the basis for deriving others, it may in a certain sense be asserted that perceptions and primary conceptions are both standards of truth.¹ In strict accuracy, neither perceptions nor primary conceptions (*πρόληψεις*) can be called standards. The real standard, whereby the truth of a perception is ascertained, consists in the power, inherent in certain perceptions, of carrying conviction—*τὸ καταληπτικὸν*—a power which belongs, in the first place, to perceptions, whether of objects without or within, and, in the next place, to primary conceptions naturally formed (*κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι* or *προλήψεις*). On the other hand, conceptions and conclusions formed artificially can only have their truth established by being subjected to a scientific process of proof. How, after making these statements, the Stoics could attribute a greater strength of conviction to artificial than to primary conceptions—how they could raise doubts as to the trustworthiness of

¹ *Diog.* vii. 54: *κριτήριον δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας φασὶ τυγχάνειν τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, τουτέστι τὴν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, καθὰ φησι Χρῦσιππος ἐν τῇ δωδεκάτῃ τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ Ἀντίπατρος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Βοηθὸς κριτήρια πλείονα ἀπολείπει, νοῦν καὶ αἴσθησιν καὶ ὕρεξιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην (this looks like an approximation to the*

teaching of the Peripatetics); ὁ δὲ Χρῦσιππος διαφερόμενος πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ λόγου κριτήριά φησιν εἶναι αἴσθησιν καὶ πρόληψιν . . . ἄλλοι δὲ τινες τῶν ἀρχαιοτέρων Στωϊκῶν τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κριτήριον ἀπολείπουσιν, ὥς ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ περὶ κριτηρίου φησίν.

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simple perceptions¹—is one of those puzzles which perplex us in studying the Stoic system, and is evidence of the double current of thought which runs through that system. There is, on the one hand, a seeking for what is innate and original; a going back to nature, a turning aside from everything artificial, and from every human device. On the other hand, there is a desire to supplement the Cynics' appeal to nature by a higher culture, and to assign scientific reasons for truths which the Cynics laid down as self-evident.

The latter tendency will alone explain the care and precision which the Stoics devoted to studying the forms and rules which govern intellectual processes. Attention to this branch of study may be noticed in Zeno and his immediate successors at the first separation of Stoicism from Cynicism. Aristo is the only Stoic who is opposed to it, his whole habit of mind being purely that of a Cynic. In Chrysippus, however, it attained its greatest development, and by Chrysippus the formal logic of the Stoics attained scientific completeness. In proportion as the Stoicism of later times reverted to its original Cynical type, and later Cynicism appealed to the immediate suggestions of the mind, it lost its interest in logic. In Musonius, Epictetus, and

¹ *Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 101*: neque eos (the Academicians) contra sensus aliter dicimus, ac Stoici, qui multa falsa esse dicunt, longeque aliter se habere ac sensibus videantur. Chrysippus had enquired into the truth of the per-

ceptions of the senses, and of the notions derived from them, in his treatise *περί συνηθείας*, without, however, satisfactorily answering the objections raised against his theory.

others, this alteration of interest may be observed. For the present, however, it may suffice to consider the logic of Chrysippus, as far as that is known to us.

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The term formal logic is here used to express those investigations which the Stoics included under that division of dialectic which, according to their use of the term, treats of *expression*. The common object of those enquiries is thought, or, as the Stoics called it, *expression* (λεκτόν), understanding thereby the substance of thought—thought regarded by itself as a distinct something, differing alike from the external object to which it refers, from the sound by which it is expressed, and from the power of mind which produces it. For this reason, they maintain that expression alone is not material: things are always material; so, too, is the power of thought, consisting, as it does, in a material change within the soul; and so, too, is an uttered word, which is the result of a certain movement of the atmosphere.¹ A question is here suggested in passing,

C. Formal
logic.
(1) Ex-
pression in
general.

predicte

¹ See *Sext. Math.* viii. 11: οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, τρία φάμενοι συζυγεῖν ἀλλήλοις, τό τε σημαίνόμενον καὶ τὸ σημαῖνον καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον. ὡν σημαῖνον μὲν εἶναι τὴν φωνήν . . . σημαίνόμενον δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὑπ' αὐτῆς δηλούμενον . . . τυγχάνον δὲ τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον . . . τούτων δὲ δύο μὲν εἶναι σώματα, καθάτερ τὴν φωνὴν καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον, ἐν δὲ ἄσώματον, ὥσπερ τὸ σημαίνόμενον πρᾶγμα καὶ λεκτόν. *Sen. Ep.* 117, 13, expressly mentions, as the teaching of a Stoic: Sunt, inquit, naturæ corporum . . .

has deinde sequuntur motus animorum enuntiativi corporum—for instance, I see Cato walk—corpus est, quod video. . . . Dico deinde: Cato ambulat. Non corpus est, inquit, quod nunc loquor, sed enuntiativum quiddam de corpore, quod alii effatum vocant, alii enuntiatum, alii edocutum. Compare also *Sext. Math.* viii. 70; *Pyrrh.* iii. 52. Various arguments are used by the Stoics to prove that sound, as opposed to expression (λεκτόν) is material. The distinction between expres-

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which should not be lost sight of, viz. How far was it correct for the Stoics to speak of expression as an existing something, if it is not material, since, according to their teaching, reality only belonged to material things?¹

Expression may be either perfect or imperfect. It is perfect when it contains a proposition; imperfect when the proposition is incomplete.² The

sion and power of expression is illustrated by the assertion (in *Sext.* Pyrrh. ii. 81) that a true conviction is material, as being a state of the soul, but that truth itself is not material: λέγεται διαφέρειν τῆς ἀληθείας τὸ ἀληθὲς τριχῶς, οὐσίᾳ, συστάσει, δυνάμει· οὐσίᾳ μὲν, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς ἀσώματόν ἐστιν, ἀξίωμα γὰρ ἔστι καὶ λεκτὸν, ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια σῶμα, ἔστι γὰρ ἐπιστήμη πάντων ἀληθῶν ἀποφαντικῇ, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη πῶς ἔχον ἡγεμονικόν. *Id.* Math. vii. 38, a similar statement is expressly attributed to a Stoic. The drift of the statement in *Sen.* Ep. 117, which Seneca at first discusses, but at length declares to be a mere quibble, is similar: sapientiam bonum esse, sapere bonum non esse. The statement is supported by the argument that nothing can be a good which does not make itself felt, and nothing can make itself felt which is not material; wisdom is material, because it is mens perfecta, but sapere is incorporale et accidens alteri, i.e. sapientiae. Accordingly, λεκτὸν (as *Ammon.* De Inter. 15, b, remarks) is a μέσον τοῦ τε νοήματος καὶ τοῦ πράγματος· if, however, νόημα be taken to express the thought itself, and not for the power of

thinking, it will be identical with λεκτόν. *Simpl.* Cat. 3, a, Basil.: τὰ δὲ λεγόμενα καὶ λεκτὰ τὰ νοήματ' ἐστίν, ὥς καὶ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς ἔδοκει. In *Plut.* Plac. iv. 11, 4, a definition of νόημα or ἐννόημα is given similar to that of λεκτόν in *Sext.* Math. viii. 70: φάντασμα διάνοιας λογικοῦ ζῴου. The statement, however, of *Philop.* Anal. Pr. lx. a, Schol. in Ar. 170, a, 2, cannot be true, declaring that the Stoics called things τυγχάνοντα, thoughts ἐκφορικά, and sounds λεκτά.

¹ This question was raised in the Stoic School itself; at least Sextus (Math. viii. 262) speaks of an ἀνήνυτος μάχη in reference to the ἵπαρξις of λεκτὰ, and he remarks (viii. 258): ὁρῶμεν δὲ ὥς εἰσὶ τινες οἱ ἀνρηκότες τὴν ἵπαρξιν τῶν λεκτῶν, καὶ οὐχ οἱ ἑτερόδοξοι μόνον, οἶον οἱ Ἑπικούρειοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοί, ὥς οἱ περὶ τὸν Βασιλείδην, οἷς ἔδοξε μηδὲν εἶναι ἀσώματον. Probably the question was first raised by later Stoics, when pressed by their opponents. Basilides was the teacher of Marcus Aurelius.

² *Sext.* Math. viii. 70: τῶν δὲ λεκτῶν τὰ μὲν ἑλλιπῇ καλοῦσι τὰ δὲ αὐτοτελῇ. Various kinds of propositions are then enumerated as being αὐτοτελῇ. Following

portion of logic, therefore, which treats of expression is divided into two parts, devoted respectively to the consideration of perfect and imperfect expression.

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In the section devoted to imperfect forms of expression, much is found which we should include under the grammar of words rather than under logic. Thus all the various forms of imperfect expression are divided into two groups—one group including proper names and class-words, or, as we should say, subjects; the other group including verbs, or predicates.¹ These two groups are used respectively to express what is essential and what is accidental,² and are again divided into a number

(2) *Imperfect expression.*

(a) *The grammar of words.*

the same authority. *Diog.* 63, says: φασὶ δὲ τὸ λεκτὸν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ φαντασίαν λογικὴν ὑφιστάμενον. τῶν δὲ λεκτῶν τὰ μὲν λέγουσιν εἶναι αὐτοτελῆ οἱ Στωϊκοί, τὰ δὲ ἑλλιπῆ. ἑλλιπῆ μὲν οὖν ἔστι τὰ ἀναπάρτιστον ἔχοντα τὴν ἐκφορὰν, οἷον Γράφει· ἐπιζητοῦμεν γὰρ, τίς; αὐτοτελῆ δ' ἔστι τὰ ἀπληρτισμένην ἔχοντα τὴν ἐκφορὰν, οἷον Γράφει Σωκράτης. *Prantl* uses the term judgment as most nearly representing λεκτόν· but it must be remembered that λεκτόν has a wider meaning than that of a logical judgment. The latter (ἀξίωμα) is only one form of λεκτὰ αὐτοτελῆ. λεκτόν may be better rendered by *predication*.

¹ *Plut.* Qu. Plat. x. 1, 2: A judgment (πρότασις or ἀξίωμα) ἐξ ὀνόματος καὶ ῥήματος συνέστηκεν, ὃν τὸ μὲν πῶσιν οἱ διαλεκτικοί, τὸ δὲ κατηγορήματα καλοῦσιν. The terms πῶσις and κατηγορήματα are peculiar to the Stoics, and therefore the Stoics must be meant by οἱ διαλεκτικοί. In the first class

of words they distinguish ὄνομα and προσηγορία, limiting ὄνομα to proper names, and understanding by προσηγορία all general terms, whether substantives or adjectives (*Diog.* 58; *Bekker's Anecd.* ii. 842). According to *Stob. Ecl.* i. 332, πῶσις was only used to express προσηγορία. *Diog.* 192, mentions two books of Chrysippus περὶ τῶν προσηγορικῶν. For the meaning of κατηγορήματα or ῥήματα, consult *Diog.* 58 and 64; *Sext. Pyrrh.* iii. 14; *Cic. Tusc.* iv. 9, 21; *Porphyr.* in Ammon. De Inter. 37, a. According to *Apollon. De Const.* i. 8, ῥήματα was used in strict accuracy only for the infinitive, other forms being called κατηγορήματα.

² The distinction between ὄνομα and κατηγορήματα was somewhat bluntly referred to their logical and metaphysical antithesis by the Stoics, as may be seen in *Stob. Ecl.* i. 336: αἴτιον δ' ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν εἶναι δι' ὃ, οὐ δὲ αἴτιον συμβεβηκός· καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον σῶμα,

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of subdivisions and varieties.¹ To this part of logic the enquiry into the formation and division of conceptions, and the doctrine of the categories, properly belong; but it cannot be said with certainty what place it occupies in the logic of the Stoics.² Certain it is that the Stoics introduced little new matter into their enquiries on this topic; all that is known of their teaching, in reference to the formation of conceptions, in reference to their relations to one another, and their divisions, being the same as the teaching of Aristotle, and differing only from the

οὗ δὲ αἴτιον κατηγορήμα. . . . Ποσειδώνιος . . . τὸ μὲν αἴτιον ὄν καὶ σῶμα, οὗ δὲ αἴτιον οὔτε ὄν οὔτε σῶμα, ἀλλὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ κατηγορήμα. Hence the latter were called σύμβαμα and παρασύμβαμα.

¹ The cases of nouns were distinguished, the nominative, according to *Ammon.*, being called ὄνομα, and the other cases πτώσεις: a statement, however, which does not agree with the usual use of those terms. In *Diog.* 65, the cases (γενική, δοτική, αἰτιατική) are called πλάγαι πτώσεις. Chrysippus wrote a distinct treatise on the five cases, *Diog.* 192. Similar were the divisions of the κατηγορήμα. According to *Diog.* 66, the Stoics distinguished between transitive verbs (ὀρθά), such as ὀρᾷ, διαλέγεται: passive verbs (ὑπτία), such as ὀρώμαι: neuter verbs (οὐδέτερα), such as φρονεῖν, περιπατεῖν: and middle verbs (ἀντιπεπονθότα), κείρεσθαι, πείθεσθαι, &c. Consult on this point *Philo.* De Cherub. 121, c; *Orig.* C. Cels. vi. 57; also *Dionys. Thrax.* § 15. *Simpl.* Categ. 79, α, ζ; *Diog.* 191; *Lersch.* ii. 196;

Steinthal, *Gesch. der Sprachw.* i. 294. They also distinguished between σύμβαμα and παρασύμβαμα—a verb, when used with a nominative, being called σύμβαμα or κατηγορήμα, and παρασύμβαμα when used with an oblique case; περιπατεῖ is a σύμβαμα, μεταμέλει a παρασύμβαμα, περιπατεῖ requiring a nominative (Σωκράτης), μεταμέλει requiring a dative (Σωκράτει). If an oblique case was necessary to complete a sentence, besides the subject, the verb was called ἑλαττον ἢ σύμβαμα or ἑλαττον ἢ κατηγορήμα, as in the sentence: Πλάτων φιλεῖ Δίωνα: if this was necessary with a παρασύμβαμα, it was called ἑλαττον ἢ παρασύμβαμα, as in the sentence: Σωκράτει μεταμέλει Ἀλκιβιάδους. This explains *Porphyr.* in *Ammon.* 36, b. See *Diog.* 64; *Apollon.* De Const. iii. 32; *Suid.* σύμβαμα: *Priscian*, xviii. p. 1118.

² There is nothing whatever on record which serves to show the position held by the categories. By some definition and division were treated of under the head of language.

corresponding parts of that teaching in the change of a few expressions, and a slightly altered order of treatment.¹

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Of greater importance is the Stoic doctrine of the categories.² In this section of their logic, the Stoics also follow Aristotle, but not without deviating from him in many respects. Aristotle referred his categories to no higher conception, regarding them as generic conceptions existing side by side; the Stoics referred them all to one higher conception. Aristotle enumerated ten categories; the Stoics thought that

(b) *The
Stoic
Categories.*

¹ According to *Diog.* 60, *Bekker*, Anecd. ii. 647, ὅρος was defined by Chrysippus as ἰδίου ἀπόδοσις by Antipater as λόγος κατ' ἀνάλυσιν (Anecd. ἀνάγκην) ἀπαρτιζόντως ἐκφερόμενος, i.e. a proposition in which the subject and the collective predicates may be interchanged. Ὅρισμός gives in detail what ὄνομα gives collectively (*Simpl.* Categ. 16, β). An imperfect ὅρος is called ὑπογραφή. Instead of the Aristotelian τί ἦν εἶναι, the Stoics were content with the τί ἦν of Antisthenes (*Alex.* Top. 24, m). Like Prodicus, they laid great stress on distinguishing the conceptions denoted by words of similar meanings, χαρὰ, τέρψις, ἡδονή, εὐφροσύνη (*Alex.* Top. 96). The relation of γένος to εἶδος is also explained: γένος is defined to be the summing up of many thoughts (ἀναφαρέτων ἐννοημάτων which may mean thoughts which, as integral parts of a conception, cannot be separated from it); εἶδος as τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ γένους περιεχόμενον (*Diog.* 60). γενικάτατον is δ γένος ὅν

γένος οὐκ ἔχει· εἰδικώτατον, δ εἶδος ὃν εἶδος οὐκ ἔχει (*Diog.* 61; *Sext.* Pyrrh. i. 138). As to διαίρεσις, ὑποδιαίρεσις, and ἀντιδιαίρεσις (division into contradictories) nothing new is stated; but μερισμός has a special notice (*Diog.* 61). Lastly, if *Sext.* Pyrrh. ii. 213, refers to the Stoics, various kinds of division are enumerated. There is little new material in the Stoic discussion of Opposition, and the same may be said of what *Simpl.* (Categ. 100, β and δ; 101, ε; 102, β) quotes from Chrysippus (περὶ τῶν κατὰ στέρησιν λεγόμενων) on the subject of στέρησις and ἔξις.

² See *Petersen*, Philos. Chrysipp. Fund. p. 36–144, invaluable for its careful collection of authorities, but defaced by attempting to build the Stoic system on the categories. *Trendelenburg*, Hist. Beitr. i. 217; *Prantl*, Gesch. der Logik, i. 426. The chief authorities here followed are *Simplicius*, on the Categories, and *Plotinus*, *Ennead.* vi. 1, 25–30.

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they could do with four,¹ which four only partially coincide with those of Aristotle. Aristotle placed the categories side by side, as co-ordinate, so that no object could come under a second category in the same respect in which it came under the first one;² the Stoics placed them one under the other, as subordinate, so that every preceding category is more accurately determined by the next succeeding one.

(a) *Highest
Conception
—an in-
definite
Something.*

The highest conception of all was described, according to the view of the older Stoics, as the conception of Being. Now since, in the strict use of terms, what is material can alone be said to have any being, and many of our notions refer to incorporeal and unreal objects, the conception of an indefinite Something³ was in later times put in the

¹ The Stoics attack the Aristotelian categories for being too numerous, and not for including every kind of expression.

² That such was the intention of the Aristotelian categories appears by the way in which they were introduced, no less than by the enquiry (Phys. v. 2) into the various kinds of motion—this enquiry being entirely based on the idea of their co-ordination.

³ It will thus be understood how the ancients could at one time speak of *ὄν*, at another of *τί*, as being the highest conception of the Stoics. The former is found in *Diog.* 61: *γενικώτατον δέ ἐστιν ὃ γένος ὄν γένος οὐκ ἔχει, οἶον τὸ ὄν.* *Sen.* Ep. 58, 8: Nunc autem genus illud primum quærimus, ex quo ceteræ species suspensæ sunt, a quo nascitur omnis divisio, quo universa comprehensa

sunt. After noticing the distinction between what is material and what is immaterial, he proceeds: quid ergo erit, ex quo hæc deducantur? illud . . . quod est [*τὸ ὄν*] . . . quod est aut corporale est aut incorporale. Hoc ergo genus est primum et antiquissimum et, ut ita dicam, generale [*τὸ γενικώτατον*]. It is, however, more usual to find *τί*. Thus *Plotin.* *Enn.* vi. 1, 25: *κοινὸν τί καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων ἐν γένος λαμβάνουσι.* *Alex. Aphrod.* *Top.* 155; *Schol.* 278, b, 20: *οὕτω δεικνύοις ἂν ὅτι μὴ καλῶς τὸ τί οἱ ἀπὸ στυᾶς γένος τοῦ ὄντος (τί as the genus, of which ὄν is a species) τίθενται· εἰ γὰρ τί, δηλὸν ὅτι καὶ ὄν . . . ἀλλ' ἐκείνοι νομοθετήσαντες αὐτοῖς τὸ ὄν κατὰ σωμάτων μόνων λέγεσθαι διαφεύγειν ἂν τὸ ἡπορημένον· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ τί γενικώτερον αὐτοῦ φασὶν εἶναι κατηγορού-*

place of the conception of Being, and intended, as the highest conception, to include every kind of notion. This indefinite Something comprehends alike what is material and what is not material—in other words, what has being and what has not being; and the Stoics appear to have employed this twofold division as a basis for a real division of things.

For the class-conceptions referring to differences in kind—the Categories, as they were called—other points were singled out, which have no connection with the division into things material and things not material. Of this kind are the four highest conceptions, or *summa genera*¹—all, however, subordinate to the conception of the indefinite Something; viz. the categories of *subject-matter* or *substance* (τὸ ὑποκείμενον), of *property* or *form* (τὸ ποιόν), of *variety* (τὸ πῶς ἔχον), and of *variety of relation* (τὸ πρὸς τι πῶς ἔχον).²

μενον οὐ κατὰ σωμάτων μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀσωμάτων. Schol. in Arist. 14, b, 11. *Sext. Pyrrh.* ii. 86: τὸ ἵ, ὅπερ φασὶν εἶναι πάντων γενεώτατον. *Math.* x. 234: The Stoics affirm τῶν τινῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι σώματα τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα. *Sen.* 3: Stoici volunt superponere uic etiam nunc aliud genus magis principale . . . primum genus stoicis quibusdam videtur quid, or in rerum, inquirunt, natura uædam sunt, quedam non sunt: examples of the latter are centaurs, giants, and similar notions of unreal things. *Ritter*, iii. 566, remarks, with justice, that the older teaching must have placed the conception of Being at the head; otherwise the objection

could not have been raised, that we can think of what has not being. Probably the change was made by Chrysippus, although it is not definitely proved by *Stob.* *Ecl.* i. 390. *Petersen* confuses the two views. He thinks (p. 146) that the Stoics divided Something into Being and Not Being, subdividing Being again into what is material and what is not material.

¹ The Stoics appear to have called them γενικώτατα or πρῶτα γένη, in preference to categories. *Simpl.* *Categ.* 16, δ; *Marc. Aurel.* vi. 14.

² *Simpl.* 16, δ: οἱ δὲ γε Στωϊκοὶ εἰς ἐλάττωνα συστέλλειν ἀξιούσι τὸν τῶν πρῶτων γενῶν ἀριθμόν . . .

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V.(β) *Cate-
gory of
subject-
matter or
substance.*

The first of these categories, that of matter or substance,¹ expresses the subject-matter of things in themselves (τὸ ὑποκείμενον), the material of which they are made, irrespective of any and every quality,² the something which underlies all definite being, and which alone has a substantial value. Following Aristotle,⁴ the Stoics distinguish, in this category of matter, between matter in general, or universal matter, and the particular matter or material out of which individual things are made. The former alone is incapable of being increased or diminished. Far otherwise is the material of which particular things are made. This can be increased

ποιούνται γὰρ τὴν τομὴν εἰς τέσσαρα· εἰς ὑποκείμενα καὶ ποιά καὶ πῶς ἔχοντα καὶ πρὸς τι πῶς ἔχοντα. *Plot. En. vi. 1, 25; Plut. Comm. Not. 44, 6.*

¹ Instead of ὑποκείμενον, the Aristotelian category of being, οὐσία, was substituted by some, both within and without the School. *Stob. Ecl. i. 434.*

² *Porphyr. in Simpl. 12, δ: ἡ τε γὰρ ἄποιος ὕλη . . . πρῶτόν ἐστι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου σημαίνόμενον. Plot. 588, B: ὑποκείμενα μὲν γὰρ πρῶτα τάξαντες καὶ τὴν ὕλην ἐνταῦθα τῶν ἄλλων προτάξαντες. Galen, An. Anal. S. Incorp. 6, xix. 478: λέγουσι μόνην τὴν πρῶτην ὕλην ἁλθιον τὴν ἄποιον.* It would seem to follow, as a matter of course, from the Stoic belief in immaterial properties, that the Stoics also believed in immaterial substances (*Petersen, 60*); but since this would stand in contradiction to their belief that reality only belonged to material things,

and must have drawn upon then the criticism of their opponents it is safer to suppose that they never went so far as to assert this belief.

³ *Simpl. 44, δ: ζοικε Στωϊκῇ τινι συνηθείᾳ συνεπέσθαι, οὐδὲ ἄλλο ἢ τὸ ὑποκείμενον εἶναι νομίζων, τὰς δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ διαφορὰς ἀνυποστάτους ἡγούμενος. Diog. 150. Stob. Ecl. i. 322 and 324 ἔφησε δὲ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὴν τῷ ὅλων οὐσίαν καὶ ὕλην ἄποιον καὶ ἄμορφον εἶναι, καθ' ὅσον οὐδὲν ἀποτεταγμένον ἴδιον ἔχει σχῆμα οὐδὲ ποιότητα κατ' αὐτήν· ἀεὶ δ' ἐν τινὶ σχήματι καὶ ποιότητι εἶναι. διαφέρειν δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ὕλης, τῇ οὐσαν κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, ἐπινοία μόνον. Simpl. Phys. 50: τὴν ἄποιον σῶμα τὴν πρωτίστην ὕλην εἶναι φασιν.*

⁴ *Porphyr. in Simpl. Cat. 12 δ: διττόν ἐστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον οἱ μόνον κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶ ἀλλὰ κατὰ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους.*

and diminished, and, indeed, is ever undergoing change; so much so, that the only feature which continues the same during the whole term of its existence¹ constituting its identity, is its quality.

¹ *Diog.* 150: οὐσίαν δέ φασι τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων τὴν πρώτην ὕλην. So thought Zeno and Chrysippus: ὕλη δέ ἐστιν ἐξ ἧς ὁτιδήποτε γίνεται. καλεῖται δὲ διχῶς οὐσία τε καὶ ὕλη, ἥ τε τῶν πάντων καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρος. ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν ὅλων οὔτε πλείων οὔτε ἐλάττων γίνεται, ἡ δὲ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρος καὶ πλείων καὶ ἐλάττων. *Stob. Ecl.* i. 322: (Ζήνωνος) οὐσίαν δὲ εἶναι τὴν τῶν ὄντων πάντων πρώτην ὕλην, ταύτην δὲ πᾶσαν αἰδίου καὶ οὔτε πλείω γιγνομένην οὔτε ἐλάττω, τὰ δὲ μέρη ταύτης οὐκ αἰεὶ ταῦτὰ διαμένειν, ἀλλὰ διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ συγχέσθαι. The same was held by Chrysippus, according to *Stob. Ecl.* i. 432, who says: Posidonius held that there were four varieties of change, those κατὰ διαίρεσιν, κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν (water to air), κατὰ σύγχυσιν (chemical combination), κατ' ἀνάλυσιν, the latter also called τὴν ἐξ ὅλων μεταβολήν. τούτων δὲ τὴν κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν γίνεσθαι (the elements, according to the Stoics, changing into each other) τὰς δὲ ἄλλας τρεῖς περὶ τοὺς ποιοὺς λεγόμενους τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας γιγνομένους. ἀκολουθῶν δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰς γενέσεις συμβαίνειν. τὴν γὰρ οὐσίαν οὐτ' αὖξασθαι οὔτε μειοῦσθαι . . . ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίως ποίων (not the properties, but the materials out of which individual things are made) οἶον Δίωνος καὶ Θέωνος, καὶ αὖξῆσεις καὶ μειώσεις γίνεσθαι. διὸ καὶ παραμένειν τὴν ἐκάστον ποιότητα ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως μέχρι

τῆς ἀναιρέσεως. . . . ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίως ποίων δύο μὲν εἶναι φασὶ τὰ δεκτικὰ μόρια (the materials of individual things have two component parts, one of which is capable of change), τὸ μὲν τι κατὰ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ὑπόστασιν τὸ δὲ τι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ποίου. τὸ γὰρ [ἰδίως ποῖον] ὥς πολλάκις λέγομεν τὴν αὖξῃσιν καὶ τὴν μείωσιν ἐπιδέχασθαι. *Dexipp.* in *Cat.* 31, 15, *Speng.*: ὥς ἐστὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον διττὸν, οὐ μόνον κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους, ἐν μὲν τὸ λεγόμενον πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον, ὥς ἡ ἁποῖος ὕλη . . . δεύτερον δὲ ὑποκείμενον τὸ ποῖον ὃ κοινῶς ἢ ἰδίως ὑφίσταται, ὑποκείμενον γὰρ καὶ ὁ χαλκὸς καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης. *Plut.* *Comm. Not.* 44, 4: (the Stoics assert) ὥς δύο ἡμῶν ἕκαστός ἐστιν ὑποκείμενα, τὸ μὲν οὐσία, τὸ δὲ [ποῖον]. καὶ τὸ μὲν αἰεὶ ρεῖ καὶ φέρεται, μήτ' αὖξόμενον μήτε μειούμενον, μήτε ὅλως οἶον ἐστὶ διαμένον, τὸ δὲ διαμένει καὶ αὖξάνεται καὶ μειοῦται καὶ πάντα πάσχει τὰναντία θάτερόν συμπεφυκὸς καὶ συνηρμοσμένον καὶ συγκεχυμένον, καὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῇ αἰσθήσει μηδαμῶς παρέχον ἄψασθαι. The latter is the material itself, of which individual things are made; the former is matter in general, in reference to which Plutarch had just said: τὰ λήμματα συγχωροῦσιν οὗτοι, τὰς [μὲν] ἐν μέρει πάσας οὐσίας ρεῖν καὶ φέρεσθαι, τὰ μὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν μεθείσας, τὰ δὲ ποθὲν ἐπίοντα προσδεχομένας· οἷς δὲ πρόσσεισι καὶ ἅπεισιν ἀριθμοῖς καὶ πλήθεσιν,

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V.(γ) *The
category of
property or
form.*

The second category, that of property¹ or form, comprises all those essential attributes, by means of which a definite character is impressed on otherwise indeterminate matter.² If the definite character

ταῦτα μὴ διαμένειν, ἀλλ' ἔτερα γίνεσθαι ταῖς εἰρημέναις προσόδοις, ἐξαλλαγὴν τῆς οὐσίας λαμβανούσης. It may appear strange that this perpetually changing material should be said to be μὴτ' αὐξόμενον μῆτε μειούμενον, but the meaning is this: a material can only be said to increase and diminish by being considered as one and the same subject, as an *idίως ποιόν* during the change; but the material itself cannot be properly so regarded, since it is always changing.

¹ *ποιόν* or *ποιότης*, and also *ποιός* (sc. *λόγος*). According to *Simpl.* 55, α, many Stoics assign a threefold meaning to *ποιόν*. The first, which is also the most extensive meaning, includes every kind of quality, whether essential or accidental—the *πῶς ἔχον* as well as the *ποιόν*. In the second meaning *ποιόν* is used to express *permanent* qualities, including those which are non-essential—the *σχέσεις*. In the third and narrowest sense it expresses *τοὺς ἀπαρτίζοντας* (κατὰ τὴν ἐκφορὰν) καὶ ἐμμόνως ὄντας κατὰ διαφορὰν ποιόν, i.e. those qualities which faithfully represent essential attributes in their distinctive features. The substantive *ποιότης* is only used in the last sense.

² *Simpl.* 57, ε (the passage is discussed by *Petersen*, p. 85, and *Trendelenburg*, 223): οἱ δὲ Στωικοὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς ποιότητος τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων λέγουσι διαφορὰν εἶναι οὐσίας οὐκ ἀποδιαληπτὴν

(separable, i.e. from matter) καθ' ἑαυτὴν, ἀλλ' εἰς ἓν νόημα καὶ ἰδιότητα ἀπολήγουσαν οὔτε χρόνῳ οὔτε ἰσχύϊ εἰδοποιουμένην, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐξ αὐτῆς τοιουτότητι, καθ' ἣν ποιοῦ ὑφίσταται γένεσις. The meaning is, that *ποιότης* constitutes no independent unity, but only a unity of conception. Non-essential qualities were by the Stoics excluded from the category of *ποιόν*, and reckoned under that of *πῶς ἔχον*.

The same distinction between what is essential and what is not essential is indicated in the terms *ἔξις* and *σχέσις*: *ποιότητες*, or essential properties, being called essential forms (*ἔξεις* or *ἐκτάς*); non-essential qualities being called features or varieties (*σχέσεις*). See *Simpl.* 54, γ; 55, ε. Attributes, according to *Simpl.* 61, β, are declared to be essential, not owing to their permanence, but when they spring from the nature of the object to which they belong: τὰς μὲν γὰρ σχέσεις ταῖς ἐπικτήτοις καταστάσεσι χαρακτηρίζεσθαι τὰς δὲ ἔξεις ταῖς ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐνεργείαις. A very limited meaning, that of local position, is given to *σχέσις* in *Stob. Ecl.* i. 410.

The distinction between *ἑνωσις* and *συναφή* also belongs here. Anything the union of which depends on an essential quality is *ἡνωμένον*: everything else is either *συννηρμένον* or *ἐκ διεστώτων*. *Sext. Math.* ix. 78 (also in vii. 102): τῶν τε σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ἔστιν ἡνωμένα τὰ δὲ ἐκ συναπτο-

be one which belongs to a group or class, it is called a common form—*κοινῶς ποιόν*—or, if it be something peculiar and distinctive, it is called a distinctive form—*ιδίως ποιόν*.¹ Forms combined with matter constitute the special materials out of which individual things are made; ² and when a form is thus combined

μένων τὰ δὲ ἐκ διεστώτων· ἡνωμένα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὰ ὑπὸ μιᾷς ἕξεως κρατούμενα, καθάπερ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα· συνάφεια applies to chains, houses, ships, &c.; combination ἐκ διεστώτων to flocks and armies. *Seneca*, Ep. 102, 6, Nat. Qu. ii. 2, says the same. *Conf. Alex.* De Mixt. 143: ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸ ἐν σώμα ὑπὸ μιᾷς ὥς φασιν ἕξεως συνέχεσθαι. *Simpl.* 55, ε: τὰς γὰρ ποιότητας ἐκτὰ λέγοντες οὗτοι ἐπὶ τῶν ἡνωμένων μόνων ἐκτὰ ἀπολείπουσιν· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ συναφὴν, οἷον νεῶς, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ διάστασιν, οἷον στρατοῦ, μηδὲν εἶναι ἐκτὸν μηδὲ εὐρίσκεσθαι πνευματικόν τι ἐν ἐπ' αὐτῶν μηδὲ ἓνα λόγον ἔχον ὥστε ἐπὶ τινα ὑπόστασιν ἄλθεῖν μιᾷς ἕξεως.

Those *ἕξεις* which admit of no increase or diminution (*ἐπίτασις* and *ἕνεσις*) are called *διαθέσεις*, or *permanent forms*. Virtues, for instance, which, according to the Stoics, always exist in a perfect form where they exist at all, are *διαθέσεις*, but arts are only *ἕξεις*. *Simpl.* Categ. 61, β; *Stob.* Ecl. ii. 98 and 128.

¹ *Syrian*, on Arist. *Metaph.* 21: καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δὲ τοὺς κοινούς ποιοὺς πρὸ τῶν ἰδίων ποιῶν ἀποτίθενται. *Stob.* Ecl. i. 434; *Simpl.* De An. 61 explains *ιδίως ποιοὺς* by *ἀτομωθὲν εἶδος*. *Diog.* vii. 138; *Plut.* C. Not. 36, 3.

² Besides the passages already quoted in note 2 on p. 100, see

Sext. Pyrrh. i. 57: τὰ κιννύμενα (the intermingled materials) ἐξ οὐσίας καὶ ποιότητων συγκεῖσθαι φασιν. The Stoics, therefore, clearly distinguish between an *ἕξις*, or *essential form*, and the subject to which it belongs; and Philo must have been following the Stoics when he said (*Nom. Mutat.* 1063, D): ἕξεις γὰρ τῶν κατ' αὐτὰς ποιῶν ἀμείνους, ὥς μουσικὴ μουσικοῦ, κ.τ.λ. The Stoics also distinguish between a thing and its οὐσία. *Stob.* Ecl. i. 436: μὴ εἶναι τε ταῦτὸν τό τι ποῖον ἰδίως καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐξ ἧς ἐστὶ τοῦτο, μὴ μέντοι γε μὴδ' ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ μόνον οὐ ταῦτὸν, διὰ τὸ καὶ μέρος εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπέχειν τόπον, τὰ δ' ἕτερα τινῶν λεγόμενα δεῖν καὶ τόπῳ κεχωρίσθαι καὶ μὴδ' ἐν μέρει θεωρεῖσθαι. *Sext.* Pyrrh. iii. 170; *Math.* ix. 336: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ οὕτε ἕτερον τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος οὔτε τὸ αὐτό φασιν ὑπάρχειν· and *Seneca*, Ep. 313, 4. Mnesarchus accordingly compares the relation of a definite material to matter in general (οὐσία) with that of a statue to the material of which it is composed. Since the *ιδίως ποιοὺς* distinguishes a thing from every other, it follows as a matter of course, and is asserted by Chrysippus (in *Philo*, *Incorrupt.* M. 951, B), ὅτι δύο εἰδοποιούς [= *ιδίως ποιοὺς*] ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας ἀμήχανον συστήναι.

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with matter, it (ποιόν) corresponds to the form of (εἶδος) Aristotle.¹ It may, in fact, be described as the active and efficient part of a thing.² Aristotle's form, however, expresses only the non-material aspects of a thing, whereas form is regarded by the Stoics as something material—in fact, as air.³ Hence the mode in which form is conceived to reside in matter is that of an intermingling of elements.⁴ The same theory of intermingling applies of course to the union of several properties in one and the same subject-matter,⁵ and likewise to the combination of

¹ This may be seen from the passages quoted in the last note.

² *Plut.* St. Rep. 43, 4: τὴν ὕλην ἀργὸν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς καὶ ἀκίνητον ὑποκείσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν ἀποφαίνουσι, τὰς δὲ ποιότητας πνεύματα οὐσας καὶ τόνους ἀερώδεις οἷς ἂν ἐγγένωνται μέρεσι τῆς ὕλης εἰδοποιεῖν ἕκαστα καὶ σχηματίζειν. It is a carrying out of the Stoic teaching (as *Simpl.* 57, ε, remarks) for Plotinus to reduce ποιότης to the class-conception of δύναμις (Enn. vi. 1, 10). But the Stoic definition of δύναμις (quoted by *Simpl.* 58, α) — ἡ πλείονων ἐποιστικὴ συμπρωμάτων, with and without the addition of κατὰ κρατοῦσα τῶν ἐνεργειῶν—does not directly refer to ποιότης. ποιότης may also be connected with the λόγος σπερματικός. See *Plotin.* i. 29: εἰ δὲ τὰ ποιά ὕλην ποιάν λέγοιεν, πρῶτον μὲν οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῖς ἐνυλοὶ ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν ὕλῃ γενόμενοι σύνθετόν τι ποιήσουσιν . . . οὐκ ἔρα αὐτοὶ εἶδη οὐδὲ λόγοι. *Diog.* vii. 148: ἔστι δὲ φύσις ἕξις [= ποιότης] ἐξ αὐτῆς κινουμένη, κατὰ σπερματικὸν λόγον ἀποτελουσά τε καὶ συνέχουσα τὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς, κ.τ.λ.

³ *Plut.* Ibid. § 2: (Χρύσιππος) ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἔξεων οὐδὲν ἄλλο τὰς ἕξεις πλὴν ἕρας εἶναι φησιν· ὑπὸ τούτων γὰρ συνέχεται τὰ σώματα, καὶ τοῦ ποῖον ἕκαστον εἶναι αἷτιος ὁ συνέχων ἄνθρωπος ἐστίν, ὃν σκληρότητα μὲν ἐν σιδήρῳ, πυκνότητα δ' ἐν λίθῳ, λευκότητα δ' ἐν ἀργύρῳ καλοῦσιν. *Simpl.* 69, γ: ἡ τῶν Στωϊκῶν δόξα λεγόντων, σώματα εἶναι τὰ σχήματα ὥσπερ τὰ ἔλλα ποιά. Ibid. 67, ε; 56, δ: πῶς δὲ καὶ πνευματικὴ ἡ οὐσία ἔσται τῶν σωματικῶν ποιότητων αὐτοῦ τοῦ πνεύματος συνθέτου ὄντος, κ.τ.λ.

⁴ *Alex.* *Arheto.* De An. 143, b: πῶς δὲ σωζόντων ἐπὶ τὴν περὶ κρᾶσεως κοινὴν πρόληψιν τὸ λέγειν καὶ τὴν ἕξιν τοῖς ἔχουσιν αὐτὴν μεμίχθαι καὶ τὴν φύσιν τοῖς φυτοῖς καὶ τὸ φῶς τῷ ἀέρι καὶ τὴν ψυχῇ τῷ σώματι. Ibid. 144, α, the saying is attributed to the Stoics: μεμίχθαι τῇ ὕλῃ τὸν θεόν.

⁵ *Plut.* C. Not. 36, 3: λέγουσιν οἱ τοὶ καὶ πλάττουσιν ἐπὶ μιᾷ οὐσίᾳ δύο ἰδίως γενέσθαι ποίους, καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν ἕνα ποῖον ἰδίως ἔχουσαν ἐπιόντος ἐτέρου δέχεσθαι καὶ διαφυλάττειν ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέρους.

several attributes to produce a single 'form.'¹ In all cases the relation is supposed to be a materialistic one, and is explained by the hypothesis of mutual interpenetration of material things.²

This explanation could not, however, apply to every kind of attributes. Unable, therefore, to dispense entirely with things not material,³ the Stoics were obliged to admit the existence of attributes belonging to immaterial things, these attributes being, of course, themselves not material.⁴ What idea they formed

¹ *Simpl.* 70, ε: καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δὲ ποιότητας ποιότητων ποιούσιν ἑαυτῶν (? ἐκτῶν) ποιούντες ἐκτὰς ἕξεις. The context shows that the meaning of these words is that given above. The conception of form is formed from several attributes, and, therefore, that of a property, sometimes from several subordinate properties. If λευκὸν is a φρῶμα, the ἕξις, or form of λευκὸν, is διακριτικὸν ὄψεως.

² This follows of necessity from the Stoic doctrine of the material nature of properties and of the mingling of material things. The mechanical combination of material things (μίξις and κρᾶσις· chemical combination is expressed by παράθεσις and σύγχυσις) is defined to be a complete interpenetration of one material by another, without giving rise to a third new material (*Stob. Ecl.* i. 376; *Alex. De Mixt.* 142; *Plut. C. Not.* 37, 2). Properties are said to be material; and in all cases when they are combined, each property retains its own peculiarity, and yet is inherent in the subject-

matter and in every other property belonging to the same subject-matter. These statements can only be explained by accepting a mutual interpenetration of properties with each other and with their subject-matter, in the same way that it appears in mechanical combination.

³ The proof of this will be given subsequently. But compare p. 91.

⁴ *Simpl.* 56, δ, and 54, β: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ τῶν μὲν σωμάτων σωματικὰς, τῶν δὲ ἀσωμάτων ἀσωμάτων εἶναι λέγουσι τὰς ποιότητας. The σωματικαὶ ποιότητες are alone πνευματικάι. Incorporeal properties were called ἐκτὰ, to distinguish them from ἕξεις (essential forms). *Dexipp.* in *Cat.* p. 61, 17, Speng.: θαυμάζω δὲ τῶν Στωϊκῶν χωρίζοντων τὰς ἕξεις ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκτῶν· ἀσώματα γὰρ μὴ παραδεχόμενοι καθ' ἑαυτὰ, ὅταν ἐρεσχελεῖν δεόν ᾖ, ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαλήψεις ἔρχονται. But this use of terms appears not to have been universal among the Stoics (*Simpl. Categ.* 54, γ); and different views prevailed about the extent of the conception of ἐκτόν.

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to themselves of these incorporeal attributes, when reality was considered to belong only to things corporeal, it is, of course, impossible for us to determine.¹

(δ) *The categories of variety and variety of relation.*

The two remaining categories include everything which may be excluded from the conception of a thing on the ground of being either non-essential or accidental. In so far as such things belong to the object taken by itself alone, they come under the category of variety (πὼς ἔχον); but when they belong to it, because of its relation to something else, they come under the category of variety of relation (πρὸς τί πὼς ἔχον). Variety includes all accidental qualities, which can be assigned to any object independently of its relation to any other object²—such as size, colour, place, time, action, passion, possession, motion, state. In short, all the Aristotelian categories, with the exception of substance, whenever they apply to an object independently of its relation to other objects, belong to the category of variety³ (πὼς ἔχον).

¹ *Simpl.* 57, ε, after giving a definition of quality, continues: ἐν δὲ τούτοις, εἰ μὴ οἶόν τε κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνων λόγον κοινὸν εἶναι σύμπτωμα σωμάτων τε καὶ ἀσωμάτων, οὐκέτι ἔσται γένος ἢ ποιότης, ἀλλ' ἐτέρως μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων ἐτέρως δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων αὕτη ὑφέστηκε.

² *Simpl.* 44, δ: ὁ δὲ τὴν στάσιν καὶ τὴν κάθισιν μὴ προσποιούμενος (include) ἔοικε Στωϊκῇ τινι συνηθείᾳ συνέπεσθαι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸ ὑποκείμενον εἶναι νομίζων, τὰς δὲ περὶ αὐτὸ διαφορὰς ἀνυποστάτους ἡγούμενος καὶ πὼς ἔχοντα αὐτὰ

ἀποκαλῶν ὡς ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἔχοντα αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸ πὼς ἔχειν.

³ *Dexipp.* in Cat. 41, 20, Speng.: εἰ δέ τις εἰς τὸ πὼς ἔχον συντάττοι τὰς πλείστας κατηγορίας, ὥσπερ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ποιοῦσιν. *Plotin.* vi. 1, 30: πὼς δὲ ἐν τὸ πὼς ἔχον, πολλῆς διαφορᾶς ἐν αὐτοῖς οὕσης; πὼς γὰρ τὸ τρίτην καὶ τὸ λευκὸν εἰς ἐν [γένος θετέον], τοῦ μὲν ποσοῦ τοῦ δὲ ποιῶ ὄντος; πὼς δὲ τὸ ποτέ καὶ τὸ ποῦ; πὼς δὲ ὅλως πὼς ἔχοντα τὸ χθές καὶ τὸ πέρυσιν καὶ τὸ ἐν Δυκεΐᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀκαδηγίᾳ; καὶ ὅλως πὼς δὲ ὁ χρόνος πὼς ἔχον; . . . τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν πὼς πὼς

On the other hand, those features and states which are purely relative—such as right and left, sonship and fatherhood, &c.—come under the category of variety of relation (*πρὸς τί πως ἔχον*); a category from which the simple notion of relation (*πρὸς τι*) must be distinguished. Simple relation (*πρὸς τι*) is not spoken of as a distinct category, since it includes not only accidental relations, but also those essential properties (*ποιὰ*) which presuppose a definite relation to something else—such as knowledge and perception.¹

ἔχον . . . καὶ ὁ πάσχον οὐ πὼς ἔχον . . . ἴσως δ' ἂν μόνον ἀρμόσκει ἐπὶ τοῦ κείσθαι τὸ πὼς ἔχον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἔχειν· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἔχειν οὐ πὼς ἔχον ἀλλὰ ἔχον. *Simpl.* Categ. 94, ε: The Stoics include ἔχειν under πὼς ἔχον. *Simpl.* 16, δ, says that the Stoics omitted quantity, time, and place; which means that they did not treat them as separate categories. *Trendelenburg*, p. 229, with justice, observes that ποσὸν comes under ποιόν.

¹ *Simpl.* 42, ε: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ ἀνθ' ἑνὸς γένους δύο κατὰ τὸν τόπον τοῦτον ἀριθμοῦνται, τὰ μὲν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τι τιθέντες, τὰ δ' ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τί πως ἔχουσι, καὶ τὰ μὲν πρὸς τι ἀντιδιαφοροῦντες τοῖς καθ' αὐτὰ, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα τοῖς κατὰ διαφορὰν. (*Ibid.* 44, β: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ νομίζουσι πάσης τῆς κατὰ διαφορὰν ιδιότητος ἀπηλλάχθαι τὰ πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα.) Sweet and bitter belong to τὰ πρὸς τι· to the other class belong δεξιὸς, πατὴρ, &c., κατὰ διαφορὰν δὲ φασὶ τὰ κατὰ τι εἶδος χαρακτηρίζεσθαι. Every καθ' αὐτὸ is also κατὰ διαφορὰν (determined as to quality), and every πρὸς τί

πως ἔχον is also a πρὸς τι, but not conversely. εἰ δὲ δεῖ σαφέστερον μεταλαβεῖν τὰ λεγόμενα, πρὸς τι μὲν λέγουσιν ὅσα κατ' οἰκίον χαρακτηρὰ διακείμενά πως ἀπονέμει πρὸς ἕτερον (or, according to the definition in *Seal.* Math. viii. 454: πρὸς τι ἐστὶ τὸ πρὸς ἑτέρῳ νοούμενον), πρὸς τι δὲ πως ἔχοντα ὅσα πέφυκε συμβαίνειν τινὶ καὶ μὴ συμβαίνειν ἄνευ τῆς περὶ αὐτὰ μεταβολῆς καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως μετὰ τοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἐκτὸς ἀποβλέπειν, ὥστε ὅταν μὲν κατὰ διαφορὰν τι διακείμενον πρὸς ἕτερον νεύσῃ, πρὸς τι μό:ον τοῦτο ἔσται, ὡς ἡ ἔξις καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις· ὅταν δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἐνοῦσαν διαφορὰν κατὰ ψιλὴν δὲ τὴν πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσιν θεωρῇται, πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα ἔσται· ὁ γὰρ υἱὸς καὶ ὁ δεξιὸς ἔξωθεν τινῶν προσδεόνται, πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν· διδ καὶ μηδεμιᾶς γινομένης περὶ αὐτὰ μεταβολῆς γένοιτ' ἂν οὐκ ἐτι πατὴρ, τοῦ υἱοῦ ἀποθανόντος, ὁ δὲ δεξιὸς τοῦ παρακειμένου μεταστατῆτος· τὸ δὲ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρὸν οὐκ ἂν ἀλλοίῳ γένοιτο εἰ μὴ συμμεταβάλλοι καὶ ἡ περὶ αὐτὰ δύναμις. In the same sense, therefore, πρὸς τι belongs to ποιόν, being composed (as *Simpl.*

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V.(c) *Relation of the categories to one another.*

The relation of these four Categories to one another is such, that each preceding Category is included in the one next following, and receives from it a more definite character.¹ Subject-matter is in reality never met with apart from its forms, but has always some definite quality or other to give it a character. On the other hand, property or form is never met with alone, but always in connection with some subject-matter. Variety supposes that the subject-matter has already a definite form or property, and variety of relation supposes the existence of variety.² It will be seen hereafter how closely these characteristics, and, indeed, the whole doctrine of the Categories, depends on the peculiar metaphysical groundwork of the Stoic system.

(3) *Perfect expression.*
(a) *Judgment.*

Passing from imperfect to perfect expression, we come, in the first place, to sentences or propositions,³ all the various kinds of which corresponding to the

43, a, says) of ποῖον and πρὸς τι. On the other hand, πρὸς τί πως ἔχον only expresses an accidental relation.

¹ *Trendelenburg*, p. 220, considers that the complete name for the second category would be ὑποκείμενα ποιά· for the third, ὑποκείμενα ποιά πως ἔχοντα· for the fourth, ὑποκείμενα ποιά πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα. In support of this, he refers to *Simpl.* 43, a: ἐπεταὶ δὲ αὐτοῖς κάκεινο ἄτοπον τὸ σύνθετα ποιεῖν τὰ γένη ἐκ προτέρων τινῶν καὶ δευτέρων ὡς τὸ πρὸς τι ἐκ ποιοῦ καὶ τοῦ πρὸς τι. *Plot.* C. Not. 44, 6: τέτταρά γε ποιοῦσιν ὑποκείμενα περὶ ἕκαστον, μᾶλλον δὲ τέτταρα ἕκαστον ἡμῶν. *Plot.* Enn. vi. 1, 29: ἄτοπος ἡ διαίρεσις . . . ἐν θατέρῳ τῶν εἰδῶν τὸ ἕτερον

τιθεῖσα, ὥσπερ ἂν [εἴ] τις διαίρων τὴν ἐπιστήμην τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν λέγοι, τὴν δὲ γραμματικὴν καὶ ἄλλο τι· if ποιά are to be ὕλη ποιά, they are composed of ὕλη and εἶδος or λόγος.

² *Plotin.* vi. 1, 30: Why are πῶς ἔχοντα enumerated as a third category, since πάντα περὶ τὴν ὕλην πῶς ἔχοντα; The Stoics will probably say that ποιά are περὶ τὴν ὕλην πῶς ἔχοντα, whereas the πῶς ἔχοντα, in the strict sense of the term, are περὶ τὰ ποιά. This may be true; but since the ποιά themselves are nothing more than ὕλη πῶς ἔχοντα, all categories must be ultimately reduced to ὕλη.

³ *Prantl*, *Gesch. d. Logik*, i. 440-467.

different forms of syntax, were enumerated by the Stoics with the greatest precision.¹ Detailed information is, however, only forthcoming in reference to the theory of judgment (*ἀξιωμα*), which appears to have engaged the greatest and most important part of their speculations. A judgment is a perfect expression, which is either true or false.² Judgments are divided into two classes: *simple* judgments, and *composite* judgments.³ By a simple judgment the Stoics understood a judgment which is purely categorical.⁴ Under the head of composite judgments are comprised hypothetical, corroborative, copulative, disjunctive, comparative, and causal judgments.⁵ In

¹ In *Diog.* 66; *Sext. Math.* viii. 70; *Ammon.* De Interp. 4, a (Schol. in Arist. 93, a); *Simpl.* Cat. 103, a; *Boëth.* De Interp. 315; *Cramer,* Anecd. Oxon. iii. 267, a distinction is drawn between *ἀξιωμα* (a judgment), *ἐρώτημα* (a direct question, requiring Yes or No), *πύσμα* (an enquiry), *προστακτικόν*, *ὀρκικόν*, *ἀρατικόν* (wishes), *εὐκτικόν* (a prayer), *ὑποθετικόν* (a supposition), *ἐκθετικόν* (as *ἐκκείσθω εὐθεία γραμμὴ*), *προσαγορευτικόν* (an address), *θαυμαστικόν*, *ψεκτικόν*, *ἐπαπορητικόν*, *ἀφηγηματικόν* (explanatory statements), *ὅμοιον ἀξιώματι* (a judgment with something appended, as: *ὡς Πριαμίδῃσιν ἐμφερὴς ὁ Βουκόλος!*). *Ammon.* in Waitz, *Arist. Orig.* i. 43, speaks of ten forms of sentences held by the Stoics, mentioning, however, only two, *προστακτικὸς* and *εὐκτικὸς*. *Diog.* 191, mentions treatises of Chrysippus on interrogatory and hortatory sentences. See also *Simpl.*; *Stob.* Floril. 28, 15.

² *Diog.* 65: *ἀξιωμα δὲ ἐστὶν ὃ ἐστὶν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος*. Questions and other similar sentences are neither true nor false (*Ibid.* 66 and 68). This definition of a judgment is constantly referred to by *Simpl.* Cat. 103, a; *Cic.* Tusc. i. 7, 14; *De Fato*, 10, 20; *Gell.* N. A. xvi. 8, 8; Schol. in *Arist.* 93. The purport of the expression *λόγος ἀποφαντικός*, *λεκτὸν ἀποφαντὸν* (in *Diog.* 65; *Gell.* xvi. 8, 4; *Ammon.* De Interp. 4, a; Schol. in *Arist.* 93) is the same.

³ *Sext. Math.* viii. 93: *τῶν γὰρ ἀξιωμαίων πρώτην σχεδὸν καὶ κυριωτάτην ἐκφέρουσι διαφορὰν οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ καθ' ἣν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἀπλᾶ τὰ δ' οὐχ ἀπλᾶ*. *Ibid.* 95 and 108; *Diog.* 68.

⁴ *Sext. Ibid.*; *Diog.*

⁵ *Diog.* 69: *ἐν δὲ τοῖς οὐχ ἀπλοῖς τὸ συνημμένον καὶ τὸ παρασυνημμένον καὶ τὸ συμπεπλεγμένον καὶ τὸ αἰτιώδες καὶ τὸ διεξευγμένον καὶ τὸ διασαφούν τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ διασαφούν τὸ ἥττον*. For the

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(a) *Simple
judgment.*

the case of simple judgments, a greater or less definiteness of assertion is substituted by the Stoics in the place of the ordinary difference in respect of quantity;¹ and with regard to quality, they not only make a distinction between affirmative and negative judgments,² but, following the various forms of language, they speak of judgments of general negation, judgments of particular negation, and judgments of double negation.³ Only affirmative and negative judgments have a contradictory relation to one another; all other judgments stand to each other in the relation of contraries.⁴ Of two propositions which

παρὰσυνημμένον — a conditional sentence, the first part of which is introduced by ἐπειδὴ—see *Diog.* 71 and 74; for the συμπλεγμένον, the characteristic of which is καί, see *Diog.* 72; *Sext. Math.* viii. 124; *Gell. N. A.* xvi. 8 and 9; *Ps. Galen, Eisag. dial.* p. 13; *Desripp.* in *Cat.* 27, 3, Speng.; for the αἰτιῶδες, which is characterised by a διότι, *Diog.* 72 and 74; for the διασαφούν τὸ μᾶλλον and the διασαφούν τὸ ἥττον, *Diog.* 72; *Cramer, Anecd. Oxon.* i. 188; *Apollon.* *Synt. (Bekker's Anecd.* ii.), 481. These are only some of the principal forms of composite judgments, their number being really indefinite. Chrysippus estimated that a million combinations might be formed with ten sentences. The celebrated mathematician, Hipparchus, however, proved that only 103,049 affirmative and 310,952 negative judgments could be formed with that material (*Plut. Sto. Rep.* 29, 5; *Qu. Symp.* viii. 9, 3, 11).

¹ There is no notice of a divi-

sion of judgments into general and particular. Instead of that, *Sext. (Math.* viii. 96) distinguishes ὀρισμένα as οὗτος κάθηται, ἀόριστα as τις κάθηται, and μέσα as ἄνθρωπος κάθηται, Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ. When the subject stood in the nominative, ὀρισμένα were called καταγορευτικά, the others κατηγορικά. a καταγορευτικὸν is οὗτος περιπατεῖ. a κατηγορικὸν, Δίων περιπατεῖ.

² An affirmative judgment was called καταφατικὸν. a negative ἀποφατικὸν, by Chrysippus and *Simpl. Cat.* 102, δ, ζ. *Apul. Dogm. Plat.* iii. p. 266, renders these terms by dedicativa and abdicativa. See *Boëth. De Interp.* 373; *Schol.* in *Arist.* 120.

³ A judgment of general negation was called ἀρνητικὸν—for instance, οὐδεὶς περιπατεῖ. one of particular negation, στερητικὸν—as, ἀφιλάνθρωπός ἐστιν οὗτος. one of double negation, ὑπεραποφατικὸν—as, οὐχὶ ἡμέρα οὐκ ἐστὶ. See *Diog.* 69.

⁴ *Sext. Math.* viii. 89; *Diog.* 73: ἀντικείμενα are ὦν τὸ ἔτερον

are related as contradictories, according to the old rule, one must be true and the other false.¹

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The most important among the composite judgments are the hypothetical and disjunctive judgments, but, as regards the latter, next to no information has reached us.² A hypothetical judgment (*συνημμένον*) is a judgment consisting of two clauses, connected by the conjunction 'if,' and related to one another, as cause and effect; the former being called the *leading* (*ἡγούμενον*), and the latter the *concluding* clause (*ἀηγγον*).³ In the correctness of the inference the truth of a hypothetical judgment consists. As to the conditions upon which the accuracy of an

(β) Composite judgments.

τοῦ ἑτέρου, either ἐστὶν ἀποφατικὸν or ἀποφάσει πλεονάζει—as, It is day, and It is not day. Aristotle called contradictories ἀντίφασις, and contraries ἐναντιότης, putting both under the class conception of ἀντικείμενα. The Stoics reserved ἀντικείμενα for expressing contradictories, and used μαχόμενα, instead of ἐναντίον, for contraries (*Apollon. Synt.* p. 484, Bekk.). Otherwise, following Aristotle, they distinguished between ἐναντίον and ἐναντίως ἔχον· ἐναντία are conceptions which are in plain and immediate contrast, such as φρόνησις and ἀφρόνησις· ἐναντίως ἔχοντα are those which are only contrasted by means of the ἐναντία, such as φρόνιμος and ἀφρων (*Simpl. Categ.* 98, γ). The former, therefore, apply to abstract, the latter to concrete notions. See the fragment of Chrysippus περὶ ἀποφατικοῦ.

¹ *Simpl. Categ.* 103, β; *Cic. De Fato*, 16, 37; *N. De. i.* 25, 70.

² *Viz.* that the members of a

disjunction, as well as their contradictory opposites, must also be contraries (*adversa* or *pugnantia*), and that from the truth of the one the falsehood of the other follows. A disjunction which does not satisfy one or the other of these conditions is false (*παράδειξευγμένον*). *Gell. N. A.* xvi. 8, 12; *Sext. Pyrrh.* ii. 191; *Alex. Anal. Pr.* 7, b.

³ *Diog.* 71; *Sext. Math.* 109; *Galen, De Simpl. Medicamen.* ii. 16; *Ps. Galen, Εἰσαγ. διαλ.* p. 15. The Stoics distinguish most unnecessarily, but quite in harmony with their ordinary external formality, the case in which the leading clause is identical with the inferential clause (*εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶν, ἡμέρα ἐστὶν*) and the case in which it is different (*εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶν, φῶς ἐστὶν*). Conditional sentences of the first kind are called *διφορούμενα συνημμένα*. *Sext. viii.* 281; 296; and 466; *Pyrrh.* ii. 112; viii. 95; *Diog.* 68.

inference rests, different opinions were entertained within the Stoic School itself.¹ The leading clause was also called a *suggestive* or *indicatory symbol*,²

¹ *Sext. Math. viii. 112*: κοινῶς μὲν γὰρ φασιν ἅπαντες οἱ Διαλεκτικοὶ ὀγιῆς εἶναι συνημμένον, ὅταν ἀκολουθῇ τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡγουμένῳ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ λήγον. περὶ δὲ τοῦ πότε ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ πῶς, στασιάζουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαχόμενα τῆς ἀκολουθίας ἐκτίθενται κριτήρια. *Cic. Acad. ii. 47, 143*: In hoc ipso, quod in elementis dialectici docent, quomodo judicare oporteat, rerum falsumne sit, si quid ita connexum est, ut hoc: Si dies est, lucet; quanta contentio est! aliter Diodoro aliter Philoni, Chrysippo aliter placet. The Philo here alluded to—the same Philo against whom Chrysippus wrote his treatises (*Diog. vii. 191 and 194*), the well-known dialectician, and pupil of Diodorus—had declared all conditional sentences to be right which had not a false inferential clause drawn from a true leading clause. According to this view, conditional sentences would be right, with both clauses true, or both false, or with a false leading clause and true inferential clause (*Sext. viii. 245 and 449; Pyrrh. ii. 110*). According to *Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 104*, the view of Philo appears to have gained acceptance among the Stoics, perhaps through Zeno, who was connected with Philo (*Diog. vii. 16*). But, in any case, the meaning appears to have been (*Diog. vii. 81*), that, in the cases mentioned, conditional sentences *might* be right, not that they *were* right.

Others more appropriately judged of the correctness of con-

ditional sentences by the connection of their clauses, either requiring that the contradictory opposite of the inferential clause should be irreconcilable with the leading clause, or that the inferential clause should be potentially contained in the leading clause (*Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 111*). The first requirement which is mentioned by *Diog. 73*, as the only criterion of the Stoic School, was due to Chrysippus, who refused to allow sentences in which this was not the case to be expressed hypothetically (*Cic. De Fato, 6, 12; 8, 15*): it was not right to say, Si quis natus est oriente canicula, is in mari non morietur; but, Non et natus est quis oriente canicula et is in mari morietur.

It may be observed, in connection with the accuracy of conditional sentences, that a true conditional sentence may become false in time. The sentence, If Dion is alive now, he will continue to live, is true at the present moment; but in the last moment of Dion's life it will cease to be true. Such sentences were called ἀπεριγράφως μεταπίπτοντα, because the time could not be previously fixed when they would become false (*Simpl. Phys. 305, a*). Chrysippus also wrote on the μεταπίπτοντα. *Diog. vii. 105*, mentions two treatises of his on the subject, characterising them, however, as spurious.

² According to *Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 100, Math. viii. 143 and 156*, the Stoics distinguished between σημαῖα ὑπομνηστικά and σημαῖα ἐν-

because it made an assertion, the existence of which indicates something of the inferential clause.

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The modality of judgments occupied a great deal of attention in the logic of Aristotle and his immediate pupils, and was no doubt treated by the Stoics at considerable length; but, on this branch of the Stoic logic, likewise, those rules are only known to us, which were laid down by Chrysippus in his contest with the Megarian Diodorus,¹ and relate to possible and necessary judgments. They are in themselves

(γ) Mo-
dality of
judgments.

δεικτικά. The definition of the latter was ἐνδεικτικὸν ἀξίωμα ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ καθηγούμενον ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ λήγοντος· the ὑγιὲς συνημμένῳ being a sentence with both the leading and inferential clauses true. *Sext.* Pyrrh. ii. 101; 106; 115; *Math.* viii. 249.

429) that the οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον was partly possible and partly impossible, without contradicting their other statement, that the δυνατὸν was partly necessary and partly not necessary. The conceptions of the Possible and the Not-necessary are thus made to overlap.

¹ Diodorus had said that Only what is, or what will be, is possible. The Stoics, and in particular Chrysippus, define δυνατὸν as what is capable of being true (τὸ ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ ἀληθὲς εἶναι), if circumstances do not prevent; ἀδύνατον as ὃ μὴ ἐστὶν ἐπιδεκτικὸν τοῦ ἀληθὲς εἶναι. From the δυνατὸν they distinguish the οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, which is defined as ὃ καὶ ἀληθὲς ἐστὶ καὶ ψεῦδος οἶόν τε εἶναι τῶν ἐκτὸς μηδὲν ἐναντιούμενων (*Plut. Sto. Rep.* 46; *Diog.* 75; *Boëth.* De Interp. 374; *Alex. Aphr.* De Fato, v. 10). On the other hand, ἀναγκαῖον is, what is both true and incapable of being false, either in itself or owing to other circumstances. There was probably another definition of οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, as ὃ ψεῦδος οἶόν τε εἶναι τῶν ἐκτὸς μὴ ἐναντιούμενων· so that it might be said (*Boëth.*

To defend his definition of the Possible against the *κυριεύων* of Diodorus, Chrysippus denied the statement, δυνατῷ ἀδύνατον μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν, without exposing the confusion contained in it between sequence in time and causal relation (*Alex. Anal. Pri.* 57, b; *Philop. Anal. Pr.* xlii. b; *Schol.* in *Arist.* 163, a; *Cic. De Fato*, 7, 13; *Ep. ad Div.* ix. 4). Cleanthes, Antipater, and Panthoides preferred to attack another leading clause of Diodorus, the clause that Every past occurrence must necessarily be true (*Epictet. Diss.* ii. 19, 2 and 5). The Aristotelian position in reference to a disjunction, that When the disjunction refers to something future, the disjunction itself is true, without either clause being necessarily true, was not accepted by the Stoics (*Simpl. Cat.* 103, β).

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of no great value. Nevertheless, great value was attached to them by the Stoics, in the hope that by their help they would escape the difficulties in which their views on freedom and necessity¹ must otherwise have involved them.

(b) In-
ference.

In the theory of illation,² to which the Stoics attached specially value, priding themselves no little on their investigations,³ chief attention was paid to hypothetical and disjunctive inferences.⁴ The rules they laid down in regard to these forms of inference are well known; and from these forms they took their examples, even when treating of inference in general.⁵ According to Alexander,⁶ the hypothetical and disjunctive forms were considered the only regular forms of inference,⁷ categorical conclusions

(a) Hypo-
thetical in-
ference the
original
form.

¹ *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 46, justly insists on this point.

² *Prantl*, pp. 467-496.

³ *Diog.* 45; *Sext. Pyrrh.* ii. 194.

⁴ Both were included by the Peripatetics under the term hypothetical.

⁵ As shown by *Prantl*, 468, 171; *Sext. Pyrrh.* ii. 135; *Diog.* 76; *Apul. Dogm. Plat.* iii. 279.

⁶ *Anal. Pr.* 87, b: δι' υποθέσεως δὲ ἄλλης, ὡς εἶπεν (*Arist. Anal. Pr.* i. 23) εἶεν ἂν καὶ οὗς οἱ νεώτεροι συλλογισμοὺς μόνους βούλονται λέγειν· οὗτοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ διὰ τροπικοῦ, ὡς φασί, καὶ τῆς προλήψεως γινόμενοι, τοῦ τροπικοῦ ἢ συνημμένου ὄντος ἢ διεσπυγμένου, ἢ συμπεπλεγμένου. By the νεώτεροι, the Stoics must be meant, for the terminology is theirs; and the Peripatetics, to whom it might otherwise apply, always considered the categorical to be the original form.

⁷ Such an inference was called λόγος· for instance, If it is day, it is light. The arrangement of the clauses, which were designated by numbers (and not by letters, as the Peripatetics had done), was called τρόπος· for instance, εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον. A conclusion composed of both forms of expression was a λογότροπος· for instance, εἰ ξῆ Πλάτων, ἀναπνεῖ Πλάτων· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον. The premisses were called λήμματα (ἀξίωμα is a judgment independently of its position in a syllogism); or, more correctly, the major premiss was λῆμμα, the minor πρόσληψις (hence the particles δέ γε were προσληπτικὸς σύνδεσμος, *Apollon. Synt.* p. 518, Bekk.). The conclusion was ἐπιφορά. The major premiss in a hypothetical syllogism was called τροπικόν, its two clauses being called, respec-

being considered correct in point of fact, but defective in proper syllogistic form.¹ A distinction was also made between such inferences as are connected or conclusive, and those which are disconnected, inconclusive, or uninferential.² In determining the connection of an inference, regard was had partly to the greater or less accuracy of expression,³ and partly to the difference between correctness of form and truth of matter.⁴ The Stoics also remarked that true conclusions do not always extend the field of knowledge; and that those which do, frequently depend on grounds only privately and personally valid, and not on proofs universally acknowledged.⁵

tively, ἡγούμενον and λήγον. *Diog.* 76; *Sext.* *Pyrrh.* ii. 135; *Math.* viii. 301; *Alex.*; *Philop.* *Anal.* Pr. lx. a; *Schol.* in *Arist.* 170, a; *Ammon.* on *Anal.* Pr. 24, b, 19; *Arist.* *Orig.* ed. *Waitz*, i. 45; *Apul.* *Dog.* *Plat.* iii. 279; *Ps. Galen.* *Eisag.* *διαλ.* p. 19.

¹ *Alex.* *Anal.* Pr. 116, b, first mentions ἀμεθόδως περαίνοντες συλλογισμοί, or inferences incomplete in point of form. Such a one is: $A = B, B = C, \therefore A = C$, which is said to want as its major premiss: Two things which are equal to a third are equal to one another. He then continues: οὗς ὅτι μὲν μὴ λέγουσι συλλογιστικῶς συνάγειν, ὅγιως λέγουσι [οἱ νεώτεροι] . . . ὅτι δὲ ἡγοῦνται ὁμοίους αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοῖς κατηγορηκοῖς συλλογισμοῖς . . . τοῦ παντὸς διαμαρτάνουσιν.

² συνακτικοί or περαντικοί, and ἀσυνακτικοί or ἀπεραντοί, or ἀσυλλογιστοί. *Sext.* *Pyrrh.* ii. 137; *Math.* viii. 303 and 428; *Diog.* 77.

³ Syllogisms which are con-

nected in point of fact, but wanting in precision of form, were called περαντικοί: those complete also in form, συλλογιστικοί. *Diog.* 78; *Ps. Galen.* *Eisag.* *διαλ.* 58.

⁴ An inference is true (ἀληθής) when not only the illation is correct (ὀρθή), but when the individual propositions, the premisses as well as the conclusion, are materially true. The λόγοι συνακτικοί may therefore be divided into true and false. *Sext.* *Pyrrh.* ii. 138; *Math.* viii. 310 and 412; *Diog.* 79.

⁵ *Sext.* *Pyrrh.* ii. 140 and 135; *Math.* viii. 305; 313; and 411: True forms of inference are divided into ἀποδεικτικοί and οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί. ἀποδεικτικοί = οἱ διὰ προδήλων ἁδηλόν τι συνάγοντες: οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί when this is not the case, as in the inference: If it is day, it is light—It is day, \therefore It is light; for the conclusion, It is light, is known as well as it is known that It is day. The ἀπο-

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(β) *The five simple forms of hypothetical inference.*

Their most important way of dividing inferences was, however, by a division based on logical form. According to Chrysippus,¹ who adopted the division of Theophrastus, there are five original forms of hypothetical inference, the accuracy of which is beyond proof; and to these all other forms of inference were referred, and were by them tested as standards.² Yet even among these forms, which are especially dwelt upon, some repeat the same sentence tautologically in the form of a conclusion.³ How widespread the love of formality must have been which could so often disfigure the Stoic logic!

(γ) *Composite forms of inference.*

The combination of these five simple forms of inference gives rise to the composite forms of inference,⁴ all of which may be reduced to their simple forms again.⁵

δεικτικοὶ may proceed either ἐφοδευτικῶς or ἐφοδευτικῶς ἅμα καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικῶς· ἐφοδευτικῶς when the premisses rest upon faith (πίστις and μνήμη); ἐκκαλυπτικῶς when they are based on a scientific necessity.

¹ According to *Diog.* 79, *Sext.* *Pyrrh.* ii. 157, others added other forms of ἀναπόδεικτοι. *Cic.*, in adding a sixth and seventh (*Top.* 14, 57), must have been following these authorities.

² Consult *Diog.* 79–81; *Sext.* *Pyrrh.* ii. 156–159; 201; *Math.* viii. 223–227; *Cic.* *Top.* 13; *Simpl.* *Phys.* 123; *Ps. Galen.* *Eisag.* *διαλ.* 17; *Prantl.* 473, 182; *Sext.* *Pyrrh.* i. 69; *Cleomed.* *Meteora*, pp. 41 and 47.

³ Two cases are distinguished in which this is so. The first class are called διφορούμενοι· If it is day, it is day; It is day, ∴ It

is day. The second class, ἀδιαφόρως περαινόντες· It is either day or night; It is day, ∴ It is day. See *Alex. Anal.* *Pr.* 7, a; 53, b; *Top.* 7; *Schol.* in *Arist.* 294, b, 25; *Cic.* *Acad.* ii. 30. 96; *Prantl.* 476, 185.

⁴ *Cic.* *Top.* 15, 57: ex his modis conclusiones innumera-biles nascuntur. *Sext.* *Math.* viii. 228, in which passage it is striking that ἀναπόδεικτοι should be divided into ἀπλοῖ and οὐχ ἀπλοῖ. It has been suggested that ἀποδεικτικῶν should be substituted for ἀναποδείκτων, but the latter word may be used in a narrow as in a wider sense.

⁵ *Diog.* 78: συλλογιστικοὶ [λόγοι] μὲν οὖν εἰσιν οἱ ἥτοι ἀναπόδεικτοι ὄντες ἢ ἀναγόμενοι ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀναποδείκτους κατὰ τι τῶν θεμάτων ἢ τινά. Chrysippus had taken great pains in reducing the com-

Among the composite forms of inference, those composed of similar parts are distinguished from those composed of dissimilar parts,¹ but in the treatment of the former such a useless love of form is shown, that it is hard to say what the Stoics thereby intended.² If two or more inferences are combined, in such a way that the conclusion of the one is the first premiss of the other, the judgment which constitutes the conclusion and premiss at once being omitted in each case, the result is a Sorites or Chain-inference. The rules prescribed by the Peripatetics for the Chain-inference were developed by the Stoics with a minuteness far transcending all the wants of science.³

posite forms of inference (*Diog.* 190 and 194; *Galen*, *Hipp.* et *Plat.* ii. 3).

¹ *Sext.* 229-243, who quotes the example used by *Ænesidemus*, though he is no doubt following the Stoic treatment. *Prantl*, 479.

² *Sext.*; *Prantl*.

³ *Alex.* on *Anal. Pr.* i. 25, after speaking of the Sorites, continues (p. 94, b): ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ τῶν προτάσεων συνεχεία τό τε συνθετικόν ἐστὶ θεώρημα . . . καὶ οἱ καλούμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν νεωτέρων ἐπιβάλλοντες τε καὶ ἐπιβαλλόμενοι. συνθετικὸν θεώρημα (or chain-argument), the meaning of which is next investigated, must be an expression of the Peripatetics. The same meaning must attach to ἐπιβάλλοντες τε καὶ ἐπιβαλλόμενοι, which are to be found ἐν ταῖς συνεχῶς λαμβανομέναις προτάσεσι χωρὶς τῶν συμπερασμάτων for instance, A is a property of

B, B of C, C of D; ∴ A is a property of D. ἐπιβαλλόμενος means the inference, the conclusion of which is omitted; ἐπιβάλλων, the one with the omitted premiss. These inferences may be in either of the three Aristotelian figures κατὰ τὸ παραδεχόμενον συνθετικὸν θεώρημα. ὃ οἱ μὲν περὶ Ἀριστοτέλην τῇ χρεῖᾳ παραμετρήσαντες παρέδοσαν, ἐφ' ὅσον αὐτὴ ἀπῆρει, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς παρ' ἐκείνων λαβόντες καὶ διελόντες ἐποίησαν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὸ καλούμενον παρ' αὐτοῖς δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον θέμα καὶ τέταρτον, ἀμελήσαντες μὲν τοῦ χρησίμου, πᾶν δὲ τὸ ὅπως οὖν δυνάμενον λέγεσθαι ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ θεωρίᾳ, καὶ ἄχρηστος ἦ, ἐπεξελθόντες τε καὶ ζηλώσαντες. Reference is made to the same object in *Simpl.* De Cælo; *Schol.* in *Arist.* 483, b, 26: ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη ἀνάλυσις τοῦ λόγου, ἡ τὸ συμπέρασμα λαμβάνουσα καὶ προσλαμβάνουσα ἄλλην πρότασιν, κατὰ τὸ

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V.(δ) In-
ference
from a sin-
gle pre-
miss.

With these composite forms of inference other forms having only a single premiss¹ were contrasted by Antipater, who thus made an addition to the field of logic of very doubtful worth. On a few other points connected with the Stoic theory of illation, some very imperfect information exists.² The loss of better information will, however, be felt all the less, since in what we already possess we have conclusive evidence that the objections brought against the Stoic logic were really well founded. The petty littleness and minuteness with which the Stoics followed out even the most worthless logical forms³ is truly astonishing.

(c) Refu-
tation of
fallacies.

Next to describing the inferences which were valid, another subject seemed to demand the greatest care on the part of the Stoics, and to afford at the same time an opportunity for the display of their subtlety. This subject was no other than the enumeration and refutation of false inferences,⁴ and in particular the exposing of the many fallacies which had

τρίτον λεγόμενον παρὰ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς θέμα περαινεται, the rule of which is, that when a third proposition can be concluded from the conclusion of an inference and a second proposition, that third proposition can be concluded from the premisses of the inference and the second proposition. This appears to have escaped the notice of *Prantl*. The expressions διὰ δύο τροπικῶν, διὰ τριῶν τροπικῶν (*Galen*; *Sext. Pyrrh.* ii. 2), appear to refer to such composite inferences.

¹ Called μονολήμματοι συλλο-

γισμοί. Such were ἡμέρα ἐστι, φῶς ἄρα ἐστίν· and ἀναπνείς, ζῆς ἄρα. See *Alex. Top.* 6; *Anal. Pr.* 7, a; *Sext. Pyrrh.* ii. 167; *Math.* viii. 443; *Apul. Dogm. Plat.* iii. 272; *Prantl*, 477, 186.

² Compare the remarks of *Prantl*, 481, on *Sext. Pyrrh.* ii. 2; *Alex. Anal. Pr.* 53, b; *Galen*; *Ps. Galen*.

³ Conf. *Alex. Anal. Pr.* 95, a; *Galen*.

⁴ *Diog.* 186, mentions fallacies due to Chrysippus, which can only have been raised for the purpose of being refuted.

become current since the age of the Sophists and Megarians. In this department likewise Chrysippus, as might be expected, led the van.¹ But Chrysippus was not always able to overcome the difficulties that presented themselves; witness his remarkable attitude towards the Chain-inference, from which he thought to escape by withholding judgment.² The fallacies, however, to which the Stoics devoted their attention, and the way in which they met them, need not occupy our attention further.³

In all these researches the Stoics were striving to secure a solid basis for a scientific process of proof. Great as was the value which they assigned to such a process, they nevertheless admitted, as Aristotle had done before, that everything could not be proved. Here, then, was the weak point in science; but instead of strengthening this weak point by means of induction, and endeavouring to obtain a more complete theory of induction, they were content with conjectural data, sometimes involving their own truth, at other times needing to be established by inferences of which they were themselves the premisses.⁴ Thus,

D. *Estimate of Stoic Logic.*
(1) *Its shortcomings.*

¹ The list of his writings contains a number of treatises on fallacies, among them no less than five on the *ψευδόμενος*.

² *Cic. Acad. ii.* 29, 93: Placet enim Chrysippo, cum gradatim interrogetur, verbi causa, tria pauca sint, anne multa, aliquanto prius, quam ad multa perveniat, quiescere, id est, quod ab iis dicitur *ἡσυχάζειν*. The same remark is made by *Sext. Math. vii.* 416; *Pyrrh. ii.* 253. The same argument was employed against

other fallacies (*Simpl. Cat. 6, γ*). *Prantl*, p. 489, connects *ἀργὸς λόγος* (*Cic. De Fato*, 12, 28) with *λόγος ἡσυχάζων* (*Diog.* 198), regarding the one as the practical application of the other, but without reason. The *ἀργὸς λόγος*, by means of which the Stoic fatalism was reduced ad absurdum, did not commend itself to Chrysippus.

³ *Prantl*, pp. 485-496.

⁴ *Sext. Math. viii.* 367: ἀλλ' οὐ δεῖ, φασί, πάντων ἀπόδειξιν αἰτεῖν,

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V.(2) *Its
value.*

like their theory of knowledge, their theory of method ended by an ultimate appeal to the individual feeling.

No very high estimate can therefore be formed of the formal logic of the Stoics. Comparatively little as is known of that logic, still that little is enough to decide our judgment absolutely. We see that since the time of Chrysippus the greatest care was expended by the Stoics in tracing into their minutest ramifications, and referring to a fixed type, the forms of intellectual procedure. At the same time, we see that in doing this the real business of logic was lost sight of—that business being to portray the operations of thought, and to give its laws—whilst the most useless trifling with forms was recklessly indulged in. No discoveries of importance were even made as to the logical forms of thought, or they would have been recorded by writers ever on the alert to notice the slightest derivations from the Aristotelian logic. The whole activity of the Stoics in the field of logic was simply devoted to clothing the logic of the Peripatetics in new terms, and to developing certain parts of it with painful minuteness, whilst other parts were neglected. The part treating of inference obtained unusual care; but it was no improvement on the part of Chrysippus to regard the hypothetical rather than the categorical form as the original form

τινὰ δὲ καὶ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λαμβάνειν, ἐπεὶ οὐ δυνήσεται προβαίνειν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, εἰ μὴ δοθῇ τι πιστὸν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τυγχάνειν. *Ibid.* 375: ἀλλ' εἰώθασιν ὑποτυγχάνοντες λέγειν ὅτι πίστις ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐρῶσθαι τὴν

ὑπόθεσιν τὸ ἀληθὲς εὐρίσκεισθαι ἐκεῖνο τὸ τοῖς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ληφθεῖσιν ἐπιφερόμενον· εἰ γὰρ τὸ τοῦτοῖς ἀκολουθοῦν ἐστὶν ὑγιὲς, κακὴν αὖ οἷς ἀκολουθεῖ ἀληθῆ καὶ ἀναμφίλεκτα καθέστηκεν.

of inference. It was quite the reverse. Making all allowances for the extension of the field of logic, logic lost in scientific precision more than it gained by the labours of Chrysippus. The history of philosophy cannot pass over in silence this branch of the Stoic system, which was so carefully cultivated by the Stoics themselves, and was so important in determining their intellectual attitude. Yet, when all has been said, the Stoic logic is only an outpost of their system. The very care which was lavished on it since the time of Chrysippus only betokened the decline of intellectual originality.

CHAPTER VI.

THE STUDY OF NATURE. FUNDAMENTAL POSITIONS.

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OF far more importance in the Stoic system than the study of logic was the study of nature, a branch of learning which, notwithstanding their constant appeal to older views, was treated by them with more independence than any other branch. The subjects which it included may be divided into four groups, and arranged under the four heads of: 1. Fundamental positions; 2. The course, character, and government of the universe; 3. Irrational nature; and 4. Man.¹

The present chapter will be devoted to considering the first of these groups—the fundamental positions held by the Stoics in regard to nature; among which three are specially characteristic of their system—

¹ Natural Science was divided by the Stoics themselves (*Diog.* 132): (1) *εἰδικῶς* into *τόποι περὶ σωμάτων καὶ περὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ στοιχείων καὶ θεῶν καὶ περάτων καὶ τόπου καὶ κενοῦ*; (2) *γενικῶς* into three divisions, *περὶ κόσμον*, *περὶ στοιχείων*, and the *αἰτιολογικός*. The first of these divisions covers

ground which is shared by the mathematician; and the third, ground which is shared by both the physician and mathematician. The precise allotment of the subject into these divisions is not known. At best, it would be a very uncomfortable division.

their materialistic notions; their dynamical view of the world; and their Pantheism.

Nothing appears more striking to a reader fresh from a study of the philosophy of Plato or Aristotle than the startling contrast presented to it by the Materialism of the Stoics. Whilst so far following Plato as to define a real thing¹ to be anything possessing the capacity of acting or being acted upon, the Stoics nevertheless restricted the possession of this power to material objects. Hence followed as a corollary their maxim, that nothing real exists except what is material; or, if they could not deny existence in some sense or other to what is incorporeal, they were fain to assert that essential and real Being only belongs to what is material, whereas only a certain modified kind of Being can be predicated of what is incorporeal.²

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A. Materialism.
(1) Meaning of the Stoic materialism.
(a) Material or corporeal objects.

(a) Reality belongs to material objects only.

Following out this view, it was natural that they

¹ Soph. 247, D.

² *Plut. Com. Not.* 30, 2: ὄντα γὰρ μόντα τὰ σώματα καλοῦσιν, ἐπειδὴ ὄντος τὸ ποιεῖν τι καὶ πάσχειν. *Plac.* i. 11, 4: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ πάντα τὰ αἴτια σωματικά· πνεύματα γάρ. *iv.* 20: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ σώμα τὴν φωνήν· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ δρώμενον ἢ καὶ ποιοῦν σῶμα· ἢ δὲ φωνὴ ποιεῖ καὶ δρᾷ . . . ἔτι πᾶν τὸ κινεῖν καὶ ἐνοχλοῦν σῶμά ἐστιν . . . ἔτι πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον σῶμά ἐστιν. *Cic. Acad.* i. 11, 39: [Zeno] nullo modo arbitrabatur quidquam effici posse ab ea [natura] quæ expers esset corporis . . . nec vero aut quod efficere aliquid aut quod efficere posse esse non corpus. *Seneca; Stob. Ecl.* i. 336 and 338: Χρύσιππος

αἴτιον εἶναι λέγει δι' ὃ. καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον ὄν καὶ σῶμα, κ.τ.λ. Ποσειδώνιος δὲ οὕτως. αἴτιον δ' ἐστὶ τινος δι' ὃ ἐκείνο, ἢ τὸ ἀρχηγὸν ποιήσεως, καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον ὄν καὶ σῶμα, οὗ δὲ αἴτιον οὔτε ὄν οὔτε σῶμα, ἀλλὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ κατηγορημα. *Diog.* vii. 56: According to Chrysippus, the voice is material, πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ποιοῦν σῶμά ἐστι. *Ibid.* 150: οὐσίαν δὲ φασὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων τὴν πρώτην ὕλην, ὡς καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ Ζήνων· ὕλη δὲ ἐστίν, ἐξ ἧς ὅτιδήποτε γίνεται . . . σῶμα δὲ ἐστὶ κατ' αὐτοὺς ἡ οὐσία. *Hippolyt. Refut. Haer.* i. 21: σώματα δὲ πάντα ὑπέθεντο, κ.τ.λ.

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should regard many things as corporeal which are not generally considered so; for instance, the soul and virtue. Nevertheless, it would not be correct to say¹ that the Stoics gave to the conception of matter or corporeity a more extended meaning than it usually bears. For they define a body to be that which has three dimensions,² and they also lay themselves out to prove how things generally considered to be incorporeal may be material in the strictest sense of the term. Thus, besides upholding the corporeal character of all substances, including the human soul and God, they likewise assert that properties or forms are material: all attributes by means of which one object is distinguished from another are produced by the existence of certain air currents,³ which emanate from the centre of an object, diffuse themselves to its outer limits, and having reached the surface, return again to the centre to constitute the inward unity.⁴ Nor was the theory of air currents confined

(β) *Theory
of air cur-
rents.*

¹ As do *Ritter*, iii. 577, and *Schleiermacher*, *Gesch. der Philos.* 129.

² *Diog.* vii. 135: σῶμα δ' ἐστὶ (φησὶν Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ φυσικῇ) τὸ τριχῇ διαστατὸν, κ.τ.λ.

³ *Sen.* Ep. 102, 7, remarks, in reference to the difference of ἡνωμένα· nullum bonum putamus esse, quod ex distantibus constat: uno enim spiritu unum bonum contineri ac regi debet, unum esse unius boni principale. Hence the objection raised in *Plut.* Com. Not. 50, 1: τὰς ποιότητας οὐσίας καὶ σώματα ποιοῦσιν.

⁴ *Philo*, Qu. De S. Immut. p. 298, D: ἡ δὲ [ἐξίς = ποιότης] ἐστὶ

πνεῦμα ἀντιστρέφον ἐφ' ἑαυτό. ἄρχεται μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν μέσων ἐπὶ τὰ πέρατα τείνεσθαι, ψαύσαν δὲ ἄκρας ἐπιφανείας ἀνακάμπτει πάλιν, ἕχρις ἂν ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀφίκηται τόπον, ἀφ' οὗ τὸ πρῶτον ὥρμισθη. ἔξωθεν δὲ συνεχῆς οὗτος δόρυλος ἄνθρωπος, κ.τ.λ. Qu. Mund. S. Incorr. 960, D: ἡ δ' [ἐξίς] ἐστὶ πνευματικὸς τόπος. There can be no doubt that Philo is describing the Stoic teaching in these passages.

The same idea is also used to explain the connection between the soul and the body. The unity of the universe is proved by the fact that the Divine Spirit

to bodily attributes. It was applied quite as much to mental attributes. Virtues and vices are said to be material,¹ and are explained to be atmospheric bodies residing within the soul, and thereby imparting to it varieties of tension.² For the same reason the Good is called a body, for according to the Stoics the Good is only a virtue, and virtue is a definite state of that material which constitutes the soul.³ In the same sense also truth is said to be material, personal and not independent truth being of course understood

pervades it. See *Alex. Aphr.* De Mixt. 142, a: ἡνώσθαι μὲν υποτίθεται [Χρύσιππος] τὴν σύμπασαν οὐσίαν πνεύματος τινος διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς διήκοντος, ὅφ' οὗ συνάγεται τε καὶ συμμένει καὶ σύμπαθές ἐστιν αὐτῷ τὸ πᾶν.

¹ *Plut.* Com. Not. 45. *Sen.* Ep. 117, 2: Placet nostris, quod bonum est, esse corpus, quia quod bonum est, facit: quidquid facit corpus est . . . sapientiam bonum esse dicunt: sequitur, ut necesse sit illam corporalem quoque dicere.

² This is the conception of *τόνος*, upon which the strength of the soul depends, as well as the strength of the body. *Cleanthes*, in *Plut.* Sto. Rep. 7, 4: πληρὴ πυρὸς ὁ τόνος ἐστὶ καὶ ἱκανὸς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένηται πρὸς τὸ ἐπιτελεῖν τὰ ἐπιβάλλοντα ἰσχύς καλεῖται καὶ κράτος. *Stob.* Ecl. ii. 110: ὥσπερ ἰσχύς τοῦ σώματος τόμος ἐστὶν ἱκανὸς ἐν νευροῖς, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἰσχύς τόμος ἐστὶν ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ κρίνειν καὶ πράττειν καὶ μῆ. All properties may be classed under the same conception of tension. *Plut.* Com. Not. 49, 2: γῆν μὲν γὰρ ἴσασι καὶ ὕδωρ οὔτε

αὐτὰ συνέχειν οὔτε ἕτερα, πνευματικῆς δὲ μετοχῇ καὶ πυρώδους δυνάμεως τὴν ἐνότητα διαφυλάττειν· ἀέρα δὲ καὶ πῦρ αὐτῶν τ' εἶναι δι' εὐτονίαν ἐκτακτικά καὶ τοῖς δυσὶν ἐκείνοις ἐγκεκραμένα τόνον παρέχειν καὶ τὸ μόνιμον καὶ οὐσιώδες. *Ps. Censorin.* Fragm. c. 1: Initia rerum eadem elementa et principia dicuntur. Ea Stoici credunt tenorem atque materiam, tenorem, qui rarescente materia a medio tendat ad summum, eadem concrescente rursus a summo referatur ad medium.

³ *Sen.* Ep. 106, 4: bonum facit, prodest enim quod facit corpus est: bonum agitat animum et quodammodo format et continet, quæ propria sunt corporis. Quæ corporis bona sunt, corpora sunt: ergo et quæ animi sunt. Nam et hoc corpus. Bonum hominis necesse est corpus sit, cum ipse sit corporalis . . . si adfectus corpora sunt et morbi animorum et avaritia, crudelitas, indurata vitia . . . ergo et malitia et species ejus omnes . . . ergo et bona. It is then remarked that the Good, i.e. virtue, works upon the body, and governs it.

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in this case.¹ For what is truth but knowledge, or a property of the soul that knows? And since according to the Stoics knowledge consists in the presence of certain material elements within the soul, truth in the sense of knowledge may be rightly called something material. Even emotions, impulses, notions and judgments, in so far as they are due to material causes, the air currents pouring into the soul (*πνεύματα*), were regarded as material objects, and for the same reason not only habits of skill but individual actions were said to be corporeal.²

¹ *Sext. Math.* vii. 38: τὴν δὲ ἀλήθειαν οἶονταί τινες, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, διαφέρειν τῶν λεγόντων κατὰ τρεῖς τρόπους . . . οὐσία μὲν παρ' ὅσον ἢ μὲν ἀλήθεια σώμα ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἀσώματον ὑπῆρχε. καὶ εἰκότως, φασί. τοῦτ' ἐμὲν γὰρ ἀξιωμα ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ ἀξιωμα λεκτὸν, τὸ δὲ λεκτὸν ἀσώματον· ἀνάπαλιν δὲ ἡ ἀλήθεια σώμα ἐστὶν παρ' ὅσον ἐπιστήμη πάντων ἀληθῶν ἀποφαντικὴ δοκεῖ τυγχάνειν· πᾶσα δὲ ἐπιστήμη πῶς ἔχον ἐστὶν ἡγεμονικὸν . . . τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονικὸν σώμα κατὰ τοῦτους ὑπῆρχε. *Ibid.* *Pyrrh.* ii. 81.

² *Plut.* *Com. Not.* 45, 2: ἄτοπον γὰρ εἶναι μᾶλλον, τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας, πρὸς δὲ τοῦταις τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς μνήμας πᾶσαι, ἔτι δὲ φαντασίας καὶ πάθη καὶ ὁρμαὶ καὶ συγκαταθέσεις σώματα ποιουμένων ἐν μηδενὶ φάναι κείσθαι, κ.τ.λ. . . . οἱ δ' οὐ μόνον τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ζῶα εἶναι λέγουσιν, οὐδὲ τὰ πάθη μόνον, ὁργὰς καὶ φθόνους καὶ λύπας καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, οὐδὲ καταλήψεις καὶ φαντασίας καὶ ἁγνοίας οὐδὲ τὰς τέχνας ζῶα, τὴν σκντοτομικὴν, τὴν χαλκοτυπικὴν· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦτοις

καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας σώματα καὶ ζῶα ποιοῦσι, τὸν περίπατον ζῶον, τὴν ὀρχήσιν, τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, τὴν προσαγόμενσιν, τὴν λαιδίαν. *Plutarch* is here speaking as an opponent. *Seneca*, however (*Ep.* 106, 5), observes: Non puto te dubitaturum, an adfectus corpora sint . . . tanquam ira, amor, tristitia: si dubitas, vide an vultum nobis mutent. . . . Quid ergo? tam manifestas corpori notas credis imprimi, nisi a corpore? *Stob.* *Ecl.* ii. 114: The Stoics consider virtues to be substantially identical (τὰς αὐτὰς καθ' ὑπόστασιν) with the leading part of the soul (ἡγεμονικὸν), and consequently to be, like it, σώματα and ζῶα. *Seneca*, *Ep.* 113, 1, speaks still more plainly: Desideras tibi scribi a me, quid sentiam de hac quaestione jactata apud nostros: an justitia, an fortitudo, prudentia ceteræque virtutes animalia sint. . . . Me in alia sententia profiteor esse. . . . Quæ sint ergo quæ antiquos moverint, dicam. Animum constat animal esse. . . . Virtus autem nihil aliud est, quam animus quodammodo

Certain actions, however, such as walking and dancing, can hardly have been called bodies by the Stoics, any more than being wise was called a body;¹ but the objects which produced these actions, as indeed everything which makes itself felt, were considered to be corporeal. To us it appears most natural to refer these actions to the soul as their originating cause; but the Stoics, holding the theory of subject-matter and property, preferred to refer each such action to some special material as its cause, and to consider that an action is due to the presence of this material. The idealism of Plato was thus reproduced in a new form by the materialism of the Stoics. Plato had said, a man is just and musical when he participates in the *idea* of justice and music; the Stoics said, a man is virtuous when the *material* producing virtue is in him; musical, when he has the *material* producing music.

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(γ) *The causes of actions material.*

Moreover, these materials produce the phenomena of life; hence, not content with calling them bodies, the Stoics actually went so far as to call them living beings—a truly startling assertion. It seems, however, not less startling to hear the name of bodies given to such things as day and night, and parts of the day and parts of the night, to months and years,

(δ) *Wide extension of material.*

se habens: ergo animal est. Deinde: virtus agit aliquid: agi autem nihil sine impetu (δρμη) potest. If it is urged: Each individual will thus consist of an innumerable number of living beings, he replies that these animalia are only parts of one

animal, the soul; they are accordingly not many (multa), but one and the same viewed from different sides: idem est animus et justus et prudens et fortis ad singulas virtutes quodammodo se habens.

¹ See page 91, note.

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even to days of the month and seasons of the year.¹ But by these singularly unhappy expressions Chrysippus appears to have meant little more than that the realities corresponding to these names depend on certain material conditions: by summer is meant a certain state of the air when highly heated by the sun; by month the moon for a certain definite period during which it gives light to the earth.² But from all these examples one lesson may be gathered—that the Stoics found it impossible to assign reality to anything that is not material.

(b) *The incorporeal or non-material.*

In carrying out this theory they could not, as might be expected, wholly succeed. Hence a Stoic could not deny that there are certain things which it is absurd to call material. Among such are included empty space, place, time, and expression (*λεκτόν*),³ all of which are allowed to be incorporeal;

¹ *Plut. Com. Not.* 45, 5: Χρυσίππου μνημονεύοντες ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν φυσικῶν ζητημάτων οὕτω προσάγοντος· οὐχ ἡ μὲν νύξ σῶμά ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ ἑσπέρα καὶ ὁ ὀρθὸς καὶ τὸ μέσον τῆς νυκτὸς σώματα οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐδὲ ἡ μὲν ἡμέρα σῶμά ἐστιν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ἡ νουμηνία σῶμα, καὶ ἡ δεκάτη, καὶ πεντεκαίδεκάτη καὶ ἡ τριακὰς καὶ ὁ μὴν σῶμά ἐστι καὶ τὸ θέρος καὶ τὸ φθινόπωρον καὶ ὁ ἐνιαντός.

² *Diog.* 151: χειμῶνα μὲν εἶναι φασὶ τὸν ὑπὲρ γῆς ἅερα κατεψυγμένον διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἡλίου πρόσω ἄφοδον, ἔαρ δὲ τὴν εὐκρασίαν τοῦ ἁέρος κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς πορείαν, θέρος δὲ τὸν ὑπὲρ γῆς ἅερα καταθαλλόμενον, κ.τ.λ. *Stob. Ecl.* i. 260: Chrysippus defines ἔαρ ἔτους ὥραν κεκραμένην ἐκ χειμῶνος ἀπολήγοντος καὶ θέρους ἀρχομένου . . .

θέρος δὲ ὥραν τὴν μάλιστ' ἀφ' ἡλίου διακεκαυμένην· μετόπωρον δὲ ὥραν ἔτους τὴν μετὰ θέρος μὲν πρὸ χειμῶνος δὲ κεκραμένην· χειμῶνα δὲ ὥραν ἔτους τὴν μάλιστα κατεψυγμένην, ἢ τὴν τῷ περὶ γῆν ἅερι κατεψυγμένην, *Ibid.*: According to Empedocles and the Stoics, the cause of winter is the prevalence of air, the cause of summer the prevalence of fire. *Ibid.* 556: μὲν δ' ἐστὶ, φησὶ [Χρῦσιππος] τὸ φαινόμενον τῆς σελήνης πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἢ σελήνη μέρος ἔχουσα φαινόμενον πρὸς ἡμᾶς. *Cleomedes, Meteora*, p. 112, distinguishes four meanings of μὴν.

³ *Diog.* vii. 140; *Stob. Ecl.* i. 392; *Sext. Math.* x. 218 and 237; viii. 11; vii. 38; *Pyrrh.* ii. 81; iii. 52.

and yet they did not wish to assert that these things do not exist at all. The denial of existence to all incorporeal things is an assertion belonging only to isolated members of the Stoic School, and for which they must be held personally responsible. How they could bring belief in incorporeal things into harmony with their maxim that existence alone belongs to what is material is not on record.

The question next before us is: What led the Stoics to take such a materialistic view of things? It might be supposed that their peculiar theory of knowledge based on sensation was the cause; but this theory did not preclude the possibility of advancing from the sensible to the super-sensible. It might also be said that their theory of knowledge was a consequence of their materialism, and that they referred all knowledge to sensation, because they could allow no real being to anything which is not material. The probability therefore remains that their theory of knowledge and their materialistic view of nature both indicate one and the same habit of mind, and that both are due to the action of the same causes.

Nor will it do to seek for these causes in the influence exercised by the Peripatetic or pre-Socratic philosophy on the Stoic School. At first sight, indeed, it might appear that the Stoics had borrowed from Heraclitus their materialism, together with their other views on nature; or else it might seem to be an expansion of the metaphysical notions of Plato and Aristotle. For if Aristotle denied Plato's dis-

(2) *Causes which produced the Stoic materialism.*

(a) *The Stoic materialism not an expansion of Peripatetic views.*

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tion of form and matter to such an extent that he would hardly allow form to *exist* at all except in union with matter, might not others, following in the same track, deny the distinction of form and matter in *conception*, thus reducing form to a property of matter? Were there not difficulties in the doctrine of a God external to the world, of a passionless Reason? Were there not even difficulties in the antithesis of form and matter, which the system of Aristotle was powerless to overcome? And had not Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus, even before the time of Zeno, and Strato immediately after his time, advanced from the ground occupied by the Peripatetics to materialistic views? And yet we must pause before accepting this explanation. The founder of Stoicism appears from what is recorded of his intellectual growth to have been repelled by the Peripatetic School more than by any other; nor is there the least indication in the records of the Stoic teaching that that teaching resulted from a criticism of the Aristotelian and Platonic views of a double origin of things. Far from it, the proposition that everything capable of acting or being acted upon must be material, appears with the Stoics as an independent axiom needing no further proof.

(b) *The Stoic materialism not due to Heraclitus.*

The supposed connection between the Stoics and Heraclitus, so far from serving to explain their materialistic views, is itself based on the presumption of a mutual resemblance between them. Yet long before the appearance of Zeno the philosophy of Heraclitus as a living tradition had become extinct. No

historical connection therefore, or relation of original dependence, can possibly exist between the two. Sympathy only with a kindred spirit, which must at best have been gained at second-hand, can have directed Zeno to the study of his predecessor. Zeno's own view of the world was not a consequence, but the cause, of his sympathy with Heraclitus. In short, neither the Peripatetics nor Heraclitus can have given the first impulse to Zeno's materialism, although they may have helped in many ways to strengthen his views on that subject, when already formed.

The real causes for these views must therefore be sought elsewhere, and will be found in the central idea of the whole system of the Stoics—the practical view which they took of philosophy. Originally devoting themselves with all their energies to practical inquiries, in their theory of nature the Stoics occupied the ground of ordinary common sense, which knows of no real object excepting what is grossly sensible and corporeal. In all their speculations their primary aim was to discover a firm basis for human actions. In actions, however, men are brought into direct contact with external objects. The objects then presented to the senses are regarded by them as real things, nor is an opportunity afforded for doubting their real being. Their reality is practically taken for granted, because of the influence they exercise on man, and because they serve as objects for the exercise of man's powers. In every such exercise of power, both subject and object are

(c) *Practical turn
of the Stoic
philosophy
the cause.*

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material. Even when an impression is conveyed to the soul of man, the direct instrument is something material—the voice or the gesture. In the ? region of experience there are no such things as non-material impressions. This was the ground occupied by the Stoics: a real thing is what either acts on us, or is acted upon by us. Such a thing is naturally material; and the Stoics with their practical ideas not being able to soar above what is most obvious, declared that reality belongs only to the world of matter.

(3) *Consequences of the Stoic materialism.*
(a) *Individual perceptions alone true; yet a higher truth assigned to general conceptions.*

From this material view of nature, it follows that individual perceptions are alone true, and that all general conceptions without exception must be false. If each kind of expression (λεκτόν) is incorporeal, and consequently unreal, will not absence of reality in a much higher degree belong to the expression of what is general? Individual expressions refer to perceptions, i.e. to something incorporeal; nevertheless they indirectly refer to the things perceived, i.e. to what is material. But general expressions do not even indirectly refer to anything corporeal; they are pure fabrications of the mind, which have nothing real as their object. This is the purport of the Stoic argument. And yet they attribute to these general conceptions, to which no real objects correspond, a higher truth and certainty than belongs to the perceptions of individual objects. Here was a gross inconsistency, but one which the Stoic system made not the slightest attempt to overcome.

In another respect, within the domain of natural science, the materialism of the Stoics led to results producing some most astonishing assertions. If the attributes of things, the soul and even the powers of the soul, are all corporeal, the relation of attributes to their objects, of the soul to the body, of one body to another body, is that of *mutual intermingling*. Moreover the essential attributes of any definite material belong to every part of that material; and the soul resides in every part of the body, without the soul's being identical with the body, and without the attributes being identical with the material to which they belong, or with one another. Hence it follows that one body may intermingle with another not only by occupying the vacant spaces in that body, but by interpenetrating all its parts, without, however, being fused into a homogeneous mass with it.¹ This view involves not only a denial of the impenetrability of matter, but it further supposes that a smaller body when mingled with a greater body will extend over the whole of the latter. It is known as the Stoic theory of universal intermingling (*κρασις δι' ὅλων*), and is alike different from the ordinary view of mechanical mixture and from that of chemical mixture. It differs from the former in that

(b) *Theory of universal intermingling.*

¹ Let a piece of red-hot iron be taken, every part of which is heavy, hard, hot, &c. Not one of these attributes can be confounded with another, or with the iron itself, but each one runs through the whole iron. Now, if each attribute is due to the

presence of some material producing it, there is no avoiding the conclusion that there must exist in the iron, and in each part of it, as many various materials as there are attributes, without any one of them losing its own identity.

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every part of the one body is interpenetrated by every part of the other; from the latter, because the bodies after mixture still retain their own properties.¹ This peculiar theory, which is one of the much debated

¹ *Diog.* vii. 151: καὶ τὰς κράσεις δὲ διόλου γίνεσθαι, καθά φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ τῶν φυσικῶν, καὶ μὴ κατὰ περιγραφὴν καὶ παράθεσιν· καὶ γὰρ εἰς πέλαγος ὀλίγος οἶνος βληθεὶς ἐπὶ πόσον ἀντιπαρεκταθήσεται εἴτα συμφυρήσεται. According to *Stob. Ecl.* i. 374, the Stoics more accurately distinguish *μίξις*, *κράσις*, *παράθεσις*, *σύγχυσις*. *Παράθεσις* is *σωμάτων συναφή* κατὰ τὰς ἐπιφανείας; for instance, the combination of various kinds of grain. *Μίξις* is *δύο ἢ καὶ πλείονων σωμάτων ἀντιπαρέκτασις* δι' ὧν, ὑπομενουσῶν τῶν συμφυῶν περὶ αὐτὰ ποιότητων; for instance, the union of fire and iron, of soul and body. Such a union is called *μίξις* in the case of solid bodies, *κράσις* in the case of fluids. *Σύγχυσις* is *δύο ἢ καὶ πλείονων ποιότητων περὶ τὰ σώματα μεταβολὴ εἰς ἑτέρας διαφερούσης τούτων ποιότητος γένεσις*, as in the making up salves and medicines. According to *Alex. Aphr. De Mixt.* 142, a, Chrysippus distinguished three kinds of *μίξις*: *παράθεσις*, or union of substances, in which each retains its *οἰκεία οὐσία* or *ποιότης* κατὰ τὴν περιγραφὴν; *σύγχυσις*, in which both substances, as well as attributes, are destroyed (*φθειρεσθαι*), giving rise to a third body; *κράσις* = *δύο ἢ καὶ πλείονων τινῶν σωμάτων ὧν δι' ὧν ἀντιπαρέκτασιν ἀλλήλοις οὕτως, ὥστε σώζειν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ μίξει· τῇ τοιαύτῃ τὴν τε οἰκείαν οὐσίαν καὶ τὰς ἐν αὐτῇ*

ποιότητας. Materials thus united can be again separated, but can never be so united: ὥς μηδὲν μόριον ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶναι μὴ μετέχον πάντων τῶν ἐν τῷ μίγματι.

For such a union to be possible, (1) it must be possible for one material to penetrate every part of another, without being fused into a homogeneous mass. Hence the expression *σῶμα διὰ σώματος ἀντιπαρήκειν*, *σῶμα σώματος εἶναι τόπον καὶ σῶμα χωρεῖν διὰ σώματος κένον μηδετέρου περιέχοντος ἀλλὰ τοῦ πλήρους εἰς τὸ πλήρες ἐνδυομένου* (*Plut. C. Not.* 37, 2; *Alex.* 142, b; *Themist. Phys.* 37; *Simpl. Phys.* 123, b; *Hippolyt. Refut. Hær.* i. 21); (2) it must be possible for the smaller body to extend over the whole size of the greater. This is affirmed by Chrysippus: οὐδὲν ἀπέχειν φάμενος, οἶνον σταλαγμὴν ἕνα κεράσαι τὴν θάλατταν, or even *εἰς ὅλον τὸν κόσμον διατενεῖν τῇ κράσει τὸν σταλαγμόν* (*Plut.* 10; *Alex.* 142, b; *Diog.*). The greater body is said to help the smaller, by giving to it an extension of which it would not otherwise be capable. Nevertheless, the bodies so united need not necessarily occupy more space than was previously occupied by one of them (*Alex.* 142, b; *Plotin. Enn.* iv. 7, 8). The absurdities which this theory involves were exposed by Arcesilaus (*Plut.* 7), and in detail by Alexander, Plutarch, Sextus, and Plotinus (*Enn.* ii. 7, *περὶ τῆς δι' ὧν κράσεως*).

but distinctive features of the Stoic system,¹ cannot have been based on scientific observation. On the contrary, the arguments by which Chrysippus supported it prove that it was ultimately the result of speculative considerations.² We have, moreover, still less reason to doubt this fact, inasmuch as the materialistic undercurrent of the Stoic system affords for it the best explanation.

¹ πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ λέγεται περὶ κρᾶσεως καὶ σχεδὸν ἀνήνυτοι περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου σκέμματός εἰσι παρὰ τοῖς Δογματικοῖς στάσεις. *Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 56.*

² According to Alex. 142, a, the following arguments were used by Chrysippus:—(1) The argument from *κοινὰ ἔννοιαι*—our notion of *κρᾶσις* is different from that of *σύγχυσις* or *παράθεσις*. (2) Many bodies are capable of extension, whilst retaining their own properties; frankincense, for instance, when burnt, and gold. (3) The soul penetrates every part of the body, without losing its properties. (4) The same holds good of fire in red-hot metal, of fire and air in water and earth, of poisons, and of light.

It is clear that the first of these arguments does not embody the real reason in the mind of Chrysippus; it might, with equal justice, have been used to prove anything else. Just as little does the second; for the phenomena to which it refers would be equally well explained on the theory of mechanical (*παράθεσις*) or chemical (*σύγχυσις*) mixture. Nor does the fourth argument, taken independently of the theory

of the corporeal nature of properties, necessarily lead to the idea of *κρᾶσις* as distinct from *παράθεσις* and *σύγχυσις*. Even the fact, greatly insisted upon by the Stoics, that things so mixed could be again separated into their component materials (*Alex. 143, a; Stob. i. 378*), is not conclusive. On the other hand, the relation of the soul to the body, of property to subject-matter, of *φύσις* to *φυτὸν*, of God to the world, cannot be otherwise explained, except by *κρᾶσις*, if a material existence be assigned to the soul to *φύσις* to *ἔξις* and to God. The third argument, therefore, supplies the real ground on which this theory was based; and from this argument Simplicius rightly deduces it (*Phys. 123, b*): τὸ δὲ σῶμα διὰ σώματος χωρεῖν οἱ μὲν ἀρχαῖοι ὡς ἐναργὲς ἄτοπον ἐλάβανον, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ὕστερον προσήκοντο ὡς ἀκολουθοῦν ταῖς σφῶν αὐτῶν ὑποθέσεσιν . . . σώματα γὰρ λέγειν πάντα δοκοῦντες, καὶ τὰς ποιότητας καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ διὰ παντὸς ὁρῶντες τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν χωροῦσαν καὶ τὰς ποιότητας ἐν ταῖς κρᾶσεσι, συνεχώρουν σῶμα διὰ σώματος χωρεῖν.

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B. *Dynamical
theory of
nature.*
(1) *Matter
and force.*

Although the stamp of materialism was sharply cut, and its application fearlessly made by the Stoics, they were yet far from holding the mechanical theory of nature, which appears to us to be a necessary consequence of strict materialism. The universe was explained on a dynamical theory; the notion of force was placed above the notion of matter. To matter, they held, alone belongs real existence; but the characteristic of real existence they sought in causation, in the capacity to act and to be acted upon. This capacity belongs to matter only by virtue of certain inherent forces, which impart to it definite attributes. Let pure matter devoid of every attribute be considered, the matter which underlies all definite materials, and out of which all things are made;¹ it will be found to be purely passive, a something subject to any change, able to assume any shape and quality, but taken by itself devoid of quality, and unable to produce any change whatsoever. This inert and powerless matter is first reduced into shape² by means of attributes, all of which suppose tension in the air currents which produce them, and consequently suppose a force producing tension. Even the shape of bodies, and the place they occupy in

¹ On ἄποιος ὕλη, as the universal ὑποκείμενον or οὐσία κοινή, see p. 98, note 2. *Sext. Math.* x. 312: ἐξ ἀποίου μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐνδὸς σώματος τὴν τῶν ὅλων ὑπεστήσαντο γένεσιν οἱ Στωϊκοί. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τῶν ὄντων κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐστὶν ἡ ἄποιος ὕλη καὶ δι' ὅλων τρεπτῇ, μεταβαλλούσης τε ταύτης γίνεται τὰ τέσσαρα

στοιχεῖα, πῦρ, κ.τ.λ. *Plut. C.* Not. 48, 2: ἡ ὕλη καθ' αὐτὴν ἄλογος οὐσα καὶ ἄποιος. *M. Aurel.* xii. 30: μία οὐσία κοινή, κὰν διείρηται ἰδίως ποιοῖς σώμασι μυρίοις. *Diog.* 137: τὰ δὲ τέτταρα στοιχεῖα εἶναι ὁμοῦ τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην.

² *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 43.

space is, according to the Stoics, something derivative, the consequence of tension;¹ tension keeping the different particles apart in one or the other particular way. Just as some modern physiologists construct nature by putting together a sum of forces of attraction and repulsion, so the Stoics refer nature to two forces, or speaking more accurately, to a double kind of motion—expansion and condensation. Expansion works outwardly, condensation inwardly; condensation produces being, or what is synonymous with it, matter; expansion gives rise to the attributes of things.² Whilst, therefore, they assert that everything really existing must be material, they still distinguish in what is material two component parts—the part which is acted upon, and the part which acts, or in other words *matter* and *force*.³

¹ *Simpl.* Cat. 67, ε (Schol. 74, α, 10): τὸ τοίνυν σχῆμα οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τὴν τάσιν παρέχεσθαι λέγουσιν, ὥσπερ τὴν μεταξὺ τῶν σημείων διάστασιν. διδὲ καὶ εὐθείαν δρίζονται γραμμὴν τὴν εἰς ἄκρον τεταμένην.

² *Simpl.* Cat. 68, ε: οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ δύναμιν, ἢ μᾶλλον κίνησιν τὴν μανωτικήν καὶ πυκνωστικήν τιθένται, τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ ἔσω, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω· καὶ τὴν μὲν τοῦ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ποιεῖν εἶναι νομίζουσιν αἰτίαν. *Nemes.* Nat. Hom. c. 2: εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν, καθάπερ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ, τονικήν τινα εἶναι κίνησιν περὶ τὰ σώματα, εἰς τὸ ἔσω ἅμα καὶ εἰς τὸ ἔξω κινουμένην, καὶ τὴν μὲν εἰς τὸ ἔξω μεγεθῶν καὶ ποιότητων ἀποτελεστικήν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ εἰς τὸ ἔσω ἐνώσεως καὶ οὐσίας. This remark is confirmed by Censorinus, and by

the language of Plutarch (*Def. Orac.* c. 28), in reference to Chrysippus: πολλάκις εἰρηκώς, ὅτι ταῖς εἰς τὸ αὐτῆς μέσον ἢ οὐσία καὶ ταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτῆς μέσου διοικεῖται καὶ συνέχεται κινήσεσι.

³ *Diog.* vii. 134: δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὄλων δύο, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἁποῖον οὐσίαν τὴν ὕλην, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν θεόν. τοῦτον γὰρ ὄντα αἰδίδιον διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς δημιουργεῖν ἕκαστα. Such is the teaching of Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Archedemus, and Posidonius. *Sext.* Math. ix. 11: οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ὁτοῦς δύο λέγοντες ἀρχὰς, θεὸν καὶ ἁποῖον ὕλην, τὸν μὲν θεὸν ποιεῖν ὑπεκλήφασιν, τὴν δὲ ὕλην πάσχειν τε καὶ τρέπεσθαι. See also *Alex.* *Aph.* De Mixt. 144; *Achill.* *Tat.*

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(2) *The nature of force.*
(a) *Force limited to the notion of efficient cause.*

The Stoics, however, would not agree with Plato and Aristotle so far as to allow to formal and final causes a place side by side with acting force or efficient cause. In general, anything may be called a cause which serves to bring about a definite result,¹ but various kinds of causes may be distinguished, according as they bring about this result directly or indirectly, by themselves alone or by the help of others.² But according to the Stoics, cause in the highest sense can only be an acting or efficient cause.

Isag. c. 3, 124, E; *Plut. Pl. Phil.* i. 3, 39; *Stob. Ecl.* i. 306; 322: *διὰ ταύτης δὲ διαθεῖν τὸν τοῦ παντὸς λόγον ὃν ἐνιοὶ εἰμαρμένην καλοῦσιν, οἷόν περ' ἐν τῇ γόνυ τὸ σπέρμα.* *Sen. Ep.* 65, 2: Dicunt, ut scis, Stoici nostri, duo esse in rerum natura, ex quibus omnia fiant: causam et materiam. Materia jacet iners, res ad omnia parata, cessatura si nemo moveat. Causa autem, i.e. ratio, materiam format et quocumque vult versat, ex illa varia opera producit. Esse ergo debet, unde fit aliquid, deinde a quo fiat. Hoc causa est, illud materia. *Ibid.* 23: Universa ex materia et ex Deo constant . . . potentius autem est ac pretiosius quod facit, quod est Deus, quam materia patiens Dei.

¹ *Sen. Ep.* 65, 11: Nam si, quocumque remoto quid effici non potest, id causam judicant esse faciendi, &c. *Sext. Math.* ix. 228: εἰ αἰτιὸν ἐστὶν οὗ παρόντος γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα. This appears to be the most general Stoic definition. That given by *Sext. Pyrrh.* iii. 14—τούτο, δι' ὃ ἐνεργοῦν γίνεται τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα—expresses a narrower conception

—the conception of efficient cause, which is the only essential one for a Stoic.

² *Sext. Pyrrh.* iii. 15, distinguishes between *συνεκτικά*, *συν-αίτια*, and *σύνεργα αίτια*, all of which are, however, subordinated to the δι' ὃ, which he is there alone discussing. Seneca maintains that, with the definition given above, time, place, and motion should be reckoned as causes, since nothing can be produced without these. He allows, however, that a distinction must be made between causa efficiens and causa superveniens. This agrees with what Cicero (*De Fato*, 18, 41) quotes from Chrysippus relative to causæ perfectæ et principales, and causæ adjuvantes et proximæ, and with the Platonic and Aristotelian distinction of αἰτίον δι' ὃ and οὗ οὐκ ἔνευ. In the same way, *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 47, 4, distinguishes between αίτια αὐτοτελῆς and προκαταρκτική. *Alex. Aph.* *De Fato*, p. 72, blames the Stoics: σμῆνος γὰρ αἰτίων καταλέγουσι, τὰ μὲν προκαταρκτικά, τὰ δὲ συναίτια, τὰ δὲ ἐκτικά, τὰ δὲ συνεκτικά, τὰ δὲ ἄλλο τι.

The form is due to the workman, and is therefore only a part of the efficient cause. The type form is only an instrument, which the workman employs in his work. The final cause or end-in-chief, in as far as it represents the workman's intention, is only an occasional cause; in as far as it belongs to the work he is about, it is not a cause at all, but a result. There can be but one pure and unconditional cause, just as there can be but one matter; and to this cause everything that exists and everything that takes place must be referred.¹

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In attempting to form a more accurate notion of what the Stoics understand by efficient cause, the first point which deserves attention is, that every kind of action ultimately proceeds from one source. For how could the world be such a clearly-defined unit, such a harmonious whole, unless it were governed by one and the same force?² Moreover, since everything which acts is material, the highest efficient cause must likewise be considered material; and since all qualities and forces are produced by atmo-

(b) Character of this efficient cause.

¹ *Seneca*, after enumerating the four causes of Aristotle, adds: This turba causarum embraces either too much or too little. Sed nos nunc primam et generalem quærimus causam. Hæc simplex esse debet, nam et materia simplex est. Quærimus quæ sit causa, ratio scilicet faciens, id est Deus. Ita enim, quæcumque retulisti, non sunt multæ et singulæ causæ, sed ex una pendent, ex ea, quæ faciet. *Stob. Ecl. i. 336: αἰτίων δ' ὁ Ζήνων*

φησὶν εἶναι δι' ὃ . . . Χρύσιππος αἰτίων εἶναι λέγει δι' ὃ . . . Ποσειδώνιος δὲ οὕτως· αἰτίων δ' ἐστὶ τινος δι' ὃ ἐκείνο, ἢ τὸ πρῶτον ποιοῦν ἢ τὸ ἀρχηγὸν ποιήσεως.

² *Cic. N. De. ii. 7, 19*, after speaking of the consensuens, conspirans, continuata cognatio rerum, continues: Hæc ita fieri omnibus inter se concinentibus mundi partibus profecto non possent, nisi ea uno divino et continuato spiritu continerentur. See *Sext. Math. ix. 78*.

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spheric or igneous elements, can it be otherwise with the highest acting force? In everything nourishment and growth, life and motion, are connected with heat; everything possesses its own degree of heat, and is preserved and endued with life by the heat of the sun. What applies to parts of the world must apply to the world as a whole; and heat or fire is the power to which the life and the existence of the world must be referred.¹

This power must be further conceived as being the soul of the world, as being the highest reason, as being a kind, beneficent, and philanthropic being; in short, as being God himself. The universal belief and the universal worship of God proves this beyond a doubt.² It is, however, confirmed by a more accurate investigation. Pure matter can never move itself or fashion itself; nothing but an inherent power such as the soul is can produce these results.³ The world would not be most perfect and complete unless Reason were inherent in it;⁴ nor could it contain

¹ *Cic. N. D. ii. 9, 23*, says, apparently as the view of Cleanthes: All living things, plants, and animals, exist by heat: nam omne quod est calidum et igneum cietur et agitur motu suo. Digestion and the circulation are the result of heat: ex quo intelligi debet, eam caloris naturam vim habere in se vitalem per omnem mundum pertinentem. Moreover: omnes partes mundi . . . calore fultæ sustinentur. . . . Jam vero reliqua quarta pars mundi, ea et ipsa tota natura fervida est, et cæteris naturis omnibus salutarem impertit et vitalem calorem.

Ex quo concluditur, cum omnes mundi partes sustineantur calore, mundum etiam ipsum simili parique natura in tanta diuturnitate servari: eoque magis quod intelligi debet, calidum illum atque igneum ita in omni fusum esse natura, ut in eo insit procreandi vis, &c.

² On the argument, ex consensu gentium, consult *Plut. Sto. Rep. 38, 3*; *Com. Not. 32, 1*; *Cic. N. D. ii. 2, 5*; *Seneca, Benef. iv. 4*; *Sext. Math. ix. 123* and 131.

³ *Sext. Math. ix. 75*.

⁴ *Cic. N. D. iii. 9, 22*: Zeno

any beings possessed of consciousness, unless it were conscious itself.¹ It could not produce creatures endowed with a soul and reason, unless it were itself endowed with a soul and reason.² Results surpassing human power could not exist, unless there were some higher power equally surpassing human power.³ The subordination of means to ends which governs the world in every part down to the minutest details would be inexplicable, unless the world owed its origin to a reasonable creator.⁴ The graduated rank

enim ita concludit: quod ratione utitur, melius est, quam id, quod ratione non utitur. Nihil autem mundo melius. Ratione igitur mundus utitur. *Ibid.* ii. 8, 21, and 12, 34. *Sext.* Math. ix. 104: εἰ τὸ λογικὸν τοῦ μὴ λογικοῦ κρείττον ἐστίν, οὐδὲν δέ γε κόσμον κρείττον ἐστίν, λογικὸν ἄρα ὁ κόσμος . . . τὸ γὰρ νοερὸν τοῦ μὴ νοεροῦ καὶ ἔμψυχον τοῦ μὴ ἐμψύχου κρείττον ἐστίν· οὐδὲν δέ γε κόσμου κρείττον· νοερὸς ἄρα καὶ ἔμψυχός ἐστιν ὁ κόσμος. *Diog.* 142, says that Chrysippus, Apollodorus, and Posidonius agree that the world is ζῶον καὶ λογικὸν καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ νοερὸν· τὸ γὰρ ζῶον τοῦ μὴ ζῶου κρείττον· οὐδὲν δὲ τοῦ κόσμου κρείττον· ζῶον ἄρα ὁ κόσμος.

¹ *Cic.* N. D. ii. 8, 22: Zeno affirms: nullius sensu carentis pars aliqua potest esse sentiens. Mundi autem partes sentientes sunt. Non igitur caret sensu mundus.

² *Diog.* 143: ἔμψυχον δὲ [τὸν κόσμον], ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς ἐκεῖθεν οὐσης ἀποσπάσματος. *Sext.* Math. ix. 101: Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Κιττιεὺς ἀπὸ Ξενοφάντος

τὴν ἀφορμὴν λαβὼν οὕτως συνερωτᾷ· τὸ προiέμενον σπέρμα λογικοῦ καὶ αὐτὸ λογικόν ἐστίν· ὁ δὲ κόσμος προiεται σπέρμα λογικοῦ, λογικὸν ἄρα ἐστίν ὁ κόσμος. The same proof in *Sext.* Math. ix. 77 and 84; *Cic.* *Ibid.* ii. 31, 79; 6, 18. See also *Sext.* ix. 96; *Xen.* Mem. i. 4, 8.

³ *Cic.* *Ibid.* iii. 10, 25: Is [Chrysippus] igitur: si aliquid est, inquit, quod homo efficere non possit, qui id efficit melior est homine. Homo autem hæc, quæ in mundo sunt, efficere non potest. Qui poterit igitur, is præstat homini. Homini autem præstare quis possit, nisi Deus Est igitur Deus.

⁴ Cleanthes made use of arguments from final causes to prove the existence of Gods. Of this nature are all the arguments which he employs in *Cic.* N. D. ii. 5, but particularly the fourth, based on the regular order and beauty of heaven. A building cannot exist without a builder; no more can the building of the world exist without a ruling spirit. See *Cic.* N. D. ii. 32-66; *Cleomedes*, *Meteora*, p. 1; *Seneca*,

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of beings would be incomplete, unless there were a highest Being of all whose moral and intellectual perfection were absolutely unsurpassable.¹ This perfection belongs, in the first place, to the world as a whole; nevertheless, as in everything consisting of many parts, so in the world the ruling part must be distinguished from other parts. It is *the* part from which all acting forces emanate and diffuse themselves over the world.² By Zeno, Chrysippus, and the majority of the Stoics, the seat of this efficient force was placed in the heaven,³ by Cleanthes in the

De Provid. i. 1, 2-4; Nat. Qu. i.; *Sext. Math.* ix. 111; *Ps. Censorin.* *Fragm.* i. 2; *Plut. Plac.* i. 6, 8.

¹ See the expansion of this thought by Cleanthes (in *Sext. Math.* ix. 88-91) and the Stoics (in *Cic. N. D.* ii. 12, 33). Cicero distinguishes four kinds of beings—Plants, Animals, Men, and God.

² *Sext. Math.* ix. 102: πάσης γὰρ φύσεως καὶ ψυχῆς ἡ καταρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως γινέσθαι δοκεῖ ἀπὸ ἡγεμονικοῦ καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἐπὶ τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου ἐξαποστελλόμεναι δυνάμεις ὡς ἀπὸ τινος πηγῆς τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐξαποστέλλονται. *Cic. N. D.* ii. 29: omnem enim naturam necesse est, quæ non solitaria sit, neque simplex, sed cum alio juncta atque connexa, habere aliquem in se principatum [= ἡγεμονικόν] ut in homine mentem, &c. . . . Itaque necesse est illud etiam, in quo sit totius naturæ principatus, esse omnium optimum.

³ *Cic. Acad.* ii. 41, 126: Zenoni et reliquis fere Stoicis æther videtur summus Deus, mente præditus, qua omnia regantur.

N. D. i. 14, 36: (Zeno) æthera Deum dicit. 15, 39: ignem præterea et eum, quem antea dixi, æthera (Chrysippus Deum dicit esse). *Diog.* vii. 138: οὐρανὸς δέ ἐστιν ἡ ἐσχάτη περιφέρεια, ἐν ᾗ πᾶν ἴδρυται τὸ θεῖον. *Ibid.* 139: τὸν ὅλον κόσμον ζῶον ὄντα καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ λογικὸν ἔχειν ἡγεμονικὸν μὲν τὸν αἰθέρα, καθά φησιν Ἀντίπατρος . . . Χρύσιππος δ' . . . καὶ Ποσειδώνιος . . . τὸν οὐρανόν φασι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου. He continues: ὁ μὲντοι Χρύσιππος διαφορώτερον πάλιν τὸ καθαρώτερον τοῦ αἰθέρος ἐν ταῦτῳ [= τῷ οὐρανῷ] δ καὶ πρῶτον θεὸν λέγουσιν, αἰσθητικῶς ὥσπερ κεχωρηκέναι διὰ τῶν ἐν ἀέρι καὶ διὰ τῶν ζώων ἀπάντων καὶ φυτῶν, διὰ δὲ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς καθ' ἑξίν. *Arius Didymus*, in *Eus. Præp. Ev.* xv. 15, 4: Χρυσίππῳ δὲ [ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου εἶναι ἥρεσε] τὸν αἰθέρα τὸν καθαρώτατον καὶ εὐκρινέστατον, ὅτε πάντων εὐκίνητότατον ὄντα καὶ τὴν ὅλην περιέγοντα τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν. *Ibid.* xv. 20, 2: According to the Stoics, the air surrounding sea and earth is the soul of the world. *Cornut. Nat.*

sun,¹ and by Archedemus in the centre of the world.² This source of all life and motion, at once the highest Cause and the highest Reason, is God. God and formless matter therefore are the *two* ultimate grounds of things.³

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The language used by the Stoics in reference to the Deity at one time gives greater prominence to the material, at another to the spiritual aspect of God. As a general rule their expressions are so startling, that none of them can be taken singly apart from their general connection with the system. God is spoken of as being Fire, Ether, Air, or most generally as being *πνεῦμα* or Atmospheric Current. He is said to be inherent in everything—in what is bad and ugly, as well as in what is beautiful.⁴

(3) *God.*
(a) *The conception of God more accurately defined.*

De. p. 8: Zeus dwells in heaven, ἐπεὶ ἐκεῖ ἐστι τὸ κυριώτατον μέρος τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ψυχῆς. *Tertullian* (Apol. 47; Ad Nat. ii. 2, 4) inaccurately attributes to the Stoics the belief in a God external to nature.

¹ *Cic. Acad. Ibid.*: Cleanthes . . . solem dominari et rerum potiri putat. He speaks with less accuracy in N. D. i. 14, 37, but says that he no doubt identified αἰθήρ with calor. *Diog.* 139: Κλεάνθης δὲ [τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν φησι] τὸν ἥλιον. *Ar. Diāymus*: ἡγεμονικὸν δὲ τοῦ κόσμου Κλεάνθει μὲν ἤρεσε τὸν ἥλιον εἶναι διὰ τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἄστρον ὑπάρχειν καὶ πλείστα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων διοίκησιν, κ.τ.λ. *Stob.* Ecl. i. 452; Ps. *Censorin.* Fragm. i. 4. According to *Epiphani.* Exp. Fidei, 1090, c, he called the sun δαδούχος to the universe.

² *Stob. Ibid.*: Ἀρχίδαμος τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ κόσμου ἐν γῇ ὑπαρχειν ἀποφῆνατο. This resembles somewhat the Pythagorean doctrine of a central fire, and the view of Speusippus. His resemblance to the Pythagoreans appears still more in *Simpl.* De Cælo; Schol. in Ar. 505, a, 45.

³ *Aristocles*, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 14: στοιχείων εἶναι φασὶ (Stoics) τῶν ὄντων τὸ πῦρ, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος, τούτου δ' ἀρχὰς ὕλην καὶ θεὸν, ὡς Πλάτων.

⁴ *Hippolytus*, Refut. Hær. i. 21: Chrysippus and Zeno suppose ἀρχὴν μὲν θεὸν τῶν πάντων, σῶμα ὄντα τὸ καθαρώτατον (æther). *Diog.* 148: Antipater calls the οὐσία θεοῦ ἀεροιδής. *Stob.* Ecl. i. 60: Mnesarchus (a pupil of Panætius) defines God to be τὸν κόσμον τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν ἔχοντα ἐπὶ πνεύματος. *Sext.* Pyrrh. iii.

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He is further described¹ as being the Soul, the Mind, or the Reason of the world; as being a

218: Στωϊκοὶ δὲ [λέγουσι θεὸν] πνεῦμα διήκον καὶ διὰ τῶν εἰδεχθῶν. *Alex. Aphr.* on *Metaph.* 995, b, 31: τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἔδοξεν ὁ θεὸς καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ εἶναι. *Ibid.* De *Mix.* 144: πνεύματι ὡς διὰ πάντων διήκοντι ἀνάπτειν [Στωϊκοῦς] τό τε εἶναι ἐκάστου καὶ τὸ σώζεσθαι καὶ συμμένειν. De *An.* 145: [τὸν νοῦν] καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαυλοτάτοις εἶναι θεῖον ὄντα, ὡς τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἔδοξεν. *Lucian*, *Hermot.* 81: ἀκούομεν δὲ αὐτοῦ λέγοντος, ὡς καὶ ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἐκ οὐρανῷ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ διὰ πάντων πεφοίτηκεν, οἷον ξύλων καὶ λίθων καὶ ζώων, ἄχρι καὶ τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων. *Tertullian*, *Ad Nation.* ii. 4: Zeno makes God penetrate materia mundialis, as honey does.

Clemens, *Strom.* v. 591, A: φασὶ γὰρ σῶμα εἶναι τὸν θεόν οἱ Στωϊκοὶ καὶ πνεῦμα κατ' οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν. i. 295, c: (οἱ Στωϊκοὶ) σῶμα ὄντα τὸν θεόν διὰ τῆς ἀτιμοτάτης ὕλης πεφοιτηκέναι λέγουσιν οὐ καλῶς. *Protrept.* 44, A: τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, διὰ πάσης ὕλης, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀτιμοτάτης, τὸ θεῖον διήκειν λέγοντας. *Orig.* c. *Cels.* vi. 71: τῶν Στωϊκῶν φασκόντων ὅτι ὁ θεὸς πνεῦμά ἐστι διὰ πάντων διεληλυθὸς καὶ πάντ' ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιεχόν. Opponents like Origen, Alexander, and Plutarch naturally attack them for their materialistic views.

¹ *Stob.* *Ecl.* i. 58. *Diog.* 138: τὸν δὴ κόσμον οἰκεῖσθαι κατὰ νοῦν καὶ πρόνοιαν . . . εἰς ἅπαν αὐτοῦ μέρος διήκοντος τοῦ νοῦ καθάπερ ἐφ' ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς. ἀλλ' ἤδη δι' ὧν μὲν μᾶλλον, δι' ὧν δὲ ἥττον. *Ibid.* 147: θεὸν εἶναι ζῶον ἀθάνα-

τον λογικὸν τέλειον ἢ νοερὸν ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ, κακοῦ παντὸς ἀνεπίδεκτον, προνοητικὸν κόσμου τε καὶ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ, μὴ εἶναι μέντοι ἀνθρωπόμορφον. εἶναι δὲ τὸν μὲν δημιουργὸν τῶν ὄλων καὶ ὥσπερ πατέρα πάντων κοινῶς τε καὶ τὸ μέρος αὐτοῦ τὸ διήκον διὰ πάντων, δὲ πολλαῖς προσηγορίαις προσνομάζεσθαι κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις. *Phæd.* *Nat. De. Col.* 1: According to Chrysippus, Zeus is κοινὴ φύσις, εἰμαρμένη, ἀνάγκη, κ.τ.λ. *Ibid.* *Col.* 3: He considered νόμος to be God. *Themist.* De *An.* 72, b: τοῖς ἀπὸ Ζήνωνος . . . διὰ πάσης οὐσίας πεφοιτηκέναι τὸν θεὸν τιθεμένοις, καὶ ποῦ μὲν εἶναι νοῦν, ποῦ δὲ ψυχὴν, ποῦ δὲ φύσιν, ποῦ δὲ ἔξιν. *Cic.* *Acad.* ii. 37, 119: No Stoic can doubt hunc mundum esse sapientem, habere mentem, quæ se et ipsum fabricata sit, et omnia moderetur, moveat, regat. *Id.* *N. D.* ii. 22, 58: ipsius vero mundi . . . natura non artificiosa solum sed plane artifex ab eodem Zenone dicitur, consultrix et provida utilitatum opportunitatumque omnium. . . . Natura mundi omnes motus habet voluntarias conatusque et appetitiones, quas ὁρμαὶ Græci vocant, et his consentaneas actiones sic adhibet ut nosmet ipsi, qui animis movemur et sensibus, on which account the mens mundi is called πρόνοια. *M. Aurel.* iv. 40: ὡς ἐν ζῶον τὸν κόσμον μίαν οὐσίαν καὶ ψυχὴν μίαν ἐπέχον συνεχῶς ἐπινοεῖν· πῶς εἰς αἰσθησιν μίαν τὴν τοῦτον πάντα ἀναδίδεται καὶ πῶς ὁρμῇ μιᾷ πάντα πράσσει. *Heraclit.* *Alleg. Hom.* 72. *Tertullian*, *Apol.* 21: Hunc enim (λόγον) Zeno determinat

united Whole, containing in Himself the germs of all things; as the Connecting element in things; as Universal Law, Nature, Destiny, Providence; as a perfect, happy, ever kind and all-knowing Being. It needed no great labour to show that no conception could be formed of God without these attributes.¹

facitatore, qui cuncta in dispositione formaverit, eundem et fatum vocari et Deum et animum Jovis et necessitatem omnium rerum. Hæc Cleanthes in spiritum congerit, quem permeatorem universitatis affirmat. See *Lactant.* Inst. iv. 9, 1, 5. *Epiphan.* Hær. v. 1: According to the Stoics, God is *νοῦς*, residing in the world as its soul, and permeating the *μερικὰ οὐσίαι*. Zeus is also spoken of as being the soul of the world by *Cornutus*, Nat. De. 2; by *Plut.* Sto. Rep. 39, 2; and by *Chrysippus* (Ibid. 34, 5): *ὅτι δ' ἡ κοινὴ φύσις καὶ ὁ κοινὸς τῆς φύσεως λόγος εἰμαρμένη καὶ πρόνοια καὶ Ζεὺς ἐστίν οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀντίποδας λέληθε· πανταχοῦ γὰρ ταῦτα θρυλεῖται ὑπ' αὐτῶν.* *Stob.* Ecl. i. 178: *Ζήνων* . . . [τὴν εἰμαρμένην] *δύναμιν κινητικὴν τῆς ὕλης κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὡσαύτως, ἥντινα μὴ διαφέρειν πρόνοιαν καὶ φύσιν καλεῖν.* *Ar. Didymus*, in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 2: God cares for man; He is kind, beneficent, and loves men. Zeus is called *κόσμος* as *αἴτιος τοῦ ζῆν*, *εἰμαρμένη*, because *εἰρομένην λόγῳ διοικεῖ* all things, *ἀδράστεια*, *ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστὶν αὐτὸν ἀποδιδράσκειν*, *πρόνοια*, *ὅτι πρὸς τὸ χρησιμον οἰκονομεῖ ἕκαστα.* *Aristocles* (Ibid. xv. 14): Fire contains the causes and *λόγοι* of all things; the unchangeable law and destiny of the world forms their connection. *Sen. Benef.* iv.

7, 1: Quid enim aliud est natura, quam Deus et divina ratio toti mundo et partibus ejus inserta? . . . Hunc eundem et fatum si dixeris non mentieris. *Id.* Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 2: God or Jupiter may be equally well spoken of as Destiny, Providence, Nature, the World. *Stob.* Ecl. i. 178: *Ἀντίπατρος ὁ Στωϊκὸς θεὸν ἀπεφώνησε τὴν εἰμαρμένην.* Zeus is called *κοινὸς νόμος* by *Diog.* vii. 88; by *Cleanthes* (*Stob.* Ecl. i. 34); and by *Zeno* (*Cic. N. D.* i. 14, 36): *Naturalem legem divinam esse censet (Zeno), eamque vim obtinere recta imperantem prohibentemque contraria.* *Plut.* C. Not. 32, 1; *Sto. Rep.* 38, 3 and 7: God must be conceived of as *μακρίος, εὐποιητικὸς, φιλόανθρωπος, κηδεμονικὸς, ὠφέλιμος.* *Muson.* (in *Stob.* Floril. 117, 8): God is the type of every virtue, *μεγαλόφρων, ἐνεργητικὸς, φιλόανθρωπος, κ.τ.λ.* *Sen.* Ep. 24, 49: *Quæ causa est Dis beneficiendi? Natura.* Errat, si quis illas putat nocere nolle: non possunt. Further details in *Sen. Benef.* i. 9; iv. 3-9 and 25-28; *Clement.* i. 5, 7; *Nat. Qu.* v. 18, 13; *Ep.* 83, 1; *V. Beat.* 20, 5.

¹ According to *Cic. N. D.* ii. 30, 75, the Stoics divided the proposition as to God's providential care of the world into three parts. The first part proved that if there existed Gods, there

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Two kinds of expression are combined in asserting that God is the fiery Reason of the World, the Mind in Matter, an internal Atmospheric Current, penetrating all things, and assuming various names according to the objects in which He resides, the skilful Agency of Fire, containing in Himself the germs of everything, and producing therefrom according to an unalterable law the world and all that is therein.¹

must also be a care of the world; for Gods could not exist without having something to do, and to care for the world is the noblest thing that could be done. The second part proved that the force and skill of nature produced all things. Things in themselves so beautiful and so harmoniously arranged must be directed by a *natura sentiens*. This applies, *a fortiori*, to the world as a whole, which is the most beautiful of all things. The third part was directed to proving, in a round-about way, *quanta sit admirabilitas cœlestium rerum atque terrestrium*.

¹ *Stob. Ecl. i. 58: Διογένης καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Οἰνοπίδης τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴν [θεὸν λέγουσι] . . . Ποσειδώνιος πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρᾶδες, οὐκ ἔχον μὲν μορφήν μεταβάλλον δὲ εἰς ὃ βούλεται καὶ συνεξομοιούμενον πᾶσιν . . . Ζήνων ὁ Στωϊκὸς νοῦν κόσμον πύρινον. Ib. 64: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ νοερὸν θεὸν ἀποφαίνονται πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὀδῶ βαδίζον ἐπὶ γενέσει κόσμου ἐμπεριεληφὸς τε πάντας τοὺς σπερματικούς λόγους, καθ' οὓς ἅπαντα καθ' εἰμαρμένην γίνεται, καὶ πνεῦμα ἐνδιήκον, δι' ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου, τὰς δὲ προσηγορίας μεταλαμβάνον διὰ τὰς τῆς ὕλης, δι' ἧς κεχώρηκε μεταλλάξεις. Follow-*

ing the same source, Athenag. Deg. pro Christ. c. b: εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν θεὸς πῦρ τεχνικόν, κ.τ.λ. . . τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα αὐτὸν διήκει δι' ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου· ὁ θεὸς εἰς κατ' αὐτοὺς, Ζεὺς μὲν κατὰ τὸ ζέον τῆς ὕλης ὀνομαζόμενος, Ἥρα δὲ κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ καθ' ἕκαστον τῆς ὕλης μέρος, δι' ἧς κεχώρηκε, καλούμενος. The latter passage is explained by Diog. 147: Δία μὲν γὰρ φασὶ δι' ὃν τὰ πάντα· Ζῆνα δὲ καλοῦσι παρ' ὅσον τοῦ ζῆν αἰτίος ἐστὶν ἡ διὰ τοῦ ζῆν κεχώρηκεν. Ἀθηναῖον δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰς αἰθέρα διάτασιν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ αὐτοῦ. Ἥραν δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰς ἀέρα. καὶ Ἡφαιστον κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ τεχνικὸν πῦρ. καὶ Ποσειδῶνα κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ ὑγρόν. καὶ Δήμητραν κατὰ τὴν εἰς γῆν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας προσηγορίας ἐχόμενοι τινος ὁμοιότητος ἀπέδωσαν. Plut. C. Not. 48, 2: τὸν θεόν . . . σῶμα νοερὸν καὶ νοῦν ἐν ὕλῃ ποιοῦντες. M. Aurel. 5, 32: τὸν διὰ τῆς οὐσίας διήκοντα λόγον, κ.τ.λ. Porphyry. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 16, 1: τὸν δὲ θεόν . . . πῦρ νοερὸν εἰκόντες. Orig. c. Cels. vi. 71: κατὰ μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς . . . καὶ ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ ὁ μέχρι ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ἐλαχίστων καταβαίνων οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ πνεῦμα σωματικόν. The same combination of nature and mind is found

These expressions, as used in the Stoic system, generally mean one and the same thing. It is an unimportant difference whether the original cause is called an Air Current or Ether, or Heat or Fire. It is rightly called an Air Current, since Air Currents are the causes of the properties of things, giving them shape and connection. It is also rightly called Fire, for by fire is meant the warm air, or the fiery fluid, which is sometimes called Ether, at other times Fire, at other times Heat,¹ and which is expressly distinguished from ordinary fire.² Moreover the terms, Soul of the world, Reason of the world, Nature, Universal Law, Providence, Destiny—all mean the same thing. Even the more abstract names, Law, Providence, Destiny, have with the Stoics an essentially real meaning, and imply not only the form according to which the world is arranged and governed, but also the substantial existence of the world, as a power exalted above all its particular and individual parts.³ If Nature must be distinguished

in the hymn of Cleanthes (in *Stob. Ecl. i. 30*), Zeus being described as the ἀρχηγὸς φύσεως, who directs the κοινὸς λόγος ὃς διὰ πάντων φοιτᾷ, by means of πῦρ αἰέζων.

¹ *Stob. Ecl. i. 374*: Chrysippus teaches εἶναι τὸ ὃν πνεῦμα κινεῖν ἑαυτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, ἢ πνεῦμα ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω· πνεῦμα δὲ εἴληπται διὰ τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὸ ἀέρα εἶναι κινούμενον· ἀνάλογον δὲ γίγνεσθαι ἔπειτα [?] αἰθερὸς, ὥστε μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὸ πῦρ ὃν δὴ αἰθέρα καλεῖσθαι.

² *Stob. Ecl. i. 538*, on the au-

thority of Zeno; *Cic. N. D. ii. 15, 40*, on that of Cleanthes. Both state that the difference consists in this: Ordinary (ἄτεχνον) fire consumes things; but the πῦρ τεχνικόν, which constitutes φύσις and ψυχὴ, preserves things. Heraclitus, in making fire the basis of things, did not mean flame, but warmth.

³ *Seneca, De Benefic. iv. 7, 2*: God may also be called fatum: nam cum fatum nihil aliud sit quam series implexa causarum, ille est prima omnium causa, ex qua ceteræ pendent. *Nat. Qu. ii.*

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from Destiny, and both of these notions again from Zeus,¹ the distinction can only be, that the three conceptions describe one original Being at different stages of His manifestations and growth. Viewed as the whole of the world He is called Zeus; viewed as the inner power in the world, Providence or Destiny;² and to prove this identity Chrysippus maintained that at the close of every period Zeus reunited Providence to Himself.³

Moreover, upon closer examination, the difference between the materialistic and idealistic description of God vanishes. God, according to Stoic principles, can only be invested with reality when He has a material form. Hence when he is called the Soul, the Mind, or the Reason of the world, this is only done on the assumption that these conceptions have a material form. Such a material form the Stoics thought to discern in that heated fluid which they at one time denominated Air Current, at

45, 1: Vis illum fatum vocare? Non errabis. Hic est, ex quo suspensa sunt omnia, causa causarum.

¹ *Stob. Ecl. i. 178 (Plut. Plac. i. 28, 5): Ποσειδώνιος [τὴν εἰμαρμένην] τρίτην ἀπὸ Διὸς. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸν Δία, δεύτερον δὲ τὴν φύσιν, τρίτην δὲ τὴν εἰμαρμένην. In Cic. Divin. i. 55, 125, prophecy is deduced, according to Posidonius, (1) a Deo, (2) a fato, (3) a natura. *Plut. C. Not. 36, 5: λέγει γοῦν Χρύσιππος, εἰκέναι τῷ μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τὸν Δία καὶ τὸν κόσμον, τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ τὴν πρόνοιαν· ὅταν οὖν ἐκ πύρωσις γένηται μόνον ἀφθαρτον ὄντα τὸν Δία τῶν**

θεῶν ἀναχωρεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν, εἰτα ὁμοῦ γενομένους ἐπὶ μιᾷ τῇ τοῦ αἰθέρος οὐσίας διατελεῖν ἀμφοτέρους. To this maxim of Chrysippus, reference is made by Philo, Incorrupt. M. 951, B. Here, too, πρόνοια is equivalent to ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου.

² According to Chrysippus. According to Posidonius, Zeus stands for the original force, φύσις for its first, and εἰμαρμένη for its second production.

³ *Plut. Sen. Ep. 9, 16: Jovis, cum resolutio mundo et Diis in unum confusus paullisper cessante natura acquiescit sibi cogitationibus suis traditur.*

another Ether, at another Fire;¹ definitions all of which appeared to them equally indispensable, and which become identical as soon as the Stoic premisses are granted.² According to these premisses the infinite character of the divine Reason depends on the purity and lightness of the fiery material which composes it. Seneca is therefore quite in harmony with Stoic theories when he speaks of its being indifferent whether God is spoken of as Destiny or as an all-pervading Air Current.³ Those who would charge the Stoics with inconsistency for calling God at one time Reason, at another Soul of the universe, at another Destiny, at another Fire, Ether, or even the Universe,⁴ forget that they are attaching to these

¹ *Cic. Acad. i. 11, 39*: (Zeno) statuebat ignem esse ipsam naturam. *Diog. vii. 156*: δοκεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς τὴν μὲν φύσιν εἶναι πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδῶ βαδίζον εἰς γένεσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ πνεῦμα πυροειδὲς καὶ τεχνοειδές. *Stob. Ecl. i. 180*: Χρύσιππος δυνάμιν πνευματικὴν τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς εἰμαρμένης τάξει τοῦ παντὸς διοικητικὴν; or, according to another definition: εἰμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος, ἢ λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοία διοικουμένων, κ.τ.λ. Instead of λόγος, he also used ἀλήθεια, φύσις, αἰτία, ἀνάγκη, &c.

² *Cic. N. D. ii. 11, 30*: Atque etiam mundi ille fervor purior, perlucidior mobiliorque multo ob easque causas aptior ad sensus commovendos quam hic noster calor, quo hæc quæ nota nobis sunt, retinentur et vigent. Absurdum igitur est dicere, cum homines bestiæque hoc calore teneantur et propterea moveantur ac sentiant, mundum esse sine

sensu, qui integro et puro et libero eodemque acerrimo et mobilissimo ardore teneatur. *Ar. Didymus*, page 124.

³ *Consol. ad Helvid. 8, 3*: Id actum est, mihi crede, ab illo, quisquis formatio universi fuit, sive ille Deus est potens omnium, sive incorporalis ratio ingentium operum artifex, sive divinus spiritus per omnia maxima ac minima æquali intentione diffusus, sive fatum et immutabilis causarum inter se cohærentium series.

⁴ *Cic. N. D. i. 14*: Zeno calls natural law divine, but he also calls the Ether and the all-pervading Reason God; Cleanthes gives the name of God to the world, reason, and the soul of the world; Chrysippus to reason, to the soul of the world, to ruling reason, to communis natura, destiny, fire, ether, the world-whole, and eternal law.

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terms a meaning entirely different from those in which they were used by the Stoics.¹

(b) *God as
original
matter.*

The more the two aspects of the conception of God—the material and the ideal—are compared, the clearer it becomes that there is no difference between God and original Matter. Both are one and the same Being, which when conceived of as universal subject-matter, is known as inert matter; but when conceived of as acting force, is called universal Ether, all-warming Fire, all-penetrating Air, Nature, Soul of the world, Reason of the world, Providence, Destiny, God. Property and material, matter and form, are not as with Aristotle things radically different, though united from all eternity. Far from it, the forming force resides in matter as such; it is in itself something material; it is identical with ether, or fiery matter, or atmospheric current. The difference, therefore, of material and efficient cause, of God and matter, resolves itself into the difference between Air Currents and other materials. It is in itself no original ultimate difference. According to the Stoic teaching, every particular material has developed in the lapse of time out of the original fire or God, and to God it will return at the end of the world. The difference is therefore only a temporary and passing one—one with which we have here nothing to do. The conception of God, however, taken in its full meaning, includes the original matter, as well as the original force. The sum of all real existences constitutes the divine Air Current, extending beyond

¹ *Krische*, Forsch. i. 365.

its own limits, and withdrawing into them again.¹ God is the original fire, containing in Himself the germ of force and of matter;² He is the World in its atmospheric condition,³ the Universal Substance changing into definite materials, and returning to itself again, which regarded in its real form as God includes everything, but is more often regarded under one or other aspect only, as including only a part of real existence.⁴

From all that has been said it follows that the Stoics did not think of God and the world as different beings. Their system was therefore strictly pantheistic. The world is the sum of all real existence, and all real existence is originally contained in God, who is at once universal matter and the creative force which fashions matter into the particular materials of which things are made. We can, therefore, think of nothing which is not either God or a manifestation of God. In point of Being, God and the world are the same, the two conceptions being declared by the Stoics to be absolutely identical.⁵ If they have

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C. Pan-
theism.
(1) God
identical
with the
world.

¹ *Chrysippus*. See p. 145, note 1.

² *Aristocles*. See p. 141, note 3.

³ *Mnesarchus*, in *Stob.* i. 60.

⁴ *Orig. c. Cels.* iii. 75: Στωϊκῶν θεὸν φθαρτὸν εἰσαγόντων καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ λεγόντων σῶμα τρεπτὸν διόλου καὶ ἀλλοιωτὸν καὶ μεταβλητὸν καὶ ποτε πάντα φθειρόντων καὶ μόνον τὸν θεὸν καταλιπόντων. *Ibid.* iv. 14: ὁ τῶν Στωϊκῶν θεὸς ὅτε σῶμα τυγχάνων ὅτε μὲν ἡγεμονικὸν ἔχει τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν ὅταν ἢ ἐκπύρωσις ᾖ· ὅτε δὲ ἐπὶ μέρους γίνεταί αὐτῆς ὅταν ᾖ διακόσμησις.

⁵ Besides the quotations already given from *Chrysippus* and *Cleanthes*, compare *Phædr.* Nat. De. (*Philodem.* περὶ εὐσεβείας), Col. 5: Διογένης δ' ὁ Βαβυλώνιος ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς τὸν κόσμον γράφει τῷ Διὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν, ἢ περιέχειν τὸν Δία καθάπερ ἄνθρωπον ψυχὴν. *Cic.* N. De. ii. 17, 45: Nothing corresponds better to the idea of God, quam ut primum hunc mundum, quo nihil fieri excellentius potest, animantem esse et Deum judicem. *Ibid.* 13, 34:

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nevertheless to be distinguished, the distinction is only derivative and partial. The same universal Being is called God when it is treated as a whole, World when it is regarded as progressive in one of the many forms assumed in the course of its development. The difference, therefore, is tantamount to assigning a difference of meaning to the term world, according as it is used to express the whole of what exists or only a part.¹

Perfect reason Deo tribuenda, id est mundo. *Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 45, 3*: Vis illum vocare mundum? Non falleris. Ipse enim est hoc quod vides totum, suis partibus inditus et se sustinens et sua. *Ibid. Prolog. 13*: Quid est Deus? Mens universi. Quid est Deus? Quod vides totum et quod non vides totum. Sic demum magnitudo sua illi redditur, qua nihil majus excogitari potest, si solus est omnia, opus suum et extra et intra tenet. *Diog. vii. 148*: οὐσίαν δὲ θεοῦ Ζήνων μὲν φησι τὸν ὅλον κόσμον καὶ τὸν οὐρανόν. *Ar. Didym. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 1* and *3*: ὅλον δὲ τὸν κόσμον σὺν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μέρεσι προσαγορεύουσι θεόν. . . . διὸ δὴ καὶ Ζεὺς λέγεται ὁ κόσμος. *Orig. c. Cels. v. 7*: σαφῶς δὴ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον λέγουσιν εἶναι θεόν Στωϊκοὶ μὲν τὸ πρῶτον. The arguments given, p. 137, for the existence of God are based on the supposition that God is the same as the world. The existence of God is proved by showing the reasonableness of the world. *Aratus* gives a poet's description of the Stoic pantheism at the beginning of the *Phænomena*: Zeus is the being of whom streets and markets, sea and

land, are full, whose offspring is man, and who, in regard for man, has appointed signs in the heaven to regulate the year. The same idea is contained in the well-known lines of Virgil, *Georg. iv. 220*; *Æn. vi. 724*. See also *Sen. Ep. 113, 22*; *De M. Claud. 8, 1*; *Cic. N. D. i. 17, 46*.

¹ *Stob. Ecl. i. 444*: κόσμον δ' εἶναι φησιν ὁ Χρῦσιππος σύστημα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις φύσεων· ἢ τὸ ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων σύστημα καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἕνεκα τούτων γεγονότων. λέγεται δ' ἐτέρως κόσμος ὁ θεός, καθ' ὃν ἡ διακόσμησις γίνεται καὶ τελειοῦται. *Diog. vii. 137*: λέγουσι δὲ κόσμον τριχῶς· αὐτὸν τε τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης οὐσίας ἰδίως ποιόν, ὃς δὴ ἀφθαρτός ἐστι καὶ ἀγέννητος δημιουργὸς ὢν τῆς διακοσμήσεως κατὰ χρόνων τινὰς περιόδους ἀναλίσκων εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὴν ἅπασαν οὐσίαν καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ γεννῶν, καὶ αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν διακόσμησιν τῶν ἀρτέρων κόσμον εἶναι λέγουσι καὶ τρίτον τὸ συνεστηκὸς ἐξ ἀμφοῦν, καὶ ἔστι κόσμος ἢ ὁ ἴδιος ποιὸς τῆς τῶν ὅλων οὐσίας, ἢ ὥς φησι Ποσειδώνιος . . . σύστημα ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις φύσεων, ἢ σύστημα ἐκ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ἕνεκα τούτων

Nor does this distinction depend only upon our way of looking at things, but it is founded in the nature of things. Original force, original fire, original reason, constitute what is originally God. Things which have grown from the original Being are only divine in a derivative sense. Hence God, who is originally identical with the whole of the world, may be described as a part of the world, as the leading part (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν), as the Soul of the world, as the all-pervading fiery Air.¹ The distinction, however, is only a relative one. What is not God in His original form is nevertheless God in a derivative sense, as being a manifestation of God. The soul of the world may not be identical with its body, the world itself; nevertheless it pervades every part of that body;² and moreover it passes for a part of the world. At the end of every period, however, all derivative things return to the unity of God, and the distinction between what is originally God and what is God only in a derivative sense, in other words, the distinction between God and the world, ceases.

Boëthus alone dissented from the pantheism of the Stoics by making a real distinction between God

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(2) *Difference between God and the world only relative.*

γεγονότων. *Ar. Didym.* in *Eus. Pr. Ev.* xv. 15, 1: κόσμος is the name for τὸ ἐκ πάσης τῆς οὐσίας ποιδν, and for τὸ κατὰ τὴν διακόσμησιν τὴν τοιαύτην καὶ διὰταξιν ἔχον. In the former sense, the world is eternal, and the same as God; in the latter, created, and subject to change.

¹ See p. 141. The two ideas blend into each other. Thus *Seneca*, *Nat. Qu. Prol.* 13, says

God must be the Reason of the world; he must also be the universe itself; and he continues: Quid ergo interest inter naturam Dei et nostram? Nostri melior pars animus est, in illo nulla pars extra animum est. Totus est ratio, &c.

² The connection of the two, like the connection between soul and body, is a κρᾶσις δι' ὧλων.

(3) *Boëthus dissents from the pantheism of the Stoics.*

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and the world. Agreeing with the other Stoics in considering God to be an Atmospheric Substance,¹ he would not allow that God resided, as the Soul, within the whole world, and, consequently, he refused to call the world a living being.² Instead of doing this, he declared that the highest of the heavenly spheres, the sphere of the fixed stars, was the seat of God, and that from this abode God acted upon the world.³ The opposite view detracted, in his eyes, from the unchangeable and exalted character of the divine Being. How anxious Boëthus was to vindicate that character will also be seen in the way in which he differed from his fellow-Stoics in reference to the destruction of the world.

¹ *Stob.* Ecl. i. 60: Βόηθος τὸν αἰθέρα θεὸν ἀπεφάνητο.

² *Diog.* 143: Βόηθος δὲ φησιν οὐκ εἶναι ζῶν τοῦ κόσμου. The words of *Philo*, *Incorrump.* M. 953, c—ψυχὴ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου κατὰ τοὺς ἀντιδοξοῦντας ὁ θεὸς—are probably not taken from Boëthus.

³ *Diog.* 148: Βόηθος δὲ ἐν τῇ

περὶ φύσεως οὐσίαν θεοῦ τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν· the ἡγεμονικὸν of the world resides in the purest part of the ether. In *Philo*, *Incorrump.* M. 953, B, God is described as the charioteer guiding the world, and παρίσταμενος the stars and elements.

CHAPTER VII.

THE STUDY OF NATURE. COURSE, CHARACTER, AND
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNIVERSE.

By virtue of a law inherent in nature, Primary Being passes over into particular objects; and, as it involves in itself the conception of a forming and creating force, it must as necessarily develope into a universe, as a seed or ovum must develope into a plant or animal.¹ Primary fire—so taught the Stoics, following Heraclitus—first goes over into vapour, then into moisture: one part of this moisture is precipitated in the form of earth, another remains as water, whilst a third part, evaporating, constitutes atmospheric air, and air, again, enkindles fire out of itself. By the mutual play of these four elements the world is formed,² built

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A. *The general course of the universe.*
(1) *Origin of the world.*

¹ *Diog.* vii. 136: κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν καθ' αὐτὸν ὄντα [τὸν θεόν] τρέπειν τὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν δι' αἰέρος εἰς ὕδωρ· καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα περιέχεται, οὕτω καὶ τοῦτον σπερματικὸν λόγον ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου τοιοῦδε ὑπολιπέσθαι ἐν τῷ ὕγρῳ ἐνεργὸν αὐτῷ ποιοῦντα τὴν ὕλην πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἐξῆς γένεσιν, κ.τ.λ. *Seneca*, *Nat. Quæst.* iii.

13, 1: Fire will consume the world: hunc evanidum considere, et nihil relinqui aliud in rerum natura, igne restincto, quam humorem. In hoc futuri mundi spem latere. *Stob. Eccl.* i. 372 and 414.

² *Stob.* i. 370: Ζήνωνα δὲ οὕτως ἀποφαίνεσθαι διαρρήδην· τοιαύτην δεήσει εἶναι ἐν περιόδῳ τὴν τοῦ

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round earth as a centre,¹ by the action on the chaotic mass of the heat which is developed out of water.² Now, for the first time, by this division of the elements, a distinction between the active and

δλου διακόσμησιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας. ὅταν ἐκ πυρὸς τροπὴ εἰς ὕδωρ δι' αἰέρος γένηται τὸ μὲν τι ὑφίστασθαι καὶ γῆν συνίστασθαι, ἐκ τοῦ λοιποῦ δὲ τὸ μὲν διαμέμειν ὕδωρ, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἀτμιζομένου αἶρα γίνεσθαι, ἐκ τίνος δὲ τοῦ αἰέρος πῦρ ἐξάπτειν. *Diog.* vii. 142: γίνεσθαι δὲ τὸν κόσμον ὅταν ἐκ πυρὸς ἢ οὐσία τροπῇ δι' αἰέρος εἰς ὕδωρ εἴτα τὸ παχυμερὲς αὐτοῦ συστὰν ἀποτελεσθῇ γῆ τὸ δὲ λεπτομερὲς ἐξαερωθῇ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐπιπλεόν λεπτυνθὲν πῦρ ἀπογεννήσῃ; εἴτα κατὰ μίξιν ἐκ τούτων φυτὰ τε καὶ ζῶα καὶ ἄλλα γένη. *Chrys. in Plut. St. Rep.* 41, 3: ἡ δὲ πυρὸς μεταβολὴ ἐστὶ τοιαύτη· δι' αἰέρος εἰς ὕδωρ τρέπεται· καὶ τούτου γῆς ὑφίσταμένης ἀῆρ ἐνθυμῖται· λεπτυνόμενου δὲ τοῦ αἰέρος ὁ αἰθήρ περιχεῖται κύκλῳ. The same writer observes, in the Scholia on Hesiod's Theogony, v. 459, ὅτι καθύγρων ὄντων τῶν ὀλων καὶ ὕμβρων καταφερομένων πολλῶν τὴν ἑκκρίσιν τούτων Κρόνον ὠνομάζθαι. *Conf. Clemens, Strom.* v. 599, c, and *Stob.* i. 312.

¹ *Stob. Ecl.* i. 442, also affirms that the creation of the universe begins with earth.

² *Stob. Ibid.*: Κλεάνθης δὲ οὕτω πῶς φησιν· ἐκφλογισθέντος τοῦ παντός ἀνίξειν τὸ μέσον αὐτοῦ πρῶτον, εἴτα τὰ ἐχόμενα ἀποσβένυσθαι δι' ὄλου. τοῦ δὲ παντός ἐξυγρυνθέντος, τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ πυρὸς, ἀντιτυπήσαντος αὐτῷ τοῦ μέσου, τρέπεσθαι πάλιν εἰς τοῦναντίον (the probable meaning is, that the last remains of the original fire begin a motion in

the opposite direction) εἴθ' οὕτω τρεπόμενον ἄνω φησὶν αὔξεσθαι· καὶ ἄρχεσθαι διακοσμεῖν τὸ ὄλον, καὶ τοιαύτην περίοδον αἰεὶ καὶ διακόσμησιν ποιουμένον τοῦ ἐν τῇ τῶν ὀλων οὐσίᾳ τόγου μὴ παύεσθαι [διακοσμούμενον τὸ ὄλον]. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐνός τίνος τὰ μέρη πάντα φύεται ἐκ σπερμάτων ἐν τοῖς καθήκουσι χρόνοις, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ὄλου τὰ μέρη, ὧν καὶ τὰ ζῶα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει, ἐν τοῖς καθήκουσι χρόνοις φύεται. καὶ ὥσπερ τινὲς λόγοι τῶν μερῶν εἰς σπέρμα συνιόντες μίγνυνται καὶ αἰθερ διακρίνονται γενομένων τῶν μερῶν, οὕτως ἐξ ἐνός τε πάντα γίνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ πάντων εἰς ἓν συγκρίνεσθαι, ὁδῶ καὶ συμφώνως διεξιούσης τῆς περιόδου. A few further details are supplied by *Macrobi. Sat.* i. 17. The myth respecting the birth of Apollo and Artemis is referred to the formation of the sun and moon. *Namque post chaos, ubi primum cœpit confusa deformitas in rerum formas et elementa nitescere, terræque adhuc humida substantia in molli atque instabili sede mutaret: convalescente paulatim ætheres calore atque inde seminibus in eam igneis defluentibus hæc sidera edita esse credantur; et solem maxima caloris vi in suprema raptum; lunam vero humidiore et velut femineo sexu naturali quodam pressam tempore inferiora tenuisse, tanquam ille magis substantia patris constet, hæc matris. Conf. Lactant. Inst.* vii. 4; *Sext. Math.* ix. 28.

the passive powers of nature—between the soul of the world and the body of the world—becomes apparent. The moisture into which the primary fire was first changed represents the body, just as the heat¹ latent in it represents the soul;² or, if the later fourfold division of the elements is considered, the two lower ones correspond to matter, the two higher ones to acting force.³

As the distinction between matter and force has its origin in time, so it will also have an end in time.⁴ Matter which forms the body of primary

(2) *End of the world.*

¹ There must always be some remainder of heat or fire, as Cleanthes and Chrysippus avowed, or else there would be no active life-power from which a new creation could emanate. *Philo*, *Incorrupt*. M. 954, c, observes that, if the world were entirely consumed by fire at the ἐκπύρωσις, the fire itself would be extinguished, and no new world would be possible. διὸ καὶ τινες τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς . . . ἔφασαν, ὅτι μετὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν, ἐπειδὴν ὁ νέος κόσμος μέλλει δημιουργεῖσθαι, σύμπαν μὲν τὸ πῦρ οὐ σβέννυται, ποσὴ δέ τις αὐτοῦ μοῖρα ὑπολείπεται.

² Chrys. in *Plut.* *Ibid.* 41, 6: διόλου μὲν γὰρ ὢν ὁ κόσμος πυρώδης εὐθὺς καὶ ψυχὴ ἐστιν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἡγεμονικόν. ὅτε δὲ μεταβαλὼν εἰς τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὴν ἐναπολειφθεῖσαν ψυχὴν τρῶσιν τινὰ εἰς σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν μετέβαλεν ὥστε συνεστάναι ἐκ τούτων, ἄλλον τινὰ εἶχε λόγον.

³ *Nemes*, *Nat. Hom.* C. 2: λέγουσι δὲ οἱ Στωϊκοί, τῶν στοιχείων τὰ μὲν εἶναι δραστικά· τὰ δὲ παθητικά· δραστικά μὲν ἄερα καὶ πῦρ,

παθητικά δὲ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ. *Plut.* *Com.* *Not.* 49, 2. From this passage a further insight is obtained into two points connected with the Stoic philosophy, which have been already discussed. It can no longer appear strange that the active power, or God, should at one time be called Fire, at another Air-Current, for both represent equally the acting force; and the statement that properties are atmospheric currents—as, indeed, the whole distinction of subject-matter and property—follows from this view of things.

⁴ The Stoics, according to *Diog.* 141, prove that the world (διακόσμησις, not κόσμος, in the absolute sense) will come to an end, partly because it has come into being, and partly by two not very logical inferences: οὐ τὰ μέρη φθαρτά ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὅλον· τὰ δὲ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου φθαρτά, εἰς ἄλλα γὰρ μεταβάλλει· φθαρτὸς ἄρα ὁ κόσμος· and εἴ τι ἐπιδεικνόν ἐστι τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον μεταβολῆς, φθαρτόν ἐστι· καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἄρα· ἐξαυχοῦνται γὰρ καὶ ἐξυδατοῦνται.

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Being is being gradually consumed; so that, at the end of the present course of things, there will be a general conflagration of the world, and all things will return to their original form; then everything which is only part of God in a derivative sense will cease to exist, and pure Deity, or primary fire, will alone remain.¹ In this resolution of the world into fire or ether,² the same intermediate stages occur, according to the view of the Stoics, as in its generation from the primary fire.³ Cleanthes,

In *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 44, 2, Chrysippus asserts that the οὐσία is immortal, but to κόσμος belongs a ὅσπερ ἀφθαρσία.

¹ *Plut. St. Rep.* 39, 2: [Χρύσιππος] ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ προνοίας τὸν Δία, φησὶν, ἀξέσθαι μέχρις ἂν εἰς αὐτὸν ἅπαντα καταναλώσῃ. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ θάνατος μὲν ἐστὶ ψυχῆς χωρισμὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴ οὐ χωρίζεται μὲν, ἀξέται δὲ συνεχῶς μέχρις ἂν εἰς αὐτὴν ἐξαναλώσῃ τὴν ὕλην, οὐ βητέον ἀποθνήσκειν τὸν κόσμον. *Stob. Ecl.* i. 414: Ζήνωνι καὶ Κλεάνθει καὶ Χρυσίππῳ ἀρέσκει τὴν οὐσίαν μεταβάλλειν οἷον εἰς σπέρμα τὸ πῦρ καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τούτου τοιαύτην ἀποτελεῖσθαι τὴν διακόσμησιν οἷα πρότερον ἦν. *Seneca, Consol.* ad Marciam, gives a graphic description of the end of the world, which recalls the language of the Revelation. Compare, on the subject of ἐκπύρωσις, *Diog.* vii. 142; *Ar. Didym.* in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 15, 1; *Plut. Com.* Not. 36; *Heracлит.* Alleg. Hom. c. 25; *Cic. Acad.* ii. 37, 119; *N. D.* ii. 46, 118; *Sen. Consol.* ad Polyb. i. 2; *Alex. Aphr.* in Meteor. 90, a. In the last-named passage, it is

urged by the Stoics, in support of their view, that even now large tracts of marsh land are dried, and added to the soil. *Simpl. Phys.* iii.; *De Cælo*; *Schol.* in *Arist.* 487 and 489; *Justin. Apol.* i. 20; ii. 7; *Orig. c. Cels.* iii. 75, 497, a; vi. 71. Since at the ἐκπύρωσις everything is resolved into God, *Plut. C. Not.* 17, 3, says: ὅταν ἐκπυρώσωσι τὸν κόσμον οὗτοι, κακὸν μὲν οὐδ' ὅτι οὖν ἀπολείπεται, τὸ δ' ἔλον φρόνιμόν ἐστι τῆνικαῦτα καὶ σοφόν.

² *Numen.* in Eus. Pr. Ev. xv. 18, 1: ἀρέσκει δὲ τοῖς πρεσβυτάτοις τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἰρέσεως ταύτης, ἐξαγροῦσθαι πάντα κατὰ περιόδους τινὰς τὰς μεγίστας, εἰς πῦρ αἰθερώδες ἀναλνομένον πάντων. According to *Philo*, *Incorrup.* M. 954, v, Cleanthes called this fire φλόξ, Chrysippus αὐγή.

³ This is, at least, the import of the general principle (assigned to Chrysippus by *Stob. Ecl.* i. 314) expressed by Heracлитus, that, in the resolution of earth and water into fire, the same steps intervene, in a retrograde order, as in their generation.

following his peculiar view as to the seat of the governing force, supposed that the destruction of the world would come from the sun.¹

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No sooner has everything returned to its original unity,² and the course of the world come to an end, than the formation of a new world begins,³ which will so exactly correspond with the previous world that every particular thing, every particular person, and every occurrence will recur in it,⁴ precisely as

(3) *Cycles*
in the
world's
course.

¹ *Plut. Com. Not.* 31, 10: ἐπαγωνιζόμενος ὁ Κλεάνθης τῇ ἐκπυρώσει λέγει τὴν σελήνην καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄστρα τὸν ἥλιον ἐξομοιωσαι πάντα ἑαυτῷ καὶ μεταβαλεῖν εἰς ἑαυτόν.

² It is expressly asserted that everything, without exception, is liable to this destiny; neither the soul nor the Gods are exempt. *Conf. Sen. Cons. ad Marc.* 26, 7: Nos quoque felices animæ et æterna sortitæ, cum Deo visum sit iterum ista moliri, labentibus cunctis et ipsæ parva ruinæ ingentis accessio in antiqua elementa vertemur. Chrysippus says of the Gods, in *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 38, 5: Some of the Gods have come into being and are perishable, others are eternal: Helios and Selene, and other similar Gods, have come into being; Zeus is eternal. In *Philo, In-corrump. M.* 950, A, *Orig. c. Cels.* iv. 68, *Plut. Def. Oræ.* 19, *Com. Not.* 31, 5, it is stated that, at the general conflagration, the Gods will melt away, as though they were made of wax or tin. According to *Philodem. περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς*, *Tab. i.* 1, even Zeno restricted the happy life of the Gods to certain lengthy periods of time.

³ *Arius*, in *Eus. Pr. Ev.* xv. 19: ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο δὲ προελθὼν ὁ κοινὸς λόγος καὶ κοινὴ φύσις μέλζων καὶ πλείων γενομένη τέλος ἀναξηράνασα πάντα καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὴν ἀναλαβοῦσα ἐν τῇ πάσῃ οὐσίᾳ γίνεται, ἐπανελθοῦσα εἰς τὸν πρῶτον βηθέντα λόγον καὶ εἰς ἀνάστασιν ἐκείνην τὴν ποιοῦσαν ἐν αὐτὸν τὸν μέγιστον, καθ' ὃν ἀπ' αὐτῆς μόνης εἰς αὐτὴν πάλιν γίνεται ἡ ἀποκατάστασις, ἐπανελθοῦσα δὲ διὰ τάξιν ἀφ' οἷας διακοσμεῖν ὡσαύτως ἤρξατο κατὰ λόγον πάλιν τὴν αὐτὴν διεξαγωγὴν ποιεῖται. According to *Nemes. Nat. Hom. c.* 38, *Censorin. Di. Nat.* 18, 11, the ἐκπύρωσις takes place when all the planets have got back to the identical places which they occupied at the beginning of the world, or, in other words, when a periodic year is complete. The length of a periodic year was estimated by Diogenes (*Plut. Pl.* i. 32, 2; *Stob. Ecl. i.* 264) as 365 periods, or 365 × 18,000 ordinary years. *Plut. De Ei. Ap. d.* 9, mentions the opinion, ὅπερ τρία πρὸς ἓν, τοῦτο τὴν διακόσμησιν χρόνῳ πρὸς τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν εἶναι.

⁴ The belief in changing cycles is a common one in the older Greek philosophy. In particular, the Stoics found it in Heraclitus.

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VII.

they occurred in the world preceding. Hence the history of God and the world—as, indeed, with the eternity of matter and acting force, must necessarily be the case—revolves in an endless cycle through exactly the same stages.¹ Still there were not want-

The belief, however, that each new world exactly represents the preceding one is first encountered among the Pythagoreans, and is closely connected with the theory of the migration of souls and a periodic year. Eudemus had taught (in *Simpl. Phys.* 173): *εἰ δέ τις πιστεύσειε τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις, ὥς πάλιν τὰ αὐτὰ ἀριθμῶ, καὶ γὰρ μυθολογῶ τὸ ῥαβδίων ἔχων ὑμῖν καθημένοις οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὁμοίως ἔξει, καὶ τὸν χρόνον εὐλογόν ἔστι τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι.* The Stoics appear to have borrowed this view from the Pythagoreans, and it commended itself to them as being in harmony with their theory of necessity. Hence they taught: *μετὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν πάλιν πάντα ταῦτα ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γενέσθαι κατ' ἀριθμὸν, ὥς καὶ τὸν ἰδίως ποῖον πάλιν τὸν αὐτὸν τῷ πρόσθεν εἶναι τε καὶ γίνεσθαι ἐκείνῳ τῷ κόσμῳ* (*Alex. Anal. Pr.* 58, b). *τούτου δὲ οὕτως ἔχοντος, δῆλον, ὥς οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον, καὶ ἡμῶς μετὰ τὸ τελευτῆσαι πάλιν περιόδων τινῶν εἰλημμένων χρόνου εἰς ὃν νῦν ἔσμεν καταστήσεσθαι σχῆμα* (*Chrysippus, περὶ Προνοίας, in Lactant. Inst.* vii. 23). This is to apply to every fact and to every occurrence in the new world, at the *παλιγγενεσία* or *ἀποκατάστασις*: thus there will be another Socrates, who will marry another Xanthippe, and be accused by another Anytus and Meletes. Hence *M. Aurel.* vii.

19, xi. 1, deduces his adage, that nothing new happens under the sun. *Simpl. Phys.* 207; *Philop. Gen. et Corr. B.* ii. Schly. p. 70; *Tatian. c. Græc.* 8, 3; *Clemens, Strom.* v. 549, D; *Orig. c. Cels.* iv. 68; v. 20 and 23; *Nemes.*; *Plut. Def. Or.* 29. Amongst other things, the question was raised, Whether the Socrates who would appear in the future world would be numerically identical (*εἰς ἀριθμῶ*) with the present Socrates? to which the answer was given, that they could not be numerically identical, since this would involve uninterrupted existence, but that they were distinct without a difference (*ἀπαράλλακτοι*). Others, however, chiefly among the younger Stoics, appear to have held that they were different (*Orig.* v. 20). From such questions was derived the false notion (*Hippolyt. Hær.* i. 21; *Epiphani. Hær.* v.) that the Stoics believed in the transmigration of souls. The remark made by *Nemes.*, that the Gods know the whole course of the present world, from having survived the end of the former one, can only apply to one highest God.

¹ *Ar. Didym.* continues: *τῶν τοιούτων περιόδων ἐξ αἰδίου γινόμενων ἀκαταπαύστως. οὔτε γὰρ τῆς ἀρχῆς αἰτίαν καὶ πᾶσιν οἶόν τε γινέσθαι, οὔτε τοῦ διοικούντος αὐτά. οὐσίαν τε γὰρ τοῖς γινόμενοις ὑφ'εστάναι δεῖ πεφυκυῖαν*

ing, even in comparatively early times, members of the Stoic School who entertained doubts on this point; and among the number of the doubters some of the most distinguished of the later Stoics are to be found.¹ Besides owing its destruction to fire, it

ἀναδέχεσθαι τὰς μεταβολὰς πάσας καὶ τὸ δημιουργῆσον ἐξ αὐτῆς, κ.τ.λ. Conf. *Philop.*: ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις, ὥς φησιν Ἀλέξανδρος, πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλη. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ὕλη ἡ αὐτὴ ἀεὶ διαμένει, ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ, διὰ ποίαν αἰτίαν οὐχὶ κατὰ περιόδον τινα πλείονος χρόνου ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ὕλης τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν κατ' ἀριθμὸν ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔσται; ὅπερ τινὲς φασὶ κατὰ τὴν παλιγγενέσιαν καὶ τὸν μέγαν ἐνιαυτὸν συμβαίνειν, ἐν ᾧ πάντων τῶν αὐτῶν ἀποκατάστασις γίνεται. See *M. Aurel.* v. 32.

¹ According to Philo (Incorrup. M. 947, c), Boëthius, as well as Posidonius and Panætius, the pupil of Posidonius (*Diog.* vii. 142; *Stob.* Ecl. i. 414), declared, in opposition to the ordinary Stoic teaching, for the eternity of the world. Philo adds that this was also the view of Diogenes of Seleucia, in his later years. Moreover, Zeno of Tarsus, on the authority of Numenius (in *Euseb.* Præp. Ev. xv. 19, 2), considered that the destruction of the world by fire could not be proved. But these statements are elsewhere contradicted. Diogenes mentions Posidonius as one who held the destruction of the world by fire. The testimony of Diogenes is confirmed by *Plut.* Pl. Phil. ii. 9, 3 (*Stob.* Ecl. i. 380; *Eus.* Pr. Ev. xv. 40. See *Achill. Tatian.* Isag. 131, c), who says that Posidonius only allowed so

much empty space outside the world as was necessary for the world to be dissolved in at the ἐκπύρωσις. Antipater, according to Diogenes, also believed in a future conflagration. Little importance can be attached to the fact that *Cic.* N. D. ii. 46, 118, says of Panætius, addubitare dicebant; whereas the words of *Stob.* are: πιθανωτέραν νομίζει τὴν ἀδιότητα τοῦ κόσμου; and those of *Diog.*: ἄφθαρτον ἀπεφηνάτο τὸν κόσμον.

Boëthius denied the destruction of the world with vigour, his chief reasons being the following:—(1) If the world were destroyed, it would be a destruction without a cause, for there is no cause, either within or without, which could produce such an effect. (2) Of the three modes of destruction, those κατὰ διαίρεσιν, κατὰ ἀναίρεσιν τῆς ἐπεχούσης ποιότητος, κατὰ σύγχυσιν, not one can apply to the world. (3) If the world ceased to exist, the action of God on the world would also cease; in fact, His activity would altogether cease. (4) If everything is consumed by fire, the fire must go out for want of fuel. With that, the possibility of a new world is at an end.

The resolution of the world into indefinite vacuum, attributed by *Plut.* Plac. ii. 9, 2, to the Stoics in general, is no doubt the same as the condensation and expansion

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was further supposed that the world was periodically destroyed by floods;¹ but there was a difference of opinion on this point, some holding the whole universe subject to these floods, others restricting them to the earth and to its inhabitants²

B. Govern-
ment of the
world.

(1) Nature
or destiny.
(a) Destiny
as Pro-
vidence.

One point established as a matter of fact by the generation and destruction of the world is, the uncertainty of all particular things, and the unconditional dependence of everything on a universal law and the course of the universe. This point is a leading one throughout the Stoic enquiries into

of matter. *Ritter*, iii. 599 and 703, supposes it to be a misapprehension of the real Stoic teaching. *Hegel*, *Gesch. d. Phil.* ii. 391, and *Schleiermacher*, *Gesch. d. Philos.* p. 129, absolutely deny that the Stoics held a periodic destruction of the world.

¹ The flood and its causes are fully discussed by *Sen. Nat. Qu.* iii. 27-30. Rain, inroads of the sea, earthquakes, are all supposed to contribute. The chief thing, however, is, that such a destruction has been ordained in the course of the world. It comes cum fatalis dies venerit, cum adfuerit illa necessitas temporum, cum Deo visum, ordiri meliora, vetera finiri; it has been fore-ordained from the beginning, and is due not only to the pressure of the existing waters, but also to their increase, and to a changing of earth into water. The object of this flood is to purge away the sins of mankind, ut de integro totæ rudes innoxique generentur [res humanæ] nec supersit in deteriora præceptor; peracto iudicio

generis humani exstructisque pariter feris . . . antiquus ordo revocabitur. Omne ex integro animal generabitur dabiturque terris, homo inscius scelerum: but this state of innocence will not last long. Seneca appeals to Berosus, according to whom the destruction of the world by fire will take place when all the planets are in the sign of the Crab, its destruction by water when they are in the sign of the Capricorn. Since these signs correspond with the summer and winter turns of the sun, the language of Seneca agrees with that of *Censorin.* *Di. Nat.* 18, 11: Cujus anni hiems summa est cataclysmus . . . æstas autem ecpyrasis. *Heraclit.* *Alleg. Hom.* c, 25: When one element gains the supremacy over the others, the course of the world will come to an end, by ἐκπύρωσις, if the element is fire; εἰ δ' ἔθρουν ὕδωρ ἐκραγείη, κατακλυσµῶ τὸν κόσμον ἀπολείσθαι.

² The former view is held by Heraclitus and Censorinus, the latter by Seneca.

nature. Every particular thing, by virtue of a natural and unchangeable connection of cause and effect, flows from the nature of the universe and the general law which governs it. This absolute necessity, regulating all Being and Becoming, is expressed in the conception of Fate or Destiny (ἡ εἰμαρμένη).¹ Viewed as to its nature, Destiny is only another name for primary Being, for the all-pervading, all-producing atmospheric current, for the molten fire which is the soul of the world.² But since the activity of this Being is always rational and according to law, Destiny is also identical with the Reason of the World, with universal Law, with the rational form of the world's course.³ Primary Being, or universal Law, when

¹ *Diog.* vii. 149: καθ' εἰμαρμένην δέ φασι τὰ πάντα γίνεσθαι Χρύσιππος, κ.τ.λ. ἔστι δ' εἰμαρμένη αἰτία τῶν ὄντων εἰρομένη ἢ λόγος καθ' ὃν ὁ κόσμος διεξάγεται. *A. Gell.* vi. 2, 3: (Chrysippus) in libro περὶ προνοίας quarto εἰμαρμένην esse dicit φυσικὴν τινὰ σύνταξιν τῶν ὄλων ἐξ αἰδίου τῶν ἐτέρων τοῖς ἐτέροις ἐπακολουθοῦντων καὶ μετὰ πολλὴν μὲν οὖν ἀπαραβάτου οὐσσης τῆς τοιαύτης συμπλοκῆς. *Cic.* *Divin.* i. 55, 125: Fatum, or εἰμαρμένη, was called ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causa causæ nexa rem ex se gignat. *Sen.* *Nat. Qu.* ii. 36: Quid enim intelligis fatum? existimo necessitatem rerum omnium actionumque, quam nulla vis rumpat. *De Prov.* 5, 8: Irrevocabilis humana pariter ac divina cursus vehit. Ille ipse omnium conditor et rector scripsit quidem fata, sed

sequitur. Semper paret, semper^{el} jussit.

² *Stob.* *Ecl.* i. 180: Χρύσιππος δύναμιν πνευματικὴν τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς εἰμαρμένης τάξει τοῦ παντὸς διοικητικὴν.

³ Hence Chrysippus' definition: εἰμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος ἢ νόμος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοία διοικουμένων· ἢ λόγος καθ' ὃν τὰ μὲν γεγονότα γέγονε, τὰ δὲ γιγνόμενα γίγνεται, τὰ δὲ γενήσόμενα γενήσεται. Instead of λόγος, Chrysippus also used ἀλήθεια, αἰτία, φύσις, ἀνάγκη. *Theodoret.* *Cur. Gr. Aff.* vi. 14: Chrysippus assigns the same meaning to εἰμαρμένον and καθηναγκασμένον, explaining εἰμαρμένη to be κίνησις αἰδίου συνεχῆς καὶ τεταγμένη; Zeno defines it as δύναμις κινητικὴ τῆς ὕλης; also as φύσις or πρόνοια; his successors as λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοία διοικου-

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thought of as being the groundwork of natural formations, is called Nature; but when it appears as the cause of the orderly arrangement and development of the world, it is known as Providence;¹ or in language less technical, as Zeus or the will of Zeus; and in this sense it is popularly said that nothing happens without the will of Zeus.²

b) Des-
igning as
generative
reason.

In action as the creative force in nature, this universal Reason also bears the name of Generative Reason (λόγος σπερματικός). It bears this name more immediately in relation to the universe, as being the generating power out of which all form and shape, all life and reason, in the present arrangement of the world, has grown, and by which all things were produced out of primary fire as

μένων, or as εἰρμὸς αἰτίων. Even τύχη, he continues, is explained as a God; but this supposes it to be essentially identical with εἰμαρμένη. Chrysippus, in *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 34, 8: τῆς γὰρ κοινῆς φύσεως εἰς πάντα διατεινούσης δεήσει πᾶν τὸ ὁπωσοῦν γινόμενον ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ καὶ τῶν μορίων ὁτῶσιν κατ' ἐκείνην γενέσθαι καὶ τὸν ἐκείνης λόγον κατὰ τὴν ἐξῆς ἀκωλύτως· διὰ τὸ μήτ' ἐξῶθεν εἶναι τὸ ἐνστυγνόμενον τῇ οἰκονομίᾳ μήτε τῶν μερῶν μηδὲν ἔχειν ὅπως κινήσεται ἢ σχήσει ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν. *Cleanthes*, Hymn. (in *Stob. Ecl.* i. 30) v. 12; *M. Aurel.* ii. 3.

¹ It has been already demonstrated that all these ideas pass into one another.

² *Plut. Com. Not.* 34, 5: εἰ δέ, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος, οὐδὲ τοῦλάχιστον ἐστὶ τῶν μερῶν ἔχειν

ἄλλως ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ τὴν Διὸς βούλησιν, κ.τ.λ. *St. Rep.* 34, 2: οὕτω δὲ τῆς τῶν ὅλων οἰκονομίας προαγοῦσης, ἀναγκαῖον κατὰ ταύτην, ὥς ἂν ποτ' ἔχωμεν, ἔχειν ἡμᾶς, εἴτε παρὰ φύσιν τὴν ἰδίαν νοσοῦντες, εἴτε πεπρωμένοι, εἴτε γραμματικοὶ γεγονότες ἢ μουσικοὶ . . . κατὰ τοῦτον δὲ τὸν λόγον τὰ παραπλήσια ἐροῦμεν καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡμῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς κακίας καὶ τὸ ὅλον τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀτεχνῶν, ὥς ἔφην . . . οὐθὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλως τῶν κατὰ μέρος γενέσθαι, οὐδὲ τοῦλάχιστον, ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνης λόγον. *Ibid.* 47, 4 and 8. *Cleanth.* Hymn. v. 15: οὐδέ τι γίγνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σοῦ δίχα, δαίμον, οὔτε κατ' αἰθέριον θεῖον πόλον οὔτ' ἐνὶ πόντῳ, πλὴν ὅποσα βέξουσιν κακοὶ σφετέρησιν ἀνοίαις.

their seed, thanks to the exercise of an inherent law. Primary fire, therefore, or Reason, is conceived of as containing in itself the germ of all things.¹ In the same sense, generative powers in the plural, or λόγοι σπερματικοί, of God and Nature are spoken of; and in treating of man, the generative powers are said to be parts of the soul, and to bear the same relation to the individual soul that the generative powers of Nature do to the soul of nature.² By the term Generative Reason, therefore, must be understood the creative and forming forces in nature, which have collectively produced the universe, and particular exercises of which produce individual things. These forces, agreeably with the ordinary Stoic speculations, are spoken of as the original *material*, or material germ of things. On the other hand, they also constitute the *form* of things—the law which determines their shape and qualities, the λόγος—only we must beware of trying to think of form apart from matter. Just as the igneous or ethereal material of primary Being is in itself the same as the forming

¹ See *Diog.* vii. 136; *Stob. Ecl.* i. 372 and 414; *Cic. N. D.* ii. 10, 28; 22, 58; *Sext. Math.* ix. 101; *M. Aurel.* iv. 14: ἐνοφανισθήσῃ τῷ γεννήσαντι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναληφθήσῃ εἰς τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ τὸν σπερματικὸν κατὰ μεταβολήν. *Ibid.* 21: αἱ ψυχὰς . . . εἰς τὸν τῶν ὅλων σπερματικὸν λόγον ἀναλαμβάνόμεναι.

² *M. Aurel.* ix. 1: ὥρμησεν [ἡ φύσις] ἐπὶ τήνδε τὴν διακόσμησιν συλλαβοῦσά τινας λόγους τῶν

ἐσομένων καὶ δυνάμεις γονίμους ἀφωρίσασα, κ.τ.λ. *Ibid.* vi. 24: Alexander and his groom ἐλήθησαν εἰς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοῦ κόσμου σπερματικοὺς λόγους. *Diog.* vii. 148: ἔστι δὲ φύσις ἕξις ἐξ αὐτῆς κινουμένη κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγους, κ.τ.λ. *Ibid.* 157: μέρη δὲ ψυχῆς λέγουσιν ὁκτώ, τὰς πέντε αἰσθήσεις καὶ τοὺς ἐν ἡμῖν σπερματικοὺς λόγους καὶ τὸ φωνητικὸν καὶ τὸ λογιστικόν.

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and creating element in things, the Reason of the world or the Soul of nature; so in the seeds of individual things, the atmospheric substance, in which the generative power alone resides,¹ is in itself the germ out of which the corresponding thing is produced by virtue of an inherent law.² The inward form is the only permanent element in things, amid the perpetual change of materials. It constitutes the identity of the universe; and whereas matter is constantly changing from one form to another,³ the universal law of the process alone continues unchangeably the same.

(2) *Argument in favour of Providence.*

All parts of the Stoic system lead so unmistakably to the conclusion, not only that the world as a whole is governed by Providence, but that every part of it is subject to the same unchangeable laws, that no definite arguments would appear necessary to establish this point. Nevertheless, the Stoics lost no opportunity of meeting every objection in the most explicit manner.⁴ In the true spirit of a Stoic, Chrysippus appealed to the general conviction of mankind, as expressed in the names used to denote fate and destiny,⁵ and to the lan-

(a) *Argument from the general convictions of mankind.*

¹ As the primary fire or ether is called the seed of the world, so, according to Chrysippus (in *Diag.* 159), the σπέρμα in the seed of plants and animals is a πνεῦμα κατ' οὐσίαν.

² σπερματικὸς λόγος is also used to express the seed or the egg itself. Thus, in *Plut. Quæst. Conviv.* ii. 3, 3 and 4, it is defined as γόνος ἐνδεὲς γενέσεως.

³ This is particularly manifest in the doctrine of the constant change of the elements.

⁴ Heine, *Stoicorum de Fato Doctrina* (Novemb. 1859), p. 29.

⁵ Compare what the Peripatetic Diogenianus (in *Eus. Pr. Ev.* vi. 8, 7) and *Stob.* (Ecl. i. 180) observe on the derivations of εἰμαρμένη, πεπρωμένη, Χρεὼν, Μοῖραι, Κλωθῶ; also *Ps. Arist. De Mundo*,

guage of poetry.¹ Nor was it difficult to show² that a divine government of the world followed of necessity from the Stoic conception of the perfection of God. Besides, in proving the existence of a God by the argument drawn from the adaptation of means to ends, a providential government of the world had been already assumed.³ Chrysippus also thought that a providential government of the world could be upheld in the same strictly logical manner by the theory of necessity. For must not every judgment be either true or false?⁴ And does not this apply to judgments which refer to future events, as well as to others? Judgments, however, referring to the future can only be true when what they affirm must come to pass of necessity; they can only be false when what they affirm is impossible; and, accordingly, everything that takes place must follow of necessity from the causes which produce it.⁵

(b) *Argument from the perfection of God.*

(c) *Argument from the theory of necessity.*

The same process of reasoning, applied to the inner world of mind, instead of to the things of the external world, underlies the argument from the foreknowledge of God.⁶ If it may be said that whatever is true before it comes to pass is necessary,

(d) *Argument from foreknowledge of God.*

c. 7. The argument for Providence, drawn from the consensus gentium in *Sen. Benef. iv. 4*, follows another tack.

¹ Homeric passages, which he was in the habit of quoting.

² See *Cic. N. D. ii. 30, 76*.

³ The two are generally taken together.

⁴ Aristotle and the Peripatetics

thought differently.

⁵ *Cic. De Fato, 10, 20.*

⁶ *Alex. De Fato, p. 92, Orel.:*
τὸ δὲ λέγειν εὐλογον εἶναι τοὺς θεοὺς τὰ ἔσομενα προειδέναι . . . καὶ τοῦτο λαμβάνοντας κατασκευάζειν πειρᾶσθαι δι' αὐτοῦ τὸ πάντα εἰς ἀνάγκης τε γίνεσθαι καὶ καθ' εἰμαρμένην οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε εὐλογον.

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(e) *Argument from the existence of divination.*

(3) *The idea of Providence determined.*

(a) *Providence as necessity.*

it may also be said that whatever may be truly known before it comes to pass is necessary.

To these arguments may be added a further one to which the Stoics attached great importance—the argument from the existence of divination.¹ If it is impossible to know beforehand what is accidental, it is also impossible to predict it.

But the real key to the Stoic fatalism may be found in the maxim, that nothing can take place without a sufficient cause, nor, under the given circumstances, can happen differently from the way in which it has happened.² It is as impossible, according to the Stoics, for anything to happen differently from what has happened as it is for something to come out of nothing.³ If such a thing were possible, the unity of the world would be at an end—that unity consisting in the chain-like dependence of cause upon cause, and in the absolute necessity of every thing and of every change.⁴ The

¹ *Cic.* N. D. ii. 65, 162; *De Fato*, 3, 5; *Diogenian* (in *Eus. Pr. Ev.* iv. 3, 1): Chrysippus proves, by the existence of divination, that all things happen καθ' εἰμαρμένην; for divination would be impossible, unless things were foreordained. *Alex. De Fato*, c. 21: οἱ δὲ ὑμνοῦντες τὴν μαντικὴν καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτῶν λόγον μόνον σώζεσθαι λέγοντες αὐτὴν καὶ ταύτῃ πίστει τοῦ πάντα καθ' εἰμαρμένην γίνεσθαι χρώμενοι, κ.τ.λ.

² *Plut.* *De Fato*, 11: κατὰ δὲ τὸν ἐναντίον [λόγον] μάλιστα μὲν καὶ πρῶτον εἶναι δόξειε τὸ μηδὲν ἀναίτιως γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ

προηγούμενας αἰτίας· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ φύσει διοικεῖσθαι τόνδε τὸν κόσμον, σύμπουν καὶ συμπαθῇ αὐτὸν αὐτῷ ὄντα. Then come the considerations confirmatory of that view—divination, the wise man's acquiescence in the course of the world, the maxim that every judgment is either true or false. *Nemes. Nat. Hom.* c. 35: εἰ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν αἰτίων περισσ-τηκότων, ὥς φασιν αὐτοὶ, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τὰ αὐτὰ γίνεσθαι.

³ *Alex. De Fato*, c. 22: ὁμοίον τε εἶναι φασὶ καὶ ὁμοίως ἀδύνατον τὸ ἀναίτιως τῷ γίνεσθαι τι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος.

⁴ *Alex. Ibid.* φασὶ δὴ τὸν κόσμον

Stoic doctrine of necessity was the direct consequence of the Stoic pantheism. The divine force which governs the world could not be the absolute uniting cause of all things, if there existed anything in any sense independent of itself, and unless it were alone the one unchangeable connecting cause of the universe.

Hence divine Providence does not extend to individuals taken by themselves, but only in as far as they form part of the universe. Since, however, everything in every position is determined by its connection with the universe, and is subject to the general order of the world, it follows that we may say that God cares not only for the universe, but for each individual thing in it.¹ The converse of this may also be asserted with equal justice, viz. that God's care is directed to the universe, and not to individuals, and that it extends to things great, but not to things small.² It is always directed to

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(b) Providence directed immediately on the universe, indirectly on individuals.

τὸνδε ἓνα ὄντα . . . καὶ ὑπὸ φύσεως διοικούμενον ζωτικῆς τε καὶ λογικῆς καὶ νοεῖας ἔχειν τὴν τῶν ὄντων διοίκησιν αἰδίδιον κατὰ εἰρμόν τινα καὶ τάξιν προϊούσαν; so that everything is connected as cause and effect, ἀλλὰ παντί τε τῷ γινομένῳ ἑ-ερόν τι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ἡρτημένον ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀπ' ἀνάγκης ὡς αἰτίου, καὶ πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον ἔχειν τι πρὸ αὐτοῦ, ᾧ ὡς αἰτίῳ συνήρτηται· μηδὲν γὰρ ἀναιτίως μῆτε εἶναι μῆτε γίνεσθαι τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ διὰ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ ἀπολελυμένον τε καὶ κεχωρισμένον τῶν προγεγονότων ἀπάντων· διασπᾶσθαι γὰρ καὶ διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ μηκέτι τὸν κόσμον ἓνα μένειν ἀεὶ, κατὰ μίαν τάξιν τε καὶ οἰκονομίαν

διοικούμενον, εἰ ἀναιτίως τις εἰσάγοιτο κίνησις. See *Cic. Divin.* i. 55, 125; *De Fato*, 4, 7; *M. Aurel.* x. 5.

¹ In *Cic. N. D.* ii. 65, 164, the Stoic says: Nec vero universo generi hominam solum, sed etiam singulis a Diis immortalibus consuli et provideri solet.

² *Sen. Nat. Qu.* ii. 46: Singulis non adest [Jupiter], et tamen vim et causam et manum omnibus dedit. *Cic. N. D.* 66, 167: Magna Dii curant, parva negligunt. *Ibid.* iii. 35, 86: At tamen minora Dii negligunt . . . ne in regnis quidem reges omnia minima curant. Sic enim dicitis.

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the universe, in the first place, to individuals only secondarily, by virtue of their connection with the universe, as being contained in the universe, and having their condition decided by its condition.¹ The Stoic notion of Providence is therefore entirely based on a view of the world at large; individual things and persons can only be considered as themselves dependent parts of the universe.

(c) Difficulties connected with the theory of necessity.

(a) Statement of several difficulties.

The Stoics were thus involved in a difficulty which besets every theory of necessity—the difficulty of doing justice to the claims of morality, and of vindicating the existence of moral responsibility. This difficulty became for them all the greater the higher those claims were advanced, and the greater the number of persons who were brought under the lash of their condemnation.² Chrysippus appears to have made most energetic efforts to overcome this difficulty.³ He could not allow the existence of chance, it being his aim to prove that

¹ Cicero uses the following argument to show that the providential care of God extends to individuals:—If the Gods care for all men, they must care for those in our hemisphere, and, consequently, for the cities in our hemisphere, and for the men in each city. The argument may be superfluous, but it serves to show that the care of individuals was the result of God's care of the whole world. *M. Aurel.* vi. 44: εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐβουλεύσαντο περὶ ἐμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐμοὶ συμβῆναι ὀφειλόντων οἱ θεοὶ, καλῶς ἐβουλεύσαντο . . . εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐβουλεύσαντο κατ' ἰδίαν περὶ ἐμοῦ, περὶ γε τῶν

κοινῶν πάντως ἐβουλεύσαντο, οἷς κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν καὶ ταῦτα συμβαίνοντα ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ στέργειν ὀφείλω. Similarly, ix. 28. It will be seen that the Stoics consider that the existence of divination, which served as a proof of special providence, was caused by the connection of nature.

² As *Alex.* fitly observes.

³ The great majority of the Stoic answers to πολλὰ ζητήματα φυσικά τε καὶ ἠθικά καὶ διαλεκτικά, which (according to *Plut.* De Fato, c. 3) were called forth by the theory of destiny, in all probability belong to him.

what seems to be accidental has always some hidden cause.¹ Still less would he allow that everything was necessary, since that alone is necessary and is therefore always true which depends on no external conditions;² or, in other words, that which is eternal and unchangeable, not that which comes to pass in time, however inevitable it may be.³ And, by a similar process of reasoning, he still tried to preserve the idea of things being Possible from being denied.⁴

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In reference to human actions, the Stoics did not recognise the freedom of the will, in the proper sense of the term; but they were of opinion that, in so doing, they did not deny to the will the character of being a deciding-power. Was not one and the same determining power everywhere active

(β) *Moral responsibility vindicated.*

¹ Chrysippus, in *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 23, 2. He assigned as a general reason τὸ γὰρ ἀναίτιον ὅλως ἀνυπαρκτον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον. Hence the Stoic definition of τύχη is αἰτία ἀπρονόητος καὶ ἄδηλος ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ in *Plut. De Fato*, c. 7; *Plac.* i. 29, 3; *Alex. De Fato*, p. 24; *Simpl. Phys.* 74.

² *Alex.* The Stoics assert that things are possible which do not take place, if in themselves they can take place, and διὰ τοῦτο φασὶ μὴδὲ τὰ γενόμενα καθ' εἰμαρμένην, καίτοι ἀπαράβτως γινόμενα, ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεσθαι, ὅτι ἔστιν αὐτοῖς δυνατόν γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον. *Cic. Top.* 15, 59: Ex hoc genere causarum ex æternitate pendentium fatum a Stoicis nec tuitur.

³ *Alex. De Fato*, c. 10; *Cic. De Fato*, 17, 39; 18, 41. Hence *Plut. Plac.*: ἃ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι κατ' ἀνάγκην, ἃ δὲ καθ' εἰμαρμένην, ἃ δὲ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, ἃ δὲ κατὰ τύχην, ἃ δὲ κατὰ τὸ αὐτοματόν, which is evidently more explicit than the language used by *Stob. Ecl.* i. 176.

⁴ Opponents such as *Plut. Sto. Rep.* c. 46, and *Alex.*, pointed out how illusory this attempt was. According to the latter, he fell back on the future, maintaining that, in the case of results happening καθ' εἰμαρμένην, there was nothing to prevent the opposite results from taking place, provided only the causes which prevented those results from happening were unknown.

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in each particular being, as well as in the universe according to the law of its nature, acting under one form in organic beings, under another in inorganic beings, differently in animals and plants, in rational and irrational creatures?¹ And may not every action be said to be free, and to be due to our own impulses and decision, although it may be brought about by the co-operation of causes depending on the connection of the universe and the character of the agent?² It would only be involuntary in case it were produced by external causes alone, without any co-operation, on the part of our wills, with external causes.³ In moral responsibility, everything, according to the Stoics, depends on freedom. What emanates from my will is my action, no matter whether it is possible for me to act differently or not.⁴ Praise and blame, rewards and punishment, only express the judgment of society relative to the character of certain persons or actions.⁵ Whether they might

¹ *Chrysipp.* in *Gell.* N. A. vii. 2, 6; *Alex.* De Fato, c. 36.

² *Gell.*; *Alex.* c. 13; *Nemes.* Nat. Hom. c. 35. *Alex.* c. 33, gives a long argument, concluding with the words: πᾶν τὸ καθ' ὁρμὴν γινόμενον ἐπὶ τοῖς οὕτως ἐνεργοῦσιν εἶναι. *Nemes.* appeals to Chrysippus, and also to Philopator, a Stoic of the second century, A.D.

Cic. De Fato, 18, 41: In order to avoid necessitas, or to uphold fate, Chrysippus distinguishes causæ principales et perfectæ from causæ adjuvantes, his

meaning being that everything happens according to fate, not causis perfectis et principalibus, sed causis adjuvantibus. Although these causes may not be in our power, still it is our will which assents to the impressions received. *Cenomaus* (in *Eus. Pr. Ev.* vi. 7, 3 and 10) charges Chrysippus with making a ἡμιδοῦλον of the will, because he laid so great a stress on freedom.

⁴ *Gell.* vii. 2, 13; *Cic.*

⁵ *Alex.* c. 34, puts in the mouth of the Stoics: τὰ μὲν τῶν ζώων ἐνεργήσει μόνον, τὰ δὲ πράξει τὰ

have been different, or not, is irrelevant. But for this explanation, the Stoics would have been obliged to allow that virtue and vice are not in our power, and that, consequently, no responsibility attaches to them. When a man is once virtuous or vicious, he cannot be otherwise:¹ the highest perfection, that of 'the Gods, is absolutely unchangeable.² Chrysippus³ even endeavoured to show, not only that his whole theory of destiny was in harmony with the claims of morality and moral responsibility, but that it presupposed the existence of morality. The arrangement of the universe, he argued, involves the idea of law, and law involves the distinction between what is conventionally right and what is conventionally wrong, between what deserves praise and what deserves blame.⁴ Moreover, it is impossible to think of destiny without thinking of the world, or to think of the world

λογικά, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἁμαρτήσεται, τὰ δὲ κατορθώσει. ταῦτα γὰρ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν μὲν, ὄντων δὲ καὶ ἁμαρτημάτων καὶ κατορθωμάτων, καὶ τῶν τοιαύτων φύσεων καὶ ποιότητων μὴ ἀγνοουμένων, καὶ ἔπαινοι μὲν καὶ ψόγοι καὶ τιμαὶ καὶ κολάσεις.

¹ *Alex.* c. 26.

² *Ibid.* c. 32.

³ The arguments usual among the Stoics in after times may, with great probability, be referred to Chrysippus.

⁴ *Ibid.* c. 35: λέγουσι γὰρ· οὐκ ἔστι τοιαύτη μὲν ἡ εἰμαρμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ πεπρωμένη· οὐδὲ ἔστι πεπρωμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ αἴσα· οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν αἴσα, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ νέμεις· οὐκ ἔστι μὲν νέμεις, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ

νόμος· οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν νόμος, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ λόγος ὀρθὸς προστακτικὸς μὲν ὧν ποιητέον ἀπαγορευτικὸς δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον· ἀλλὰ ἀπαγορεύεται μὲν τὰ ἁμαρτανόμενα, προσταττεται δὲ τὰ κατορθώματα· οὐκ ἔστι μὲν τοιαύτη ἡ εἰμαρμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ κατορθώματα· ἀλλ' εἰ ἔστιν ἁμαρτήματα καὶ κατορθώματα, ἔστιν ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία· εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἔστι καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καλὸν ἐπαινετὸν, τὸ δὲ αἰσχρὸν ψεκτόν· οὐκ ἔστι τοιαύτη μὲν ἡ εἰμαρμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ ψεκτόν. What is praiseworthy deserves τιμὴ or γέρας ἀξίωσις, and what is blameworthy merits κόλασις or ἐπανάρθωσις.

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without thinking of the Gods, who are supremely good. Hence the idea of destiny involves also that of goodness, which again includes the contrast between virtue and vice, between what is praiseworthy and what is blameworthy.¹ To this his opponents replied, that, if everything is determined by destiny, individual action is superfluous, since what has been once foreordained must happen, come what may. They were met by a distinction which Chrysippus made between two kinds of foreordination—one simple, the other composite; from which he argued that, as the consequences of human actions are simply results of those actions, those consequences are therefore quite as much foreordained as the actions themselves.²

From all these observations, it appears that the

¹ *Alex. c. 37*: A second argument ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς παλαιστρας is the following:—οὐ πάντα μὲν ἔστι καθ' εἰμαρμένην, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἀκάλυτος καὶ ἀπαρεμπόδιστος ἡ τοῦ κόσμου διοίκησις· οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κόσμος· οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν κόσμος, οὐκ εἰσὶ δὲ θεοί· εἰ δὲ εἰσι θεοὶ, εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ οἱ θεοί· ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, ἔστιν ἀρετή· ἀλλ' εἰ ἔστιν ἀρετή, ἔστι φρόνησις· ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο ἔστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ποιητέων τε καὶ οὐ ποιητέων· ἀλλὰ ποιητέα μὲν ἔστι τὰ κατορθώματα, οὐ ποιητέα δὲ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, κ.τ.λ. οὐκ ἔρα πάντα μὲν γίνεται καθ' εἰμαρμένην, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ γεραίρειν καὶ ἐπανορθοῦν.

² *Cic. De Fato*, 12, 28; *Dio-genian.* (in *Eus. Pr. Ev.* vi. 8, 16); *Sen. Nat. Qu.* ii. 37. Things which were determined by the co-operation of destiny alone

Chrysippus called συγκαθειμαρμένα (confatalia). The argument by which he was confuted went by the name of ἀργὸς λόγος (ignava ratio). Besides the ἀργὸς λόγος, *Plut. De Fato*, c. 11, mentions the *θερίων* and the *λόγος παρὰ τὴν εἰμαρμένην* as fallacies which could only be refuted on the ground of the freedom of the will. The last-named one, perhaps, turned on the idea (*Ænomaus*, in *Eus. Pr. Ev.* vi. 7, 12) that man might frustrate destiny if he neglected to do what was necessary to produce the results foreordained. According to *Ammon. De Inter.* 106, a, the *θερίων* was as follows:—Either you will reap or you will not reap: it is therefore incorrect to say, *perhaps* you will reap.

Stoics never intended to allow man to hold a different position, in regard to destiny, from that held by other beings. All the actions of man—in fact, his destiny—are decided by his connection with the universe: one individual only differs from another in that one acts on his own impulse, and agreeably with his own feelings, whereas another, under compulsion and against his will, conforms to the eternal law of the world.¹

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Since everything in the world is produced by one and the same divine power, the world, as regards its structure, is an organic whole, and perfect in respect of its properties. The unity of the world, which was a doctrine distinguishing the Stoics from the Epicureans, followed as a corollary from the unity of the primary substance and of the primary force.² It was further proved by the universal connection, or, as the Stoics called it, by the sympathy prevailing among all the parts of the world, and, in

C. *Nature of the world.*

(1) *Its unity and perfections.*

¹ *Sen. Ep. 107, 11: Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt. Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. i. 21: τὸ καθ' εἰμαρμένην εἶναι πάντα διεβηβαίωσαντο παραδείγματι χρησάμενοι τοιούτω, ὅτι ὥσπερ σχήματος ἔαν ἢ ἐξηρτημένος κύων, ἔαν μὲν βούληται ἔπεσθαι, καὶ ἔλκεται καὶ ἔπεται ἑκὼν . . . ἔαν δὲ μὴ βούληται ἔπεσθαι, πάντως ἀναγκασθήσεται, τὸ αὐτὸ δῆπου καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· καὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀναγκασθήσονται πάντως εἰς τὸ πεπρωμένον εἰσελθεῖν.* The same idea is expanded by *M. Aurel. vi. 42: All must work for the whole, ἐκ περιουσίας δὲ καὶ ὁ μεμφόμενος καὶ ὁ ἀντιβαίνειν*

πειρώμενος καὶ ἀναιρεῖν τὰ γινόμενα, καὶ γὰρ τοῦ τοιούτου ἔχρηξεν ὁ κόσμος. It is man's business to take care that he acts a dignified part in the common labour.

² After all that has been said, this needs no further confirmation. Conversely, the unity of the forming power is concluded from the unity of the world. *Conf. Plut. Def. Orac. 29. M. Aurel. vi. 38: πάντα ἀλλήλοις ἐπιτέπλεκται καὶ πάντα κατὰ τοῦτο φίλα ἀλλήλοις ἐστί . . . τοῦτο δὲ διὰ τὴν τοικίην κίνησιν καὶ σύμπνοιαν καὶ τὴν ἑνωσιν τῆς οὐσίας. Ibid. vii. 9.*

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particular, by the coincidence of the phenomena of earth and heaven.¹ It also followed, as a consequence, from their fundamental principles.² But the Stoics made use of many arguments in support of the

¹ *Sext. Math.* ix. 78: τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἡνωμένα, τὰ δὲ ἐκ συναπτομένων, τὰ δὲ ἐκ διεστώτων . . . ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ ὁ κόσμος σῶμα ἐστίν, ἥτοι ἡνωμένον ἐστὶ σῶμα ἢ ἐκ συναπτομένων ἢ ἐκ διεστώτων· οὔτε δὲ ἐκ συναπτομένων οὔτε ἐκ διεστώτων, ὥς δείκνυμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν συμπαθειῶν· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τῆς σελήνης αὐξήσεις καὶ φθίσεις πολλὰ τῶν τε ἐπιγείων ζώων καὶ θαλασσίων φθίνει τε καὶ αὔξεται, ἀμπώτεις τε καὶ πλημμυρίδες περί τινα μέρη τῆς θαλάσσης γίνονται. In the same way, atmospheric changes coincide with the setting and rising of the stars: ἐξ ὧν συμφανές, ὅτι ἡνωμένον τι σῶμα καθέστηκεν ὁ κόσμος, ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐκ συναπτομένων ἢ διεστώτων οὐ συμπάσχει τὰ μέρη ἀλλήλοις. *Diog.* vii. 140: ἐν δὲ τῷ κόσμῳ μὴδὲν εἶναι κενὸν ἀλλ' ἡνωσθαι αὐτὸν, τοῦτο γὰρ ἀναγκάζειν τὴν τῶν οὐρανίων πρὸς τὰ ἐπίγεια σύμπνοιαν καὶ συντονίαν. *Ibid.* 143: ὅτι θ' εἰς ἐστὶ Ζήνων φησὶν ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ Χρύσιππος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος . . . καὶ Ποσειδώνιος. *Alex. De Mixt.* 142; *Cic.* N. D. ii. 7, 19; *Epictet.* Diss. i. 14, 2: οὐ δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἡνωσθαι τὰ πάντα; Δοκεῖ, ἔφη· τί δέ; συμπαθεῖν τὰ ἐπίγεια τοῖς οὐρανίοις οὐ δοκεῖ σοι; Δοκεῖ, ἔφη. Cicero mentions the changes in animals and plants corresponding to the changes of seasons, the phases of the moon, and the greater or less nearness of the sun. *M. Aurel.* iv. 40. From all these

passages we gather what the question really was. It was not only whether other worlds were possible, besides the one which we know from observation, but whether the heavenly bodies visible were in any essential way connected with the earth, so as to form an organic whole (ζῶον).

The Stoic conception of συμπαθεια was not used to denote the magic connection which it expresses in ordinary parlance, but the natural coincidence between phenomena belonging to the different parts of the world, the consensus, concentus, cognatio, conjunctio, or continuatio naturæ (*Cic.* N. D. iii. 11, 18; *Divin.* ii. 15, 34; 69, 142). In this sense, *M. Aurel.* ix. 9, observes that like is attracted by like; fire is attracted upwards, earth downwards; beasts and men seek out each other's society; even amongst the highest existences, the stars, there exists a ἔνωσις ἐκ διεσθηκότων, α συμπαθεια ἐν διεστώσι. Even the last remark does not go beyond the conception of a natural connection; nevertheless, it paves the way for the later Neoplatonic idea of sympathy, as no longer a physical connection, but as an influence felt at a distance by virtue of a connection of soul.

² *M. Aurel.* vi. 1: ἡ τῶν ὅλων οὐσία εὐπειθής καὶ εὐτρεπής· ὁ δὲ ταύτην διοικῶν λόγος οὐδεμίαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰτίαν ἔχει τοῦ κακοποιεῖν· κακίαν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει, οὐδὲ τι κακὸς

perfection of the world, appealing, after the example of preceding philosophers, sometimes to the beauty of the world, and, at other times, to the adaptation of means to ends.¹ To the former class of arguments belong the assertion of Chrysippus, that nature made many creatures for the sake of beauty—the peacock, for instance, for the sake of its tail²—and the dictum of Marcus Aurelius, that what is purely subsidiary and subservient to no purpose, even what is ugly or frightful in nature, has peculiar attractions of its own;³ and the same kind of consideration may have led to the Stoic assertion, that no two things in nature are altogether alike.⁴ Their chief argument for the beauty of the world was based on the shape, the size, and the colour of the heavenly structure.⁵

ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ βλάπτεται τι ὑπ' ἐκείνου. πάντα δὲ κατ' ἐκείνον γίνεται καὶ περαινεται.

¹ *Diog.* 149: ταύτην δὲ [τὴν φύσιν] καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος στοχάζεσθαι καὶ ἡδονῆς, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου δημιουργίας.

² *Plut.* *St. Rep.* 21, 3: εἰπὼν [Χρύσιππος] ὅτι . . . φιλοκαλεῖν . . . τὴν φύσιν τῇ ποικιλίᾳ χεῖρουσαν εἰκὸς ἐστὶ, ταῦτα κατὰ λέξιν εἴρηκε· γένοιτο δ' ἂν μάλιστα τοῦτου ἔμφασιν ἐπὶ τῆς κέρκου τοῦ ταῷ. *Conf. the Stoic in Cic.* *Fin.* iii. 5, 18: Jam membrorum . . . alia videntur propter eorum usum a natura esse donata . . . alia autem nullam ob utilitatem, quasi ad quendam ornatum, ut cauda pavoni, plumæ versicolores columbis, viris mammæ atque barba.

³ *M. Aurel.* iii. 2: It is there proved by examples, ὅτι καὶ τὰ ἐπιγινόμενα τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις ἔχει τι εὐχαρί καὶ ἐπαγωγὴν . . . σχεδὸν οὐδὲν οὐχὶ καὶ τῶν κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν συμβαινόντων ἡδεώς πως διασυνίστασθαι.

⁴ *Cic.* *Acad.* ii. 26, 85; *Sen.* *Ep.* 113, 16. The latter includes this variety of natural objects among the facts, which must fill us with admiration for the divine artifices.

⁵ *Plut.* *Plac.* i. 6, 2: καλὸς δὲ ὁ κόσμος· δῆλον δ' ἐκ τοῦ σχήματος καὶ τοῦ χρώματος καὶ τοῦ μεγέθους καὶ τῆς περὶ ὅν κόσμον τῶν ἀστέρων ποικιλίας; the world has the most perfect form, that of a globe, with a sky the most perfect in colour, &c.

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The other class of arguments is found, not so much in individual expressions; but—owing, no doubt, to the predominantly practical character of their way of treating things—the whole Stoic view of nature, like the Socratic, is constantly based on the adaptation of means to ends observed in the world. In this adaptation of means to ends they found the most convincing proof of the existence of God; and, on the other hand, by it, more than by anything else, they thought God's government of the world took place.¹ Like Socrates, however, they took a very superficial view of the adaptation of means to ends, arguing that everything in the world was created for the benefit of some other thing—plants for the support of animals, animals for the support and the service of man,² the world for the benefit of Gods and men³—not unfrequently

¹ See *Cic. N. D.* ii. 32.

² *Plut.* (in *Porphyr.* De Alest. iii. 32): ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο νῆ Δία τοῦ Χρυσίππου πιθανὸν ἦν, ὡς ἡμᾶς αὐτῶν καὶ ἀλλήλων οἱ θεοὶ χάριν ἐποιήσαντο, ἡμῶν δὲ τὰ ζῶα, συμπολεμεῖν μὲν ἵππους καὶ συνθηρεῖν κύνas, ἀνδρείas δὲ γυμνάσια παρδάλειs καὶ ἄρκτους καὶ λέοντας, κ.τ.λ. *Cic. N. D.* ii. 14, 37: Scite enim Chrysippus: ut clypei causa involucrum, vaginam autem gladii. sic præter mundum cætera omnia aliorum causa esse generata, ut eas fruges et fructus, quas terra gignit, animantium causa, animantes autem hominum, ut equum vehendi causa, arandi bovem, venandi et custodiendi canem. *Id. Off.* i. 7, 22: Placet Stoicis, quæ in terris gignan-

tur ad usum hominum omnia creari.

³ *Cic. Fin.* iii. 20, 67: Præclare enim Chrysippus, cetera nata esse hominum causa et Deorum, eos autem communitatis et societatis suæ. *N. D.* ii. 53, 133: Why has the universe been made? Not for the sake of plants or animals, but for the sake of rational beings, Gods and men. It is then shown (c. 54–61), by an appeal to the structure of man's body, and his mental qualities, how God has provided for the wants of man; and the argument concludes with the words, Omnia, quæ sint in hoc mundo, quibus utantur homines, hominum causa facta esse et parata. Just as a city and

degenerating into the ridiculous and pedantic, in their endeavours to trace the special end for which each thing existed.¹ But, in asking the further question, For what purpose do Gods and men exist? they could not help being at length brought to the idea of an end-in-itself: the end for which Gods and men exist is that of mutual relation. Or, expressing the same idea in language more philosophical, the end of man is the contemplation and imitation of the world; man has only importance as being a part of a whole; the universe itself is alone perfect and an end-in-itself.²

The greater the importance attached by the Stoics to the perfection of the world, the less were they able to avoid the difficult problem of harmonising the various forms of evil they found in the

(2) *Moral theory of the world.*

what it contains is intended for the use of the inhabitants, so the world is intended for the use of Gods and men. Even the stars *quantum ad mundi coherrentiam pertinent, tamen et spectaculum hominibus præbent.* *Orig. c. Cels. iv. 74; M. Aurel. v. 16 and 30; Gill. vii. 1, 1.*

¹ Chrysippus (in *Plut. Sto. Rep. 32, 1*) shows how useful fowls are; the horse is intended for riding, the ox for ploughing, the dog for hunting. The pig, Cleanthes thought (*Clemens, Strom. vii. 718, B*), was made to sustain man, and endowed with a soul, in place of salt, to prevent its corrupting (*Cic. N. D. ii. 64, 160; Fin. v. 13, 38; Plut. Qu. Conviv. v. 10, 3 and 6; Porphy. De Alestin. iii. 20*); oysters and

birds for the same purpose also. In the same way, he spoke of the value of mice and bugs. The Stoic in *Cic. N. D. ii. 63, 158*, following in the same tack, declares that sheep only exist for the purpose of clothing, dogs for guarding and helping man, fishes for eating, and birds of prey for divers uses. *Epictet. Diss. ii. 8, 7*, in the same spirit, speaks of asses being intended to carry burdens.

² *Cic. N. D. ii. 14, 37: Ipsæ autem homo ortus est ad mundum contemplandum et imitandum, nullo modo perfectus, sed est quædam particula perfecti. Sed mundus quoniam omnia complexus est, nec est quidquam, quod non insit in eo, perfectus undique est.*

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world with this perfection. By the attention which, following the example of Plato, they gave to this question, they may be said to be the real creators of the moral theory of the world.¹ The character of this moral theory was already determined by their system. Subordinating individuals, as that system did, to the law of the whole, it met the charges preferred against the evil found in the world by the general maxim, that imperfection in details is necessary for the perfection of the whole.² This maxim, however, might be explained in several ways, according to the meaning assigned to the term necessary. If necessity was taken to mean conformity with the course of nature, the existence of evil was excused as being a natural necessity, from which not even God could grant exemption. If, on the other hand, the necessity was not a physical one, but one arising from the relation of means to ends, evil was justified as a condition or necessary means for bringing about good. Both views are combined in the three chief questions involved in the moral theory of the world: the existence of physical evil, the existence of moral evil, and the relation of outward circumstances to morality.

(a) Existence of physical evil.

The existence of physical evil gave the Stoics little trouble, since they refused to regard it as an

¹ We gather this from the comparatively full accounts of the Stoic theory of the moral government of the world. *Plut. St. Rep.* 37, 1, says that Chrysippus wrote several treatises *περὶ τοῦ μηδὲν ἐγκλητὸν εἶναι μηδὲ*

μεμπτὸν κόσμῳ.

² Chrysippus (in *Plut. St. Rep.* 44, 6): *τελεον μὲν ὁ κόσμος σῶμά ἐστιν, οὐ τέλεα δὲ τὰ κόσμου μέρη τῷ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον πως ἔχειν καὶ μὴ καθ' αὐτὰ εἶναι.* Compare also *Plut. Solert. An.* c. 2.

evil at all, as will be seen in treating of their ethical system. It was enough for them to refer evil of this kind—diseases, for instance—to natural causes, and to regard it as the inevitable consequence of causes framed by nature to serve a definite purpose.¹ Still, they did not fail to point out that many things are only evil by being applied to a perverted use,² and that other things, ordinarily regarded as evil, are of the greatest value.³

Greater difficulty was found by the Stoics to beset the attempt to justify the existence of moral evil—the difficulty being enhanced by the extent and degree of moral evil in the world.⁴ They were prevented by their theory of necessity from removing the responsibility of moral evil from nature or God, and laying it on man; but, nevertheless,

(b) *Exist-
ence of
moral evil.*

¹ *Gell.* vii. [vi.] 1, 7: Chrysippus, in his treatise *περί προνοίας*, discussed, amongst other things, the question, *εἰ αἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων νόσοι κατὰ φύσιν γίνονται*. *Ex-istimat autem non fuisse hoc principale naturæ consilium, ut faceret homines morbis obnoxios . . . sed cum multa inquit atque magna gigneret pareretque aptissima et utilissima, alia quoque simul agnata sunt incommoda iis ipsis, quæ faciebat coherentia: eaque non per naturam sed per sequelas quasdam necessarias facta dicit, quod ipse appellat κατὰ παρακολούθησιν. . . .* Proinde morbi quoque et ægritudines partæ sunt dum salus paritur. *M. Aurel.* vi. 36: All evils are ἐπιγεννήματα τῶν σεμνῶν καὶ καλῶν. *Plut.* An. Procr. c. 6 and 9: αὐτοὶ δὲ (the

Stoics) κακίαν καὶ κακοδαιμονίαν τοσαύτην . . . κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν γεγονέναι λέγουσιν. *Sen. Nat. Qu.* vi. 3, 1.

² *Sen. Nat. Qu.* v. 18, 4 and 13: Non ideo non sunt ista natura bona, si vitio male utentium nocent . . . si beneficia naturæ utentium pravitate perpendimus, nihil non nostro malo accepimus.

³ Chrysippus (in *Plut. St. Rep.* 21, 4) remarks that bugs do us good service by preventing us from sleeping too long. He also observes (*Ibid.* 32, 2) that wars are as useful as colonies, by preventing overpopulation. *M. Aurel.* viii. 50, makes a similar remark in regard to weeds.

⁴ A circumstance which *Plut.* Com. Not. 19, dexterously uses against the Stoics.

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VII.

they did not altogether neglect this course, inasmuch as they refused to allow to God any participation in evil, and referred evil to the free will and intention of men.¹ In doing this, they acted not unlike other systems of necessity, following, however, the subject further back than they had done.² The real solution which they gave to the difficulty was partly by asserting that God is not able to keep human nature free from faults,³ and partly by the consideration that the existence of evil is necessary, as a counterpart and supplement to good,⁴ and

¹ *Cleanthes*, Hymn. v. 17. *Plut.* St. Rep. 33, 2: Chrysippus affirms, ὡς τῶν αἰσχυρῶν τὸ θεῖον παράτιον γίνεσθαι οὐκ ἐβλογόν ἐστιν, law is innocent of crime, God of impiety. *Id.* (in *Gell.* vii. [vi.] 2, 7): Quamquam ita sit, ut ratione quadam necessaria et principali coacta atque connexa sint fato omnia, ingenia tamen ipsa mentium nostrarum perinde sunt fato obnoxia, ut proprietates eorum est ipsa et qualitas . . . sua sævitate et voluntario impetu in assidua delicta, et in errores ruunt. Hence Cleanthes continues: ὡς τῶν βλαβῶν ἐκάστοις παρ' αὐτοῖς γινομένων καὶ καθ' ὁρμὴν αὐτῶν ἀμαρτανόντων τε καὶ βλαπτομένων καὶ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν διάνοιαν καὶ πρόθεσιν. In *Plut.* Sto. Rep. 47, 13, Chrysippus says that, even if the Gods make false representations to man, it is man's fault if he follows those representations. *Epictet.* Ench. c. 27: ὥσπερ σκοπὸς πρὸς τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν οὐ τίθεται, οὕτως οὐδὲ κακοῦ φύσις ἐν κόσμῳ γίνεται. *Id.* Diss. i. 6, 40. Such observations bear out in some degree the statement of *Plut.*

Plac. ii. 27, 3, that, according to the Stoics, τὰ μὲν εἰμάρθαι, τὰ δὲ ἀνειμάρθαι.

² Chrysippus recognised this; and hence he says (in *Gell.*): It has been also decreed by destiny that the bad should do wrong.

³ Chrysippus (in *Plut.* St. Rep. 36, 1: κακίαν δὲ καθόλου ἄραι οὔτε δυνατόν ἐστιν οὔτ' ἔχει καλῶς ἀρθῆναι. *Id.* (in *Gell.* vii. 1, 10): As diseases spring from human nature, sic hercle inquit dum virtus hominibus per consilium naturæ gignitur vitia ibidem per affinitatem contrariam nata sunt.

⁴ Chrysippus (in *Plut.* St. Rep. 35, 3): γίνεται γὰρ αὐτῇ πως [ἡ κακία] κατὰ τὴν τῆς φύσεως λόγον καὶ ἵνα οὕτως εἴπω οὐκ ἀχρηστὸς γίνεται πρὸς τὰ ἅλα, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν τὰ γαθὸν ἦν. C. Not. 14, 1: As in a comedy, what is absurd contributes to the effect of the whole, οὕτω μέλειαις ἂν αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς τὴν κακίαν τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις οὐκ ἀχρηστὸς ἐστιν. *M. Aurel.* vi. 42. *Gell.* vii. [vi.] 1, 2: (Chrysippus) nihil est prorsus istis, inquit, insubidius, qui opinantur, bona esse potuisse, si non essent

that, in the long run, evil would be turned by God into good.¹

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VII.

The third point in the moral theory of the world, the connection between moral worth and happiness, engaged all the subtlety of Chrysippus and his followers. To deny any connection between them would have been to contradict their ordinary views of the relation of means to ends. Besides, they were prepared to regard a portion of our outward ills as divine judgments.² Still there were facts, which could not be reconciled with this view—the misfortunes of the virtuous, the good fortune of the vicious—and which required explanation. The task of explaining these facts appears to have involved the Stoics in considerable embarrassment, nor were their answers altogether satisfactory.³ But, in the

(c) Con-
nection be-
tween
virtue and
happiness.

ibidem mala: nam cum bona malis contraria sint, utraque necessum est opposita inter se et quasi mutuo adverso quæque fulta nixu consistere: nullum adeo contrarium est sine contrario altero. Without injustice, cowardice, &c., we could not be aware of justice and valour. If there were no evil, φρόνησις as ἐπιστήμη αγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν would be impossible (*Plut.* C. Not. 16, 2).

¹ *Cleanthes*, Hymn. 18:

ἀλλὰ σὺ καὶ τὰ περισσὰ ἐπίστασαι
ἔρτια θεῖναι
καὶ κοσμεῖν τὰ ἄκοσμα, καὶ οὐ φίλα
σοὶ φίλα ἐστίν·
ᾧδε γὰρ εἰς ἐν ἅπαντα συνήρμοκας
ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν
ᾧθ' ἕνα γίγνεσθαι πάντων λόγον
αἰὲν ὄντα.

² *Plut.* Sto. Rep. 35, 1: τὸν
θεὸν κολάζειν φησὶ τὴν κακίαν καὶ

πολλὰ ποιεῖν ἐπὶ κολάσει τῶν πονηρῶν . . . ποτὲ μὲν τὰ δύσχρηστα συμβαίνειν φησὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οὐχ ὥσπερ τοῖς φαύλοις κολάσεως χάριν ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλην οἰκονομίαν ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν . . . [τὰ κακὰ] ἀπονέμεται κατὰ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς λόγον ἥτοι ἐπὶ κολάσει ἢ κατ' ἄλλην ἔχουσάν πως πρὸς τὰ ὅλα οἰκονομίαν. *Id.* 15, 2: ταῦτά φησι τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖν ὅπως τῶν πονηρῶν κολαζομένων οἱ λοιποὶ παραδείγμασι τοῖσι χρώμενοι ἦττον ἐπιχειρῶσι τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν. At the beginning of the chapter, the ordinary views of divine punishment had been treated with ridicule.

³ Thus Chrysippus (in *Plut.* St. Rep. 37, 2) replies to the question, How the misfortune of the virtuous is to be explained, by asking: πότερον ἀμελουμένων

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spirit of their system, only one explanation was possible: no real evil could happen to the virtuous, no real good fortune could fall to the lot of the vicious.¹ Apparent misfortune will therefore be regarded by the wise man partly as a natural consequence, partly as a wholesome exercise of his moral powers; everything that happens, when rightly considered, contributes to our good;² nothing that is secured by moral turpitude is in itself desirable.³ With this view, it was possible to connect

τινῶν καθάπερ ἐν οἰκίαις μείζουσι παρσπίπτει τινα πίτυρα καὶ ποσοὶ πυροὶ τινες τῶν ὄλων εἰδὲ οἰκονομούνων· ἢ διὰ τὸ καθίστασθαι ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων δαιμόνια φαῦλα ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι γίνονται ἐγκλητέαι ἀμέλειαι; Similarly the Stoic in *Cic. N. D. ii. 66*: *Magna Dii curant, parva negligunt*. It is less satisfactory to hear Seneca (*Benef. iv. 32*) explaining the unmerited good fortune of the wicked as due to the nobility of their ancestors. The reason assigned by Chrysippus (in *Plut.*)—πολὸν καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης μεμῖχθαι—does not quite harmonise with *Plut. C. Not. 34, 2*: οὐ γὰρ ἢ γε ὄλη τὸ κακὸν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς παρέσχηκεν, ἄπιοις γὰρ ἔστι καὶ πάσας ὄσας δέχεται διαφορὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ κινούντος αὐτὴν καὶ σχηματίζοντος ἔσχεν. Just as little does Seneca's—*Non potest artifex mutare materiam* (*De Prov. 5, 9*)—agree with his lavish encomia on the arrangement and perfection of the world.

¹ *M. Aurel. ix. 16*: οὐκ ἐν πείσει, ἀλλ' ἐνεργείᾳ, τὸ τοῦ λογικοῦ ζῶον κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία αὐτοῦ ἐν πείσει, ἀλλὰ ἐνεργείᾳ.

² *M. Aurel. viii. 35*: ὃν τρόπον

ἐκείνη [ἢ φύσις] πᾶν τὸ ἐνιστάμενον καὶ ἀντιβαῖνον ἐπιπεριτρέπει καὶ κατατάσσει εἰς τὴν εἰμαρμένην καὶ μέρος ἑαυτῆς ποιεῖ, οὕτως καὶ τὸ λυγικὸν ζῶον δύναται πᾶν κώλυμα ὄλην ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ ἐφ' οἷον ἂν καὶ ὥρμησεν.

³ Seneca's treatise, *De Providentia*, is occupied with expanding this thought. In this treatise, the arguments by which the outward misfortunes of good men are harmonised with the divine government of the world are: (1) The wise man cannot really meet with misfortune; he cannot receive at the hands of fortune what he does not, on moral grounds, assign to himself. (2) Misfortune, therefore, is an unlooked-for exercise of his powers, a divine instrument of training; a hero in conflict with fortune is a *spectaculum Deo dignum*. (3) The misfortunes of the righteous show that external condition is neither a good nor an evil. (4) Everything is a natural consequence of natural causes. *Epictet. Diss. iii. 17*; *i. 6, 37*; *i. 24, 1*; *Stob. Ecl. i. 132*; *M. Aurel. iv. 49*; *vii. 68* and *54*; *x. 33*.

a belief in divine punishment, by saying that what is an exercise of power to a good man is a real misfortune—and, consequently, a punishment—to a bad man; but we are not informed whether the scattered notices in Chrysippus really bear out this meaning.

The whole investigation is one involving much doubt and inconsistency. Natural considerations frequently intertwine with considerations based on the adaptation of means to ends; the divine power is oftentimes treated as a will working towards a definite purpose, at one time arranging all things for the best with unlimited power, at another time according to an unchangeable law of nature;¹ but all these inconsistencies and defects belong to other moral theories of the world, quite as much as they belong to that of the Stoics.

¹ *Philodem.* περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς, φεύγουσιν ἐπὶ τὸ διὰ τοῦτο φάσκειν col. 8: ἰδιωτικῶς ἅπαντος αὐτῷ τὰ συναπτόμενα μὴ ποιεῖν, ὅτι οὐ [θεῷ] δύναμιν ἀναθέντες, ὅταν ὑπὸ πάντα δύνανται. τῶν ἐλέγχων πιέζονται, τότε κατα-

CHAPTER VIII.

IRRATIONAL NATURE. THE ELEMENTS. THE UNIVERSE.

CHAP.
VIII.

A. The
most gene-
ral ideas
on nature.

TURNING now from the questions which have hitherto engaged our attention to natural science, in the stricter sense of the term, we must first make a few remarks as to the general conditions of all existence. About these conditions the Stoics hold little that is of a distinctive character. The matter or substance of which all things are made is corporeal.¹ All that is corporeal is infinitely divisible, although it is never infinitely divided.² But, at the same time, all things are exposed to the action of change, since one material is constantly going over into another.³ Herein the Stoics follow Aristotle, and, in contrast to the mechanical theory of nature,⁴ distinguish

¹ *Diog.* 135. Conf. *Stob. Ecl.* i. 410.

² In *Diog.* 150, there is no real difference between Apollodorus and Chrysippus. *Stob. Ecl.* i. 344; *Plut. C. Not.* 38, 3; *Sext. Math.* x. 142.

³ *Plut. Plac.* i. 9, 2: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ τρεπτὴν καὶ ἀλλοιωτὴν καὶ μεταβλητὴν καὶ ρευστὴν ὕλην δι' ἑλίου τὴν ὕλην. *Diog.* 150. *Sen. Nat. Qu.* iii. 101, 3: Fiunt omnia ex omnibus, ex aqua aër, ex aëre

aqua, ignis ex aëre, ex igne aër . . . ex aqua terra fit, cur non aqua fiat e terra? . . . omnium elementorum in alternum recursus sunt. *Epictet.* in *Stob. Floril.* 108, 60. This is borrowed not only from Heraclitus, but also from Aristotle.

⁴ They only called the first kind κίνησις. Aristotle understood by κίνησις every form of change.

change in quality from mere motion in space. They enumerate several varieties of each kind.¹ Nevertheless, they look upon motion in space as the primary form of motion.² Moreover, they include action and suffering³ under the conception of motion. The condition of all action is contact;⁴ and since the motions of different objects in nature are due to various causes, and have a variety of characters, the various kinds of action must be distinguished which correspond to them.⁵ In all these statements there is hardly a perceptible deviation from Aristotle.

Of a more peculiar character are the views of the Stoics as to the intermingling of substances, to

¹ *Stob. Ecl.* i. 404, gives definitions of *κίνησις*, or *φορὰ*, and of *μονή*, taken from Chrysippus and Apollodorus. *Simpl. Categ.* 110, β, distinguishes between *μένειν*, *ἡρεμεῖν*, *ἡσυχάζειν*, *ἀκίνητεῖν*, but this is rather a matter of language. *Simpl. Cat.* 78, β, relates that the Stoics differed from the Peripatetics in explaining Motion as an incomplete energy, and discusses their assertion that *κινεῖσθαι* is a wider, *κινεῖν* a narrower, idea.

² *Simpl. Phys.* 310, b: *οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοῦς κατὰ πᾶσαν κίνησιν ἔλεγον ὑπεῖναι τὴν τοπικὴν, ἢ κατὰ μέγιστα διαστήματα ἢ κατὰ λόγῳ θεωρητὰ ὑφίσταμένην.*

³ *Simpl. Categ.* 78, β: Plotinus and others introduce into the Aristotelian doctrine the Stoic view: *τὸ κοινὸν τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν εἶναι τὰς κινήσεις.*

⁴ *Simpl. l. c.* 77, β; *Schol.* 77, b, 33. Simplicius himself contra-

dicts this statement. It had, however, been already advanced by Aristotle.

⁵ *Simpl. l. c.* 78, β: The Stoics made the following *διαφορὰ γενῶν*: *τὸ ἐξ αὐτῶν κινεῖσθαι, ὡς ἡ μάχαιρα τὸ τέμνειν ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας ἔχει κατασκευῆς—τὸ δὲ ἑαυτοῦ ἐνεργεῖν τὴν κίνησιν, ὡς αἱ φύσεις καὶ αἱ ἱατρικαὶ δυνάμεις τὴν πόλιν ὑπεργάζονται*; for instance, the seed, in developing into a plant—*τὸ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖν*, or *ἀπὸ ἰδίας ὁρμῆς ποιεῖν*, one species of which is *τὸ ἀπὸ λογικῆς ὁρμῆς—τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργεῖν*. It is, in short, the application to a particular case of the distinction which will be subsequently met with of *ἔξις*, *φύσις*, *ψυχὴ*, and *ψυχὴ λογικὴ*. The celebrated grammatical distinction of *ὁρθὰ* and *ὑπτία* is connected with the distinction between *ποιεῖν* and *πάσχειν*. *Conf. Simpl. p.* 79, α, ζ; *Schol.* 78, b, 17.

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which reference has already been made.¹ They also made some innovations on Aristotle's theory with regard to Time and Space. Space (τόπος), according to their view, is the room occupied by a body,² the distance enclosed within the limits of a body.³ From Space they distinguish the Empty. The Empty is not met with in the universe, but beyond the universe it extends indefinitely.⁴ And hence they assert that Space is limited, like the world of matter, and that the Empty is unlimited.⁵ Nay, not only Space, but Time also, is by them set down as immaterial; and yet to the conception of Time a meaning as concrete as possible is assigned, in order that Time may have a real value. Zeno defined Time as the extension of motion; Chrysippus defines it, more definitely, as the extension of the motion of the world.⁶ The Stoics affirm the infinite divisibility

¹ See pages 102 and 131.

² *Stob. Ecl. i. 382*: Ζήνων καὶ οἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ μὲν τὸν κόσμον μὴ δὲ εἶναι κενὸν ἔξω δ' αὐτὸν ἄπειρον (conf. *Themist. Phys. 40, b*; *Plut. Plac. i. 18, 4*), διαφέρειν δὲ κενὸν τόπον χώραν· καὶ τὸ μὲν κενὸν εἶναι ἐρημίαν σώματος, τὸν δὲ τόπον τὸ ἐπεχόμενον ὑπὸ σώματος, τὴν δὲ χώραν τὸ ἐκ μέρους ἐπεχόμενον. *Stob. i. 390*: Chrysippus defined τόπος = τὸ κατεχόμενον δι' ὅλου ὑπὸ ὄντος, ἢ τὸ οἶον κατέχεσθαι ὑπὸ ὄντος καὶ δι' ὅλου κατεχόμενον εἶτε ὑπὸ τινὸς εἶτε ὑπὸ τινῶν. If, however, only one portion of the οἶον τε κατέχεσθαι ὑπὸ ὄντος is really filled, the whole is neither κενὸν nor τόπος, but ἕτερόν τι οὐκ ὠνομασμένον, but may possibly be called

χώρα. Hence τόπος corresponds to a full, κενὸν to an empty, χώρα to a half-empty, vessel. *Sext. Math. x. 3*, *Pyrrh. iii. 124*, speaks to the same effect. *Cleomed. Meteor. γ. 2*. *Simpl. Categ. 91, δ*. According to the Stoics, παρ-υφίσταται τοῖς σώμασιν ὁ τόπος καὶ τὸν ὅρον ἀπ' αὐτῶν προσλαμβάνει τὸν μέχρι τοσοῦδε, καθό-ον συμπληροῦται ὑπὸ τῶν σωμάτων.

³ The Stoic idea of space is so understood by *Themist. Phys. 38, b*; *Simpl. Phys. 133, a*.

⁴ *Diog. 140*.

⁵ *Stob. Ecl. i. 392*, quoting Chrysippus.

⁶ *Simpl. Categ. 88, ζ*. Schol. 80, a, 6: τῶν δὲ Στωϊκῶν Ζήνων μὲν πάσης ἀπλῶς κινήσεως διάστημα τὸν χρόνον εἶπε, Χρύσιππος

of Time and Space,¹ but do not appear to have instituted any deep researches into this point.

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In expanding their views on the origin of the world, the Stoics begin with the doctrine of the four elements,² a doctrine which, since the time of Aristotle and Plato, was the one universally accepted. They even refer this doctrine to Heraclitus, wishing, above all things, to follow his teaching on natural science.³ On a previous occasion, the order and the stages have been pointed out, according to which primary fire developed into these elements at the creation of the world.⁴ In the same order, these elements now go over one into the other. And yet, in this constant transformation of materials, in the perpetual change of form to which primary matter is subject, in this flux of all its

B. Ele-
ments.

δὲ διάστημα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως. Conf. *Ibid.* 89, α, β; *Simpl.* Phys. 165, α. More full is *Stob.* Ecl. i. 260: ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος χρόνον εἶναι κινήσεως διάστημα καθ' ὃ ποτε λέγεται μέτρον τάχους τε καὶ βραδύτητος, ἢ τὸ παρακολουθοῦν διάστημα τῇ τοῦ κόσμου κινήσει. The passages quoted by *Stob.* *Ibid.* 250, 254, 256, 258, and *Diog.* 141, from Zeno, Chrysippus, Apollodorus, and Posidonius, are in agreement with this.

¹ *Sext.* Math. x. 142; *Plut.* Com. Not. 41; *Stob.* i. 260.

² For the conception of στοιχεῖον, which is also that of Aristotle (*Metaph.* i. 3), and its difference from that of ἀρχή, see *Diog.* 134; 136. The difference, however, is not always observed.

Chrysippus (in *Stob.* Ecl. i. 312) distinguishes three meanings of στοιχεῖον. In one sense, it is fire; in another, the four elements; in the third, any material out of which something is made.

³ *Lassalle*, Heraclitus, ii. 84.

⁴ See p. 153. As is there stated, primary fire first goes over into water δι' αἴρος (i.e. after first going over into air), and water goes over into the three other elements. In this process there is, however, a difficulty. Fire is said to derive its origin from water, and yet a portion of primary fire must have existed from the beginning, as the soul of the world. Nor is it correct to say, that actual fire is never obtained from water in the formation of the upper elements.

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parts, the unity of the whole still remains untouched.¹ The distinctive characteristic of fire is heat; that of air is cold; that of water, moisture; dryness, that of the earth.² These essential qualities, however, are not always found in the elements to which they belong in a pure state,³ and hence every element has several forms and varieties.⁴ Among the four essential qualities of the elements, Aristotle

¹ Chrysippus, in *Stob. Ecl. i. 312*: πρώτης μὲν γιγνομένης τῆς ἐκ πυρὸς κατὰ σύστασιν εἰς ἀέρα μεταβολῆς, δευτέρας δ' ἀπὸ τούτου εἰς ὕδωρ, τρίτης δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον κατὰ τὸ ἀνίλογον συνισταμένου τοῦ ὕδατος εἰς γῆν, πάλιν δὲ ἀπὸ ταύτης διαλυομένης καὶ διαχαιομένης πρώτη μὲν γίγνεται χύσις εἰς ὕδωρ, δεύτερα δὲ ἐξ ὕδατος εἰς ἀέρα, τρίτη δὲ καὶ ἐσχάτη εἰς πῦρ. On account of this constant change, primary matter is called (*Ibid. 316*) ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ αἰδῖος δύναμις . . . εἰς αὐτὴν τε πάντα καταναλίσκουσα καὶ τὸ [ἐξ] αὐτῆς πάλιν ἀποκαθιστάσα τεταγμένως καὶ ὁδῶ. Epictet. in *Stob. Floril. 108, 60*: Not only mankind and animals are undergoing perpetual changes, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ θεῖα, καὶ νῆ Δι' αὐτὰ τὰ τέτταρα στοιχεῖα ἕνω καὶ κάτω τρέπεται καὶ μεταβάλλει· καὶ γῆ τε ὕδωρ γίνεται καὶ ὕδωρ ἄηρ, οὗτος δὲ πάλιν εἰς αἰθέρα μεταβάλλει· καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος τῆς μεταβολῆς ἄνωθεν κάτω. On the flux of things, see also *M. Aurel. ii. 3; vii. 19; ix. 19; 28. Cic. N. D. ii. 33, 84*: Et cum quatuor sint genera corporum, vicissitudine eorum mundi continuata (= συν-εχής; conf. *Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 2, 2*) natura est. Nam ex terra aqua, ex aqua oritur aër, ex aëre

aether: deinde retrorsum vicissim ex æthere aër, ex aëre aqua, ex aqua terra infima. Sic natura his, ex quibus omnia constant, sursum, deorsum, ultro citroque commutantibus mundi partium conjunctio continetur.

² *Diog. 137*: εἶναι δὲ τὸ μὲν πῦρ τὸ θερμὸν, τὸ δ' ὕδωρ τὸ ὑγρὸν, τὸν τ' ἀέρα τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν τὸ ξηρὸν. *Plut. Sto. Rep. 43, 1*: The air is, according to Chrysippus, φύσει ζοφερὸς and πρώτως ψυχρός. *Id. De Primo Frig. 9, 1; 17, 1; Galen, Simpl. Medic. ii. 20. Sen. Nat. Qu. iii. 10; i. 4*: Aër . . . frigidus per se et obscurus . . . natura enim aëris gelida est. Conf. *Cic. N. D. ii. 10, 26*.

³ Thus the upper portion of the air (*Sen. Nat. Qu. iii. 10*) is the warmest, the driest, and the rarest. Below, it is dense and cloudy, but yet warmer than in the middle.

⁴ Chrysippus, in *Stob. i. 314*: λέγεσθαι δὲ πῦρ τὸ πυρῶδες πᾶν καὶ ἀέρα τὸ ἀερῶδες καὶ ὁμοίως τὰ λοιπὰ. Thus *Philo, Incorrupt. M. 953, ε*, who is clearly following the Stoics, distinguishes three kinds of fire: ἀνθραξ, φλᾶξ, αὐγή. He seems, however, only to refer to terrestrial fire, which, after all, is only one kind of fire.

had already singled out two, viz. heat and cold, as the two active ones, and designated dryness and moisture as the passive ones. The Stoics do the same, only more avowedly. They consider the two elements to which these qualities properly belong to be the seats of all active force, and distinguish them from the two other elements, as the soul is distinguished from the body.¹ In their materialistic system, the finer materials are opposed to the coarser, and occupy the place of incorporeal forces.

The relative density of the elements also determines their place in the universe. Fire and air are light; water and earth are heavy. Fire and air move away from the centre of the universe;² water and earth are drawn towards it;³ and thus,

¹ Pp. 155 seq.

² *Stob. Ecl. i. 346 (Plut. Pl. i. 12, 4). Zeno, Ibid. 406: οὐ πάντως δὲ σῶμα βάρος ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἀβαρῆ εἶναι ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ . . . φύσει γὰρ ἀνάφοιτα ταῦτ' εἶναι διὰ τὸ μηδενὸς μετέχειν βάρους. Plut. Sto. Rep. 42: In the treatise περὶ κινήσεως, Chrysippus calls fire ἀβαρὲς and ἀνωφερὲς, καὶ τούτῳ παραπλησίως τὸν ἀέρα, τοῦ μὲν ὕδατος τῇ γῇ μᾶλλον προσνευμένου, τοῦ δ' ἀέρος, τῷ πυρί. On the other hand, in his *Φυσικὰ τέχνηαι*, he inclines to the view that air is neither absolutely heavy nor absolutely light.*

³ This statement must be taken with such modification as the oneness of the world renders necessary. If the upper elements were to move away from the centre, absolutely the world would go to pieces. Hence the

motions referred to can only take place within the enclosure holding the elements together. Conf. Chrysippus, in *Plut. Sto. Rep. 44, 6: The striving of all the parts of the world is to keep together, not to go asunder. οὕτω δὲ τοῦ ὅλου τεινομένου εἰς ταῦτ' οὐ καὶ κινουμένου καὶ τῶν μορίων ταύτην τὴν κίνησιν ἔχόντων ἐκ τῆς τοῦ σώματος φύσεως, πιθανὸν, πᾶσι τοῖς σώμασιν εἶναι τὴν πρώτην κατὰ φύσιν κίνησιν πρὸς τὸ τοῦ κόσμου μέσον, τῷ μὲν κόσμῳ οὕτως κινουμένῳ πρὸς αὐτὸν, τοῖς δὲ μέρεσιν ὥς ἂν μέρεσιν οὖσιν. Achill. Tat. Isag. 132, A: The Stoics maintain that the world continues in empty space, ἐπεὶ πάντα αὐτοῦ τὰ μέρη ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον νέεσκε. The same reason is assigned by *Cleomedes, Meteor. p. 5.**

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from above to below—or, which is the same thing, from without to within—the four layers of fire, air, water, and earth are formed.¹ The fire on the circumference goes by the name of Ether.² Its most remote portion was called by Zeno Heaven;³ and it differs from earthly fire not only by its greater purity,⁴ but also because the motion of earthly fire is in a straight line, whereas the motion of the Ether is circular.⁵ A radical difference between these two kinds of fire, which Aristotle supposed to exist, because of this difference of motion, the Stoics did not feel it necessary to admit.⁶ They could always maintain that, when beyond the limits of its proper locality, fire tried to return to them as quickly as possible, whereas within those limits it moved in the form of a circle.

Taking this view of the elements, the Stoics did

¹ *Diog.* 137: ἀνωτάτω μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὸ πῦρ δὲ αἰθέρα καλεῖσθαι, ἐν ᾧ πρώτην τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν γεννᾶσθαι, εἶτα τὴν τῶν πλανωμένων. μεθ' ἣν τὸν ἀέρα, εἶτα τὸ ὕδωρ, ὑποστάθμην δὲ πάντων τὴν γῆν, μέσσην ἁπάντων οὖσαν. *Ibid.* 155. To these main masses, all other smaller masses of the same element are attracted. *Conf. M. Aurel.* ix. 9.

² *Sen.* *Nat. Qu.* vi. 16, 2. The same thing is meant by Zeno, where he says (*Stob. Ecl.* i. 538, 554) that the stars are made of fire; not, however, of πῦρ ἄτεχνον, but of πῦρ τεχνικόν, which appears in plants as φύσις, in animals as ψυχή.

³ In *Ach. Tat.* *Isag.* 130, A, he defines οὐρανὸς as αἰθέρος τὸ ἔσ-

χατον, ἐξ οὗ καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ πάντα ἐμφανῶς. *Conf. Diog.* 138; *Cleomed. Met.* p. 7.

⁴ See p. 156.

⁵ *Stob.* i. 346: τὸ μὲν περίγειον φῶς κατ' εὐθείαν, τὸ δ' αἰθέριον περιφερῶς κινεῖται. It is only terrestrial fire that Zeno (*Stob. Ecl.* i. 356) says moves in a straight line. Cleanthes assigns a conical shape to the stars. See *Plut.* *Plac.* ii. 14, 2; *Stob.* i. 516; *Ach. Tat.* *Isag.* 133, B.

⁶ They denied it, according to *Orig.* c. Cels. iv. 56. *Cic. Acad.* i. 11, 39, says: Zeno dispensed with a quinta natura, being satisfied with four elements: statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam, quæ quæque gignerit, et mentem atque sensus.

not deviate to any very great extent, in their views of the Universe, from Aristotle and the views which were generally entertained. In the centre of the Universe reposes the globe of the earth;¹ around it is water, above the water is air. These three strata form the kernel of the world, which is in a state of repose,² and around these the Ether revolves in a circle, together with the stars which are set in it. At the top, in one stratum, are all the fixed stars; under the stratum containing the fixed stars are the planets, in seven different strata—Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Mercury, Venus, then the Sun, and in the lowest stratum, bordering on the region of air, is the Moon.³ Thus the world consists, as with Aristotle, of a globe containing many strata, one joining the other.⁴ Nor is the world

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C. The
universe.

¹ The conical shape of the earth is a matter of course, and is mentioned by *Ach. Tat.* Isag. 126, c; *Plut.* Plac. iii. 10, 1; 9, 3. *Cleom.* Met. p. 40, gives a proof of it, for the most part taken from Posidonius.

² *Heraclit.* Alleg. Hom. c. 36, and *Diog.* 145, also affirm that the earth is in the centre, unmoved. The reason for this fact is stated by *Stob.* i. 408, to be its weight. Further proofs in *Cleomed.* Met. p. 47.

³ *Stob.* Ecl. i. 446: τοῦ δὲ . . . κόσμου τὸ μὲν εἶναι περιφερόμενον περὶ τὸ μεσον, τὸ δ' ὑπομένον, περιφερόμενον μὲν τὸν αἰθέρα, ὑπομένον δὲ τὴν γῆν καὶ τὰ ἐπ' αὐτῆς ὕγρα καὶ τὸν ἄερα. The earth is the natural framework, and, as it were, the skeleton of the world. Around it lies water, out of which

the more exalted spots project as islands. For what is called continent is also insular. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ὕδατος τὸν ἄερα ἐξηφθαι καθάπερ ἐξατμισθέντα σφαιρικῶς καὶ περικεχύσθαι, ἐκ δὲ τούτου τὸν αἰθέρα ἀραιοτάτον τε καὶ εἰλικρινέστατον. Then follows what is given in the text as to stars, next to which comes the stratum of air, then that of water, and lastly, in the centre, the earth. Conf. *Achil. Tat.* Isag. 126, b. The language of *Cleom.* Met. c. 3, is somewhat divergent. He places the sun amongst the planets, between Mars and Venus. Archidemus also refused to allow the earth a place in the centre. The language of *Ach. Tat.* Isag. c. 7, 131, b, is ambiguous.

⁴ *Stob.* i. 356; *Plut.* Plac. ii. 2, 1; i. 6, 3; *Diog.* 140; *Cleomed.*

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unlimited, as Democritus and Epicurus maintain; nor, indeed, can it be, consistently with being material.¹ The space within the world is fully occupied by the material of the world, without a vacant space being left anywhere.² Outside the world, however, is an empty place, or else how—the Stoics asked—would there be a place into which the world could be resolved at the general conflagration?³ Moreover, this empty place must be unlimited; for how can there be a limit, or any kind of boundary, to what is immaterial and non-existent?⁴ But although the world is in empty space, it does not move, for the half of its component elements being heavy, and the other half light, as a whole it is neither heavy nor light.⁵

Met. pp. 39 and 46; *Heraclit.* Alleg. Hom. c. 46. Comparing *Achil. Tat.* Isag. 130, c, *Plut.* Plac. ii. 2, 1, with the passages on p. 189, note ², it appears probable that Cleanthes believed in a conical form of the earth. According to *Ach. Tat.* Isag. 152, A, the axis of the world consists of a current of air passing through the centre. On the division of the heaven into five parallel circles, and that of the earth into five zones, conf. *Diog.* 155; *Strabo*, ii. 2, 3.

¹ *Stob.* i. 392; *Simpl. Phys.* iii. 6; *Diog.* 143 and 150.

² *Diog.* 140; *Stob.* i. 382; *Plut.* Plac. i. 18, 4; *Sext. Math.* vii. 214; *Theodoret*, Cur. Gr. Aff. iv. 14; *Hippolyt.* Refut. Hær. i. 21. *Sen. Nat. Qu.* ii. 7, observes that motion is possible by means of ἀντιπλοῦρασις, without supposing the existence of empty

space. A number of arguments against the existence of empty space may be found in *Cleomed.* Met. p. 4.

³ *Cleomed.* Met. 2 and 5.

⁴ Chrysippus, in *Stob.* i. 392: The Empty and the Non-Material is unlimited. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ μηδὲν οὐδὲν ἐστὶ πέρασ, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ μηδενὸς, οἶόν ἐστι τὸ κενόν. The Empty could only be bounded by being filled. To the same effect, *Cleomed.* p. 6. On the unlimited beyond the world, see *Diog.* 140 and 143; *Stob.* i. 260 and 382; *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 44, 1; *C. Not.* 30, 2; *Plac.* i. 18, 4; ii. 9, 2; *Theodoret*, l. c. Posidonius denied the infinite size of the Empty. Chrysippus, in affirming that the world occupies the centre of space, was therefore contradicting himself; and to this fact *Plut. Def. Or.* 28, draws attention.

⁵ *Achil. Tat.* Isag. 126, A; 132,

The stars are spherical masses,¹ consisting of fire; but the fire is not in all cases equally pure,² and is sustained, as Heraclitus taught, by evaporations from the earth and from water.³ With this process of sustentation the motion of the stars is brought into connection, their orbit extending over the space in which they obtain their nutriment.⁴ Not only

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D. Irrational parts
of nature.
(1) Stars.

A; *Stob.* i. 408. According to *Stob.* i. 442, *Plut.* C. Not. 30, 2 and 10, *Plac.* ii. 1, 6; i. 5, 1, *Diog.* 143, *Sext. Math.* ix. 332, *Ach. Tat.* 129, D, the Stoics had various names for the world, according as the Empty was included or excluded in its conception. Including the Empty, it is called τὸ πᾶν; without it, ὅλον. The πᾶν, it was said, is neither material nor immaterial, since it consists of both. *Plut.* C. Not.

¹ *Diog.* 145; *Plut.* *Plac.* ii. 14, 1; 22, 3; 27, 1; *Stob.* i. 516; 540; 554; *Ach. Tat.* 133, D.

² According to *Cic.* N. D. ii. 15, 40, *Diog.* 144, *Stob.* *Ecl.* i. 314; 519; 538; 554; 565, *Plut.* *Fac. Lun.* 5, 1; 21, 13, *Plac.* ii. 25, 3; 30, 3, *Galen.* *Hist. Phil.* 15, *Philo.* *De Somn.* 587, B, *Achil. Tat.* *Isag.* 124, D; 133, C, the stars generally consist of fire, or, more accurately, of πῦρ τεχνικόν, or Ether. The purest fire is in the sun. The moon is a compound of dull fire and air, or, as it is said, is more earth-like, since, owing to its proximity to the earth, it takes up earthy particles in vapour. Perhaps it was owing to this fact that it was said to receive its light from the sun (*Diog.* 145), which, according to *Cleomed.* *Met.* p. 106, and *Plut.* *Fac. Lun.* 16, 12, is not only on

its surface, but reaches into it some depth. *Cleomed.* 100, believes that it has also a light of its own.

³ *Diog.* 145; *Stob.* i. 532; 538; 554; *Floril.* 17, 43; *Plut.* *De Is.* 41; *Sto. Rep.* 39, 1; *Qu. Com.* viii. 8, 2, 4; *Plac.* ii. 17, 2; 20, 3; 23, 5; *Galen.* *Hist. Phil.* 14; *Porphyr.* *Antr. Nymph.* c. 11; *Cic.* N. D. iii. 14, 37; ii. 15, 40; 46, 118; *Sen.* *Nat. Qu.* vi. 16, 2; *Heraclit.* *Alleg. Hom.* c. 36 and 56; most of whom affirm that the sun is sustained by vapours from the sea, the moon by those of fresh water, and the other stars by vapours from the earth. The stars are also said to owe their origin to such vapours. Chrysippus, in *Plut.* *Sto. Rep.* 41, 3, adds: οἱ δ' ἀστέρες ἐκ θαλάσσης μετὰ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀνάπτονται. *Plut.* *Ibid.* 2: ἐμψυχον ἡγείται τὸν ἥλιον, πύρινον ὂντα καὶ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τῆς ἀναθυμιάσεως εἰς πῦρ μεταβαλούσης. *Id.* C. Not. 46, 2: γεγονέναι δὲ καὶ τὸν ἥλιον ἐμψυχον λέγουσι τοῦ ὕγρου μεταβάλλοντος εἰς πῦρ νοερόν.

⁴ *Stob.* i. 532; *Cic.* l. c.; *Macro.* *Sat.* i. 23, quoting Cleanthes and Macrobius; *Plut.* *Plac.* ii. 23, 5. Diogenes of Apollonia had already expressed similar views. Further particulars as to the courses of the stars in *Stob.* i. 448; 538;

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the sun, but the moon also, was believed to be larger than the earth.¹ Plato and Aristotle had already held that the stars are living rational divine beings; and the same view was entertained by the Stoics, not only because of the wonderful regularity of their motion and orbits, but also from the very nature of the material of which they consist.² The earth, likewise, is filled by an animating soul; or else how could it supply plants with animation, and afford nutriment to the stars?³ Upon the oneness

Plut. Pl. ii. 15, 2; 16, 1; *Diog.* 144; *Cleomed.* Meteor. i. 3. Eclipses are also discussed by *Diog.* 145; *Stob.* i. 538; 560; *Plut.* Fac. Lun. 19, 12; *Plac.* ii. 29, 5; *Cleomed.* pp. 106 and 115. Nor is there anything remarkable in *Stob.* i. 518; *Achil. Tat.* Isag. 132, B; 165, C. The observations of Canopus—quoted from Posidonius by *Cleomed.* Meteor. 51; *Procl.* in Tim. 277, E; *Strabo*, ii. 5, 14—do not belong to our present theme.

¹ *Stob.* i. 554. This statement, however, appears only to be true of the sun, to which, indeed, it is confined by *Diog.* 144. That the sun is much larger than the earth, Posidonius proved; not only because its light extends over the whole heaven, but also because of the conical form of the earth's shadow in eclipse of the moon. *Diog.* l. c.; *Macrob.* Somn. i. 20; *Heracl.* Alleg. Hom. c. 46; *Cleomed.* Met. ii. 2. According to *Cleomed.* p. 79, he allowed to it an orbit 10,000 times as large as the earth's orbit, with a diameter of four million stadia. The Stoic, in *Cic.* N. D. ii. 40,

103, only calls the world half that size; and *Cleomed.* p. 96, calls it considerably smaller than the earth. The other stars are some of them as large, and others larger than the sun. Posidonius, according to *Plin.* His. N. ii. 23, 85, estimated the moon's distance from the earth at two millions, and the sun's distance from the moon at 500 million stadia. He estimated the earth's circumference at 240,000, according to *Cleomed.*; at 180,000, according to *Strabo*, ii. 2, 2.

² Conf. *Stob.* i. 66; 441; 518; 532; 538; 554; *Floril.* 17, 43; *Plut.* Sto. Rep. 39, 1; 41, 2; *C.* Not. 46, 2; *Plac.* ii. 20, 3; *Diog.* 145; *Phædr.* Nat. De. Col. 3; *Cic.* N. D. i. 14, 36 and 50; ii. 15, 39 and 42; 16, 43; 21, 54; *Acad.* ii. 37, 110; *Porphyr.* l. c.; *Achill. Tat.* Isag. c. 13. Hence, in several of these passages, the sun is called a *νοερὸν ἄναμμα* (or *ἔξαμμα*) *ἐκ θαλάσσης*.

³ *Sen.* Nat. Qu. vi. 16, discusses the point at length. See also *Cic.* N. D. ii. 9, and *Diog.* 147.

of the soul which permeates all its parts depends, in the opinion of the Stoics, the oneness of the universe.

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Most thoroughly, however, did the Stoics—and, in particular, Posidonius¹—devote themselves to investigating those problems, which may be summed up under the name of meteorology. This portion, however, of their enquiries is of little value as illustrating their philosophical tenets. It may therefore suffice to mention in a note the objects which it included, and the sources whence information may be obtained.² The same treatment may apply

(2) *Meteorology.*

¹ *Diog.* vii. 152 and 138, mentions a treatise of his, called *μετεωρολογικὴ* or *μετεωρολογικὴ στοιχείωσις*; also, vii. 135, a treatise *περὶ μετεώρων*, in several books. Alexander, in *Simpl. Phys.* 64, 6, speaks of an *ἐξήγησις μετεωρολογικῶν*, which, judging by the title, may be a commentary on Aristotle's meteorology. Geminus had made an extract from this book, a portion of which is quoted in *Simpl.* Posidonius is probably the author of most of the later statements about the Stoic meteorology. He appears also to be the chief authority for Seneca's *Naturales Quaestiones*.

² On the Milky Way, which Posidonius, agreeing with Aristotle, looked upon as a collection of fiery vapours, see *Stob.* i. 576; *Plut. Plac.* iii. 1, 10; *Macrob. Somn. Scip.* i. 15. On the comets, which are explained in a similar way, *Stob.* i. 580; Arrian, in *Stob.* i. 584; *Diog.* vii. 152; and, particularly, *Sen. Nat. Qu.* vii. We learn from the latter that

Zeno held, with Anaxagoras and Democritus, that comets are formed by several stars uniting; whereas the majority of the Stoics—and, amongst their number, Panætius and Posidonius—considered them passing phenomena. Even Seneca held the opinion that they are stars. On the phenomena of light and fire, called *παγωνίαι*, *δοκοί*, etc., see Arrian, in *Stob.* i. 584; *Sen. Nat. Qu.* i. 1, 14; 15, 4. On *σέλας*, consult *Diog.* 153; *Sen.* i. 15; on halo (*ἄλως*), *Sen.* i. 2; *Alex. Aphr. Meteorol.* 116; on the rainbow, *Diog.* 152; *Sen.* i. 3-8; on *virgæ* and *parhelia*, *Sen.* i. 9-13; Schol. in Arat. v. 880; on storms, lightning, thunder, storm-winds, and siroccos, *Stob.* i. 596; 598; Arrian, *Ibid.* 602; *Sen.* ii. 12-31; 51-58; ii. 1, 3; *Diog.* 153; on rain, ice, frost, snow, *Diog.* 153; *Sen.* iv. 3-12; on earthquakes, *Diog.* 154; *Plac.* iii. 15, 2; *Sen.* vi. 4-31; also *Strabo*, ii. 3, 6; on winds, *Plac.* iii. 7, 2; *Sen.* v. 1-17; *Strabo*, i. 2, 21; iii. 2, 5; on

CHAP.
VIII.(3) *Plants
and ani-
mals.*

to the few maxims laid down by the Stoics on the subject of inorganic nature which have come down to us.¹ Nor need we mention here the somewhat copious writings of Posidonius,² on the subjects of geography, history, and mathematics.

Little attention was devoted by the Stoics to the world of plants and animals. About this fact there can be no doubt, since we neither hear of any treatises by the Stoics on these subjects, nor do they appear to have advanced any peculiar views. The most prominent point is, that they divided all things in nature into four classes—the class of inorganic beings, the class of plants, that of animals, and that of rational beings. In beings belonging to the first class a simple quality (*ἔξις*) constitutes the bond of union; in those of the second class, a forming power (*φύσις*); in those of the third class, a soul; and in those of the fourth class, a rational soul.³ By means

waters, *Sen.* iii. 1–26; the Nile floods, *Ibid.* iv. 1; *Strabo*, xvii. 1, 5; *Cleomed.* Meteor.; on tides, *Strabo*, i. 3, 12; iii. 3, 5; 5, 8.

¹ Thus colours are explained as being *πρῶτοι σχηματισμοὶ τῆς ὕλης* (*Stob.* i. 364; *Plac.* i. 15, 5); and sounds are spoken of as undulations in the air by *Plut.* *Plac.* iv. 19, 5; *Diog.* 158.

² Conf. *Bahe*, Posidonii Rhod. Reliquiæ, pp. 87–184; *Müller*, *Fragm. Hist. Græc.* iii. 245.

³ *Sext.* Math. ix. 81: τῶν ἡνωμένων σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ ψιλῆς ἔξεως συνέχεται, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ φύσεως, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ ψυχῆς· καὶ ἔξεως μὲν ὡς λίθοι καὶ ξύλα, φύσεως δὲ, καθάπερ τὰ φυτὰ, ψυχῆς δὲ τὰ ζῷα. *Plut.* *Virt. Mer.* c. 12:

καθόλου δὲ τῶν ὄντων αὐτοὶ τέ φασι καὶ δηλόν ἐστιν ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἔξει διοικεῖται τὰ δὲ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἀλόγῳ ψυχῇ, τὰ δὲ καὶ λόγον ἐχούσῃ καὶ διάνοιαν. *Themist.* De An. 72, b; *M. Aurel.* vi. 14; *Philo.* Qu. De S. Immut. 298, d; *Leg. Alleg.* 1091, d; *Incorrupt.* M. 947, A; *Plotin.* Enn. iv. 7, 8. φύσις is said to consist of a moister, colder, and denser πνεῦμα than ψυχῇ; but, on this point, see *Plut.* *Sto. Rep.* 41, 1; *Com. Not.* 46, 2; *Galen.* Hipp. et Plat. v. 3. In *Diog.* 139, ἔξις and νοῦς, the highest and lowest links in the series, are contrasted. *Ibid.* 156, there is a definition of φύσις = πῦρ τεχνικὸν δὲ ὡς βαδί-ζον εἰς γένεσιν; and (148) another

of this division, the various branches of a science of nature were mapped out, based on a gradually-increasing development of the powers of life. But no serious attempt was made by the Stoics to work out this thought. With the single exception of man, we know exceedingly little of their views on organic beings.¹

=ἕξις ἐξ αὐτῆς κινουμένη κατὰ σπερματικούς λόγους ἀποτελοῦσά τε καὶ συνεχούσα τὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐν ὀρισμένοις χρόνοις καὶ τοιαῦτα δρῶσα ἀφ' ὧν ἀπεκρίθη. It hardly need be repeated that the force is one and the same, which at one time appears as ἕξις, at another as φύσις. Conf. *Diog.* 138; *Themist.* l. c.; *Sext. Math.* ix. 84.

¹ The belief that blood circulates in the veins, spiritus in the arteries, which was shared by the Peripatetics, deserves to

be mentioned here, *Sen. Nat. Qu.* ii. 15, 1; also the explanations of sleep, death, and age in *Plut. Plac.* v. 23, 4; the assertion that animals are not only deficient in reason, but in emotions, and that even in man the emotions are connected with the rational soul. Posidonius, however, denied this statement, and Chrysippus believed that animals had a ἡγεμονικόν. He even discovered in dogs traces of an unconscious inference. *Sext. Pyrrh.* i. 69.

CHAPTER IX.

THE STUDY OF NATURE. MAN.

CHAP.
IX.

A. *The
soul.*
(1) *Ma-
terialistic
nature of
the soul.*

THE Stoic teaching becomes peculiarly interesting, when it begins to speak of Man; and on this subject, as on every other, its tone was decided by the tone of the whole system. On the one hand, the Stoic materialism could not fail to show itself most unmistakeably in the department of anthropology; on the other hand, the conviction that all actions must be referred to active forces, and all the several active forces to one original force, could not be held without leading to a belief in the oneness and in the dynamical power of the soul. Not only does it follow, as a corollary from the materialistic view of the world, that the soul must be in its nature corporeal, but the Stoics took pains to uphold this view by special arguments. Whatever, they said, influences the body, and is by it influenced in turn, whatever is united with the body, and again separated from it, must be corporeal. How, then, can the soul be other than corporeal?¹ Whatever

¹ Cleanthes, in *Nemes. Nat.* σώματι οὐδὲ ἄσωμάτῳ σώμα ἵλλα
Hom. p. 33, and *Tert. De An. c.* σώμα σώματι • συμπάσχει ἰὲ ἡ
5: οὐδὲν ἄσώματον συμπάσχει ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι νοσοῦντι καὶ τεμ-

has extension in three dimensions is corporeal; and this is the case with the soul, since it extends in three directions over the whole body.¹ Moreover, thought and motion are due to animal life.² Animal life is nurtured and kept in health by the breath of life.³ Experience also proves that mental qualities are propagated by natural generation, and that they must be consequently connected with a corporeal substratum.⁴ The mind is therefore nothing but fiery breath; and the human soul is described by the Stoics sometimes as fire, sometimes as breath, at other times, more accurately, as warm breath, diffused throughout the body, and forming a bond of union for the body,⁵ in the very same way that

νομένῳ καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῇ ψυχῇ· αἰσχυνομένης γούν ἐρυθρόν γίνεται καὶ φοβουμένης ὥχρόν· σῶμα ἔρα ἡ ψυχῇ. Chrysippus, in *Nemes.* p. 34: ὁ θάνατός ἐστι χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος· οὐδὲν δὲ ἄσώματον ἀπὸ σώματος χωρίζεται· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐφάπτεται σώματος ἄσώματον· ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ καὶ ἐφάπτεται καὶ χωρίζεται τοῦ σώματος· σῶμα ἔρα ἡ ψυχῇ.

¹ *Nemes.* Nat. Hom. c. 2.

² *Diog.* 157; *Cic.* N. D. ii. 14, 36.

³ Zeno, in *Tertull.* l. c.: Quo digresso animal emoritur: consito autem spiritu digresso animal emoritur: ergo consitus spiritus corpus est, consitus autem spiritus anima est: ergo corpus est anima.

⁴ Cleanthes, in *Nemes.* l. c. 32: οὐ μόνον ὅμοιοι τοῖς γονεῦσι γινόμεθα, κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, τοῖς πάθεσι, τοῖς ἡθεσι, ταῖς διαθέσεσι· σώματος δὲ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἀνόμενον, οὐχὶ δὲ ἄσώματον· σῶμα ἔρα ἡ ψυχῇ.

⁵ Chrysippus, in *Galen*, Hipp. et Plat. iii. 1: ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμά ἐστι σύμφυτον ἡμῖν συνεχὲς παντὶ τῷ σώματι διήκον. *Zeno.* *Macro.* Somn. i. 14: Zenon [dixit animam] concretum corpori spiritum . . . Boëthos (probably the Stoic is meant) ex aëre et igne [constare]. *Diog.* in *Galen*, ii. 8: τὸ κινοῦν τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὰς κατὰ προαίρεσιν κινήσεις ψυχικὴ τίς ἐστὶν ἀναθυμίασις. *Cic.* Nat. D. iii. 14, 36; *Tusc.* i. 9, 19; 18, 42: Zeno considers the soul to be fire; Panætius believes that it is burning air. *Diog. L.* vii. 156, on the authority of Zeno, Antipater, Posidonius, says that it is πνεῦμα σύμφυτον, πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον. *Stob.* Ecl. i. 796 (*Plut.* Plac. iv. 3, 3). *Cornut.* N. D. p. 8: καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἡμέτεραι ψυχαὶ πῦρ εἰσι. *Ar.* Didymus, in *Eus.* Pr. Ev. xv. 20, 1: Zeno calls the soul αἴσθησιν ἢ ἀναθυμίασιν (should be αἰσθητικὴν ἀναθυμίασιν). *Ps. Plut.*

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the soul of the world is diffused throughout the world, and forms a bond of union for the world.¹ This warm breath was believed to be connected with the blood; and hence the soul was said to be fed by vapours from the blood, just as the stars are fed by vapours from the earth.²

The same hypothesis was also used to explain the origin of the soul. One part of the soul was believed to be transmitted to the young in the seed.³ From the part so transmitted there arises, by development within the womb, first the soul of a plant; and this

Vit. Hom. c. 127: τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δρίζονται πνεῦμα συμφυσὲς καὶ ἀναθυμίασιν αἰσθητικὴν ἀναπτομένην ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν σώματι ὑγρῶν. Longin. in *Eus.* Ibid. 21, 1 and 3. *Alex.* De An. 127, b: οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς πνεῦμα αὐτὴν λέγοντες εἶναι συγκεϊμένον πως ἐκ τε πυρὸς καὶ ἀέρος. Since, however, every πνεῦμα is not a soul, a soul is stated to be πνεῦμα πᾶς ἔχον (*Plotin.* Enn. iv. 7, 4); and the distinctive quality of the soul-element is its greater warmth and rarity. *Plut.* Sto. Rep. 41, 2: Chrysippus considers the ψυχὴ to be ἀραιότερον πνεῦμα τῆς φύσεως καὶ λεπτομερέστερον. Similarly, *Galen*, Qu. An. Mores, c. 4: The Stoics say that both φύσις and ψυχὴ is πνεῦμα, but that the πνεῦμα is thick and cold in φύσις, dry and warm in ψυχὴ.

¹ *Chrysippus*. The process is further explained by Iamb. in *Stob.* Ecl. i. 870 and 874, *Themist.* De Anim. f. 68, a, *Plotin.* iv. 7, 8, as being κρᾶσις, i.e. an intermingling of elements. That the soul forms the bond of union for the body, and not vice versâ, was

a point vindicated by the Stoics against the Epicureans. Posid. in *Achil.* Tat. Isag. c. 13; *Sext.* Math. ix. 72.

² *Galen.* Hippocr. et Plat. ii. 8, on the authority of Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Diogenes; Longin. in *Eus.* Pr. Ev. xv. 21, 3; *M. Aurel.* v. 33; vi. 15; *Ps. Plut.* Vit. Hom. 127.

³ Zeno described the seed as πνεῦμα μεθ' ὑγροῦ ψυχῆς μέρος καὶ ἀπόσπασμα . . . μίγμα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν (*Arius Didymus*, in *Eus.* Pr. Ev. xv. 20, 1), or as σύμμιγμα καὶ κέρασμα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων (*Plut.* Coh. Ir. 15). See also *Chrysip.* in *Diog.* 159, and *Tertullian*, De An. c. 27. According to Sphærus, in *Diog.* 159, the seed is formed by separation from all parts of the body, and can consequently produce all. *Panætius* (in *Cic.* Tusc. i. 31, 79) proves, from the mental similarity between parents and children, that the soul comes into existence by generation. For the mother's share in producing the soul, see *Ar. Did.*

becomes the soul of a living creature, after birth, by the action of the outer air.¹ This view led to the further hypothesis that the seat of the soul must be in the breast, not in the brain; since not only breath and warm blood, but also the voice, the immediate expression of thought, comes from the breast.²

Nor is this further hypothesis out of harmony with the notions generally entertained as to the nature of man. Plato and Aristotle had already fixed on the heart as the central organ of the lower powers, having assigned the brain to reason, with the view of distinguishing the rational from the mere animal soul.³ When, therefore, the Stoics assimilated man's rational activity to the activity of the senses, deducing both from one and the same

(2) *Divisions of the soul.*

¹ *Plut.* Sto. Rep. 41, 1 and 8; C. Not. 46, 2. De Primo Frig. 2, 5: οἱ Στωϊκοὶ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα λέγουσιν ἐν τοῖς σώμασι τῶν βρεφῶν τῇ περιψύξει στομοῦσθαι καὶ μεταβάλλον ἐκ φύσεως γενέσθαι ψυχὴν. Similarly, *Plotin.* Enn. iv. 7, 8; *Hippolyt.* Refut. Hær. c. 21; *Tertull.* De An. c. 25. Plutarch (Plac. v. 16, 2; 17, 1; 24, 1) draws attention to the inconsistency of saying that the animal soul, which is warmer and rarer than the vegetable soul, has been developed out of it by cooling and condensation.

² On this point, the Stoics were not altogether agreed. Some (not all, as *Plut.* Pl. Phil. iv. 21, 5, asserts) made the brain the seat of the soul, in proof of which they appealed to the story of the birth of Pallas. *Sext.* Math. ix. 119; *Diog.* in *Phædr.* Fragm. De Nat. De. col. 6. Conf. *Krische*

Forschungen, i. 488, and Chrysipp. in *Galen*, l. c. iii. 8. It appears, however, from *Galen*, l. c. i. 6, ii. 2 and 5, iii. 1, *Tertull.* De An. c. 15, that the most distinguished Stoics—Zeno, Chrysippus, Diogenes, and Apollodorus—decided in favour of the heart. The chief proof is, that the voice does not come from the hollow of the skull, but from the breast. Chrysippus was aware of the weakness of this proof, but still did not shrink from using it. At the same time, he also appealed to the fact (ii. 7; iii. 1; iv. 1) that, by universal assent, supported by numerous passages from the poets, the motions of the will and the feelings proceed from the heart.

³ Aristotle had assigned no particular organ of the body to reason.

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source, it was natural that they would depart from Aristotle's view. Accordingly, the various parts of the soul were supposed to discharge themselves from their centre in the heart into the several organs, in the form of atmospheric currents. Seven such parts were enumerated, besides the dominant part, or reason, which was also called *ἡγεμονικὸν, διανοητικὸν, λογιστικὸν, or λογισμός*. These seven parts consist of the five senses, the power of reproduction, and the power of speech;¹ and, following out their view of the close relation of speech and thought, great importance was attached to the power of speech.² At the same time, the Stoics upheld the oneness of the soul's being with greater vigour than either Plato or Aristotle had done. Reason, or *τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν*, is with them the primary power, of which all other powers are only parts, or derivative powers.³ Even feeling and desire are

¹ *Plut. Plac.* iv. 4, 2. *Ibid.* c. 21: The Stoics consider the *ἡγεμονικὸν* to be the highest part of the soul; it begets the *φαντασίαι, συγκαταθέσεις, αἰσθήσεις*, and *ὄρμαλ*, and is by them called *λογισμός*; from it the seven divisions of the soul reach to the body, like the arms of a cuttle-fish, and are therefore collectively defined as *πνεῦμα διατείνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ (μέχρις ὀφθαλμῶν, ὠτῶν, μυκτῆρων, γλώττης, ἐπιφανείας, παρυστάτων, φάρυγγος γλώττης καὶ τῶν οἰκείων ὀργάνων)*. *Galen*, l. c. iii. 1; *Diog.* 110 and 157; *Porphy.* and *Iamblich.* in *Stob.* i. 836, and 874, and 878; *Chalcid.* in *Tim.* 307; *Nicomachus*, in *Iambli. Theol. Arith.* p.

50. But there was no universal agreement among the Stoics on this subject. According to *Tert.* *De An.* 14, Zeno only admitted three divisions of the soul, whilst some among the later Stoics enumerated as many as ten; *Panætius* only held six, and *Posidonius* went still further away from the view current among the Stoics. The remarks of *Stob.* i. 828, probably refer to the *Peripatetic* *Aristo.*

² *Conf. Cleanth. Hymn.* 4: *ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμέν ἡς μίμημα λαχόντες μούνοι, ὅσα ζῶει τε καὶ ἔρπει θνητ' ἐπὶ γαίαν.*

³ *Chrys.* in *Galen*, l. c. iii. 1: *ταύτης οὖν [τῆς ψυχῆς] τῶν μερῶν*

derived from it, in direct contradiction to the teaching of Plato and Aristotle;¹ and this power was declared to be the seat of personal identity, a point on which former philosophers had refrained from expressing an opinion.²

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ἐκάστω διατεταγμένον[ων] μορίῳ, τὸ διήκον αὐτῆς εἰς τὴν τραχεῖαν ἀρτηρίαν φάνην εἶναι, τὸ δὲ εἰς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὄψιν, κ.τ.λ. καὶ τὸ εἰς ὄρχεις, ἕτερόν τιν' ἔχον τοιοῦτον λόγον, σπερματικόν, εἰς δὲ συμβαίνει πάντα ταῦτα, ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ εἶναι, μέρος ὃν αὐτῆς τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. *Plut. Plac. iv. 4, 2*: τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἀπ' οὗ ταῦτα πάντα ἐπιτέτακται διὰ τῶν οἰκείων ὀργάνων προσφερῶς ταῖς τοῦ πολυπόδου πλεκτάναις. *Conf. Sext. Math. ix. 102. Alex. Aphr. (De An. 146)* therefore denies the Stoical assertion, that the ψυχικὴ δύναμις is only one, and that every activity of the soul is only the action of the πῶς ἔχον ἡγεμονικόν. *Tertullian, De An. 14*, says, speaking quite after the manner of a Stoic: *Hujusmodi autem non tam partes animæ habebuntur, quam vires et efficaciæ et operæ . . . non enim membra sunt substantiæ animalis, sed ingenia. Iambl. in Stob. i. 874*: The powers of the soul bear, according to the Stoics, the same relation to the soul that qualities have to the substance; and their difference is partly owing to the diffusion of the πνεύματα, of which they consist, in different parts of the body, partly to the union of several qualities in one subject-matter, the latter being necessary, for ἡγεμονικόν to include φαντασία, συγκατάθεσις, ὁρμή, and λόγος.

¹ *Plut. Virt. Mort. c. 3*, speaking of Zeno, Aristo, and Chrysippus: νομίζουσιν οὐκ εἶναι τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον διαφορᾶ τινι καὶ φύσει ψυχῆς τοῦ λογικοῦ διακεκριμένον, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος, ὃ δὴ καλοῦσι διάνοιαν καὶ ἡγεμονικόν, διόλου τρεπόμενον καὶ μεταβάλλον ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς κατὰ ἔξιν ἢ διάθεσιν μεταβολαῖς κακίαν τε γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ μηδὲν ἔχειν ἄλογον ἐν ἑαυτῷ. *Plac. Phil. iv. 21, 1. Galen, l. c. iv. 1*: Chrysippus sometimes speaks as if he admitted a distinct δύνάμις ἐπιθυμητικὴ or θυμοειδής; at other times, as if he denied it. The latter is clearly his meaning. *Ibid. v. 6*: ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος οὐθ' ἕτερον εἶναι νομίζει τὸ παθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ λογιστικοῦ καὶ τῶν ἁλόγων ζώων ἀφαιρεῖται τὰ πάθη. *Iambl. in Stob. Eccl. i. 890; Diog. vii. 159. Orig. c. Cels. v. 47*: τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀρνούμενους τὸ τριμερές τῆς ψυχῆς. Posidonius (in *Galen, l. c. 6*) endeavours to prove that Cleanthes held a different view, by a passage in which he contrasts θυμὸς with λόγος—a passage, however, which is only a rhetorical flourish.

² Chrys. (in *Galen, ii. 2, 15*: οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐγὼ λέγομεν κατὰ τοῦτο (the primary power in the breast) δεικνύντες αὐτοὺς ἐν τῷ ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν εἶναι.

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B. *The individual soul and the soul of the universe.*

The individual soul bears the same relation to the soul of the universe that a part does to the whole. The human soul is not only a part, as are all other living powers, of the universal power of life, but, because it possesses reason, it has a special relationship to the Divine Being¹—a relationship which becomes closer in proportion as we allow greater play to the divine element in ourselves, i. e. to reason.² On this very account, however, the soul cannot escape the law of the Divine Being, in the shape of general necessity, or destiny. It is a mere delusion to suppose that the soul possesses a freedom independent of the world's course. The human will, like everything else in the world, is bound into the indissoluble chain of natural causes, and that irrespec-

¹ *Cleanthes*, v. 4. *Epictet*. Diss. i. 14, 6: αἱ ψυχὰς συναφεῖς τῷ θεῷ ὅτε αὐτοῦ μόρια οὔσαι καὶ ἀποσπάσματα. *Id.* ii. 8, 11. *M. Aurel.* ii. 4, v. 27, calls the soul μέρος ἀπόρροια, ἀπόσπασμα θεοῦ; and, xii. 26, even calls the human νοῦς θεός. *Sen.* Ep. 41, 2: Sacer intra nos spiritus sedet . . . in unoquoque virorum bonorum, quis Deus incertum est, habitat Deus. *Id.* Ep. 66, 12: Ratio autem nihil aliud est quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa. Consequently, reason, thought, and virtue are of the same nature in the human soul as in the soul of the universe. From this relationship to God, Posidonius deduces the soul's capacity for studying nature, and Cicero (*De Leg.* i. 8, 24) the general belief in God. All

souls, as being parts of the divine mind, may be collectively regarded as one soul or reason. *Marc. Aurel.* ix. 8: εἰς μὲν τὰ ἔλογα ζῶα μία ψυχὴ διήρηται· εἰς δὲ τὰ λογικὰ μία λογικὴ ψυχὴ μεμέρισται. xii. 30: ἐν φῶς ἡλίου, καὶ διέρεται τοίχοις, ὄρεσιν, ἄλλοις μυρίοις· μία οὐσία κοινὴ, καὶ διέρεται ἰδίως ποιοῖς σώμασι μυρίοις· μία ψυχὴ, καὶ φύσεσι διέρεται μυρίαῖς καὶ ἰδίαῖς περιγραφαῖς. This oneness, however, must, as the comparison shows, be understood in the sense of the Stoic realism: the universal soul, in the sense of etherial substance, is the element of which individual souls consist.

² In this sense, *Sen.* Ep. 31, 11, calls the animus rectus, bonus, magnus, a Deus in corpore humano hospitans.

tively of our knowing by what causes the will is decided or not. Its freedom consists only in that it obeys the call of its own nature, instead of being determined by external causes; external circumstances only helping it to form its decisions. To these decisions, however, as determined by its own nature, the greatest value is attached. Not only are our actions due to them to such an extent that action can only be considered ours because of the soul's power of self-determination, but even our judgments are, as the Stoics thought, dependent on them. It is the soul itself which lends itself to truth or error: our convictions are quite as much in our power as our actions; both are alike the necessary result of our will. And just as the individual soul does not possess activity independently of the universal soul, no more can the individual soul escape the law of destiny. At the end of the world's course, the individual soul will be resolved into the primary substance, into the Divine Being. The only point about which the Stoics were undecided was, whether all souls would last until that time as separate souls, which was the view of Cleanthes, or whether, as Chrysippus held,¹ only the souls of the wise would survive.

¹ *Diog.* 156; *Plut.* N. P. Suav. viii. 25, 58) are only speaking Viv. 31, 2; *Plac.* iv. 7, 2; *Ar.* *Didymus*, in *Eus. Præp. Ev.* xv. 20, 3; *Sen. Consol. ad Marc. c.* 26, 7; *Ep.* 102, 22; 117, 6; *Cic.* *Tusc. i.* 31, 77. *Seneca* (*ad Polyb.* 9, 2; *Ep.* 65, 24; 71, 16; 36, 9) and *M. Aurelius* (*iii.* 3; *vii.* 32; *κἀν' ἀνθρώπων*, in seeming to doubt a future life after death, in order to dispel the fear of death in every case. It is, however, a mistake of *Tiedemann* (*Sto. Phil. ii.* 155) to suppose that they believed in the imme-

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C. Freedom
and im-
mortality.

The effects of the Stoic principles appear unmistakeably in the above statements. They, however, pervade the whole body of the Stoical views on man.¹ From one point of view, the theory of necessity, and the denial of everlasting life after death, seem quite unintelligible in a system the moral tone of which is so high; but yet the connection of these theories with the Stoic ethics is very intimate. These theories commended themselves to the Stoics, as they have done in later times to Spinoza and

diate dissolution of the soul after death. It is, on the contrary, clear, from *M. Aurel.* iv. 14, 21, that the soul lives some time after death, and is not resolved into the world-soul till the general conflagration. But even this view is a variation from the ordinary view of the Stoics. According to *Seneca* (*Consol. ad Marcum*) the souls of the good, as in the doctrine of purgatory, undergo a purification, before they are admitted to the ranks of the blessed; and this purification is no doubt connected with physical causes. When the soul is purified, both in substance and morals, it rises up to the ether, and there, united to the *σπερματικὸς λόγος τῶν ὅλων*, it lives until the end of the world. The ether is also allotted to the blessed, for their residence, by *Cic. Tusc.* i. 18, 42; *Lactant.* *Inst.* vii. 20; *Plut.* *N. P. Suav. Vivi.* 31, 2. The souls, as Cicero remarks, penetrating the thick lower air, mount to heaven, until they reach an atmosphere congenial with their own nature. Here they naturally stop, and

are fed by the same elements as the stars. According to Chrysippus (in *Eustath.* on *Il.* xxiii. 65), they there assume the spherical shape of the stars. According to *Tertull.* *De An.* 54, *Lucan.* *Phars.* ix. 5, their place is under the moon. Zeno, in speaking of the islands of the blest (*Lact. Inst.* vii. 7, 20), probably only desired to enlist popular opinion in his own favour. The souls of the foolish and bad also last some time after death; only, as being weaker, they do not last until the end of the world (*Ar. Did.*; *Theodoret.* *Cur. Gr. Affec.* v. 23); and meantime, as it is distinctly asserted by *Sen.* *Ep.* 117, 6, *Tertullian*, and *Lactantius*, they are punished in the nether world.

¹ The peculiar objection mentioned by *Seneca* (*Ep.* 57, 5) as belonging to the Stoics—*animam hominis magno pondere extriti permanere non posse et statim spargi, quia non fuerit illi exitus liber*—was not required by their principles, as *Seneca* already observed. It belongs, in fact, only to individual members of that School.

Schleiermacher, because they corresponded to their fundamental view of morality, according to which the individual can only be regarded as the instrument of reason in general, as a dependent portion of the collective universe. Moreover, since the Stoics admitted a future existence—of limited, but yet indefinite, length—the same practical results followed from their belief as from the current belief in immortality. The statements of Seneca,¹ that this life is a prelude to a better; that the body is a lodging-house, from which the soul will return to its own home; his joy in looking forward to the day which will rend the bonds of the body asunder, which he, in common with the early Christians, calls the birthday of eternal life;² his description of the peace of the eternity there awaiting us, of the freedom and bliss of the heavenly life, of the light of knowledge which will there be shed on all the secrets of nature;³ his language

¹ Conf. *Baur*, Seneca und Paulus in Hilgenfeld's Zeitschrift für wissensch. Theol. i. 2, 212.

² Ep. 102, 22: Cum venerit dies ille, qui mixtum hoc divini humanique secernat, corpus hoc, ubi inveni, relinquam, ipse me Dis reddam . . . per has mortalis vitæ moras illi meliori vitæ longiorique proluditur. As a child in its mother's womb, sic per hoc spatium, quod ab infantia patet in senectutem, in alium maturescimus partum. All we possess, and the body itself, is only the baggage, which we neither brought into the world, nor can

carry away with us. Dies iste, quem tanquam extremum reformidas, æterni natalis est. Ep. 120, 14: The body is breve hospitium, which a noble soul does not fear to lose. Scit enim, quo exiturus sit, qui, unde venerit, meminit. Conf. Ep. 65, 16.

³ Consol. ad Marc. 24, 3: Imago dumtaxat filii tui perit . . . ipse quidem æternus meliorisque nunc status est, despoliatus oneribus alienis et sibi relictus. The body is only a vessel, surrounding the soul in darkness: nititur illo, unde dimissus est; ibi illum æterna requies manet.

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on the future recognition and happy society of souls made perfect;¹ his seeing in death a great day of judgment, when sentence will be pronounced on every one;² his making the thought of a future life the great stimulus to moral conduct here;³ even the way in which he consoles himself for the destruction of the soul by the thought that it will live again in another form hereafter⁴—all contain

Ibid. 26, 7: Nos quoque felices animæ et æternæ sortitæ. *Ibid.* 19, 6: Excessit filius tuus terminos intra quos servitur: excepit illum magna et æterna pax. No fear or care, no desire, envy, or compassion disturbs him. *Ibid.* 26, 5. Consol. ad Polyb. 9, 3, 8: Nunc animus fratris mei velut ex diutino carcere emissus, tandem sui juris et arbitrii, gestit et rerum naturæ spectaculo fruitor . . . fruitor nunc aperto et libero cælo . . . et nunc illic libere vagatur omniaque rerum naturæ bona cum summa voluntate perspicit. Ep. 79, 12: Tunc animus noster habebit, quod gratuletur sibi, cum emissus his tenebris . . . totum diem admiserit et cælo redditus suo fuerit. Ep. 102, 28: Aliquando naturæ tibi arcana reteguntur, discutietur ista caligo et lux undique clara percutiet.

¹ In Consol. ad Marc. 25, 1, Seneca describes how, the time of purification ended, the deceased one inter felices currit animas, and how his grandfather shows him the hall of heaven. *Ibid.* 26, 3.

² Ep. 26, 4: Velut adpropinquet experimentum et ille laturus sententiam de omnibus annis meis dies . . . quo, remotis stro-

phis ac fucis, de me judicaturus sum. Conf. die hora decretoria, Ep. 102, 24.

³ Ep. 102, 29: Hæc cogitatio (that of heaven and a future life) nihil sordidum animo subsidere sinit, nihil humile, nihil crudele. Deos rerum omnium esse testes ait: illis nos adprobari, illis in futurum parari jubet et æternitatem menti proponere.

⁴ Ep. 36, 10: Mors . . . inter-mittit vitam, non eripit: veniet iterum qui nos in lucem reponat dies, quem multi recusarent, nisi oblitos reduceret. Sed postea diligentius docebo omnia, quæ videntur perire, mutari. Æquo animo debet rediturus exire. The souls cannot return, according to the Stoic teaching, until after the general conflagration; and that is on the supposition that the same persons will be found in the future world as in the present. As long as the latter lasts, the better souls continue to exist, and only the particles of the body are employed for fresh bodies. Accordingly, the passage just quoted, and also Ep. 71, 13, must refer to the physical side of death, or else to the return of personality after the conflagration of the world.

nothing at variance with the Stoic teaching, however near they may approach to Platonic or even Christian modes of thought.¹ Seneca merely expanded the teaching of his School in one particular direction, in which it harmonises most closely with Platonism; and, of all the Stoics, Seneca was the most distinctly Platonic.

Excepting the two points which have been discussed at an earlier time, and one other point relating to the origin of ideas and emotions, which will be considered subsequently, little is on record relating to the psychological views of the Stoics.

¹ Besides the definition of αἴσθησις in *Diog.* 52, and the remark that impressions are made on the organs of sense, but that the seat of feeling is in the ἡγεμονικὸν (*Plut. Plac.* iv. 23, 1), the following statements may be mentioned:—In the process of seeing, the δραστικὸν πνεῦμα, coming into the eyes from the ἡγεμονικὸν, gives a spherical form to the air before the eye, by virtue of its τονικὴ κίνησις, and, by means of the sphere of air, comes in contact with things; and since by this process rays of light emanate from the eye, darkness must be visible. *Diog.* 158; *Alex. Aph.* De Anim. 149; *Plut. Plac.*

iv. 15. The process of hearing is due to the spherical undulations of the air, which communicate their motion to the ear. *Diog.* 158; *Plut. Plac.* iv. 19, 5. On the voice, see *Plut. Plac.* iv. 20, 2; 21, 4; *Diog.* 55. Disease is caused by changes in the πνεῦμα, *Diog.* 158; sleep ἐκλυομένου τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ τόνου περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν, *Diog.* 158; *Tertull.* De An. 43; and in a similar way, death ἐκλυομένου τοῦ τόνου καὶ παριεμένου, *Iambl.* (in *Stob. Ecl.* i. 922), who, however, does not mention the Stoics by name. In the case of man, the extinguishing of the power of life is only a liberation of rational souls.

CHAPTER X.

ETHICS. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STOIC

ETHICS. ABSTRACT THEORY OF MORALITY.

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WHATEVER attention the Stoics paid to the study of nature and to logic, nevertheless, as has been already remarked, the central place in their system was occupied by Ethics. Even nature, that 'most divine part of philosophy,' was only studied because the study of nature is an intellectual preparation for Ethics. In the domain of Ethics the true spirit of the Stoic system may therefore be expected to appear, and it may be anticipated that this subject will be treated by them with special care. Nor is this expectation a vain one; for ample materials exist, supplying data as to the Stoic doctrines on morality. Nevertheless, the way in which these materials were formally combined is only set forth in vague and contradictory statements. Moreover, the subject of morals appears to have been treated by the Stoics in such different ways, that it is hardly possible to obtain a complete survey of their

whole system by following any one of the traditional divisions.¹

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¹ The chief passage in *Diog.* vii. 84, is as follows: τὸ δὲ ἡθικὸν μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας διαιρουσιν εἰς τε τὸν περὶ ὁρμῆς καὶ εἰς τὸν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τρόπον καὶ τὸν περὶ παθῶν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ τέλους περὶ τε τῆς πρώτης ἀξίας καὶ τῶν πράξεων καὶ περὶ τῶν καθηκόντων προτροπῶν τε καὶ ἀποτροπῶν. καὶ οὕτω δ' ὑποδιαίρουσιν οἱ περὶ Χρύσιππον καὶ Ἀρχέδημον καὶ Ζήνωνα τὸν Ταρσέα καὶ Ἀπολλώδωρον καὶ Διογένην καὶ Ἀντίπατρον καὶ Ποσειδώνιον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κιτιεὺς Ζήνων καὶ ὁ Κλεάνθης ὡς ἂν ἀρχαιότεροι ἀφελέστερον περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων διέλαβον. There may be doubts as to the punctuation, and, consequently, as to the sense, of the first sentence; but the form of expression seems to point to three main divisions and six subdivisions. The ethics of Chrysippus and his followers would therefore be divided into the following main divisions: περὶ ὁρμῆς, περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ παθῶν; but it would be hard to assign to these divisions their respective subdivisions. The statement of *Epictetus*, *Diss.* iii. 2, agrees in part with this division. He distinguishes three τόποι: ὁ περὶ τὰς ὁρέξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκκλίσεις, called also ὁ περὶ τὰ πάθη; ὁ περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ ἀφορμὰς καὶ ἀπλῶς ὁ περὶ τὸ καθῆκον; and, lastly, ὁ περὶ τὴν ἀναξαρτησίαν καὶ ἀνειαυότητα καὶ ὅλως ὁ περὶ τὰς συγκαταθέσεις. The first of these divisions would correspond to the third of *Diogenes*, the second to his first, but the division περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν does not harmonise with that of *Epictetus*.

Stobæus makes a different division to either of these. In his survey of the Stoic ethics (*Ecl.* ii. 5), he first treats of what is good, evil, and indifferent, of what is desirable and detestable, of the end-in-chief, and of happiness; and in this section he discusses at length the doctrine of virtue. He then goes on to consider the καθῆκον, the impulses, and the emotions (πάθη, as being one kind of impulse), appending thereto a discussion on friendship; and, lastly, he concludes with a long treatise on ἐνεργήματα, the greater portion of which is devoted to describing the wise man and the fool. Turning to *Sen.* *Ep.* 95, 65, it is stated, on the authority of *Posidonius*, that not only præceptio, but also suasio, consolatio, and exhortatio, and, moreover, causarum inquisitio and ethologia, are necessary. In *Ep.* 89, 14, the parts of moral science are more accurately given as three; the first determining the value of things, the second treating de actionibus, the third de impetu. Two of these parts coincide with those of *Diogenes*, but this is not the case with the third, which is only a subdivision in *Diogenes*; and even *Seneca's* first part more nearly agrees with one of the subdivisions in *Diogenes*. Unfortunately, *Seneca* does not mention his authorities; and, accordingly, we are not sure whether his division is a genuine Stoical division. A similar division will be subsequently noticed in the eclectic Academician *Eudorus*. None of the divisions quoted

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Proceeding to group the materials in such a way as to give the clearest insight into the peculiarities and connection of the Stoic principles, the first distinction to be made will be one between morality in general and particular points in morality. In considering morality in general, the abstract theory of morals will be distinguished from the theory as modified to meet practical wants. In illustrating the abstract theory of morality, the enquiry may be conducted under the three following heads:—the enquiry into the highest good, that into the nature of virtue, and that relating to the wise man.

A. The
highest
good.

(1) *Nature
of the
highest
good.*

The enquiry into the destiny and end of man turns, with the Stoics, as it did with all moral philosophers since the time of Socrates, about the fundamental conception of the good, and the ingredients necessary to make up the highest good or happiness.¹ Happiness, it is said, can be sought only in rational activity or virtue. Speaking more explicitly,²

agree with the three problems proposed by *Cic.* Off. ii. 5, 18, or the three sections enumerated by *Epict.* Enchir. c. 51, in which Petersen (*Phil. Chrys. Fund.* p. 260) recognises Seneca's three divisions. It seems impossible, in the midst of such contending authorities, to establish the mode in which the Stoics divided Ethics. One thing alone is clear, that they were themselves not agreed on this subject.

¹ *Stob.* Ecl. ii. 138: τέλος δέ φασιν εἶναι τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὗ ἕνεκα πάντα πράττεται, αὐτὸ δὲ πράττεται μὲν, οὐδενὸς δὲ ἕνεκα.

² *Diog.* vii. 85; *Cic.* Fin. iii.

5; *Gell.* N. A. xii. 5, 7. That the two latter writers follow one and the same authority appears partly from their literal agreement with each other, and partly from their adopting a uniform method in refuting the Epicurean statement, that the desire for pleasure is the primary impulse. That authority is probably the treatise of Chrysippus περὶ τέλους, since it is distinctly referred to by Diogenes. *Plut.* Sto. Rep. 12, 4, quotes from it: ὡς οἰκείουμεθα πρὸς αὐτοὺς εὐθὺς γεγόμενοι καὶ τὰ μέρη καὶ τὰ ἔκγονα ἑαυτῶν. The difference mentioned by *Alex.* *Aphr.* De An. 154—that at one

the primary impulse of every being is towards self-preservation and self-gratification.¹ It follows that every being pursues those objects which are most suited to its nature,² and that such objects alone have for it any value (*ἀξία*). Hence the highest good—the end-in-chief,³ or happiness—can only be found in what is conformable to nature.⁴

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time self-love, at another the preservation of nature, is the impulse—is unimportant.

¹ *Diog.* vii. 85: τὴν δὲ πρώτην δρμὴν φασὶ τὸ ζῶον ἴσχειν ἐπὶ τὸ τηρεῖν ἑαυτὸ, οἰκειούσης αὐτῷ τῆς φύσεως ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, καθὰ φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ τε-λῶν, πρῶτον οἰκεῖον εἶναι λέγων πάντι ζῴῳ τὴν αὐτοῦ σύστασιν καὶ τὴν ταύτης συνείδησιν. οὐτε γὰρ ἀλλοτριῶσαι εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτοῦ τὸ ζῶον, οὐτε ποιῆσαι ἄν αὐτὸ μήτ' ἀλλοτριῶσαι μήτ' οὐκ [?] οἰκειῶσαι. ἀπολείπεται τοίνυν λέγειν συστημαμένην αὐτὸ οἰκεῖως πρὸς ἑαυτό· οὕτω γὰρ τὰ τε βλάπτοντα διω-θεῖται καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα προσίεται. Similarly, *Cic.* l. c. 5, 16. Antisthenes had already reduced the conception of the good to that of οἰκεῖον, without explaining more clearly how. Here the Academic theory of life according to nature, which had been enunciated by Polemo, Zeno's teacher, is combined with the conception of the good. Some difficulty was nevertheless caused by the question whether all living creatures are conscious (*συνείδησις*, *sensus*) of their own nature; without such a consciousness, natural self-love seemed to the Stoics impossible. They thought, however, that this question could be answered in the affirmative without hesitation,

and appealed for evidence to the instinctive activities by which children and animals govern their bodily motions, guard themselves from dangers, and pursue what is to their interest, without denying that the ideas which children and animals form of themselves are very indistinct, that they only have a passing knowledge of their own constitution, but not of its true nature (*Sen.* p. 11). *Constitutio*, or *σύστασις*, was defined by the Stoics as *principale animi quodam modo se habens erga corpus*.

² *Cic.* *Fin.* iii. 5, 17; 6, 20.

³ The terms are here treated as synonymous, without regard to the captious distinction of meanings assigned to *τέλος*.

⁴ *Stob.* ii. 134 and 138; *Diog.* vii. 88; 94; *Plut.* C. Not. 27, 9; *Cic.* *Fin.* iii. 7, 26; 10, 33; *Sen.* V. Beat. 3, 3; Ep. 118, 8; *Sext.* *Pyr.* iii. 171; *Math.* xi. 30. In *Stob.* ii. 78 and 96, formal definitions are given of ἀγαθόν, τέλος, and εὐδαιμονία. The latter is generally called εὖροια βίωσις, as Zeno had defined it. Various definitions of the conception of a life according to nature—those of Cleanthes, Antipater, Archedemus, Diogenes, Panætius, Posidonius, and others—are given by *Clem. Alex.* Strom. ii. 416; *Stob.* 134; and *Diog.*

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Nothing, however, can be conformable to the nature of any individual thing, unless it be in harmony with the course of the universe;¹ nor, in the case of a conscious and reasonable being, unless it proceeds from a recognition of this general law—in short, from rational intelligence.² In every enquiry into what is conformable to nature, all turns upon the question, What is the essential constitution of the being? and this essential constitution consists, in the case of man, simply in reason.³ One and the same thing, therefore, is always meant, whether,

¹ *Diog.* vii. 88: διόπερ τέλος γίγνεται τὸ ἀκολουθῶς τῇ φύσει ζῆν· ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατὰ τε τὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὄλων, οὐδὲν ἐνεργοῦντας ὧν ἀπαγορεύειν εἴωθεν ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινὸς ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος ὁ αὐτὸς ὧν τῷ Διὶ . . . εἶναι δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ εὐδαίμονος ἀρετὴν καὶ εὐροίαν βίου, ὅταν πάντα πράττηται κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν τοῦ παρ' ἐκάστῳ δαίμονος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τῶν ὄλων διοικητοῦ βούλησιν.

² *Stob.* ii. 160: διττῶς θεωρεῖσθαι τὴν τε ἐν τοῖς λογικοῖς γιγνομένην ὁρμὴν καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζῴοις. *Diog.* 86: Plants are moved by nature without feeling, animals by means of impulse. In the case of animals, therefore, τὸ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν is the same as τὸ κατὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν. In rational creatures, reason controls impulse; and accordance with nature means accordance with reason. In *Galen*, Hippoc. et Plat. v. 2, Chrysippus says: ἡμᾶς οἰκειοῦσθαι πρὸς μόνον τὸ καλόν. *M. Aurel.* vii. 11: τῷ λογικῷ ζῴῳ

ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ καὶ κατὰ λόγον. Hence the definition of a virtuous life, or a life according to nature: ζῆν κατ' ἐμπερίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων (*Chrysippus*, in *Stob.* 134; *Diog.* 87; *Clem.*; also *Diogenes*, Antipater, Archedemus, Posidonius); and that of the good: τὸ τέλειον κατὰ φύσιν λογικοῦ ὡς λογικοῦ (*Diog.* 94).

³ *Sen.* Ep. 121, 14: Omne animal primum constitutioni suæ conciliari: hominis autem constitutionem rationalem esse: et ideo conciliari hominem sibi non tanquam animali sed tanquam rationali. Ea enim parte sibi carus est homo, qua homo est. *Id.* Ep. 92, 1: The body is subservient to the soul, and the irrational part of the soul to the rational part. Hence it follows: In hoc uno positam esse beatam vitam, ut in nobis ratio perfecta sit. Similarly, Ep. 76, 8. *M. Aurel.* vi. 44: συμφέρει δὲ ἐκάστῳ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κατασκευὴν καὶ φύσιν· ἥ δὲ ἐμὴ φύσις λογικὴ καὶ πολιτικὴ. Conf. viii. 7 and 12.

with Zeno, life according to nature is spoken of as consisting in being in harmony with oneself, or whether, following Cleanthes, it is simply said to be the agreement of life with nature, and whether, in the latter case, *φύσις* is taken to mean the world at large, or is limited to human nature in particular.¹

In every case the meaning is, that the life of the individual approximates to or falls short of the goal of happiness, exactly in proportion as it agrees with or differs from the universal law of the world and the particular rational nature of man. In short, a rational life, in agreement with the general course of the world, is the highest good or virtue. The

¹ According to *Stob.* ii. 132, *Diog.* vii. 89, the ancient Stoics were not altogether agreed as to the terms in which they would express their theory. Zeno, for instance, is said by Stobæus to have defined τέλος = *ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν*; Cleanthes first added the words *τῇ φύσει*, and Chrysippus and his followers augmented the formula by several additions. *Diog.* attributes the words *τῇ φύσει* to Zeno, but adds that Chrysippus understood by *φύσις*, *τὴν τε κοινὴν καὶ ἰδίως τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην*, whereas Cleanthes understood *τὴν κοινὴν μόνην οὐκ ἐτι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ μέρους*. These differences are, however, not important. The simple expression *ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν* means, without doubt, *ἀκόλουθον ἐν βίῳ*, the *ζῆν καθ' ἕνα λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον* (*Stob.* ii. 132 and 158), the *ὁμολογία παντὸς τοῦ βίου* (*Diog.* vii. 89), the *vita sibi concors*, the *concordia animi* (*Sen.* Ep. 89, 15; V. Be. 8, 6), the *unum hominem*

agere, which, according to *Sen.* Ep. 120, 22, is only found in a wise man—in a word, the even tenour of life and consistency. But, nevertheless, this consistency is only possible when individual actions accord with the requirements of the character of the agent. Accordingly, *Stob.* ii. 158, places *ἀκολουθῶς τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει* by the side of *ἀκόλουθον ἐν βίῳ*. If, therefore, Cleanthes added to the expression the words *τῇ φύσει*, he was only going back to the next condition of *ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν*. We can, however, hardly believe that Cleanthes understood by *φύσις* only nature in general, but not human nature. He may have alluded in express terms to *κοινὴ φύσις* or *κοινὸς νόμος* only, but it cannot have been his intention to exclude human nature. Chrysippus therefore only expanded, but did not contradict, the teaching of his master.

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theory of the Stoic morality might therefore be briefly expressed in the sentence: Virtue alone is a good, and happiness consists exclusively in virtue.¹ If, however, following Socrates, the good is defined as being what is useful,² then the sentence would run thus: Virtue alone is useful; utility is the same thing as duty, and to a bad man nothing is useful,³ since, in the case of a rational being, good and evil does not depend on outward circumstances, but simply on his own conduct.⁴ A view of life is here presented to us in which happiness coincides with virtue, the good and the useful with duty and reason. There is neither any good independently of virtue, nor is there in virtue and for virtue any evil.

(2) *The
good and
evil.*

The Stoics accordingly refused to admit the ordinary distinction, sanctioned by popular opinion and the majority of philosophers, between various kinds and degrees of good; nor would they allow bodily

¹ *Diog.* vii. 30; 94; 101; *Stob.* ii. 200; 138; *Sext. Pyrrh.* iii. 169; *Math.* xi. 184; *Cic. Tusc.* ii. 25, 61; *Fin.* iv. 16, 45; *Acad.* i. 10; *Parad.* 1; *Sen. Benef.* vii. 2, 1; *Ep.* 71, 4; 74, 1; 76, 11; 85, 17; 120, 3; 118, 10. To prove their position, the Stoics make use of the chain-argument, of which they are generally fond. Thus Chrysippus (in *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 13, 11): τὸ ἀγαθὸν αἰρετόν· τὸ δ' αἰρετόν ἀρεστόν· τὸ δ' ἀρεστόν ἐπαινετόν· τὸ δ' ἐπαινετόν καλόν. (The same in *Cic. Fin.* iii. 8, 27, and iv. 18, 50.) Again: τὸ ἀγαθὸν χαρτόν· τὸ δὲ χαρτόν σεμνόν· τὸ δὲ σεμνόν καλόν. *Stob.* ii. 126:

πᾶν ἀγαθὸν αἰρετόν εἶναι, ἀρεστόν γὰρ καὶ δοκιμαστόν καὶ ἐπαινετόν ὑπάρχειν· πᾶν δὲ κακὸν φευκτόν. Another sorites of the same kind in *Sen. Ep.* 85, 2.

² *Stob.* ii. 78; 94; *Diog.* vii. 94 and 98; *Sext. Pyrrh.* iii. 169; *Math.* xi. 22, 25, and 30.

³ *Sext. Stob.* ii. 188: μηδένα φαῦλον μήτε ὠφελεῖσθαι μήτε ὠφελεῖν. εἶναι γὰρ τὸ ὠφελεῖν ἴσχειν κατ' ἀρετὴν, καὶ τὸ ὠφελεῖσθαι κινεῖσθαι κατ' ἀρετὴν. *Ibid.* ii. 202; *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 12; *Com. Not.* 20, 1; *Cic. Off.* ii. 3, 10; iii. 3, 11; 7, 34.

⁴ *M. Aurel.* ix. 16.

advantages and external circumstances to be included among good things, together with mental and moral qualities. A certain distinction between goods they did not indeed deny, and various kinds of goods are mentioned by them in their formal division of goods.¹ But these distinctions amount, in the end, to no more than this, that whilst some goods are good and useful in themselves, others are only subsidiary to what is good and useful. The existence of several equally primary goods appears to the Stoics to be at variance with the conception

¹ See *Diog.* 94; *Stob.* ii. 96; 124; 130; 136; *Sext.* Pyrrh. iii. 169; *Math.* xi. 22; *Cic.* *Fin.* iii. 16, 55; *Sen.* *Ep.* 66, 5. Good is here defined to be either *ὠφέλεια* ἢ οὐχ ἕτερον *ὠφελείας*, or, what is the same thing, *ἀρετὴ ἢ τὸ μετέχον ἀρετῆς*. *Sext.* *Math.* xi. 184. A distinction is made between three kinds of good: τὸ ὑφ' οὗ ἢ ἀφ' οὗ ἔστιν ὠφελείσθαι, τὸ καθ' ὃ συμβαίνει ὠφελείσθαι, τὸ οἶόν τε ὠφελείν. Under the first head comes virtue, under the second virtuous actions, under the third virtuous subjects—men, Gods, and demons. A second division of goods (*Diog.*, *Sext.*, *Stob.*) is into goods of the soul, external goods, and such as are neither (τὸ αὐτὸν ἐαυτῷ εἶναι σπουδαῖον καὶ εὐδαίμονα). Goods of the soul are then divided into *διαθέσεις* (virtues), *ἐξεις* (or *ἐπιτηδεύματα*, as instances of which *Stob.* ii. 100, 128, quotes *μαντικὴ* and *φιλογωμετρία*, &c.), and those which are neither *ἐξεις* nor *διάθεσεις*—actions themselves. A third division of goods distinguishes *τελικά* or *δι' αὐτὰ αἰρετὰ*

(moral actions), *ποιητικά* (friends and the services they render), *τελικά* and *ποιητικά* (virtues themselves); fourthly and fifthly, *μικτὰ* (as *εὐτεκνία* and *εὐγηρία*), and *ἀπλὰ* or *ἄμικτα* (such as science), and the *ἀεὶ παρόντα* (virtues), and *οὐκ ἀεὶ παρόντα* (*οἶον χαρὰ, περιπάτησις*). The corresponding divisions of evil are given by Diogenes and Stobæus. The latter (ii. 126 and 136) enumerates, in addition, the *ἀγαθὰ ἐν κινήσει* (*χαρὰ, &c.*) and *ἐν σχέσει* (*εὐτακτος ἡσυχία, &c.*), the latter being partially *ἐν ἐξεί*; the *ἀγαθὰ καθ' αὐτὰ* (virtues) and *πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα* (honour, benevolence, friendship); the goods which are necessary for happiness (virtues), and those which are not necessary (*χαρὰ, ἐπιτηδεύματα*). Seneca's list is far more limited, although it professes to be more general. He mentions, *prima bona, tanquam gaudium, pax, salus patriæ*; *secunda, in materia infelici expressa, tanquam tormentorum patientia*; *tertia, tanquam modestus incessus*.

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of the good. That only is a good, according to their view, which has an unconditional value. That which has a value only in comparison with something else, or because it leads to something else, does not deserve to be called a good. The difference between what is good and what is not good is not only a difference of degree, but also one of kind; and what is not a good independently of everything else can never be a good under any circumstances.¹ The same remarks apply to evil. That which is not in itself an evil can never become so from its relation to something else. Hence that which is absolutely a good, or virtue, can alone be considered a good; and that which is absolutely bad, or a vice,² can alone be considered an evil. All other things, however great their influence may be on our state, belong to a class of things neither good nor evil, but indifferent, or ἀδιάφορα.³ Neither

¹ *Cic. Fin. iii. 10, 33*: Ego assentior Diogeni, qui bonum definit id quod esset natura absolutum . . . hoc autem ipsum bonum non accessione neque crescendo aut cum ceteris comparando sed propria vi et sentimus et appellamus bonum. Ut enim mel, etsi dulcissimum est, suo tamen proprio genere saporis, non comparatione cum aliis, dulce esse sentitur, sic bonum hoc de quo agimus est illud quidem plurimi æstimandum sed ea æstimatione genere valet non magnitudine, &c.

² *Sen. Benef. vii. 2, 1*: Nec malum esse ullum nisi turpe, nec bonum nisi honestum. *Alex. Aph. De Fat. c. 28*: ἡ μὲν ἀρετὴ τε καὶ

ἡ κακία μόναι κατ' αὐτοὺς ἡ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἡ δὲ κακόν.

³ *Sext. Math. xi. 61*, after giving two definitions of ἀδιάφορον: κατὰ τρίτον δὲ καὶ τελευταῖον τρόπον φασὶν ἀδιάφορον τὸ μήτε πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν μήτε πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν συλλαμβανόμενον. To this category belong external goods, health, &c. ᾧ γὰρ ἔστιν εὖ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ἀδιάφορον· διὰ παντὸς δ' ἀρετῇ μὲν κακῶς, κακίᾳ δὲ κακῶς, ὑγιείᾳ δὲ καὶ τοῖς περὶ σώματι ποτὲ μὲν εὖ ποτὲ δὲ κακῶς ἔστι χρῆσθαι. Similarly, *Pyrrh. iii. 177*, and *Diog. 102*, who defines οὐδέτερα as ὅσα μήτ' ὠφελεῖ μήτε βλάπτει. *Stob. ii. 142*: ἀδιάφορον = τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακόν, καὶ τὸ μήτε

health, nor riches, nor honour, not even life itself, is a good; and just as little are the opposite states—poverty, sickness, disgrace, and death—evils.¹ Both are alike indifferent, a material which may either be employed for good or else for evil.²

The Academicians and Peripatetics were most vigorously attacked by the Stoics for including among goods external things which are dependent on chance. For how can that be a good, under any circumstances, which bears no relation to man's moral nature, and is even frequently obtained at the cost of morality?³ If virtue renders a man

αἰρετὸν μήτε φευκτόν. *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 31, 1: ὃ γὰρ ἔστιν εὖ χρῆσθαι καὶ κακῶς τοῦτο φασὶ μήτ' ἀγαθὸν εἶναι μήτε κακόν.

¹ Zeno (in *Sen. Ep.* 82, 9) proves this of death by a process of reasoning, the accuracy of which he appears to have suspected: Nullum malum gloriosum est: mors autem gloriosa est: ergo mors non est malum. In general, the considerations suggested by the Stoics are, that what is according to nature cannot be an evil, and that life taken by itself is not a good. Other arguments, however, for diminishing the fear of death are not denied. See *Sen. Ep.* 30, 4; 77, 11; 82, 8; Cons. ad Marc. 19, 3; *M. Aurel.* ix. 3; viii. 58.

² Chrysippus (in *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 15, 4): All virtue is done away with, ἂν ἡ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἢ τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὃ μὴ καλὸν ἔστιν, ἀγαθὸν ἀπολίπωμεν. *Id.* (in *Plut. C. Not.* 5, 2): ἐν τῷ κατ' ἀρετὴν βιοῦν μόνον ἔστι τὸ εὐδαιμόνως, τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ὄντων

πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδ' εἰς τοῦτο συνεργούντων. Similarly, *Sto. Rep.* 17, 2. *Sen. Vit. Be.* 4, 3: The only good is honestas, the only evil turpitude, cetera vilis turba rerum, nec detrahens quicquam beatæ vitæ nec adjiciens. *Id. Ep.* 66, 14: There is no difference between the wise man's joy and the firmness with which he endures pains, quantum ad ipsas virtutes, plurimum inter illa, in quibus virtus utraque ostenditur . . . virtutem materia non mutat. *Ep.* 71, 21: Bona ista aut mala non efficit materia, sed virtus. *Ep.* 85, 39: Tu illum [sapientem] premi putas malis? Utitur. *Id. Ep.* 44; 120, 3; *Plut. C. Not.* 4, 1; *Sto. Rep.* 18, 5; 31, 1; Chrysippus, in *Ps. Plut. De Nobil.* 12, 2; *Diog.* 102; *Stob.* ii. 90; *Sext. Pyrrh.* iii. 181; *Alex. Aphr. Top.* 43 and 107.

³ *Sext. Math.* xi. 61. *Diog.* 103: The good can only do good, and never do harm; οὐ μᾶλλον δ' ὠφελεῖ ἢ βλάπτει ὁ πλοῦτος καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια· οὐκ ἔρ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε πλοῦ-

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happy, it must render him perfectly happy in himself, since no one can be happy who is not happy altogether. If, on the other hand, anything which is not in man's power were to influence his happiness, it would detract from the absolute worth of virtue, and man would never be able to attain to that imperturbable serenity of mind without which no happiness is possible.¹

τος οὐθ' ὀγίεια. Again: ϕ ἔστιν εἶ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι, τοῦτ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν· πλούτω δὲ καὶ ὀγίεια ἔστιν εἶ καὶ κακῶς χρῆσθαι, κ.τ.λ. In *Sen.* Ep. 87, 11, instead of the proposition, that nothing is a good except virtue, the following arguments are given as traditional among the Stoics, but are apparently taken from Posidonius: (1) Quod bonum est, bonos facit: fortuita bonum non faciunt: ergo non sunt bona. (Similarly in *M. Aurel.* ii. 11, iv. 8: Whatever does no moral harm, does no harm to human life.) (2) Quod contemptissimo cuique contingere ac turpissimo potest, bonum non est; opes autem et lenoni et lenistæ contingunt: ergo, &c. (Conf. *Marc. Aurelius*, v. 10.) (3) Bonum ex malo non fit: divitiæ fiunt, fiunt autem ex avaritia: ergo, &c. (Conf. *Alex. Aphr.* Top. 107: τὸ διὰ κακοῦ γιγνόμενον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν· πλούτος δὲ καὶ διὰ πορνοδοσκίας κακοῦ ὄντος γίνεται, κ.τ.λ.) (4) Quod dum consequi volumus in multa mala incidimus, id bonum non est: dum divitias autem consequi volumus, in multa mala incidimus, &c. (5) Quæ neque magnitudinem animo dant nec fiduciam nec securitatem, contra autem in-

solentiam, tumorem, arrogantiam creant, mala sunt: a fortuitis autem in hæc impellimur: ergo non sunt bona. That riches are not a good is proved by Diogenes (in *Cic.* Fin. iii. 15, 49); that poverty and pain are no evils is proved by the argument, quoted in *Sen.* Ep. 85, 30: Quod malum est nocet: quod nocet deteriorem facit. Dolor et paupertas deteriorem non faciunt: ergo mala non sunt. The Stoic proposition is also established from a theological point of view. Nature, says *M. Aurel.* ii. 11, ix. 1, could never have allowed that good and evil should equally fall to the lot of the good and the bad; consequently, what both enjoy equally—life and death, honour and dishonour, pleasure and trouble, riches and poverty—can neither be good nor evil.

¹ This view is impressed on the Academicians in *Cic.* Tusc. v. 13, 39; 18, 51; *Sen.* Ep. 85, 18; 71, 18; 92, 14. In the last passage, the notion that happiness can be increased by external goods, and is consequently capable of degrees, is refuted by arguments such as: Quid potest desiderare is, cui omnia honesta contingunt? . . . et quid stultius

Least of all, however, according to the Stoic view, ought pleasure to be considered a good, or to be regarded, as by Epicurus, as the ultimate and highest object in life. He who raises pleasure to the throne makes a slave of virtue;¹ he who considers pleasure a good ignores the real conception of the good and the peculiar value of virtue;² he appeals to feelings, rather than to actions;³ he is requiring reasonable

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(3) *Pleasure and the good.*

turpiusve, quam bonum rationalis animi ex irrationalibus nectere? . . . non intenditur virtus, ergo ne beata quidem vita, quæ ex virtute est. Conf. Ep. 72, 7: Cui aliquid accedere potest, id imperfectum est.

¹ Cleanthes expands this notion, in rhetorical language, in *Cic. Fin. ii. 21, 69. Sen. Benef. iv. 2, 2*: [Virtus] non est virtus si sequi potest. Primæ partes ejus sunt: ducere debet, imperare, summo loco stare. tu illam jubes signum petere. *Id. Vit. Be. 11, 2; 13, 5; 14, 1.*

² Compare, on this subject, the words of Chrysippus, quoted by *Plut. Sto. Rep. 15*, and, for their explanation, *Sen. Benef. iv. 2, 4*: Non indignor, quod post voluptatem ponitur virtus, sed quod omnino cum voluptate conferatur contemptrix ejus et hostis et longissime ab illa resiliens. *Id. Vit. Be. 15, 1*: Pars honesti non potest esse nisi honestum, nec summum bonum habebit sinceritatem suam, si aliquid in se viderit dissimile meliori. According to *Plut. 15, 3; 13, 3*, this statement of Chrysippus is at variance with another statement of his, in which he says: If pleasure be declared to be a good,

but not the highest good, justice is still safe, since, in comparison with pleasure, it may be regarded as the higher pleasure. Still, this was only a preliminary and tentative concession, which Chrysippus subsequently proved could not be admitted, inasmuch as it could not be made to harmonise with the true conception of the good, and changed the difference in kind between virtue and other things into a simple difference in degree. *Plutarch (Sto. Rep. 15, 6)*, with more reason, blames Chrysippus for asserting against Aristotle that, if pleasure be regarded as the highest good, justice becomes impossible, but not other virtues; for how could a Stoic, of all philosophers, make such a distinction between virtues? The zeal of controversy, must, apparently, have carried Chrysippus beyond the point at which his own principles would bear him out.

³ *M. Aurel. vi. 15*: ὁ μὲν φιλόδοξος ἀλλοτρίαν ἐνέργειαν ἰδίῳ ἀγαθὸν ὑπολαμβάνει· ὁ δὲ φιλήδονος ἰδίαν πεῖσιν· ὁ δὲ νοῦν ἔχων ἰδίαν πράξειν. Conf. *ix. 16*: οὐκ ἐν πείσει, ἀλλ' ἐνεργείᾳ, τὸ τοῦ λογικοῦ πολιτικοῦ ζῆφου κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν.

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creatures to pursue what is unreasonable, and souls nearly allied to God to go after the enjoyments of the lower animals.¹ Pleasure must never be the object of our pursuit, not even in the sense that pleasure is invariably involved in virtue. That it no doubt is.² It is true there is always a peculiar satisfaction, and an invariable cheerfulness and peace of mind, in moral conduct, just as in immoral conduct there is a lack of inward peace; and in this sense it may be said that the wise man alone knows what true and lasting pleasure is.³ But even the pleasure afforded by moral excellence ought never to be an object, but only a natural consequence, of virtuous conduct; otherwise the independent value of virtue is impaired.⁴

¹ *Sen. Ep.* 92, 6-10; *Vit. Beat.* 5, 4; 9, 4; Posidonius, in *Sen. Ep.* 92, 10.

² Taking the expression in its strict meaning, it is hardly allowed by the Stoics, when they speak accurately. Since they use *ἡδονή* to express something contrary to nature and blameworthy, they assert that the wise man feels delight (*χαρά*, gaudium), but not pleasure (*ἡδονή*, lætitia, voluptas). See *Sen. Ep.* 59, 2; *Diog.* 116; *Alex. Aphr.* *Top.* 96; the last-named giving definitions of *χαρά*, *ἡδονή*, *τέρψις*, *εὐφροσύνη*.

³ *Sen. Ep.* 23, 2; 27, 3; 59, 2; 14; 72, 8; *Vit. Be.* 3, 4; 4, 4; *De Ira*, ii. 6, 2.

⁴ *Diog.* 94: Virtue is a good; *ἐπιγεννήματα δὲ τῇν τε χαρὰν καὶ τῇν εὐφροσύνην καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια*. *Sen. Benef.* iv. 2, 3: It is a question utrum virtus summi boni

causa sit, an ipsa summum bonum. Seneca, of course, says the latter. *Conf. De Vit. Be.* 4, 5: The wise man takes pleasure in peace of mind and cheerfulness, non ut bonis, sed ut ex bono suo ortis. *Ibid.* 9, 1: Non, si voluptatem præstatura virtus est, ideo propter hanc petitur . . . voluptas non est merces nec causa virtutis, sed accessio, nec quia delectat placet, sed si placet et delectat. The highest good consists in mental perfection and health only, in ipso iudicio et habitu optimæ mentis, in the sanitas et libertas animi, which desires nothing but virtue; ipsa pretium sui. *Ibid.* 15, 2: Ne gaudium quidem, quod ex virtute oritur, quamvis bonum sit, absoluti tamen boni pars est, non magis quam lætitia et tranquillitas . . . sunt enim ista bona, sed conse-

Nor may pleasure be placed side by side with virtue, as a part of the highest good, or be declared to be inseparable from virtue. Pleasure and virtue are different in essence and kind. Pleasure may be immoral, and moral conduct may go hand in hand with difficulties and pains. Pleasure is found among the worst of men, virtue only amongst the good; virtue is dignified, untiring, imperturbable; pleasure is grovelling, effeminate, fleeting. Those who look upon pleasure as a good are the slaves of pleasure; those in whom virtue reigns supreme control pleasure, and hold it in check.¹ In no sense, therefore, ought any weight to be allowed to pleasure in a question of morals: pleasure is not an end, but only the result of an action;² not a good, but something absolutely indifferent. The only point on which the Stoics are not unanimous is, whether every pleasure is contrary to nature,³ as the stern Cleanthes asserted, following the Cynics, or whether there is such a thing as a natural and desirable

quantia summum bonum, non consummantia. Here, too, belongs the sentence in *Stob.* ii. 184, 188 (conf. *M. Aurel.* vii. 74): πάντα τὸν ὀντινοῦν ὠφελούντα ἴσην ὠφέλειαν ἀπολαμβάνειν παρ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο.

¹ *Sen. Vit. Be. c.* 7 and 10–12; *M. Aurel.* viii. 10. Among the Stoic arguments against identifying pleasure and pain with good and evil, may be placed the inference in *Clem. Strom.* iv. 483, c, which bears great similarity to the third argument, quoted on p. 220: If thirst is painful, and

it is pleasant to quench thirst, thirst must be the cause of this pleasure: ἀγαθοῦ δὲ ποιητικὸν τὸ κακὸν οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, κ.τ.λ.

² *Diog.* 85: ὃ δὲ λέγουσι τινες, πρὸς ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι τὴν πρώτην ὁρμὴν τοῖς ζώοις, ψεῦδος ἀποφάνουσιν. ἐπιγέννημα γὰρ φασιν, εἰ ἔρα ἐστίν, ἡδονὴν εἶναι, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν ἢ φύσις ἐπιζητήσασα τὰ ἐναρμόζοντα τῇ συστάσει ἀπολάβῃ.

³ Taking pleasure in its widest sense. In its more restricted sense, they reject ἡδονή.

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pleasure.¹ Virtue itself needs no extraneous additions, but contains in itself all the conditions of happiness.² The reward of virtuous conduct, like the punishment of vicious conduct, consists only in the intrinsic character of those actions, one being according to nature, the other contrary to nature.³ And this self-sufficiency of virtue is so unconditional,⁴ that the happiness which it affords is not

¹ *Sext. Math.* xi. 73: τὴν ἡδονὴν ὁ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φησιν· ὁ δὲ εἰπὼν 'μανεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθεῖν' (Antisthenes) κακόν· οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀδιόφορον καὶ οὐ προηγμένον. ἀλλὰ Κλεάνθης μὲν μήτε κατὰ φύσιν αὐτὴν εἶναι μήτε ἀξίαν ἔχειν αὐτὴν ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καθάπερ δὲ τὸ κάλλυντρον κατὰ φύσιν μὴ εἶναι· ὁ δὲ Ἀρχέδημος κατὰ φύσιν μὲν εἶναι ὥς τὰς ἐν μασχάλῃ τρίχας, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχειν. Παναίτιος δὲ τινὰ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν τινὰ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν.

² Accordingly, it is defined to be τέχνη· εὐδαιμονίας ποιητική. *Alex. Aphr.* De An. 156, b.

³ *Diog.* 89: τὴν τ' ἀρετὴν διόθεσιν εἶναι ὁμολογουμένην καὶ αὐτὴν δι' αὐτὴν εἶναι αἰρετὴν, οὐ διὰ τινὰ φόβον ἢ ἐλπίδα ἢ τε τῶν ἔξωθεν· ἐν αὐτῇ τ' εἶναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. ἅπ' οὕτῃ ψύχῃ πεποιημένη πρὸς ὁμολογίαν παντὸς τοῦ βίου. *Sen.* De Clem. i. 1, 1: Quamvis enim recte factorum verus fructus sit fecisse, nec ullum virtutum pretium dignum illis extra ipsas sit. *Id.* Ep. 81, 19. Ep. 94, 19: Æquitatem per se expetendam nec metu nos ad illam cogi nec mercede conducī. Non esse iustum cui quicquam in hac virtute placet præter ipsam. *Id.* Ep. 87,

24: Maximum scelerum supplicium in ipsis est. *Benef.* iv. 12: Quid reddat beneficium? dic tu mihi, quid reddat justitia, &c.; si quicquam præter ipsas, ipsas non expetis. *M. Aurel.* ix. 42: τί γὰρ πλεόν θέλεις εὐ ποιήσας ἄνθρωπον; οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τούτῳ, ὅτε κατὰ φύσιν τὴν σὴν τι ἔπραξας, ἀλλὰ τούτου μισθὸν ζητεῖς; When man does good, πεποίηκε πρὸς ὃ κατεσκευάσται καὶ ἔχει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ. *Id.* vii. 73; viii. 2.

⁴ *Diog.* vii. 127: αὐτάρκη εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν. *Cic.* Parad. 2; *Sen.* Ep. 74, 1: Qui omne bonum honesto circumscripsit, intra se felix est. This αὐτάρκεια is even asserted of individual virtues, by virtue of the connection between them all. Of φρόνησις, for instance, in *Sen.* Ep. 85, 2, it is said: Qui prudens est, et temperans est. Qui temperans, est et constans. Qui constans est, imperturbatus est. Qui imperturbatus est, sine tristitia est. Qui sine tristitia est, beatus est. Ergo prudens est beatus, et prudentia ad vitam beatam satis est. This αὐτάρκεια of virtue was naturally a chief point of attack for an opponent. It is assailed by *Alex. Aphr.* De An. 156, on the ground that

increased by length of time.¹ Rational self-control is alone recognised as a good, and hence man makes himself thereby independent of all external circumstances, absolutely free, and inwardly satisfied.²

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The happiness of the virtuous man—and this is a peculiar feature of Stoicism—is thus far more negative than positive. It consists more in independence and peace of mind than in the enjoyment which moral conduct brings with it. In mental disquietude—says Cicero, speaking as a Stoic—consists misery; in composure, happiness. How can he be deficient in happiness, he enquires, whom courage preserves from care and fear, and self-control guards from passionate pleasure and desire?³ How can he fail to be absolutely happy who is no way dependent on fortune, but simply and solely on himself?⁴ To be free from disquietude, says Seneca, is the peculiar privilege of the wise:⁵ the advantage which is gained from philosophy is, that we live without fear, and rise superior to the troubles of life.⁶ Far

(4) *Negative character of happiness.*

neither the things which the Stoics declare to be natural and desirable, nor, on the other hand, the natural conditions of virtuous action, can be without effect on happiness, and that it will not do to speak of the latter as only negative conditions. See *Plut.* C. Not. 4, and 11, 1.

¹ *Plut.* Sto. Rep. 26; C. Not. 8, 4; *Cic.* Fin. iii. 14, 45; *Sen.* Ep. 74, 27; 93, 6; *Benef.* v. 17, 6; *M. Aurel.* xii. 35. The Stoics are, on this point, at variance with Aristotle.

² This view is frequently expressed by the Stoics of the

Roman period, Seneca, Epictetus, and M. Aurelius.

³ *Tusc.* v. 15, 43; 14, 42.

⁴ *Parad.* 2.

⁵ *De Const.* 13, 5; 75, 18: Expectant nos, si ex hac aliquando face in illud evadimus sublime et excelsum, tranquillitas animi et expulsi erroribus absoluta libertas. Quæris, quæ sit ista? Non homines timere, non Deos. Nec turpia velle nec nimia. In se ipsum habere maximam potestatem: inæstimabile bonum est, suum fieri.

⁶ *Ep.* 29, 12: Quid ergo . . . philosophia præstabit? Scilicet

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more emphatically, however, than by any isolated expressions is this negative view of morality apparent in the Stoic ethics. The doctrine of the apathy of the wise man is alone enough to prove that freedom from disturbances, an unconditional assurance, and self-control, are the points on which these philosophers lay especial value, as constituting the happiness of the virtuous man.

(5) *The
highest
good as
law.*

The Good, in as far as it is based on the general arrangement of the world, to which individuals are subordinate, appears to man in the character of *Law*. But, inasmuch as this law is to man the law of his own nature, the Good becomes the natural object of man's desire, and corresponds with natural impulse. Moral philosophers were already familiar with the notion that the Good and Law are identical; it was reserved for the Stoics to insist on this notion with peculiar zeal;¹ and it was on this point that Stoicism subsequently came into contact, partly with Roman jurisprudence, partly with the ethics of the Jews and Christians. Moreover, as the Stoics considered that the Reason which governs the world is the general Law of all beings, so they recognised in the moral demand for reason the positive and negative aspects of the Law of God.² Human law

ut malis tibi placere, quam populo, . . . ut sine metu Deorum hominumque vivas, ut aut vincas mala aut finias.

¹ See *Krische*, *Forschungen*, 368 and 475.

² νόμος, according to the Stoic definition (*Stob. Eccl.* ii. 190, 204;

Floril. 44, 12) = λόγος ὁρθὸς προσηγορικὸς μὲν τῶν ποιητέων, ἀπαγορευτικὸς δὲ τῶν οὐ ποιητέων. It is therefore σπουδαῖόν τι or ἀστέον, something of moral value, imposing duties on man. The ultimate source of this λόγος must be looked for in the λόγος

comes into existence when man becomes aware of the divine law, and recognises its claims on him.¹ The law of right and morality is therefore a binding injunction, absolutely imperative on every rational being.² No man can feel himself to be a rational being without, at the same time, feeling himself pledged to be moral.³ Obedience to this law is imposed upon man, not only by external authority, but by virtue of his own nature. The good is an object deserving of pursuit—the natural object of man's desire; on the other hand, evil is that against which his nature revolts.⁴ The former arouses his desire (ὀρμή), the latter his aversion (ἀφορμή);⁵ and

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κοινὸς, the divine or world reason. The general law is, according to *Diog.* vii. 88 = ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὃ αὐτὸς ὢν τῷ Διὶ. It is the ratio summa insita in natura, quæ jubet ea quæ facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria (*Cic. Legg.* i. 6, 18). According to *Cic. Legg.* ii. 4, 8 and 10, it is no human creature, sed æternum quiddam, quod universum mundum regeret imperandi prohibendique sapientia, the mens omnia ratione aut cogentis aut vetantis Dei, the ratio recta summi Jovis (conf. *Fin.* iv. 5, 11, and *Lact. Inst.* vi. 8). It is, accordingly (*Plato, Gorg.* 484, B), πάντων βασιλεὺς θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων.

¹ *Cic. Legg.* i. 6, 18; ii. 4, 8; 5, 11.

² As *Stob.* ii. 184, expresses it, δίκαιον ἐστὶ φύσει καὶ μὴ θέσει.

³ This is proved by *Cic. Legg.* i. 12, 33, in a chain-argument clearly borrowed from the Stoics: Quibus ratio a natura data est,

iisdem etiam recta ratio data est. Ergo et lex, quæ est recta ratio in iubendo et vetando. Si lex, jus quoque. At omnibus ratio. Jus igitur datum est omnibus. Upon this conception of law is based the Stoic definition of κατ' ὀρθωμα as εὐνόημα, that of ἀμάρτημα as ἀνόημα.

⁴ The good alone, or virtue, is αἰρετόν; evil is φευκτόν. αἰρετόν is, however, ὃ αἵρεσιν εὖλογον κινεῖ, or, more accurately, τὸ ὀρθῆς αὐτοτελοῦς κινητικόν; and αἰρετόν is distinguished from ληπτόν—αἰρετόν being what is morally good, ληπτόν being everything which has value, including external goods. The Stoics make a further distinction (according to *Stob.* ii. 140 and 194) between αἰρετόν and αἰρετέον, and similarly between ὀρεκτόν and ὀρεκτέον—the first form being used to express the good in itself, the latter the possession of the good.

⁵ ὀρμή is defined by *Stob.* ii. 160, as φορὰ ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τι; ἀφορμή,

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thus the demands of morality are at once a natural impulse of a reasonable being, and, at the same time, an object towards which his desires are by nature impelled.¹

B. *Emotions and virtue.*

(1) *The emotions.*
(a) *Their nature.*

However simple this state of things may be to a purely rational being, it must be remembered that man is not purely rational.² He has, therefore, irrational as well as rational impulses.³ He is not

as *φορὰ διανοίας ἀπό τινος*. A further distinction is there made between the impulses of reasonable beings and beings devoid of reason. It is only in the case of reasonable beings that it can be said that impulse is called forth by the idea of a thing as something which has to be done (*φαντασία ὁρμητικὴ τοῦ καθήκοντος*). Moreover, the further remarks only apply to the case of reasonable beings; for instance, that every impulse contains an affirmative judgment in itself (*συγκατάθεσις*), and also involves *κίνητικόν*; that *συγκατάθεσις* applies to particular propositions (those in which truth and falsehood consist), whereas *ὁρμή* applies to *κατηγορήματα* (i. e. activities expressed by verbs), since every impulse and every desire aims at the possession of a good. *Ὅρμη λογικὴ* is defined to be *φορὰ διανοίας ἐπὶ τι τῶν ἐν τῷ πράττειν*, and is also called *ὁρμὴ πρακτικὴ*. If the *φορὰ διανοίας* refers to something future, the *ὁρμή* becomes an *ὄρεξις*. Among the varieties of *ὁρμὴ πρακτικὴ*, Stob. enumerates *πρόθεσις*, *ἐπιβουλὴ*, *παρασκευὴ*, *ἐγχείρησις*, *αἵρεσις*, *πρόθεσις*, *βούλησις*, *θέλησις*, the definitions of which he gives. It

appears, therefore, that activities of feeling and will are included in the conception of *ὁρμή*, as will be subsequently seen more in detail.

¹ Stob. ii. 116: πάντας γὰρ ἀνθρώπους ἀφορμὰς ἔχειν ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ οἰοῦναι τὸ τῶν ἡμι-αμβειαίων λόγον ἔχειν κατὰ τὴν Κλεάνθην, ὅθεν ἀτελεῖς μὲν ὄντας εἶναι φαύλους, τελειωθέντας δὲ σπουδαίους. Diog. 89: The soul rests on the harmony of life with itself; extraneous influences corrupt it, ἐπεὶ ἡ φύσις ἀφορμὰς διδωσιν ἀδιαστρόφους. Sen. Ep. 108, 8: Facile est auditorem concitare ad cupiditatem recti: omnibus enim natura fundamenta dedit semenque virtutis.

² The one point, according to Cic. N. D. ii. 12, 34, which distinguishes man from God is, that God is absolutely rational and by nature good and wise.

³ Chrysippus (in Galen. De Hippo. et Plat. iv. 2): τὸ λογικὸν ζῷον ἀκολουθητικὸν φύσει ἐστὶ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ὡς ἂν ἡγεμόνα πρακτικόν· πολλάκις μὲν τοι καὶ ἄλλως φέρεται ἐπὶ τινα καὶ ἀπὸ τινῶν ἀπειθῶς τῷ λόγῳ ὡθούμενον ἐπὶ πλεόν, κ.τ.λ. From this, it appears that Chrysippus' definition of *ὁρμή* (in Plut. Sto.

originally virtuous, but he becomes virtuous by overcoming his emotions. Emotion or passion¹ is a movement of mind contrary to reason and nature, an impulse transgressing the right mean.² The Peripatetic notion, that certain emotions are in accordance with nature, was stoutly denied by the Stoics.³ The seat of the emotions—and, indeed, of all impulses and every activity of the soul—is in man's reason, the *ἡγεμονικόν*.⁴ Emotion is that state of the *ἡγεμονικόν* in which it is hurried into what

Rep. 11, 6 = τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγος προστακτικὸς αὐτῷ τοῦ ποιεῖν) must not be understood to imply that man has only rational, and no irrational impulses. Chrysippus, in the passage quoted, must either be referring to that impulse which is peculiar to man, and is according to his nature; or else λόγος must be taken in its more extended meaning of notion or idea, for all impulses are based on judgments; and it is clear, from *Cic. Fin.* iii. 7, 23 ('as our limbs are given to us for a definite purpose, so ὁρμή is given for some definite object, and not for every kind of use'), that ὁρμή is not in itself rational, but first becomes rational by the direction given to it by man.

¹ The term emotion is used to express πάθος, although the terms of modern psychology are more or less inadequate to express the ancient ideas.

² *Diog.* vii. 110: ἔστι δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος κατὰ Ζήνωνα ἢ ἄλογος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις ἢ ὁρμή πλεονάζουσα. The same definitions are found in *Stob.* ii. 36, with this difference, that ἀπειθής

τῷ αἰροῦντι λόγῳ stands in place of ἄλογος. *Cic. Tusc.* iiii. 11, 24; iv. 6, 11; 21, 47; Chrysippus (in *Galen.* De Hipp. et Plat. iv. 2, 4; v. 2, 4; and *Plut. Virt. Mor.* 10); *Sen. Ep.* 75, 12. A similar definition is attributed to Aristotle by *Stob.* ii. 36, but it is no longer to be found in his extant writings. If it was in one of the lost books, was that book genuine?

³ *Cic. Acad.* i. 10, 39: Cumque eas perturbationes antiqui naturales esse dicerent et rationis expertes aliaque in parte animi cupiditatem, alia rationem collocarent, ne his quidem assentiebatur [Zeno]. Nam et perturbationes voluntarias esse putabat, opinionisque iudicio suscipi, et omnium perturbationum arbitrabatur esse matrem immoderatam quandam intemperantiam. *Fin.* iii. 10, 35: Nec vero perturbationes animorum . . . vi aliqua naturali moventur. *Tusc.* iv. 28, 60: Ipsas perturbationes per se esse vitiosas nec habere quidquam aut naturale aut necessarium.

⁴ Chrysippus, in *Galen.* iii. 7; v. 1 and 6.

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is contrary to nature by the force of impulse. Like virtue, emotion is due to a change which takes place in the *ἡγεμονικόν*, not to the effect of a separate extraneous force.¹ Imagination, therefore, alone calls it into being, as it does impulse in general. 'All emotions arise from a fault in judgment, from a false notion of good and evil, and may therefore be called, in so many words, judgments or opinions:²—avarice, for instance, is a wrong opinion as to the value of money,³ fear is a wrong opinion as regards future, trouble as regards present ills.⁴ Still, as appears from the general view of the Stoics respecting impulses,⁵ these statements are not

¹ *Plut. Virt. Mor.* 3: λέγεσθαι δὲ [τὸ ἡγεμονικόν] ἄλογον, ὅταν τῷ πλεονάζοντι τῆς ὁρμῆς ἰσχυρῶς γενομένῳ καὶ κρατήσαντι πρὸς τι τῶν ἀτόπων παρὰ τὸν αἰρούντα λόγον ἐκφέρηται· καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάθος, κ.τ.λ.

² *Diog.* vii. 111: δοκεῖ δ' αὐτοῖς τὰ πάθη κρίσεις εἶναι, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ περὶ παθῶν. *Plut. Virt. Mor.* c. 3: τὸ πάθος εἶναι λόγον πονηρὸν καὶ ἀκόλαστον ἐκ φαύλης καὶ διημαρτημένης κρίσεως σφοδρότητα καὶ ῥώμην προσλαβόντα. *Stob.* ii. 168: ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς παθῶν ἐπὶ δόξας αὐτὰ λέγουσιν εἶναι, παραλαμβάνεσθαι τὴν δόξαν ἀντὶ τῆς ἀσθενοῦς ὑπολήψεως. *Conf. Cic. Tusc.* iv. 7, 14: Sed omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri et opinione . . . opinionem autem volunt esse imbecillam assensionem. *Id.* iii. 11, 24: Est ergo causa omnis in opinione, nec vero ægritudinis solum sed etiam reliquarum omnium perturbationum? *Fin.* iii. 10, 35: Perturbationes autem

nulla naturæ vi commoventur; omniaque ea sunt opiniones ac iudicia levitatis. *Acad.* i. 10.

³ *Diog.*

⁴ *Cic. Tusc.* iii. 11, 25; iv. 7, 14. Posidon. (in *Galen.* iv. 7): Chrysippus defined apprehension (ἄση) as δόξα πρόσφατος κακοῦ παρουνσίας.

⁵ *Cic. Tusc.* iv. 7, 15: Sed quæ iudicia quasque opiniones perturbationum esse dixi, non in eis perturbationes solum positas esse dicunt, verum illa etiam, quæ efficiuntur perturbationibus, ut ægritudo quasi morsum quendam doloris efficiat: metus recessum quendam animi et fugam: lætitia profusam hilaritatem; libido effrenatam appetentiam. *Galen.* *Hipp. et Plat.* iv. 3: (Ζήνωνι καὶ πολλοῖς ἄλλοις τῶν Στωϊκῶν) οἱ οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ ταύταις ἀλόγους συστολὰς καὶ ταπεινώσεις καὶ δειξίς [?] δήξεις] ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ διαχύσεις ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναι τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη. *Plut. Virt. Mor.* 10: τὰς

intended to imply that emotion is only a theoretical change. On the contrary, the effects of a faulty imagination—the feelings and decisions of will, consequent upon such a state—are expressly included in the definition of emotion; nor is it credible, as Galenus states,¹ that this was only done by Zeno, and not by Chrysippus.² The Stoics, therefore, not-

ἐπιτάσεις τῶν παθῶν καὶ τὰς σφοδρότητας οὐ φασὶ γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν, ἐν ᾗ τὸ ἀμαρτητικόν, ἀλλὰ τὰς δῆξεις καὶ τὰς συμπολὰς καὶ διαχύσεις εἶναι τὰς τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον τῷ ἀλόγῳ δεχομένας. The same results are involved in the definitions of emotion already given. In reference to the pathological effects of representations, one kind of emotions was defined (*Stob.* ii. 170; *Cic. Tusc.* iv. 7, 14) as δόξα πρόσφατος, or opinio recens boni præsentis.

¹ De Hipp. et Plat. v. 1: Χρύσιππος μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ παθῶν ἀποδεικνύναι πειράται, κρίσεις τινὰς εἶναι τοῦ λογιστικοῦ τὰ πάθη, Ζήνων δ' οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐπιγυγνομένας αὐταῖς συμπολὰς καὶ λύσεις, ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ τὰς πτώσεις τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὰ πάθη. *Conf.* iv. 2 and 3.

² *Diog.* 111, confirms the view that, in the passage referred to by Galenus, Chrysippus explained the emotions to be κρίσεις. Elsewhere Galenus asserts (*iv.* 2) that he called λύπη α μείωσις ἐπὶ φευκτῷ δοκοῦντι; ἡδονή, αὐ ἐπαρσις ἐφ' αἰρετῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν; and charges him (*iv.* 6), quoting passages in support of the charge, with deducing emotions from ἀπονία and ἀσθένεια ψυχῆς. It has already been stated that Chrysippus agreed with Zeno in

his definition of emotion. No doubt with an eye to Chrysippus, Stobæus also (*ii.* 166) defines emotion as πτοία. The words are: πᾶσαν πτοίαν πάθος εἶναι καὶ πάλιν πάθος πτοίαν; and, in Galenus (*iv.* 5), Chrysippus says: οἰκείως δὲ τῷ τῶν παθῶν γένει ἀποδίδεται καὶ ἡ πτοία κατὰ τὸ εὐσεβοποιημένον τοῦτο καὶ φερόμενον εἰκῇ. Chrysippus even repeatedly insists on the difference between emotion and error—error being due to deficient knowledge, emotion to opposition to the claims of reason, to a disturbance of the natural relation of the impulses (τὴν φυσικὴν τῶν ὁρμῶν συμμετρίαν ὑπερβαίνειν). He shows that both of Zeno's definitions imply the same (*Galen.* *iv.* 2 and 4; *Stob.* ii. 170), and explains (*Plut.* *Vir. Mor.* 10) how emotion takes away consideration, and impels to irrational conduct. Galenus (*iv.* 4) observes, however, that the view of Chrysippus on the emotions was generally held in the Stoic School, and the views of Stobæus and Cicero are expansions of the tenets of Chrysippus. In designating the emotions κρίσεις, Chrysippus cannot therefore have intended to exclude the emotions of impulse and feeling. All that he meant was, that emotions, as they take

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withstanding their championship of freedom, agreed originally with the Socratic dictum, that no one does wrong voluntarily;¹ and this dictum was used by younger members as an excuse for human faults.² Fearing lest, in allowing the freedom of emotions, they should at the same time be admitting moral weakness, and the possibility of being overcome,³ they declared that all that proceeds from our will and impulse is voluntary. [Hence emotions are also in our power; and, as in the case of every other conviction, so in the case of convictions out of which emotions arise, it is for us to say whether we will yield or withhold assent.⁴] Nor would the Stoics allow that instruction is alone needed, in order to obtain the mastery over emotions; for all emotions arise from lack of self-control,⁵ and differ from errors

place in the individual soul, are called forth by imagination; and the modes in which emotions display themselves outwardly are appealed to as evidence. See *Galen*. iv. 6: τῷ τε γὰρ θυμῷ φέρεσθαι καὶ ἐξεστηκέναι καὶ οὐ παρ' ἑαυτοῖς οὐδ' ἐν ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα τοιαῦτα φανερώς μαρτυρεῖ τῷ κρίσει εἶναι τὰ πάθη καὶ τῇ λογικῇ δυνάμει τῆς ψυχῆς συνίστασθαι καθάπερ καὶ τὰ οὕτως ἔχοντα. On the other hand, Zeno never denied the influence of imagination on emotion.

¹ *Stob.* Ecl. ii. 190 (Floril. 46, 50): The wise man, according to the Stoic teaching, admits of no indulgence; for indulgence would suppose τὸν ἡμαρτηκότα μὴ παρ' αὐτὸν ἡμαρτηκέναι πάντων ἁμαρτανόντων παρὰ τὴν ἰδίαν κακίαν.

² *Epictet.* Diss. i. 18, 1-7; 28,

1-10; ii. 26; *M. Aurel.* ii. 1; iv. 3; viii. 14; xi. 18; xii. 12.

³ This motive can be best gathered from the passages in Cicero already quoted, and from *Sen.* De Ira, ii. 2, 1: Anger can do nothing by itself, but only animo adprobante . . . nam si invitis nobis nascitur, nunquam rationi succumbet. Omnes enim motus qui non voluntate nostra fiunt invicti et inevitabiles sunt, &c.

⁴ *Cic.* Acad. i. 10, 39: Perturbationes voluntarias esse. *Tusc.* iv. 7, 14: Emotions proceed from judgment; itaque eas definiunt pressius, ut intelligatur non modo quam vitiosæ, sed etiam quam in nostra sunt potestate.

⁵ *Cic.* *Tusc.* iv. 9, 22: Omnium autem affectionum fontem esse dicunt intemperantiam, quæ est a

in that they put themselves in opposition to our better intelligence.¹ How irregular and irrational impulses could arise in our reason was a point which the Stoics never made any serious attempt to explain.

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Since emotions are called forth by imagination, their peculiar character depends on the kind of imagination which produces them. Now, all our impulses are directed to what is good and evil, and consist in pursuing what appears to us to be a good, and in avoiding what appears to us to be an evil,² good and evil being sometimes a present, and sometimes a future object. Hence there result four chief classes of faulty imagination, and, corresponding to them, four classes of emotions. From an irrational opinion as to what is good, there arises *pleasure*, when it refers to things present; *desire*, when it refers to things future. A faulty opinion of present evils produces *care*; of future evils, *fear*.³ Zeno had distinguished these four principal varieties of emotions.⁴ The same division was adopted by his

(b) *Varieties of emotion.*

tota mente et a recta ratione defectio sic aversa æ præscriptione rationis, ut nullo modo adpetitiones animi nec regi nec contineri queant.

¹ *Stob. Eccl. ii. 170*: πᾶν γὰρ πάθος βιάστικόν ἐστιν, ὥς καὶ πολλάκις ὁρῶντας τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντας ὅτι συμφέρει τὸδε οὐ ποιεῖν, ὑπὸ τῆς σφοδρότητος ἐκφερομένους . . . ἀνάγεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτὸ . . . πάντες δ' οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες ἀποστρέφονται τὸν λόγον, οὐ παραπλησίως δὲ τοῖς ἐξηπατημένοις ἐν ὁρώσῳ, ἀλλ' ἰδιαζόντως. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἡπατημένοι . . . διαχθέντες . . . ἀφίστανται τῆς κρίσεως· οἱ δ' ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν

ὄντες, καὶ μάθωσι καὶ μεταδιδάχθωσιν, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι ἢ ὅλως ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅμως οὐκ ἀφίστανται τούτων ἀλλ' ἔγονται ὑπὸ τῶν παθῶν εἰς τὸ ὑπὸ τούτων κρατεῖσθαι τυραννίδος.

² The same idea is expressed in applying the terms αἰρετὸν and φευκτὸν to good and evil (*Stob. ii. 126 and 142; 195 and 197, 3*).

³ *Stob. ii. 166; Cic. Tusc. iii. 11; iv. 7, 14; 15, 43; Fin. iii. 10, 35.*

⁴ According to *Diog. 110*, this distinction was made in the treatise περὶ παθῶν.

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pupil Aristo,¹ and afterwards became quite general. On the other hand, the vagueness in the Stoic system, already mentioned, appears in their definition of individual emotions. By some, the essence of these emotions is placed in the imagination which causes them; by others, in the state of mind which the imagination produces.² The four principal classes of emotions are again subdivided into numerous subordinate classes; but, in the enumeration of these classes, the Stoic philosophers appear to have been more guided by language than by psychology.³

¹ In *Clem. Strom.* ii. 407, A: πρὸς ὅλον τὸ τετράχορδον, ἡδονήν, λύπην, φόβον, ἐπιθυμίαν, πολλῆς δεῖ τῆς ἀσκήσεως καὶ μάχης.

² The definition of λύπη or ἔση as δόξα πρόσφατος κακοῦ παρουσίας is explicitly referred to Chrysippus (more at length in *Cic. Tusc.* iv. 7, 14: *Opinio recens mali præsentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur*), as also the definition of φιλαργυρία = ὑπόληψις τοῦ τὸ ἀργύριον καλὸν εἶναι. μέθη, ἀκολασία, and the other passions, were, according to *Diog.* 110, defined in a similar manner. To Chrysippus also belong the definitions—quoted *Tusc.* iv. 7, 14; iii. 11, 25—of ἡδονή = *opinio recens boni præsentis, in quo efferri rectum videatur*; of fear = *opinio impendentis mali quod intolerabile esse videatur*; of cupiditas = *opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu jam præsens esse atque adesse*. It is, however, more common to hear of λύπη (*Diog.* 111; *Stob.* 172; *Cic. Tusc.* iii. 11) as

συστολή ψυχῆς ἀπειθῆς λόγῳ, of fear as ἐκκλισις ἀπειθῆς λόγῳ, of ἡδονή as ἄλογος ἔπαρσις ἐφ' αἰρέτῳ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν, of ἐπιθυμία as ὀρεῖσις ἀπειθῆς λόγῳ, or immoderata appetitio opinati magni boni. The latter definitions appear to belong to Zeno. They were probably appropriated by Chrysippus, and the additions made which are found in Stobæus.

³ Further particulars may be gathered from *Diog.* vii. 111; *Stob.* ii. 174. Both include under λύπη, ἔλεος, φθόνος, ζῆλος, ζηλοτυπία, ἔχθος, ἀνία, ὀδύνη. Diogenes adds ἐνόχλησις and σύγχυσις; Stobæus, πένθος, ἄχος, ἔση. Both include under φόβος, δεῖμα, ὕκνος, αἰσχύννη, ἐκπληξεις, θόρυβος, ἀγωνία; Stobæus adds θεός and δεισιδαιμονία. Under ἡδονή, Diogenes includes κῆλησις, ἐπιχαιρεκακία, τέρψις, διάχυσις; Stobæus, ἐπιχαιρεκακία, ἀσμενισμοί, γοητεῖαι καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. Under ἐπιθυμία, Diogenes places σπάνις, μῖσος, φιλονεικία, ὀργή, ἔρως, μῆνις, θυμός; Stobæus, ὀργή καὶ τὰ εἶδη

In general, far less importance was attached, in treating the subject of emotions, to psychological accuracy than to considerations of moral worth. Nor could such considerations, as might be imagined, lead to very favourable results.¹ Emotions are impulses, overstepping natural moderation, upsetting the proper balance of the soul's powers, contradicting reason—in a word, they are failures, disturbances of mental health, and, if indulged in, become chronic diseases of the soul.² Hence a Stoic

αὐτῆς (θυμὸς, χόλος, μῆνις, κότος, πικρία, κ.τ.λ.), ἔρωτες σφοδροὶ, πόθοι, ἱμεροὶ, φιληθονίαι, φιλοπλουτίαι, φιλοδοξίαι. Definitions for all these terms—which, without doubt, belong to Chrysippus—may be found in the writers named.

¹ *Plut. Vir. Mor.* 10: πᾶν μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἁμαρτία κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐστὶν καὶ πᾶς ὁ λυπούμενος ἢ φοβούμενος ἢ ἐπιθυμῶν ἁμαρτάνει. The Stoics are therefore anxious to make a distinction in the expressions for emotions and the permitted mental affections, between pleasure and joy, fear and precaution (εὐλαβεία), desire and will (βούλησις, *Diog.* 116; cupere et velle, *Sen. Ep.* 116, 1), αἰσχύνη and αἰδώς (*Plut. Vit. Pud.* c. 2).

² On this favourite proposition of the Stoics, consult *Diog.* 115; *Stob.* ii. 182; *Cic. Tusc.* iv. 10; iii. 10, 23; *Galen. Hipp. et Plat.* v. 2; *Sen. Ep.* 75, 11. According to these passages, the Stoics distinguish between simple emotions and diseases of the soul. Emotions, in the language of Seneca, are motus animi improbabilis soluti et concitati. If they are

frequently repeated and neglected, then inveterata vitia et dura, or diseases, ensue. Disease of the soul is therefore defined as δόξα ἐπιθυμίας ἐβρύηκυῖα εἰς ἕξιν καὶ ἐνεσκιρῶμένη καθ' ἣν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὰ μὴ αἰρετὰ σφόδρα αἰρετὰ εἶναι (*Stob.*). The opposite of such a δόξα, or a confusion arising from false fear, is an opinio vehementis inhærens atque insita de re non fugienda tanquam fugienda—such as hatred of woman-kind, hatred of mankind, &c. If the fault is caused by some weakness which prevents our acting up to our better knowledge, the diseased states of the soul are called ἀρρώσθηματα, ægrotationes (*Diog.*; *Stob.*; *Cic. Tusc.* iv. 13, 29); but this distinction is, of course, very uncertain. The same fault is at one time classed among νόσοι, at another among ἀρρώσθηματα; and Cicero (11, 24; 13, 29) repeatedly observes that the two can only be distinguished in thought. Moreover, just as there are certain predispositions (ἐν-εμπτωσίαι) for bodily diseases, so within the sphere of mind there are εὐκαταφορίαι εἰς πάθος. *Diog.*,

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demands their entire eradication: true virtue can only exist where this process has succeeded. From emotions, as being contrary to nature, and symptoms of disease, the wise man must be wholly exempt.¹ When we have once learnt to estimate things according to their real value, and to discover everywhere nature's unchanging law, nothing will induce us to yield to emotion.² Hence the teaching of Plato and Aristotle, who required that emotions should be regulated, but not uprooted, was attacked in the most vigorous manner by these philosophers. Does not even a moderate evil, they ask, always remain an evil? Ought what is faulty, and opposed to reason, ever to be tolerated, no matter in how small a degree?³ On the other hand, when an

Stob., Cic. 12. The distinction between vitia and morbi (*Cic. 13*) naturally coincides with the distinction between emotions and diseases. The former are caused by conduct at variance with principles, by inconstantia et repugnantia; the latter consist in corruptio opinionum. It is not consistent with this view to call κακίαι, διαθέσεις; and νόσοι, as well as ἀρρώστια and εὐκαταφορίαι, ἔξεις (*Stob. ii. 100*); and, accordingly, Heine suggests (*De Font. Tuscul. Dis.*: Weimar, 1863) that, on this point, Cicero may have given inaccurate information. The unwise who are near wisdom are free from disease of the soul, but not from emotions (*Sen., Cic.*). The points of comparison between diseases of the body and those of the soul were investigated by Chrysippus with

very great care. Posidonius contradicted him, however, in parts (*Galen., Cic.*); but their differences are not of interest to us.

¹ *Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38*: Cumque perturbationem animi illi [superiores] ex homine non tollerent . . . sed eam contraherent in angustumque deducerent: hic omnibus his quasi morbis voluit carere sapientem. *Ibid. ii. 43, 135.* We shall find subsequently that the mental affections, which cause emotions, are allowed to be unavoidable.

² *Cic. Tusc. iv. 17, 37.*

³ *Cic. Tusc. iii. 10, 22*: Omne enim malum, etiam mediocre, magnum est. Nos autem id agimus, ut id in sapiente nullum sit omnino. *Ibid. iv. 17, 39*: Modum tu adhibes vitio? An vitium nullum est non parere rationi? *Ibid. 18, 42*: Nihil interest,

emotion is regulated by and subordinated to reason, it ceases to be an emotion, the term emotion only applying to violent impulses, which are opposed to reason.¹ The statement of the Peripatetics, that certain emotions are not only admissible, but are useful and necessary, appears of course to the Stoics altogether wrong.² To them, only what is morally good appears to be useful; emotions are, under all circumstances, faults; and were an emotion to be useful, virtue would be advanced by means of what is wrong.³ The right relation, therefore, towards emotions—indeed, the only one morally tenable—is an attitude of absolute hostility. The wise man must be emotionless.⁴ Pain he may feel, but, as he does not consider it an evil, he will suffer no torture, and know no fear.⁵ He may be slandered and abused, but he cannot be injured or degraded.⁶ *cf. p. 1.*

utrum moderatas perturbationes approbent, an moderatam injustitiam, &c. Qui enim vitiis modum apponit, is partem suscipit vitiorum. *Sen. Ep. 85*, 5, says that moderation of emotions is equivalent to modice insanendum, modice ægrotandum. *Ep. 116*, 1: Ego non video, quomodo salubris esse aut utilis possit ulla mediocritas morbi.

¹ *Sen. De Ira*, i. 9, 2; *Ep. 85*, 10.

² Full details are given by *Cic. Tusc. iv. 19–26*; *Off. i. 25*, 88; *Sen. De Ira*, i. 5, 21; ii. 12; particularly with regard to the use of anger.

³ In the same spirit, *Sen. i. 9*, 1; 10, 2, meets the assertion that valour cannot dispense with

anger by saying: Nunquam virtus vitio adjuvanda est se contenta . . . absit hoc a virtute malum, ut unquam ratio ad vitia confugiat.

⁴ *Diog. vii. 117*: φασὶ δὲ καὶ ἀπαθῆναι εἶναι τὸν σόφον, διὰ τὸ ἀνέμπτωντον εἶναι. From the apathy of the wise man, absence of feeling and severity, which are faults, must be distinguished.

⁵ Chrysippus (in *Stob. Floril. vii. 21*): ἀλγεῖν μὲν τὸν σόφον μὴ βασανίζεσθαι δέ· μὴ γὰρ ἐνδιδόναι τῇ ψυχῇ. *Sen. De Prov. 6*, 6; *Ep. 85*, 29; *Cic. Tusc. ii. 12*, 29; 25, 61; iii. 11, 25.

⁶ *Plut. Sto. Rep. 20*, 12; Musonius (in *Stob. Floril. 19*, 16); *Sen. De Const. 2*; 3; 5; 7; 12.

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He has no vanity, being untouched by honour and dishonour. He never yields to anger, nor needs this irrational impulse for valour and the championship of right.¹ But he also feels no pity,² and exercises no indulgence.³ For how can he pity others, when he would not himself consider suffering an evil? How can he yield to a diseased excitement for the sake of others, which he would not tolerate for his own sake? If justice demands punishment, feelings will not betray him into forgiveness.

(2) *Idea of virtue.*
(a) *Positive and negative aspects.*

Virtue is thus negatively defined as the being exempt from emotions; ⁴ but there is also a positive side, supplementing this barely negative view of virtue. This may be said to consist either in subordination to the general law of nature, if we look at the matter of virtuous action, or, if we look at its manner, in rational self-control.⁵ Virtue is exclusively a matter of reason⁶—in short, it is nothing else but rightly-ordered reason.⁷ To speak more accurately, virtue contains in itself two elements—one practical, the other speculative. At the root, and as a condition of all rational conduct, lies,

¹ *Cic. Tusc. iii. 9, 19.*

² *Cic. Tusc. iii. 9, 20; Sen. De Clem. ii. 5; Diog. vii. 123.*

³ *Stob. Ecl. ii. 190; Floril. 46, 50; Sen. l. c. 5, 2; 7; Diog. l. c.; Gell. N. A. xiv. 4, 4.*

⁴ *Ps. Plut. V. Hom. 134: οἱ μὲν οὖν Στωϊκοὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τίθενται ἐν τῇ ἀπαθείᾳ.*

⁵ *Alex. Aphr. De An. 156, v: Virtue consists in ἐκλογὴ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν. Diog. vii. 89: τὴν τ'*

ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἶναι ὁμολογουμένην.

⁶ *Cic. Acad. i. 10, 38: Cumque superiores non omnem virtutem in ratione esse dicerent, sed quasdam virtutes natura aut more perfectas: hic [Zeno] omnes in ratione ponebat.*

⁷ *Cic. Tusc. iv. 15, 34: Ipsa virtus brevissime recta ratio dici potest. Sen. Ep. 113, 2: Virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus quodammodo se habens.*

according to the Stoics, right knowledge; and on this point they are at one with the well-known Socratic doctrine, and with the teaching of the Cynics and Megarians. Natural virtue, or virtue acquired by exercise, they reject altogether, after the manner of Socrates, defining virtue to be knowledge, vice to be ignorance,¹ and insisting on the necessity of learning virtue.² Even the avowed enemy of all speculative enquiry, Aristo of Chios, was on this point at one with the rest of the School. All virtues were by him referred to wisdom, and, consequently, he denied the claims of most to be virtues at all.³

But, however closely the Stoics cling to the idea that all virtue is based on knowledge, and is in itself nothing else but knowledge, they are not content with knowledge, or with placing knowledge above practical activity, as Plato and Aristotle had done. We have seen already that, with them, knowledge was only a means towards rational conduct; and it is expressly mentioned, as a deviation from the teaching of the School, that Herillus of

¹ The proof of this will be found in the Stoic definitions of various virtues and vices. See *Diog.* vii. 93: *εἶναι δ' ἀγνοίας τὰς κακίας, ὅν αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἐπιστήμαι.* *Stob.* Ecl. ii. 108: *ταύτας μὲν οὖν τὰς βηθείσας ἀρετὰς τελείας εἶναι λέγουσι περὶ τὸν βίον καὶ συνεστηκέναι ἐκ θεωρημάτων.* It is not opposed to these statements for *Stob.* ii. 92 and 110, to distinguish other virtues besides those which are *τέχναι* and *ἐπιστήμαι*; nor for Hecato (in *Diog.* vii. 90) to divide

virtues into *ἐπιστημονικὰ καὶ θεωρητικὰ* (*σύστασιν ἔχουσαι τῶν θεωρημάτων*) and *ἀθεώρητοι*; for by the latter must be understood not the virtuous actions themselves, but only the states resulting from them. On the health of the soul, in its relation to virtue, see *Cic.* Tusc. iv. 13, 30.

² *Diog.* vii. 91; *Ps. Plut.* V. Hom. 144.

³ *Plut.* Sto. Rep. 7; *Diog.* vii. 161; *Galen.* vii. 2.

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Carthage, a pupil of Zeno's, declared knowledge to be the end of life, and an absolute unconditional good.¹ Virtue may, it is true, be called knowledge, but it is, at the same time, essentially health and strength of mind, a right state of the soul agreeing with its proper nature;² and it is required of man that he should never desist from labouring and contributing towards the common good.³ Thus, according to Stoic principles, virtue is such a combination of theory and practice, in which action is invariably based on intellectual knowledge, but, at the same time, knowledge has moral conduct for its object—it is, in short, power of will based on rational understanding.⁴ But this definition must not be taken to imply that knowledge precedes will, and is only subsequently referred to will, nor yet that the will only uses knowledge as a subsidiary instrument. In the eyes of a Stoic, knowledge and

¹ *Diog.* vii. 165: "Ἡριλλος δὲ ὁ Καρχηδόνιος τέλος εἶπε τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὅπερ ἐστὶ ζῆν αἰὲν πάντα ἀναφέροντα πρὸς τὸ μετ' ἐπιστήμης ζῆν καὶ μὴ τῇ ἀγνοίᾳ διαβεβλημένον. εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἕξιν ἐν φαντασιῶν προσδέξει ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου.

² Cleanthes (in *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 7): When *τόνος* is found in the soul in a proper degree, *ἰσχὺς* καλεῖται καὶ κράτος· ἡ δ' ἰσχὺς αὕτη καὶ τὸ κράτος ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐπιφανέσιν ἐμμενετοῖς ἐγγένηται ἐγκράτειά ἐστι, κ.τ.λ. In the same way, Chrysippus (according to *Galen. Hipp. et Plat.* iv. 6) deduced what is good in our conduct from *εὐτονία* and *ἰσχὺς*; what is bad, from *ἀτονία*

καὶ ἀσθένεια τῆς ψυχῆς; and (*Ibid.* vii. 1) he referred the differences of individual virtues to changes in quality within the soul. By *Aristo*, virtue is defined as health; by *Stob.* ii. 104, as *διάθεσις ψυχῆς σύμφωνος αὐτῇ*; by *Diog.* 89, as *διάθεσις ὁμολογουμένη*.

³ *Sen. De Ot.* i. 4: *Stoici nostri dicunt: usque ad ultimum vitæ finem in actu erimus, non desinamus communi bono operam dare, &c. Nos sumus, apud quos usque eo nihil ante mortem otiosum est, ut, si res patitur, non sit ipsa mors otiosa.*

⁴ This will appear from the definitions of virtue about to follow.

will are not only inseparable, but they are one and the same thing. Virtue cannot be conceived without knowledge, nor knowledge without virtue. The one, quite as much as the other, is a right quality of the soul, or, speaking more correctly, is the rightly-endowed soul,—reason, when it is as it ought to be.¹ Hence virtue may be described, with equal propriety, either as knowledge or as strength of mind; and it is irrelevant to enquire which of these two elements is anterior in point of time.

But how are we to reconcile with this view the Stoic teaching of a plurality of virtues and their mutual relations? Zeno, following Aristotle, regarded understanding, Cleanthes regarded strength of mind, Aristo, at one time health, at another the knowledge of good and evil²—as the common root from which virtues spring. Later teachers, after the time of Chrysippus, thought that the common element consisted in knowledge or wisdom, understanding by wisdom absolute knowledge, the knowing all things, human and divine.³ From this

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(b) *The
virtues se-
verally.*

¹ *Sen. Ep.* 65, 6, after describing a great and noble soul, adds: *Talis animus virtus est.*

² *Plut. Vir. Mor.* 2: 'Αρίστων δὲ ὁ Χίος τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ μίαν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀρετὴν ἐποίει καὶ ὑγίειαν ὠνόμαζε, κ.τ.λ. *Id.* on Zeno and Cleanthes. According to Galenus, Aristo defined the one virtue to be the knowledge of good and evil (*Hipp. et Plat. v.* 5): κάλλιον οὖν Ἀρίστων ὁ Χίος, οὐτε πολλὰς εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποφηνάμενος, ἀλλὰ μίαν, ἣν ἐπι-

στήμην ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν εἶναι φησιν. vii. 2: νομίσας γοῦν ὁ Ἀρίστων, μίαν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμιν, ἣ λογιζόμεθα, καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔθετο μίαν, ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. The statement that Aristo made health of soul consist in a right view of good and evil agrees with the language of Plutarch. Perhaps Zeno had already defined φρόνησις as ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.

³ *Cic. De Off.* i. 43, 153: *Princepsque omnium virtutum est illa*

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common root, a variety of virtues was supposed to proceed, which, according to the example set by Plato, are grouped under four principal virtues¹—intelligence, bravery, justice, self-control.² Intelligence consists in knowing what is good and bad, and what is neither the one nor the other;³ bravery, in knowing what to fear, what not to fear, and what to be indifferent about; or, substituting the corresponding personal attitude for knowledge, bravery is fearless obedience to the law of reason, both in boldness and endurance.⁴ Self-control consists in

sapientia, quam σοφίαν Græci vocant: prudentiam enim, quam Græci φρόνησιν dicunt, aliam quandam intelligimus: quæ est rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque scientia. Illa autem scientia, quam principem dixi, rerum est divinarum atque humanarum scientia. A similar definition of wisdom, amplified by the words, nosse divina et humana et horum causas, is found *Ibid.* ii. 2, 5. *Sen. Ep.* 85, 5; *Plut. Plac. Proem.* 2; *Strabo*, i. 1, 1. It may probably be referred to Chrysippus; and it was no doubt Chrysippus who settled the distinction between σοφία and φρόνησις. Explaining particular virtues as springing from the essence of virtue, with the addition of a differential quality, he needed separate terms to express generic and specific virtue.

¹ ἀρεταὶ πῶται. *Diog.* 92; *Stob.* ii. 104. In stating that Posidonius counted four—Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Antipater more than four—virtues, Diogenes can only mean that the latter enumerated the subdivisions,

whereas Posidonius confined himself to the four main heads of the four cardinal virtues. Besides this division of virtues, another, three-fold, division is also met with—that into logical, physical, and ethical virtues. In other words, the whole of philosophy is brought under the notion of virtue; but it is not stated how this division is to harmonise with the previous one. A two-fold division, made by Panætius and referred to by Seneca (*Ep.* 94, 45)—that into theoretical and practical virtues—is an approximation to the ethics of the Peripatetics.

² The scheme was in vogue before Zeno's time. See *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 7, 1.

³ ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων, ὅς ἐκάστων ὧν ποιητέον καὶ οὐ ποιητέον καὶ οὐδετέρων. *Stob.* 102. Stobæus adds, that the definition needs to be completed by the words, occurring in the definition of every virtue, φύσει πολιτικοῦ ζῶον. *Diog.* 92; *Sext. Math.* xi. 170 and 246; *Cic.*

⁴ ἐπιστήμη δεινῶν καὶ οὐ δεινῶν

knowing what to choose, and what to avoid, and what to be indifferent about;¹ justice, in knowing how to give to everyone what properly belongs to him.² In a similar way, the principal faults are referred to the conception of ignorance;³ but these definitions probably all belong to Chrysippus.⁴ Other definitions are attributed to his predecessors,⁵

καὶ οὐδετέρων (*Stob.* 104); ἐπιστήμη ὧν αἰρετέον καὶ ὧν εὐλαβητέον καὶ οὐδετέρων (*Diog.*); ἐπιστήμη ὧν χρὴ θαρρῆν ἢ μὴ θαρρῆν (*Galen. Hipp. et Plat.* vii. 2). *Cic. Tusc.* iv. 24, 53: (Chrysippus) fortitudo est, inquit, scientia perferendarum rerum, vel affectio animi in patiundo ac perferendo, summæ legi parens sine timore. The last-named characteristic appears still more strongly in the definition attributed to the Stoics by *Cic. Off.* i. 19, 62: Virtus propugnans pro æquitate.

¹ ἐπιστήμη αἰρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων. *Stob.* 102. The definition of φρόνησις is the same in Cicero, word for word. Since all duties refer to ποιητέα and οὐ ποιητέα, the definitions of the remaining virtues must necessarily agree with those of φρόνησις.

² ἐπιστήμη ἀπονεμητική τῆς ἀξίας ἐκάστω, in *Stob. Id.* 104, further enumerates the points of difference between the four virtues: intelligence refers to καθήκοντα, self-control to impulses, valour to ὑπομοναί, justice to ἀπονομήσεις. See also *Stob.* 112.

³ *Diog.* 93; *Stob.* 104. The πρῶται κακίαι are: ἀφροσύνη, δειλία, ἀκολασία, ἀδικία. The definition of ἀφροσύνη is ἀγνοία ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων.

⁴ This follows from the fact

that the conception of ἐπιστήμη is the basis in all.

⁵ Of Zeno, *Plut. Vir. Mor.* 2, says: ὀρίζομενος τὴν φρόνησιν ἐν μὲν ἀπονεμητέοις δικαιοσύνην· ἐν δ' αἰρετέοις σωφροσύνην· ἐν δ' ὑπονεμητέοις ἀνδρίαν. He also says that, according to Aristo, ἡ ἀρετὴ ποιητέα μὲν ἐπισκοπούσα καὶ μὴ ποιητέα κέκληται φρόνησις· ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ κοσμοῦσα καὶ τὰ μέτρων καὶ τὸ εὐκαιρον ἐν ἡδοναῖς ὀρίζουσα, σωφροσύνη· κοινωνήμασι δὲ καὶ συμβολαίοις ὁμιλοῦσα τοῖς πρὸς ἑτέροις, δικαιοσύνη. Further particulars as to Aristo may be found in *Galen. Hipp. et Plat.* vii. 2: Since the soul has only one power, the power of thought, it can only have one virtue, the ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν. ὅταν μὲν οὖν αἰρεῖσθαι τε δέη τὰγαθὰ καὶ φεύγειν τὰ κακὰ, τὴν ἐπιστήμην τὴνδε καλεῖ σωφροσύνην· ὅταν δὲ πράττειν μὲν τὰγαθὰ, μὴ πράττειν δὲ τὰ κακὰ, φρόνησιν· ἀνδρείαν δὲ ὅταν τὰ μὲν θαρρῇ, τὰ δὲ φεύγῃ· ὅταν δὲ τὰ κατ' ἀξίαν ἐκάστω νέμῃ, δικαιοσύνην· ἐνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, γινώσκουσα μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ χωρὶς τοῦ πράττειν τὰγαθὰ τε καὶ κακὰ σοφία τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη, πρὸς δὲ τὰς πράξεις ἀφικνουμένη τὰς κατὰ τὸν βίον ὁνόματα πλείω λαμβάνει τὰ προειρημένα. We know, from *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 7, 4, that, according to Cleanthes, strength of

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their framers agreeing, some more, others less, with his standard of virtue. Within these limits, a great number of individual virtues were distinguished, their differences and precise shades of meaning being worked out with all the pedantry which characterised Chrysippus.¹ The definitions of a portion of them have been preserved by Diogenes and Stobæus.² In a similar way, too, the Stoics carried their classification of errors into the minutest details.³

(c) *Mutual
relation of
the several
virtues.*

The importance attaching to this division of virtues, the ultimate basis on which they rest, and the relation which they bear, both to one another

mind, ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐπιφανέσιν ἔμμενετέοις ἐγγένηται, ἐγκράτεια ἔστιν· ὅταν δ' ἐν τοῖς ὑπομενετέοις, ἀνδρεία· περὶ τὰς ἀξίας δὲ, δικαιοσύνη· περὶ τὰς αἰρέσεις καὶ ἐκκλίσεις, σωφροσύνη. With him, too, if Plutarch's account is accurate, ἐγκράτεια, or perseverance, takes the place of φρόνησις. Cic. Tusc. iv. 24, 53, quotes no less than three definitions of bravery given by Sphaerus.

¹ *Plut.* Vir. Mor. 2, charges him with creating a σμῆνος ἀρετῶν οὐ σύννηθες οὐδὲ γνῶριμον, and forming a χαριεντότης, ἐσθλότης, μεγαλότης, καλότης, ἐπιδεξιότης, εὐαπαντήσια, εὐτραπελία, a ter the analogy of πραότης, ἀνδρεία, &c. In *Stob.* ii. 118, among the Stoic virtues, is found an ἐρωτική as ἐπιστήμη νέων θήρας εὐφῶν, &c., and a συμποτική as ἐπιστήμη τοῦ πῶς δεῖ ἐξάγεσθαι τὰ συμπόσια καὶ τοῦ πῶς δεῖ συμπίνειν. An ἐρωτική and συμποτική ἀρετὴ are also mentioned by *Philodem.* De Mus. col. 15. According to *Athen.* 162,

Persæus, in his συμποτικοὶ διάλογοι, had discussed συμποτική at length; and since, according to the Stoics, none but the wise know how to live aright and how to drink aright, these arts belong to a complete treatment of wisdom.

² *Stob.* 106, includes under φρόνησις, εὐβουλία, εὐλογιστία, ἀγχίνουα, νουνέχεια, εὐμηχανία; under σωφροσύνη, εὐταξία, κοσμιότης, αἰδημοσύνη, ἐγκράτεια; under ἀνδρεία, καρτερία, θαρραλιότης, μεγαλοψυχία, εὐψυχία, φιλοπονία; under δικαιοσύνη, εὐσέβεια, χρηστότης, εὐκοινωνησία, εὐσυνλλαξία. *Diog.* 126, is slightly different. Stobæus gives the definitions of all these virtues, and Diogenes of some. By Stobæus, they are generally described as ἐπιστήμαι; by Diogenes, as ξεῖς or διαθέσεις. Otherwise, the two authorities are agreed. A definition of εὐταξία is given by *Cic.* Off. i. 40, 142.

³ *Diog.* 93; *Stob.* 104.

and to the common essence of virtue, are topics upon which Zeno never entered. Plutarch, at least, blames him¹ for treating virtues as many, and yet as inseparable. He also blames him for finding in all only certain expressions of intelligence. Aristo attempted to settle this point more precisely. According to his view, virtue is in itself only one; and when many virtues are spoken of, the plural only refers to the variety of objects with which that one virtue is concerned.² The difference of one virtue from another is not an internal difference, but depends on the external conditions under which they are manifested; it only expresses a definite relation to something else, or, as Herbart would say, an accidental aspect of virtue.³ The same view would seem to be implied by Cleanthes, in determining the relations of the principal virtues to one another; but it was opposed by Chrysippus. The distinction between many virtues was believed by Chrysippus to depend upon an inward difference:⁴ each definite virtue, as also each definite error,

¹ Sto. Rep. 7.

² *Plut. Vir. Mor.* 2: 'Αρίστων δὲ ὁ Χῖος τῇ μὲν οὐσίᾳ μίαν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀρετὴν ἐποίει καὶ ὑγίειαν ὠνόμαζε· τῷ δὲ πρὸς τι διαφόρους καὶ πλείονας, ὡς εἴ τις ἐθέλοι τὴν δρασιν ἡμῶν λευκῶν μὲν ἀντιλαμβάνομένην λευκοθέαν καλεῖν, μελάνων δὲ μελανθέαν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ, κ.τ.λ. καθάπερ τὸ μαχαίριον ἐν μὲν ἐστίν, ἕλλοτε δὲ ἕλλο διαιρεῖ· καὶ τὸ πῦρ ἐνεργεῖ περὶ ὕλας διαφόρους μᾶ φέσει χρώμενον.

³ *Galen. Hipp. et Plat. vii. 1*: νομίζει γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐκεῖνος, μίαν οὖσαν τὴν ἀρετὴν ὀνόμασι πλείοσιν ὀνομάζεσθαι κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τι σχέϊον. Conf. *Diog. vii. 161*: ἀρετὰς τ' οὕτε πολλὰς εἰσήγεν, ὡς ὁ Ζήνων, οὔτε μίαν πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλουμένην, ὡς οἱ Μεγαρικοί, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πρὸς τί πως ἔχειν.

⁴ Their distinguishing features fall under the category of ποῖον, to use Stoic terms, not under that of πρὸς τί πως ἔχον, as Aristo maintained.

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comes into being by a peculiar change in character of the soul itself¹—in short, for a particular virtue to come into existence, it is not enough that the features common to all virtue should be directed towards a particular object, but to the common element must be superadded a further characteristic element, or differentia; the several virtues are related to one another, as the various species of one genus.

All virtues have, however, one and the same end, although they compass that end in different ways, and all presuppose the same moral tone and conviction,² which is only to be found where they are perfect, and ceases to exist the moment they are deprived of one of their component elements.³ They are, moreover, distinct from one another, each having its own end, towards which it is primarily directed; but, at the same time, they coalesce again, inasmuch as no virtue can pursue its own end

¹ *Galenus* continues: *ὁ τοίνυν Χρύσιππος δέκνυσιν, οὐκ ἐν τῇ πρὸς τι σχέσει γενόμενον τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀρετῶν τε καὶ κακιῶν, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς οἰκείαις οὐσίαις ὑπαλλασσόμεναις κατὰ τὰς ποιότητας. Plut. Sto. Rep. 7, 3: Χρύσιππος, Ἀρίστωνι μὲν ἐγκαλῶν, ὅτι μιᾶς ἀρετῆς σχέσεις ἔλεγε τὰς ἄλλας εἶναι. Id. Vir. Mor. 2: Χρύσιππος δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποῖον ἀρετὴν ἰδίᾳ ποιότητι συνίστασθαι νομίζων.*

² *Stob. ii. 110: πάσας δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς, ὅσαι ἐπιστῆμαί εἰσι καὶ τέχναι κοινὰ τε θεωρήματα ἔχειν καὶ τέλος, ὡς εἰρηται, τὸ αὐτὸ, διδὲ καὶ ἀχωρίστους εἶναι· τὸν γὰρ μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν, καὶ τὸν*

κατὰ μίαν πράττοντα κατὰ πάσας πράττειν. Diog. 125: τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λέγουσιν ἀντακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις καὶ τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν· εἶναι γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰ θεωρήματα κοινὰ, as Chrysippus, Apollodorus, and Hecato assert. τὸν γὰρ ἐν ἀρετῶν θεωρητικόν τ' εἶναι καὶ πρακτικὸν τῶν ποιητέων. τὰ δὲ ποιητέα καὶ αἰρετέα ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπομενητέα καὶ ἀπονεμητέα.

³ *Cic. Parad. 3, 1: Una virtus est, consentiens cum ratione et perpetua constantia. Nihil huic addi potest, quo magis virtus sit; nihil demi, ut virtus nomen relinquatur. Conf. Sen. Ep. 66, 9.*

without pursuing that of the others as well.¹ Accordingly, no part of virtue can be separated from its other parts. Where one virtue exists, the rest are also to be found; and where there is one fault, there all is faulty. Even each single virtuous action contains all other virtues, the moral quality from which it proceeds including in itself all the rest.² What makes virtue virtue, and vice vice, is simply and solely the intention.³ The will, although it may lack the means to carry its desire into execution, is worth quite as much as the deed;⁴ a

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¹ *Stob.* 112 (conf. *Diog.* 126): διαφέρειν δ' ἀλλήλων τοῖς κεφαλαίοις. φρονήσεως γὰρ εἶναι κεφάλαια τὸ μὲν θεωρεῖν καὶ πράττειν ὃ ποιητέον προηγουμένως, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον λόγον τὸ θεωρεῖν καὶ ἂ δεῖ ἀπονέμειν, χάριν τοῦ ἀδιαπτώτως πράττειν ὃ ποιητέον· τῆς δὲ σωφροσύνης ἴσιον κεφάλαιον ἔστι τὸ παρέχεσθαι τὰς ὁρμαὶς εὐσταθεῖς καὶ θεωρεῖν αὐτὰς προηγουμένως, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον λόγον τὰ ὑπὸ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς, ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀδιαπτώτως ἐν ταῖς ὁρμαῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι. Similarly of bravery, which has for its basis πᾶν ὃ δεῖ ὑπομένειν; and of justice, which has τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἐκάστω. *Plut.* *Alex. Virt.* 11: The Stoics teach that μία μὲν ἀρετὴ πρωταγωνιστεῖ πράξεως ἐκάστης, παρακαλεῖ δὲ τὰς ἄλλας καὶ συντείνει πρὸς τὸ τέλος.

² *Stob.* 116: φασὶ δὲ καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν τὸν σόφον κατὰ πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς· πᾶσαν γὰρ πράξιν τελείαν αὐτοῦ εἶναι. *Plut.* *Sto. Rep.* 27, 1: τὰς ἀρετὰς φησι [Χρύσιππος] ἀντακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις, οὐ μόνον τῷ τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ τὸν κατὰ μίαν ὀτιοῦν ἐνεργούντα κατὰ πάσας ἐνεργεῖν.

οὐτ' ἄνδρα φησὶ τέλειον εἶναι τὸν μὴ πάσας ἔχοντα τὰς ἀρετὰς, οὔτε πράξιν τελείαν, ἥτις οὐ κατὰ πάσας πράττεται τὰς ἀρετὰς. If Chrysippus allowed that the brave man does not always act bravely, nor the bad man always like a coward, it was a confession to which he was driven by experience, contrary to Stoic principles.

³ *Cic.* *Acad.* i. 10, 38: Nec virtutis usum modo [Zeno dicebat] ut superiores, sed ipsum habitum per se esse præclarum. *Id.* *Parad.* 3, 1: Nec enim peccata rerum eventu sed vitiis hominum metienda sunt. *Sen.* *Benef.* vi. 11, 3: Voluntas est, quæ apud nos ponit officium, which Cleanthes then proceeds to illustrate by a parable. *Ibid.* i. 5, 2: A benefaction is only ipsa tribuentis voluntas. 6, 1: Non quid fiat aut quid detur refert, sed qua mente.

⁴ Compare also the paradoxical statement—Qui libenter beneficium accepit, reddidit—which *Sen.* ii. 31, 1, justifies by saying: Cum omnia ad animum referamus, fecit quisque quantum voluit.

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wicked desire is quite as criminal as the gratification of that desire.¹ That action can alone be called virtuous which is not only good in itself, but which proceeds from a wish to do good; and although, in the first instance, the difference between the discharge and the neglect of duty (*κατόρθωμα* and *ἀμαρτήμα*) depends on the real agreement or disagreement of our actions with the moral law,² yet that alone can be said to be a true and perfect discharge of duty which arises from a morally perfect character.³

¹ Cleanthes, in *Stob. Floril.* 6, 19:

ἄσπις ἐπιθυμῶν ἀνέχεται αἰσχροῦ
πράγματος
οὗτος ποιήσει τοῦτ' ἐὰν καιρὸν
λάβῃ.

² On the notions *κατόρθωμα* and *ἀμαρτήμα*, see *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 11, 1: τὸ κατόρθωμά φασι νόμον προστάγμα εἶναι, τὸ δ' ἀμαρτήμα νόμον ἀπαγόρευμα. To a bad man, law only gives prohibitions, and never commands: οὐ γὰρ δύναται κατορθοῦν. Chrysippus, *Ibid.* 15, 10: πᾶν κατόρθωμα καὶ εὐνόμημα καὶ δικαιοπράγημά ἐστι. *Stob.* ii. 192: ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἐνεργημάτων φασὶ τὰ μὲν εἶναι κατορθώματα, τὰ δ' ἀμαρτήματα, τὰ δ' οὐδέτερα . . . πάντα δὲ τὰ κατορθώματα δικαιοπραγήματα εἶναι καὶ εὐνόμηματα καὶ εὐτακτήματα, κ.τ.λ. τὰ δὲ ἀμαρτήματα ἐκ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀδικήματα καὶ ἀνομήματα καὶ ἀτακτήματα.

³ It is in reference to this view that the distinction between *κατόρθωμα* and *καθήκον* is partly made. A *καθήκον* is, in general, any discharge of duty, or rational action; *κατόρθωμα* only

refers to a perfect discharge of duty, or to a virtuous course of conduct. *Stob.* 158: τῶν δὲ καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν εἶναι φασὶ τέλεια, ἃ δὴ καὶ κατορθώματα λέγεσθαι. κατορθώματα δ' εἶναι τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργήματα . . . τὸ δὲ καθήκον τελειωθὲν κατόρθωμα γίνεσθαι. Similarly, 184: A κατόρθωμα is a καθήκον πάντας ἐπέχον τοὺς ἀριθμούς. *Cic. Fin.* iii. 18, 59: Quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus, id autem est perfectum officium: erit autem etiam inchoatum: ut, si juste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis (*καθήκοντα*) ponatur depositum reddere. *Off.* i. 3, 8: Et medium quoddam officium dicitur et perfectum; the former is called *κατόρθωμα*, the latter *καθήκον*. A virtuous action can only be done by one who has a virtuous intention, i.e. by a wise man. *Cic. Fin.* iv. 6, 15: If we understand by a life according to nature, what is rational, rectum est, quod *κατόρθωμα* dicebas, contingitque sapienti soli. *Off.* iii. 3, 14: Illud autem officium, quod rectum ii-

Such a character, the Stoics held, must either exist altogether, or not at all; for virtue is an indivisible whole, which we cannot possess in part, but must either have or not have. He who has a right intention, and a right appreciation of good and evil, is virtuous; he who has not these requisites is lacking in virtue; there is no third alternative. Virtue admits neither of increase nor diminution,¹ and there is no mean between virtue and vice.² But if this is the case, and if the value

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(d) *Unity
of virtue.*

dem appellant, perfectum atque absolutum est, et, ut iidem dicunt, omnes numeros habet, nec præter sapientem, cadere in quenquam potest. Off. iii. 4, 16: When the Decii and Scipios are called brave, Fabricius and Aristides just, Cato and Lælius wise, the wisdom and virtue of the wise man, in the strict sense of the term, are not meant: sed ex mediocum officiorum frequentia similitudinem quandam gerebant speciemque sapientum.

¹ In *Simpl. Categ.* 61, β (Schol. in Arist. 70, b, 28), the Stoics say: τὰς μὲν ἔξεις ἐπιτείνεσθαι δύνασθαι καὶ ἀνίσθαι· τὰς δὲ διαθέσεις ἀνεπιτάτους εἶναι καὶ ἀνέτους. Thus straightness is, for instance, a διάθεσις, and no mere ἔξις. οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς διαθέσεις εἶναι, οὐ κατὰ τὸ μόνιμον ἰδίωμα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀνεπίτατον καὶ ἀνεπίδεκτον τοῦ μᾶλλον· τὰς δὲ τέχνας, ἥτοι δυσκινήτους οὕσας ἢ μὴ εἶναι διαθέσεις. *Ibid.* 72, δ: τῶν Στωϊκῶν, οἵτινες διελόμενοι χωρὶς τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπὸ τῶν μέσων τεχνῶν ταύτας οὕτε ἐπιτείνεσθαι λέγουσιν οὕτε ἀνίσθαι, τὰς δὲ μέσας τέχνας καὶ ἐπίτασιν καὶ

ἀνεσιν δέχεσθαι φασίν. *Simpl.* replies: This would be true, if virtue consisted only in theoretical conviction; such a conviction must be either true or false, and does not admit of more or less truth; but it is otherwise where it is a matter for exercise. It may be remarked, in passing, that a further distinction was made between ἀρετὴ and τέχνη—the former being preceded by an ἀξιόλογος προκοπή, the latter by a simple ἐπιτηδεύσις (*Simpl. Categ.* 62, β; Schol. 71, α, 38). There is also a definition of τέχνη attributed by Olympiodorus, in Gorg. 53, to Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus. *Conf. Sext. Pyrrh.* iii. 241; *Math.* vii. 109 and 373; *Lucian*, *Paras.* c. 4; *Cic. Acad.* ii. 7, 22.

² *Diog.* vii. 127: ἀρεσκεὶ δὲ αὐτοῖς μηδὲν μέσον εἶναι ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας· τῶν Περιπατητικῶν μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας εἶναι λεγόντων τὴν προκοπὴν· ὥς γὰρ δεῖν, φασιν, ἢ ὄρθον εἶναι ξύλον ἢ στρεβλόν, οὕτως ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον· οὕτε δὲ δικαιότερον οὕτε ἀδικώτερον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως. Similarly, *Sen. Ep.* 71, 18: Quod summum

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of an action depends wholly on the intention, it follows, necessarily, that virtue admits of no degrees. If the intention must be either good or bad, the same must be true of actions; and if a good intention or virtue has in it nothing bad, and a bad intention has in it nothing good, the same is true of actions. A good action is unconditionally praiseworthy; a bad one, unconditionally blameworthy. The former can only be found where virtue exists pure and entire; the latter, only where there is no virtue at all. According to the well-known paradox, all good actions are equally good, all vices equally vicious. The standard of moral judgment is an absolute one; and when conduct does not altogether conform to this standard, it falls short of it altogether.¹

bonum est supra se gradum non habet . . . hoc nec remitti nec intendi posse, non magis, quam regulam, qua rectum probari solet, flectes. Quicquid ex illa mutaveris injuria est recti. *Stob.* ii. 116: ἀρετῆς δὲ καὶ κακίας οὐδὲν εἶναι μεταξύ.

¹ The much-discussed paradox (*Cic.* Parad. 3; *Fin.* iv. 27; *Diog.* 101 and 120; *Stob.* 218; *Plut.* *Sto. Rep.* 13, 1; *Sext.* *Math.* vii. 422; *Sen.* *Ep.* 66, 5) is thus: ὅτι ἴσα τὰ ἀμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ κατορθώματα. It was, according to *Diog.*, supported, on the one hand, by the proposition, πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ἐπ' ἄκρον εἶναι αἰρετὸν καὶ μήτε ἀνεῖν μήτε ἐπίτασιν δέχεσθαι; on the other hand, by the remark, to which *Sext.* and *Simpl.* in *Categ.*, *Schol.* in *Arist.* 76, a, 30, refer: If truth and falsehood admit of

no difference of degree, this must also apply to the errors of our conduct. A man is not at the mark, no matter whether he is one or a hundred stadia away. Similarly, *Stobæus*: The Stoics declare all errors to be ἴσα, although not ὁμοία. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐπίσης ψεῦδος συμβέβηκεν· every ἀμαρτία is the result of a διάψευσις. It is, however, impossible for κατορθώματα not to be equivalent to one another, if vices are equivalent; πάντα γὰρ ἐστὶ τέλεια, διόπερ οὐτ' ἐλλείπειν οὐθ' ὑπερέχειν δύναται· ἂν ἀλλήλων. Cicero and Seneca devoted particular attention to this enquiry. The investigations of Cicero result in bringing him to the passage quoted p. 246, note³, from which it follows that nothing can be recto rectius, or bono melius.

From what has been said, it follows that there can be but one universal distinction suited for all mankind, the distinction between the virtuous and the vicious; and that within each of these classes there can be no difference in degree. He who possesses virtue must possess it whole and entire; he who lacks virtue must lack it altogether; and whether he is near or far from possessing it is a matter of no moment. He who is only a hand-breadth below the surface of the water will be drowned just as surely as one who is five hundred fathoms deep; he who is blind sees equally little

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C. *The wise man.*
(1) *Wisdom and folly.*

The equality of faults is a corollary from the equality of virtues, and also from the consideration that whatever is forbidden at all is equally forbidden. De Fin.: It is said, all faults are equal, quia nec honesto quidquam honestius nec turpi turpius. Seneca (Ep. 66, 5) raises the question, How, notwithstanding the difference between goods, can all be equal in value? and at once replies: Virtue—or, what is the same thing, a rightly-moulded soul—is alone a primary good. Virtue, indeed, admits of various forms, but can neither be increased nor diminished. Decrescere enim summum bonum non potest, nec virtuti ire retro licet. It cannot increase, quando incrementum maximo non est: nihil invenies rectius recto, non magis quam verius vero, quam temperato temperatus. All virtue consists in modo, in certa mensura. Quid accedere perfecto potest? Nihil, aut perfectum non erat, cui accesset: ergo ne virtuti quidem,

cui si quid adjici potest, defuit . . . ergo virtutes inter se pares sunt et opera virtutis et omnes homines, quibus illæ contingere . . . una inducitur humanis virtutibus regula. Una enim est ratio recta simplexque. Nihil est divino divinius, cœlesti cœlestius. Mortalia minuuntur . . . crescunt, &c.; divinorum una natura est. Ratio autem nihil aliud est, quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa . . . nullum porro inter divina discrimen est: ergo nec inter bona. *Ibid.* 32: Omnes virtutes rationes sunt: rationes sunt rectæ: si rectæ sunt, et pares sunt. Qualis ratio est, tales et actiones sunt: ergo omnes pares sunt: ceterum magna habebunt discrimina variante materia, etc. On the same ground, *Seneca*, Ep. 71, defended the equality of all goods and of all good actions, in particular in the words: Si rector ipsa [virtus] non potest fieri, ne quæ ab illa quidem fiunt, alia aliis rectiora sunt.

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whether he will recover his sight to-morrow or never.¹ The whole of mankind are thus divided by the Stoics into two classes—those who are wise and those who are foolish;² and these two classes are treated by them as mutually exclusive, each one being complete in itself. Among the wise no folly, among the foolish no wisdom of any kind, is possible.³ The wise man is absolutely free from faults and mistakes: all that he does is right; in him all virtues centre; he has a right opinion on every subject, and never a wrong one, nor, indeed, ever an opinion at all. The bad man, on the contrary, can do nothing aright: he has about him every kind of vice; he has no right knowledge, and is altogether rude, violent, cruel, and ungrateful.⁴

¹ *Plut. C. Not.* 10, 4: ναί, φασίν· ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ ὁ πῆχυν ἀπέχων ἐν θαλάττῃ τῆς ἐπιφανείας οὐδὲν ἦπτον πνίγεται τοῦ καταδεδυκότος ὀργυίας πεντακοσίας, οὕτως οὐδὲ οἱ πελάζοντες ἀρετῇ τῶν μακρὰν ὄντων ἦττόν εἰσιν ἐν κακίᾳ· καὶ καθάπερ οἱ τυφλοὶ τυφλοὶ εἰσι καὶ ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἀναβλέπειν μέλλωσιν, οὕτως οἱ προκόπτοντες ἄχρις οὗ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναλάβωσιν ἀνόητοι καὶ μοχθηροὶ διαμένουσιν. *Diog.* 127. *Stob.* ii. 236: πάντων τε τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων ἴσων ὄντων καὶ τῶν κατορθωμάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας ἐπίσης πάντας ἄφρονας εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ ἴσην ἔχοντας διάθεσιν. *Cic. Fin.* iii. 14, 48: Consentaneum est his quae dicta sunt, ratione illorum, qui illum bonorum finem quod appellamus extremum quod ultimum crescere putent posse, iisdem placere, esse alium alio etiam sapientiore, itemque alium magis alio vel peccare vel

recte facere. Quod nobis non licet dicere, qui crescere bonorum finem non putamus. Then follow the same comparisons as in *Plutarch. Sen. Ep.* 66, 10: As all virtues are equal, so are omnes homines quibus illae contingere. *Ep.* 79, 8: What is perfect admits of no increase; quicunque fuerint sapientes pares erunt et aequales.

² *Stob.* ii. 198: ἀρέσκει γὰρ τῷ τε Ζήνωνι καὶ τοῖς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ Στωϊκοῖς φιλοσόφοις, δύο γένη τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων· καὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου χρῆσθαι ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων ταῖς κακίαις.

³ *Plut. Aud. Poet.* 7: μήτε τι φαῦλον ἀρετῇ προσεῖναι μήτε κακίαν χρηστὸν ἀξιούσιν, ἀλλὰ πάντως μὲν ἐν πᾶσιν ἀμαρτωλῶν εἶναι τὴν ἀμαθίην, περὶ πάντα δ' αὖ κατορθοῦν τὸν δαστεῖον.

⁴ *Stob. Ecl.* ii. 116; 120; 196;

The Stoics delight in insisting upon the perfection of the wise man, and contrasting with it the absolute faultiness of the foolish man, in a series of paradoxical assertions.¹ The wise man only is free, because he alone uses his own will and controls himself;² alone beautiful, because only virtue is beautiful and attractive;³ alone rich and happy (*εὐτυχής*), because goods of the soul are the most valuable, and true riches consist in being independent of wants.⁴ Nay, more, he is absolutely rich, since he who has a right view of everything has everything in his intellectual treasury,⁵ and he who makes the right use of everything bears to everything the relation of owner.⁶ The wise only know how to obey, and they also only know how to govern; they only are therefore kings, generals, pilots;⁷ they only are orators, poets, and prophets;⁸ and since their view of the Gods and the worship of the Gods is the only true one, true piety can only be found amongst them—they are the only priests and friends of heaven. All foolish men, on

198; 220; 232; *Diog.* vii. 117; 125; *Cic.* Acad. i. 10, 38; ii. 20, 66; *Plut.* Sto. Rep. 11, 1; *Sen.* Benef. iv. 26; *Sext.* Math. vii. 434.

¹ Compare the collection of expressions in *Baumhauer*, Vet. Phil. Doct. De Mort. Volunt. p. 169.

² *Diog.* 121; 32; *Cic.* Acad. ii. 44, 136. Parad. 5: *ὅτι μόνος ὁ σοφὸς ἐλεύθερος καὶ πᾶς ἄφρων δούλος.*

³ *Plut.* C. Not. 28, 1; *Cic.* Acad. 1. c.; *Sext.* Math. xi. 170.

⁴ *Cic.* Parad. 6; Acad. 1. c.;

Cleanthes, in *Stob.* Floril. 94, 28; *Sext.* 1. c.; *Alex. Aphr.* Top. 79.

⁵ *Sen.* Benef. vii. 3, 2; 6, 3; 8, 1.

⁶ *Cic.* Acad. 1. c.; *Diog.* vii. 125.

⁷ *Cic.* 1. c.; *Diog.* vii. 122; *Stob.* ii. 206; *Plut.* Arat. 23. On all the points discussed, *Plut.* C. Not. 3, 2; De Adul. 16; Tran. An. 12; Ps. *Plut.* De Nobil. 17, 2; *Cic.* Fin. iii. 22, 75; *Hor.* Ep. i. 1, 106; Sat. i. 3, 124.

⁸ *Plut.* Tran. An. 12; *Cic.* Divin. ii. 63, 129; *Stob.* ii. 122; Ps. *Plut.* Vit. Hom. 143.

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the contrary, are impious, profane, and enemies of heaven.¹ The wise man only is capable of feeling gratitude, love, and friendship,² and he only is capable of receiving a benefit; to the foolish man, nothing is of advantage, nothing is useful.³ To sum up, the wise man is absolutely perfect, absolutely free from passion and want, absolutely happy;⁴ as the Stoics exclusively assert, he in no way falls short of the happiness of Zeus,⁵ since time, the only point in which he differs from Zeus, does not augment happiness at all.⁶ On the other hand, the foolish man is altogether foolish, unhappy, and perverse; or, in the expressive language of the Stoics, every foolish man is a madman, for he is a madman who has no knowledge of himself, nor of what most closely affects him.⁷

(2) *Universal depravity.*

This assertion was all the more sweeping, since the Stoics recognised neither virtue nor wisdom

¹ *Stob.* ii. 122 and 216; *Diog.* 119; *Sen.* *Provid.* i. 5. *Philodemus*, περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς (Vol. *Hercul.* vi. 29), quotes a Stoic saying that the wise are the friends of God, and God of the wise.

² *Sen.* *Ep.* 81, 11; *Stob.* ii. 118.

³ *Sen.* *Benef.* v. 12, 3; *Plut.* *Sto.* *Rep.* 12, 1; *C.* *Not.* 20, 1.

⁴ *Stob.* ii. 196; *Plut.* *Stoic.* *Abs.* *Poët.* *Dic.* 1, 4.

⁵ Chrysippus, in *Plut.* *Sto.* *Rep.* 13, 2; *Com.* *Not.* 33, 2; *Stob.* ii. 198. *Seneca*, *Prov.* i. 5: Bonus ipse tempore tantum a Deo differt. *Ibid.* 6, 4: Jupiter says to the virtuous: Hoc est, quo Deum anteceditis: ille extra patientiam malorum est, vos

supra patientiam. *Ep.* 73, 11; *De Const.* 8, 2; *Cic.* *N. D.* ii. 61, 153; *Epietet.* *Diss.* i. 12, 26; *Man.* 15; *Horat.* *Ep.* i. 1, 106.

⁶ *Sen.* *Ep.* 53, 11: Non multo te Di antecedent . . . diutius erunt. At mehercule magni artificis est clausisse totum in exiguo. Tantum sapienti sua, quantum Deo omnis ætas patet. 73, 13: Jupiter quo antecedit virum bonum? Diutius bonus est: sapiens nihilo se minoris æstimat, quod virtutes ejus spatio brevior clauduntur.

⁷ πᾶς ἀφρων μάλιστά. *Cic.* *Parad.* 4; *Tusc.* iii. 5, 10; *Diog.* vii. 124; *Stob.* *Ecl.* ii. 124; *Horat.* *Sat.* ii. 3, 43,

outside their own system or some system closely related to it, and since they held a most unfavourable opinion of the moral condition of mankind. It was an inevitable feature in their scheme that their opinion of their fellow-men would not be a favourable one. A system which opposes its own moral theory to current notions so sharply as that of the Stoics can only be the offspring of a general disapproval of existing circumstances. At the same time, it brings out that disapproval in a sharper manner. According to the Stoic standard, by far the majority, and almost the whole of mankind, belong to the class of the foolish; and if all foolish people are equally and altogether bad, mankind must have seemed to them to be a sea of corruption and vice, from which, at best, but a few swimmers emerge at spots widely apart.¹ Mankind pass their lives — such had already been the complaint of Cleanthes² — in wickedness. Only here and there do individuals in the evening of life, after many wanderings, attain to virtue. This was the common opinion among the successors of Cleanthes, witness their constant complaints of the depravity of the foolish, and of the rare occurrence of a wise man.³

¹ The Peripatetic Diogenianus raises the objection (in *Eus. Præp. Ev.* vi. 8, 10): *πῶς οὖν οὐδένα φῆς ἄνθρωπον, ὅς οὐχὶ μαίνεσθαι σοι δοκεῖ κατ' ἴσον Ὀρέστη καὶ Ἀλκμαίῳνι, πλὴν τοῦ σόφου; ἕνα δὲ ἢ δύο μόνους φῆς σόφους γεγονέναι.* Conf. *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 31, 5.

² *Sext. Math.* ix. 90: Man

cannot be the most perfect being, οἷον εὐθέως, ὅτι διὰ κακίας πορεύεται τὸν πάντα χρόνον, εἰ δὲ μὴ γε, τὸν πλείστον· καὶ γὰρ εἴ ποτε περιγένοιτο ἀρετῆς, ὁπὲρ καὶ πρὸς ταῖς τοῦ βίου δυσμαῖς περιγίνεται.

³ This point will be again considered in the next chapter. *Sext. Math.* ix. 133, says: εἰσὶν ἄρα σοφοί· ὅπερ οὐκ ἤρσκε τοῖς ἀπὸ

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No one probably has expressed this opinion more frequently or more strongly than Seneca. We are wicked, he says; we have been wicked; we shall be wicked. Our ancestors complained of the decline of morals; we complain of their decline; and posterity will utter the very same complaint. The limits within which morality oscillates are not far apart; the modes in which vice shows itself change, but the power of vice remains the same.¹ All men are wicked; and he who has as yet done nothing wicked is at least in a condition to commit wickedness. All are thankless, avaricious, cowardly, impious; all are mad.² We have all done wrong—one in a less, the other in a greater degree; and we shall all do wrong to the end of the chapter.³ One drives the other into folly, and the foolish are so numerous that they allow no chance of improvement to individuals.⁴ He who would be angry with the vices of men, instead of pitying their faults, would never stop. So great is the amount of iniquity!⁵

τῆς Στοᾶς, μέχρι τοῦ νῦν ἀνευρέτου ὄντος κατ' αὐτοὺς τοῦ σοφοῦ. *Alex. Aphrod.* De Fat. 28: τῶν δὲ ἀνθρώπων οἱ πλείστοι κακοὶ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀγαθοὶ μὲν εἰς ἢ δεύτερος ὑπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέναι μυθεύεται, ὥσπερ τι παράδοξον ζῶον καὶ παρὰ φύσιν, σπανιώτερον τοῦ φοίνικος . . . οἱ δὲ πάντες κακοὶ καὶ ἐπίσης ἀλλήλοις τοιοῦτοι, ὥς μηδὲν διαφέρειν ἕλλον ἕλλου, μαίνεσθαι δὲ ὁμοίως πάντας. *Philodem.* De Mus. (Vol. Herc. i.), col. 11, 18: The Stoic cannot take his stand upon the opinion of the majority (consensus gentium), since he has

declared it to be profane and impious.

¹ Benef. i. 10, 1–3.

² De Ira, iii. 26, 4; Benef. v. 17, 3.

³ De Clemen. i. 6, 3; De Ira, ii. 28, 1; iii. 27, 3.

⁴ Ep. 41, 9; Vit. Be. i. 4.

⁵ See the pathetic description, De Ira, ii. 8–10, amongst other passages the following: Ferarum iste conventus est: . . . certatur ingenti quodam nequitiae certamine: major quotidie peccandi cupiditas, minor verecundia est, &c.

No doubt the age in which Seneca lived afforded ample occasion for such effusions, but his predecessors must have found similar occasions in their own days. Indeed, all the principles of the Stoic School, when consistently developed, could not fail to lead to the impression that the great majority of men are nothing else but knaves and fools. From this sweeping verdict, even the most distinguished names were not excluded. If, for instance, a Stoic were asked for examples of wisdom, he would point to Socrates, Diogenes, Antisthenes,¹ and, in later times, to Cato;² but not only would he deny philosophic virtue to the greatest statesmen and heroes of early times, as Plato had done before him, but he would deny to them all and every kind of virtue.³ Even the scanty admission that general faults belong to some in a lower degree than to others can hardly be reconciled with their principle of the equality of all vices.⁴

¹ *Diog.* vii. 91: τεκμήριον δὲ τοῦ ὑπαρκτῆν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν φησιν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τοῦ ἡθικοῦ λόγῳ τὸ γενέσθαι ἐν προκοπῇ τοὺς περὶ Σωκράτην, Διογένην καὶ Ἀντισθένην. *Epicetet.* Man. 15.

² See *Sen.* De Const. 7, 1: The wise man is no unreal ideal, although, like everything else that is great, he is seldom met with; ceterum hic ipse M. Cato vereor ne supra nostrum exemplar sit. *Ibid.* 2, 1: Catonem autem certius exemplar sapientis viri nobis Deos immortales dedisse quam Ulixen et Herculem prioribus sæculis.

³ *Plutarch*, Prof. in Virt. 2; *Cic.* Off. iii. 4, 16.

⁴ *Sen.* Benef. iv. 27, 2: Itaque errant illi, qui interrogant Stoicos: quid ergo? Achilles timidus est? quid ergo? Aristides, cui justitia nomen dedit, injustus est? etc. Non hoc dicimus, sic omnia vitia esse in omnibus, quomodo in quibusdam singula eminent: sed malum ac stultum nullo vitio vacare . . . omnia in omnibus vitia sunt, sed non omnia in singulis extant. It hardly requires to be noticed how nearly this view coincides with that of Augustine on the virtues of the heathen, how close a

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version.*

The two moral states being thus at opposite poles, a gradual change from one to the other is, of course, out of the question. There may be a progress from folly and wickedness in the direction of wisdom,¹ but the actual passage from one to the other must be momentary and instantaneous.² Those who are still progressing belong, without exception, to the class of the foolish;³ and one who has lately become wise is in the first moment unconscious of his new state.⁴ The transition takes place so rapidly, and his former state affords so few points of contact with the one on which he has newly entered, that the mind does not

resemblance the Stoic doctrine of folly bears to the Christian doctrine of the unregenerate, and how the contrast between wisdom and folly corresponds to that between the faithful and the unfaithful.

¹ *Plut.* C. N. 10, 1; *Prof.* in *Virt.* 12; *Sen.* Ep. 75, 8.

² *Plut.* C. Not. 9; *Stoic. Abs.* Poët. Dic. 2. The Stoics are here ridiculed because, according to their view, a man may go to bed ugly, poor, vicious, miserable, and rise the next morning wise, virtuous, rich, happy, and a king. In *Prof.* in *Virt.* 1, a saying of Zeno's is given, that it is possible to tell by a dream whether we are advancing in virtue.

³ *Plut.* *Prof.* in *Virt.* 1; *Com.* Not. 10, 2; *Sen.* Ep. 75, 8.

⁴ *Plut.* C. Not. 9, 1: τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας παραγινόμενης πολλάκις οὐδ' αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸν κτησάμενον οἴονται διαλεληθέναι δ' αὖθις ὅτι μικρῶ πρόσθεν ἀθλιώτατος

ὦν καὶ ἀφρονέστατος νῦν ὁμοῦ φρόνιμος καὶ μακάριος γέγονεν. So *Sto. Rep.* 19, 3. In explanation of these words, *Ritter*, iii. 657, aptly refers to *Stob.* ii. 234, and *Philo.* De Agric. p. 325: Those yet inexperienced in wisdom παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις διαλεληθότες εἶναι λέγονται σοφοί· τοὺς γὰρ ἔχρι σοφίας ἄκρας ἐλληλακώτας καὶ τῶν ὄρων αὐτῆς ἔρτι πρῶτον ἀψαμένους ἀμήχανον εἰδέναί, φασί, τὴν ἐαυτῶν τελείωσιν. μὴ γὰρ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἄμφω συνίστασθαι τὴν τε πρὸς τὸ πέρας ἔφιξιν καὶ τὴν τῆς ἀφίξεως κατάληψιν, ἀλλ' εἶναι μεθόριον ἄγνοϊαν, κ.τ.λ. *Sen.* Ep. 75, 9, investigates the same point, but ranges those who have not yet attained the consciousness of perfection among advancers, but not among the wise. *Prantl's* conjecture (*Gesch.* d. Logik, i. 490, 210), that the σοφὸς διαλεληθὼς is connected with the fallacy known as *διαλανθάνων*, appears to be questionable.

keep pace with the change, and only becomes conscious of it by subsequent experience.

In this picture of the wise man, the moral theory of the Stoics attained its zenith. A virtuous will appears here so completely sundered from all outward conditions of life, so wholly free from all the limits of natural existence, and the individual has become so completely the organ of universal law, that it may be asked, What right has such a being to call himself a person? How can such a being be imagined as a man living among fellow-men? Nor was this question unknown to the Stoics themselves. Indeed, how could it be? Unless they were willing to allow that their theory was practically impossible, and their dream scientifically false, they could not escape the necessity of showing that it might be reconciled with the wants of human life and the conditions of reality. Let the attempt be once made, however, to reconcile the theory with facts, and without fail they would be forced to seek some means of adapting it to those very feelings and opinions towards which their animosity had formerly been so great. Daily, too, it became more necessary to make the attempt, in proportion as a greater value was attached to the practical working of their system, and to its agreement with general opinion. No doubt the original theory of Stoic morality required the absolute and unconditional submission of the individual to the law of the universe; but, in developing that theory, the rights of the individual

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asserted themselves unmistakeably. From this confluence of opposite currents arose deviations from the rigid type of the Stoic system, in the direction of the ordinary view of life; and of these deviations, several varieties deserve now to be considered.

CHAPTER XI.

THE STOIC THEORY OF MORALS AS MODIFIED BY
PRACTICAL NEEDS.

THE Stoic theory of Ethics is entirely based on the proposition, that only virtue is a good and only vice an evil. This proposition, however, frequently brought the Stoics into collision with current views; nor was it without its difficulties for their own system. In the first place, virtue is made to depend for its existence upon certain conditions, and to lead to certain results, from which it is inseparable. These results, we have already seen, were included by the Stoics in the list of goods. Moreover, virtue is said to be the only good, because only what is according to nature is a good, and rational conduct is for man the only thing according to nature. But will this absolute and unconditional statement stand criticism? Is not the instinct of self-preservation, according to the Stoic teaching, the primary impulse? and does not this instinct manifestly include the preservation and advancement of our outward life? The Stoics, therefore, could not help including physical goods and activities among things according to nature—for instance,

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sired and
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health, a right use of the senses, and such like.¹ Practically, too, the same admission was forced upon them by the consideration² that, if there is no difference in value between things in themselves, rational choice—and, indeed, all acting on motives—is impossible. At the same time, they reject the notion that what is primarily according to nature must therefore be perfect or good, just as in theory they allow that the source of knowledge, but not truth itself, is derived from the senses. When man has once recognised the universal law of action, he will, according to their view, think little of what is sensuous and individual, only considering it instrumental in promoting virtue and reason.³

¹ *Cic. Fin. iii. 5, 17. Gell. N. A. xii. 5, 7*: The primary objects of natural self-love are the *πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν*; and self-love consists mainly in this: Ut omnibus corporis sui commodis gauderet [unusquisque], ab incommodis omnibus abhorreret. *Stob. Ecl. ii. 142*: Some things are according to nature, others contrary to nature, others neither one nor the other. Health, strength, and such like, are among things according to nature; τῶν δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἀδιαφόρων ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν τὰ δὲ κατὰ μετοχὴν. πρῶτα μὲν ἐστὶ κατὰ φύσιν κίνησις ἢ σχέσις κατὰ τοὺς σπερματικούς λόγους γινομένη, οἷον ὑγιεία καὶ αἰσθησις, λεγῶ δὲ τὴν κατάληψιν καὶ ἰσχύν. κατὰ μετοχὴν δὲ . . . οἷον χεῖρ ἄρτια καὶ σῶμα ὑγιαῖνον καὶ αἰσθήσεις μὴ πεπηρωμένοι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν κατ' ἀνάλογον.

² *Cic. Fin. iii. 15, 50*: Dein-

ceps explicatur differentia rerum: quam si non ullam esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone: nec ullum sapientis munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter res eas, quæ ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset neque ullum delectum adhiberi oporteret. The theoretical *ἀδιαφορία* of the Sceptics was assailed by the Stoa on the same ground.

³ *Cic. Fin. iii. 6, 21*: Prima est enim conciliatio [*οἰκείωσις*] hominis ad ea quæ sunt secundum naturam, simul autem cepit intelligentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant *ἐννοίαν* illi, viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et ut ita dicam concordiam, multo eam pluris æstimavit quam omnia illa quæ primum dilexerat: atque ita cognitione et ratione collegit ut statueret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum

Still, it would be difficult to say how this is to be possible. The contemporaries of the Stoics already objected to the way in which a primary instinct was excluded from the natural aims of life;¹ nor can we suppress a feeling of perplexity at being told that all duties aim at attaining what is according to nature, but that what is according to nature must not be looked upon as the aim of our actions;² that the good consists not in what is according to nature, but in the rational choice and adoption of what is according to nature.³ Even if the Stoics pretend to dispose of this difficulty, they could not, at least, fail to see that whatever contributes to bodily well-being must have a certain positive value, and must be desirable in all cases in which no higher good suffers in consequence; and, contrariwise, that whatever is opposed to bodily well-being, when higher duties are not involved, must have a negative value (*ἀπαξία*), and, consequently, deserve to be avoided.⁴

... cum igitur in eo sit id bonum, quo referenda sint omnia . . . quamquam post oritur, tamen id solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est, eorum autem quæ sunt prima naturæ propter se nihil expetendum, &c.

¹ *Plut. Com. Not.* 4; *Cic. Fin.* iv. 17; v. 24, 72; 29, 89.

² *Cic. Fin.* iii. 6, 22: Ut recte dici possit, omnia officia eo referri, ut adipiscamur principia naturæ: nec tamen ut hoc sit bonorum ultimum, propterea quod non inest in primis naturæ conciliationibus honesta actio. Consequens enim est et post oritur.

³ *Plut. C. Not.* 26, 2: εἰ γὰρ

αὐτὰ μὲν [τὰ] πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθὰ μὴ ἔστιν, ἡ δ' εὐλόγιστος ἐκλογή καὶ λήψις αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ πάντα τὰ παρ' ἑαυτὸν ποιεῖν ἑκαστον ἕνεκα τοῦ τυγχάνειν τῶν πρῶτων κατὰ φύσιν, κ.τ.λ. εἴπερ γὰρ οἴονται, μὴ στοχαζομένους μὴδ' ἐπιεμένους τοῦ τυχεῖν ἐκείνων τὸ τέλος ἔχειν, ἀλλ' οὐ δεῖ ἐκείνα ἀναφέρεισθαι, τὴν τούτων ἐκλογὴν, καὶ μὴ ταῦτα. τέλος μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐκλέγεσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν ἐκείνα φρονίμως· ἐκείνα δ' αὐτὰ καὶ τὸ τυγχάνειν αὐτῶν οὐ τέλος, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ὅλη τις ὑπόκειται τὴν ἐκλεκτικὴν ἀξίαν ἔχουσα. *Cic.*

⁴ *Cic.* l. c. 6, 20; *Plut.* l. c.; *Stob.* ii. 142; *Diog.* vii. 105.

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Such objects and actions they would not, however, allow to be included in the class of goods which are absolutely valuable;¹ and it was therefore a blending of the Stoic with the Peripatetic teaching when Herillus, the fellow-student of Cleanthes, enumerated bodily and outward goods as secondary and subsidiary aims besides virtue.²

(2) *Classes
of things
indifferent.*

Nor yet were the Stoics prepared to follow the contemporary philosopher, Aristo of Chios (who endeavoured on this point too to bring their School to the level of the Cynic philosophy), in holding that there is no difference in value between things morally indifferent³ and in making the highest attitude that of indifference to all external things.⁴ Bearing, as

¹ *Stob.* ii. 132: διαφέρειν δὲ λέγουσιν αἰρετὸν καὶ ληπτὸν . . . καὶ καθόλου τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ ἀξίαν ἔχοντος.

² *Diog.* vii. 165: Herillus taught διαφέρειν τέλος καὶ ὑποτελίδα· τῆς μὲν γὰρ καὶ τοὺς μὴ σοφούς στοχάζεσθαι, τοῦ δὲ μόνον τὸν σοφόν. Hence *Cic.* *Fin.* iv. 15, 40, raises the objection, Facit enim ille duo sejuncta ultima bonorum, because he neither despises external things, nor connects them with the ultimate aim. *Diog.* l. c. says that he taught τὰ μετὰ τὸν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ἀδιάφορα εἶναι; and *Cic.* *Off.* i. 2, 6, mentions him, together with Pyrrho and Aristo, as an upholder of ἀδιάφορία. It would appear from these passages that Herillus was not far removed from true Stoicism. According to *Cic.* *Fin.* ii. 13, 43, he had no followers after the time of Chrysippus.

³ *Cic.* *Legg.* i. 21, 55: Si, ut Chius Aristo dixit, solum bonum esse diceret quod honestum esset malumque quod turpe, ceteras res omnes plane pares ac ne minimum quidem utrum adessent an abessent interesse. *Ibid.* 13, 38. *Fin.* iv. 17, 47: Ut Aristonis esset explosa sententia dicentis, nihil differre aliud ab alio nec esse res ullas præter virtutes et vitia intra quas quidquam omnino interesset. *Ibid.* ii. 13, 43; iii. 3, 11; 15, 50; iv. 16, 43; 25, 68; v. 25, 73; *Acad.* ii. 42, 130; *Offic.* *Fragm.* Hortens. (in *Nonn.* *Præfract.*); *Diog.* vii. 160; *Sext.* *Math.* xi. 64. *Cic.* usually places Aristo together with Pyrrho.

⁴ *Diog.* l. c.: τέλος ἔφησεν εἶναι τὸ ἀδιαφόρως ἔχοντα ζῆν πρὸς τὰ μετὰ τὸν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας μηδὲ ἡντινοῦν ἐν αὐτοῖς παραλλαγὴν ἀπολείποντα ἀλλ' ἐπίσης ἐπὶ πάντων ἔχοντα. *Cic.* *Acad.* l. c.:

does the Stoic virtue, in comparison with the Cynic virtue, the impress of a positive active will, it led these philosophers to look about them to find some definite relation to the external circumstances and conditions of the will which should serve as a standard for choosing or rejecting—in short, for deciding—all practical matters. Accordingly, they divided things indifferent into three classes. To the first class all those things belong which, from a moral or absolute point of view, are neither good nor evil, but yet which have a certain value; no matter whether this value belongs to them properly, because they are in harmony with human nature, or whether it belongs to them improperly, because they are means for advancing moral and natural life, or whether it belongs to them on both grounds. The second class includes everything which, either by itself or in its relation to higher aims, is opposed to nature and harmful; the third, things which, even in this conditional sense, have neither positive nor negative value. The first class bears the name of things preferential (*προηγμένον*), or things to be preferred; the second is the class of things to be declined (*ἀποπροηγμένον*); the third is the class of things intermediate.¹ The latter is called, in the

Huic summum bonum est in his rebus neutram in partem moveri: quæ ἀδιάφορα ab ipso dicitur. Chrysippus, in *Plut. C. Not.* 27, 2: Indifference to that which is neither good nor bad presupposes the idea of the good, and yet, according to Aristo, the good

only consists in that state of indifference. *Stob.* i. 920; *Clem. Strom.* ii. 416, c. See *Cic. Fin.* iv. 25, 68.

¹ *Diog.* vii. 105: τῶν ἀδιαφόρων τὰ μὲν λέγουσι προηγμένα τὰ δὲ ἀποπροηγμένα. προηγμένα μὲν τὰ ἔχοντα ἀξίαν· ἀποπροηγμένα δὲ τὰ

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strict sense, indifferent (*ἀδιάφορον*).¹ It includes not only what is really indifferent, but whatever has such a slight negative or positive value that it neither enkindles desire nor aversion. Hence the terms *προηγμένον* and *ἀποπροηγμένον* are respectively defined to mean that which has an appreciable positive or negative value.² Under things preferential, the Stoics include partly mental qualities and conditions, such as talents and skill, even progress towards virtue, in as far as it is not yet virtue; partly bodily advantages—beauty, strength, health, life itself; partly external goods—riches, honour, noble birth, relations, &c. Under things to be declined, they understand the opposite things to these; under things indifferent, whatever has no appreciable influence on our choice, such as the question whether

ἀπαξίαν ἔχοντα. By *ἀξία*, the three meanings of which are given, they understand here μέσην τινὰ δύναμιν ἢ χρεῖαν συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον. 107: τῶν προηγμένων τὰ μὲν δι' αὐτὰ προῆται, τὰ δὲ δι' ἕτερα, τὰ δὲ δι' αὐτὰ καὶ δι' ἕτερα . . . δι' αὐτὰ μὲν ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν ἐστί. δι' ἕτερα δὲ ὅτι περιποιεῖ χρεῖας οὐκ ὀλίγας. ὁμοίως δὲ ἔχει καὶ ἀποπροηγμένον κατὰ τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον. Essentially the same account, only somewhat fuller, in *Stob. Ecl.* ii. 142. *Conf. Cic. Acad.* i. 10, 36; *Fin.* iii. 15, 50; iv. 26, 72; *Sext. Pyrrh.* iii. 191; *Math.* xi. 60; *Alex. Aphr. De An.* 157. Zeno (in *Stob.* 156; *Cic. Fin.* iii. 16, 52) explains the conception *προηγμένον*, and its distinction from *ἀγαθόν*: *προηγμένον δ' εἶναι λέγουσιν, ὃ ἀδιάφορον*

ὃν ἐκλεγόμεθα κατὰ προηγούμενον λόγον . . . οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι προηγμένον, διὰ τὸ τὴν μεγίστην ἀξίαν αὐτὰ ἔχειν. τὸ δὲ προηγμένον, τὴν δεύτεραν χώραν καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχον, συνεγγίζειν πῶς τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φύσει· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ τὸν προηγούμενον εἶναι τὸν βασιλέα, ἀλλὰ τὸν μετ' αὐτὸν τεταγμένον.

¹ *Stob.* ii. 142: *ἀδιάφορα δ' εἶναι λέγουσι τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν, διχῶς τὸ ἀδιάφορον νοεῖσθαι φάμενοι, καθ' ἕνα μὲν τρόπον τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν καὶ τὸ μήτε αἰρετὸν μήτε φευκτόν· καθ' ἕτερον δὲ τὸ μήτε ὀρμῆς μήτε ἀφορμῆς κινητικόν.* Similarly *Diog.* vii. 104. *Sext. M.* xi. 60, distinguishes a third meaning.

² *Stob.* ii. 144, 156; *Sext. P.* iii. 191; *M.* xi. 62.

the number of hairs on one's head is equal or unequal, whether I pick a piece of waste paper up or leave it where it is, whether I use one piece of money or another in payment of a debt.¹

The relative value of things preferential was carefully distinguished from the absolute value of things morally good. Only the latter were really admitted to be good, because they only, under all circumstances, are useful and necessary. Of things morally indifferent, on the other hand, the best may, under certain circumstances, be bad, and the worst—sickness, poverty, and the like—may, under certain circumstances, be useful.² It was, moreover, denied that the independence of the wise man suffered by the recognition of a class of things preferential. The wise man, said Chrysippus,³ uses such things without requiring them. Nevertheless, the admission of classes of things to be preferred and to be declined obviously undermines the doctrine of the good. Between what is good and what is evil, a third group is introduced, of doubtful character; and since the term ἀδιάφορον was applied only in its more extended meaning to this group, it became impossible for them to refuse to apply the term good to things desirable,⁴ or to exclude

(3) *Collision of modified and abstract theory.*

¹ *Diog.* vii. 106; *Stob.* ii. 142; *Cic. Fin.* iii. 15, 51; *Sext.* l. c.; *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 30. The Stoics were not altogether agreed as to whether fame after death belonged to things to be desired. According to *Cic. Fin.* iii. 17, 57, Chrysippus and Diogenes denied it; whereas the younger Stoics,

pressed by the Academician Carneades, allowed it.

² *Cic. Fin.* iii. 10, 34; 16, 52; *Sext. M.* xi. 62.

³ *Sen. Ep.* 9, 14: Sapientem nulla re egere, et tamen multis illi rebus opus esse.

⁴ *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 30, 4: ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ ἀγαθῶν τρόπον

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unconditionally from the highest good many of the things which they were in the habit of pronouncing indifferent.¹

Nor was this concession merely the yielding of a term, as will appear when particular instances are considered. Not only may Seneca² be heard, in Aristotelian manner, defending external possessions as aids to virtue—not only Hecato, and even Diogenes, uttering ambiguous sentences as to permitted and forbidden gains³—not only Panætius giving expression to much that falls short of Stoic severity⁴—but even Chrysippus avows, as his opinion, that it is foolish not to desire health, wealth, and freedom from pain,⁵ that a statesman may treat honour and wealth as real goods;⁶ and he states that the whole

τινὰ συγχωρεῖ καὶ δίδωσι τοῖς βουλομένοις τὰ προηγμένα καλεῖν ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ τὰναντία ταύταις ταῖς λέξεσιν· ἔστι, εἴ τις βούλεται, κατὰ τὰς τοιαύτας παραλλαγὰς τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῶν λέγειν τὸ δὲ κακὸν . . . ἐν μὲν τοῖς σημαιομένοις οὐ διαπίπτοντος αὐτοῦ τὰ δ' ἄλλα στοχαζομένου τῆς κατὰ τὰς ὀνομασίας συνηθείας. *Cic. Fin. iv. 25, 68. Diog. 103*, says that Posidonius included bodily and external advantages among the ἀγαθά.

¹ *Sen. Ep. 95, 5*: Antipater quoque inter magnos sectæ hujus auctores aliquid se tribuere dicit externis, sed exiguum admodum. Seneca here declaims, in the spirit of strict Stoicism, against such a heresy, but he himself says (*De Vit. Be. 22, 5*): Apud me divitiæ aliquem locum habent, only not summum et postremum.

But what philosopher would have said they had this?

² *De Vit. Be. 21*.

³ *Cic. Off. iii. 12, 51; 13, 55; 23, 91; 15, 63; 23, 89*. Diogenes of Seleucia says that it is permitted to circulate base money knowingly, to conceal defects in a purchase from the purchaser, and such like. Hecato of Rhodes, a pupil of Panætius, thinks that not only will a wise man look after his property by means lawful and right, but he believes that in a famine he will prefer to let his slaves starve, to maintaining them at too great an expense.

⁴ According to *Cic. Off. ii. 14, 51*, he would allow an attorney to ignore truth, provided his assertions were at least probable.

⁵ *Plut. Sto. Rep. 30, 2*.

⁶ *Ibid. 5*.

Stoic School agrees with him in thinking that it is not unseemly for a wise man to follow a profession which lay under a stigma in the common opinion of Greece.¹ He did not even hesitate openly to assert that it is better to live irrationally than not to live at all.² It is impossible to conceal the fact that, in attempting to adapt their system to general opinion and to the conditions of practical life, the Stoics were driven into admissions strongly at variance with their previous theories. It may hence be gathered with certainty that, in laying down those theories, they had overstrained a point.

By means of the doctrine of things preferential and things to be declined, a further addition was made to the conception of duty. Under duty, or what is proper,³ we have already seen, the Stoics understand rational action in general, which becomes good conduct, or *κατόρθωμα*, by being done with a

B. *Perfect and intermediate duties.*

¹ According to *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 20, 3 and 7 and 10; 30, 3, *Diog.* vii. 188, *Stob.* ii. 224, the Stoics admit three kinds of earning an honest livelihood—by teaching, by courting the rich, by serving states and princes. The first and the last were no longer condemned in the Alexandrian period, as they had been before, but still they were in bad repute, and the second was particularly so. The course advocated by Chrysippus was still more at variance with Greek customs (in *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 30): *καὶ κυβιστήσῃν τρις ἐπὶ τοῦ- τφ λαβόντα τάλαντον*. Chrysippus himself (in *Diog.*) enumerates the objections to the modes of

life just named, and, in general, to all trading for money, but his objections cannot have appeared to him conclusive.

² *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 18, 1 and 3. *Com. Not.* 12, 4: *λυσίτελεῖ ζῆν ἔφρονα μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ βιοῦν κἂν μηδέποτε μέλλῃ φρονήσῃν*; or, as it is expressed, 11, 8: Heraclitus and Pherecydes would have done well to renounce their wisdom, if they could thereby have got rid of their sickness. A prudent man would rather be a fool in human shape than a wise man in the shape of a beast.

³ *καθῆκον*, an expression introduced by Zeno, according to *Diog.* 108.

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right intention. The conception of duty, therefore, contains in itself the conception of virtuous conduct, and is used primarily to express what is good or rational. Now, however, duty has obtained a secondary meaning. It is used to express what is desirable, as well as what is good. If the good were the only permitted object of desire, there would, of course, be but one duty—that of realising the good; and the various actions which contribute to this result would only be distinguished by their being employed on a different material, but not in respect of their moral value. But if, besides what is absolutely good, there are things relatively good, things not to be desired absolutely, but only in cases in which they may be pursued without detriment to the absolute good or virtue—if, moreover, besides vice, as the absolute evil, there are also relative evils, which we have reason to avoid in these same cases—the extent of our duties is at once thereby increased: a number of conditional duties are placed by the side of duties unconditional, differing from the latter in that they aim at pursuing things to be preferred, and eschewing things to be declined. From this platform, all that accords with nature is regarded as proper, or a duty, in the more extended sense of the term; and the conception of propriety is extended to include plants and animals.¹ Proper and dutiful

¹ *Diog.* 107: καθήκον φασιν εἶναι ὃ πραχθὲν εὐλογόν τιν' ἴσχει ἀπολογισμὸν οἷον τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν τῇ ζωῇ, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα διατείνει· ὁρᾶσθαι γὰρ κατὰ τούτων καθήκοντα. *Stob.* 158: ὀρίζεται δὲ τὸ καθήκον τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζωῇ, ὃ πραχθὲν εὐλογὸν ἀπολογίαν ἔχει· παρὰ τὸ καθήκον δὲ ἐναντίως, τοῦτο διατείνει καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλογα

actions are then divided into those which are always such and those which are only such in peculiar circumstances—the former being called *perfect*, the latter *intermediate* duties;¹ and it is stated, as a peculiarity of the latter, that, owing to circumstances, a course of conduct may become a duty which would not have been a duty without those peculiar circumstances.² In the wider sense of the term, every action is a duty which consists in the choice of a thing to be preferred (*προηγμένον*) and in eschewing a thing to be declined. On the other hand, a perfect duty is only fulfilled by virtuous

τῶν ζώων, ἐνεργεῖ γάρ τι κακείνα ἀκολουθῶς τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν λογικῶν ζώων οὕτως ἀποδίδονται, τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν βίῳ. καθήκον is, in general, what is according to nature, with which ἀκόλουθον coincides. See *Diog.* 108: ἐνέργημα δ' αὐτὸ [τὸ καθήκον] εἶναι ταῖς κατὰ φύσιν κατασκευαῖς οἰκείον.

¹ *Diog.* vii. 109: τῶν καθήκοντων τὰ μὲν αἰεὶ καθήκει τὰ δὲ οὐκ αἰεὶ· καὶ αἰεὶ μὲν καθήκει τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν· οὐκ αἰεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐρωτᾶν τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι καὶ περιπατεῖν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. *Cic.* *Fin.* iii. 17, 58: Est autem officium quod ita factum est, ut ejus facti probabilis ratio reddi possit. Ex quo intelligitur, officium medium quoddam esse, quod neque in bonis ponatur neque in contrariis . . . quoniam enim videmus, etc. . . . quoniamque non dubium est, quin in iis quæ media dicimus sit aliud sumendum aliud rejiciendum, quidquid a fit aut dicitur communi officio

continetur. Also *Off.* i. 3, 8. *Acad.* i. 10, 37. Corresponding to *προηγμένον* and *ἀποπροηγμένον*, Zeno placed *officium* and *contra officium*, as *media quædam* between *recte factum* and *peccatum*. *Stob.* ii. 158: τῶν δὲ καθήκοντων τὰ μὲν εἶναι φασὶ τέλεια, ἃ δὴ καὶ κατορθώματα λέγεσθαι . . . οὐκ εἶναι δὲ κατορθώματα τὰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντα, ἃ δὴ οὐδὲ τέλεια καθήκοντα προσαγορεύουσιν, ἀλλὰ μέσα, οἷον τὸ γαμεῖν, τὸ πρεσβεύειν, τὸ διαλέγεσθαι, τὰ τοῦτοις ὅμοια.

² *Stob.* 160. *Diog.* l. c.: τὰ μὲν εἶναι καθήκοντα ἄνευ περιστάσεως, τὰ δὲ περιστατικά. καὶ ἄνευ μὲν περιστάσεως τὰδε, ὕγείας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ αἰσθητηρίων καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· κατὰ περίστασιν δὲ τὸ πηροῦν ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὴν κτῆσιν διαβριπεῖν. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὸ καθήκον. This distinction, of course, only applies to μέσον καθήκον. The unconditional duty of virtuous life cannot be abrogated by any circumstances.

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action. Only virtuous living and a wish to do good constitute perfect duty.¹

Some confusion is introduced into this theory by the standard which the Stoics set up for distinguishing perfect from imperfect duties, taking at one time a relative, at another an absolute view of actions. Without keeping these two aspects distinct, they sometimes use the terms perfect and imperfect to express the difference between conditional and unconditional duties; at other times, to express the distinction between morality and law. A greater mistake than this formal defect is that of grouping under the conception of duty things of the most varied moral character. If once things which have only a conditional value are admitted into the list of duties, what is there to prevent their being authorised, in carrying out the Stoic teaching, on grounds altogether repugnant to the Stoic principles and their legitimate consequences?

¹ Compare, on this point, *Diog.* 108: τῶν γὰρ καθ' ὁρμὴν ἐνεργουμένων τὰ μὲν καθήκοντα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ παρὰ τὸ καθήκον, τὰ δ' οὔτε καθήκοντα οὔτε παρὰ τὸ καθήκον. καθήκοντα μὲν οὖν εἶναι ὅσα ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ ποιεῖν, ὡς ἔχει τὸ γονεῖς τιμᾶν, ἀδελφοὺς, πατρίδα, συμπεριφέρεισθαι φίλοις· παρὰ τὸ καθήκον δὲ ὅσα μὴ αἰρεῖ λόγος, e.g. neglect of parents; οὔτε δὲ καθήκοντα οὔτε παρὰ τὸ καθήκον, ὅσα οὐδ' αἰρεῖ λόγος πράττειν οὐτ' ἀπαγορεύει, οἷον κάρφος ἀνελέσθαι, κ.τ.λ. Combining with this the passage previously quoted, it appears that καθήκον includes not

only actions which aim at a moral good, but those which aim at a simple προηγμένον; and, in view of the latter, καθήκον is included among things intermediate, or ἀδιάφορα in its more extended meaning. *Cic. Stob.* 158, says that these καθήκοντα which are at the same time κατορθώματα, are οὐδὲ τέλεια, ἀλλὰ μέσα . . . παραμετρεῖσθαι δὲ τὸ μέσον καθήκον ἀδιαφόροις τισὶ καλουμένοις δὲ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τοιαύτην δ' εὐφύϊαν προσφερομένοις, ὥστ' εἰ μὴ λαμβάνομεν αὐτὰ ἢ διωθούμεθα ἀπερισπάστως μὴ εὐδαιμονεῖν.

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tions.
(1) *Per-*
mitted
affections.

In accordance with these admissions, the Stoic system sought in another respect to meet practical wants by abating somewhat from its austere demands. Those demands, developed to their legitimate consequences, require the unconditional extirpation of the whole sensuous nature, an extirpation which was originally expressed by the much-vaunted apathy. But just as the stricter Stoic theory of the good was modified by the admission of *προηγμένα*, so these demands were modified in two ways: the first elements of the forbidden emotions were allowed under other names; and, emotions being still forbidden, certain mental affections were allowed, and even declared to be desirable. In illustration of the former, it was allowed by the Stoics that the wise man feels pain, and that at certain things he does not remain quite feelingless.¹ They appealed to these facts to show that their system was not identical with that of the Cynics.² They did not require men to be entirely free from all mental affections, but only to refuse submission to them, and not to let them obtain the mastery.³ In illus-

¹ *Sen. De Ira*, i. 16, 7: When the wise man sees anything rebellious, non . . . tangetur animus ejus eritque solito commotior? Fateor, sentiet levem quendam tenuemque motum. Nam, ut dixit Zeno, in sapientis quoque animo etiam cum vulnus sanatum est, cicatrix manet. *Id.* ii. 2; *Ep.* 57, 3; *De Const.* 10, 4; *Stob. Floril.* 7, 21; *Plut. C. Not.* 25, 5; *Epictet. in Gell. N. A.* xix. 1, 17.

² *Sen. Brevit. Vit.* 14, 2: Ho-

minis naturam cum Stoicis vincere cum Cynicis excedere. *Ep.* 9, 3: Hoc inter nos et illos (Cynics) interest: noster sapiens vincit quidem incommodum omne, sed sentit: illorum ne sentit quidem.

³ *Conf. Sen. De Ira*, ii. 2-4, and *Gell.* quoting *Epictetus*: Even the wise man is apt, at terrible occurrences, paulisper moveri et contrahi et pallescere, non opinione alicujus mali percepta, sed quibusdam motibus rapidis et inconsultis, officium mentis

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tration of the latter, they propounded their doctrine of *εὐπάθειαι*, or rational dispositions, which, as distinct from emotions, are to be found in the wise man, and the wise man only. Of these rational dispositions, they distinguish three chief varieties, besides several subordinate varieties.¹ Intended, as this admission was, to vindicate the absence of emotions in the wise man, on the ground that the permitted feelings were not emotions, it made the boundary-line between emotions and feelings so uncertain that the sharply-defined contrast between the wise and the foolish threatened in practice wellnigh to disappear altogether.

(2) *Modification of apathy.*

This danger appears more imminent when we observe the perplexity in which the Stoics were placed when called upon to point out the wise man in experience. Not only their opponents asseverate that, according to their confession, no one is good, since no one can be found in known history who altogether deserves that high-sounding title;² but even their own admissions agree therewith.³ Even

atque rationis prævertentibus. But he differs from the foolish man in not assenting to such impressions (*φαντασίαι*).

¹ *Diog.* vii. 115: εἶναι δὲ καὶ εὐπαθείας φασὶ τρεῖς, χαρὰν, εὐλάβειαν, βούλησιν· καὶ τὴν μὲν χαρὰν ἐναντίαν φασὶν εἶναι τῇ ἡδονῇ οὖσαν εὐλογον ἔπαρσιν· τὴν δὲ εὐλάβειαν τῇ φόβῳ οὖσαν εὐλογον ἔκκλισιν· τῇ δὲ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἐναντίαν φασὶν εἶναι τὴν βούλησιν οὖσαν εὐλογον ὕρεξιν. Subdivisions of βούλησις are: εὐνοια, εὐμένεια, αἰσπασμὸς, ἀγάπησις; of εὐλάβεια:

αἰδώς, ἀγνεΐα; of χαρὰ: τέρψις, εὐφροσύνη, εὐθυμία. The same three εὐπάθειαι are mentioned by *Cic.* *Tusc.* iv. 6, 12; adding, that they only belong to the wise. See *Stob.* 92, and *Sen.* *Ep.* 59, 14; 72, 4 and 8.

² See *Plut.* *Sto. Rep.* 31, 5: καὶ μὴν οὐθ' αὐτὸν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἀποφαίνει σπονδαῖον, οὔτε τινὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ γνωρίμων ἢ καθηγεμόνων. *Cic.* *Acad.* ii. 47, 145; *Quintil.* *Inst.* xii. 1, 18.

³ *Sen.* *Tranq. An.* 7, 4: Ubi enim istum invenies, quem tot

Socrates, Diogenes, and Antisthenes were not called completely virtuous, but only travellers towards virtue.¹ It was of little avail to appeal to Hercules or Ulysses,² or, with Posidonius,³ to the mythical golden age, in which the wise are said to have ruled. The pictures of those heroes would have to be changed altogether, to bring them into harmony with the wise men of the Stoics; and Posidonius might be easily met, on Stoic principles, by the rejoinder that virtue and wisdom are things of free exercise; and, since free exercise was wanting in the case of the first men, their condition can only have been a state of unconscious ignorance, and not one of perfection.⁴ If there are no wise men, the division of men into the wise and the foolish falls at once to the ground: all mankind belong to the category of fools; the conception of the wise man is an unreal fancy. It becomes all the more difficult to maintain the assertion that all fools are equally foolish, and all wise are equally wise. If philosophy, instead of producing real wisdom, can only advance one step towards

seculis quærimus? Ep. 42, 1: Scis quem nunc virum bonum dicam? Hujus secundæ notæ. Nam ille alter fortasse tanquam phoenix semel anno quingentesimo nascitur, just as everything great is rare.

¹ Cic. Fin. iv. 20, 56.

² Hos enim (says Sen. De Const. 2, 1, of the two named) Stoici nostri sapientes pronuntiaverunt, invictos laboribus, etc. Further particulars in *Heraclit. Alleg. Hom.* 33 and 70.

³ Sen. Ep. 90, 5. To these

wise men of the old world Posidonius traced back all useful discoveries. Posidonius is probably meant by the 'younger Stoics' (*Sext. Math.* ix. 28), who say that they introduced belief in the Gods.

⁴ Sen. l. c. 44: Non dat natura virtutem, ars est bonum fieri . . . ignorantia rerum innocentes erant . . . virtus non contingit animo nisi instituto et edocto et ad summum adsidua exercitatione perducto. Ad hoc quidem, sed sine hoc nascimus.

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this end, still it can hardly take such a modest estimate of its own success as to allow that there is no real distinction between a zealous student and a bigotted despiser of philosophy.

(3) *The
state of
progress.*

It was therefore natural that the Stoics, notwithstanding their own assertions, found themselves compelled to recognise differences among the bad and differences among the good. In harmony with the system these differences were made to depend upon the greater or less difficulty of healing the vice, or, in the case of the good, upon qualities morally indifferent.¹ It was also natural that they should so nearly identify the state of *προκοπή*—or progress towards wisdom, the only really existing state—with wisdom that it could hardly be distinguished therefrom. If there is a stage of progress at which a man is free from all emotions, discharges all his duties, knows all that is necessary, and is even secure against the danger of relapse,² such a stage cannot be distin-

¹ *Stob. Ecl. ii. 236*: Ἰσων δὲ ὄντων τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων εἶναι τινὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς διαφορὰς, καθόσον τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπὸ σκληρᾶς καὶ δυσιάτου διαθέσεως γίγνεται, τὰ δ' οὐ. καὶ τῶν σπουδαίων γε ἄλλους ἄλλων προτρεπτικωτέρους γίγνεσθαι καὶ πιστικωτέρους ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀγχινουστέρους, κατὰ τὰ μέσα τὰ ἐμπεριλαμβανόμενα τῶν ἐπιτάσεων συμβαινουσῶν, i.e. virtuous men are not all equally secure. These differences of degree do not, however, apply to wisdom, which admits of no increase. See *Cic. Fin. iv. 20, 56*.

² *Stob. Serm. 7, 21*: ὁ δ' ἐπ' ἄκρον, φησὶ [Χρύσιππος] προκόπ-

των ἅπαντα πάντως ἀποδίδωσι τὰ καθήκοντα καὶ οὐδὲν παραλείπει. τὸν δὲ τούτου βίον οὐκ εἶναι πω φησὶν εὐδαιμόνα ἀλλ' ἐπιγίγνεσθαι αὐτῷ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὅταν αἱ μέσαι πράξεις αὐταὶ προσλάβωσι τὸ βέλαιον καὶ ἐκτικὸν καὶ ἰδίαν πῆξιν τινα λάβωσιν. Chrysippus was probably the author of the division of *progressers* into three classes, which is discussed by *Sen. Ep. 75, 8*. Those who have reached the highest stage, omnes jam affectus et vitia posuerunt, quæ erant complectenda didicerunt, sed illis adhuc inexperta fiducia est. Bonum suum nondum in usu habent. Jam tamen

guished from wisdom, either by its want of experience or by the absence of a clear knowledge of oneself. For has it not been frequently asserted that happiness is not increased by length of time, and that the wise man is at first not conscious of his wisdom? If, however, the highest stage of approximation to wisdom is supposed still to fall short of wisdom, because it is not sure of its continuance, and is not free from mental diseases, though it may be from emotions,¹ how, it may be asked, do these passing emotions differ from the mental affections which are found in the wise man? Is there any real distinction between them? If the progressing candidate has attained to freedom from diseased mental states, is the danger of a relapse very great? Besides, the Stoics were by no means agreed that the really wise man is free from all danger. Cleanthes held, with the Cynics, that virtue could never be lost; Chrysippus believed that, in certain cases, it was defectible.² After all this admission is

in illa quæ fugerunt recidere non possunt, jam ibi sunt unde non est retro lapsus, sed hoc illis de se nondum liquet et . . . scire se nesciunt.

¹ *Sen. Ep.* 75, 10 : Quidam hoc proficientium genus de quo locutus sum ita complectuntur, ut illos dicant jam effugisse morbos animi, affectus nondum, et adhuc in lubrico stare, quia nemo sit extra periculum malitiæ nisi qui totam eam excussit. The same view is upheld by *Sen. Ep.* 72, 6.

² *Diog.* vii. 127 : τὴν ἀρετὴν Χρύσιππος μὲν ἀποβλητὴν, Κλε-

άνθης δὲ ἀναπόβλητον· ὁ μὲν, ἀποβλητὴν, διὰ μέθην καὶ μελαγχολίαν· ὁ δὲ, ἀναπόβλητον, διὰ βεβαίους καταλήψεις. The latter view was that of the Cynics. *Sen. Ep.* 72, 6, speaking of Cleanthes, says that elsewhere he considered a candidate of the first class secure against relapses. On the contrary, *Simpl. Categ.* 102, α, β (Schol. in *Arist.* 86, α, 48 ; β, 30), says first that the Stoics declared virtue to be indefectible, but subsequently limits this assertion by saying that, ἐν καιροῖς καὶ μελαγχολίαις, virtue, together

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only one among many traits which prove that the Stoics were obliged to abate from the original severity of their demands.

with the whole rational life (λογικὴ εἶσις), is lost, and succeeded, not indeed by vice, but by a εἶσις μέση. A similar question is, Whether the wise man can become mad? which is answered in

the negative by *Diog.* vii. 118, though not without some modifying clauses. *Alex. Aphr.* De An. 156, b, also combats the view that the wise man will act virtuously when in a frenzy.

CHAPTER XII.

APPLIED MORAL SCIENCE.

ALL that has been hitherto stated in reference to the end and the conditions of moral action had regard to general principles only. The further question—whether the mere exposition of principles is enough, whether the practical application of these principles to circumstances of life does not also form part of moral science—was a question about which the Stoic School was not unanimous. Aristo, on this as on other points a Cynic, was of opinion that this whole branch of moral science was useless and unnecessary: the philosopher must confine himself exclusively to things which have a practical value, the fundamental points of morality.¹ Within the Stoic School, however, this view did not gain much support. Even Cleanthes, otherwise agreeing with Aristo, would not deny the

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¹ Further particulars have been already given. Seneca (Ep. 95, 1) calls the subject of applied ethics, which Aristo rejected, *parænetice*, or *pars præceptiva*. Sextus speaks of two *τόποι*—a *παραινετικός* and a *ὑποθετικός*. Both terms, however, appear to denote the same thing; for *ὑποθετικός* is defined by Muson. in

Stob. Floril. 117, 8, as *παραινετικός*. He who is himself insufficiently educated will do well *ζητῶν λόγων ἀκούειν ὑποθετικῶν παρὰ τῶν πεποιημένων ἔργων εἰδέναι τίνα μὲν βλαβερά τίνα δὲ ὠφέλιμα ἀνθρώποις. ὑποθετικὸς τρόπος* is therefore identical with the *suasio* of Posidonius (in *Sen. Ep.* 95, 65).

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value of an application of theory to details, provided the connection of these details with general principles is not lost sight of.¹ Nor can there be any doubt that, after the time of Chrysippus, details engrossed much of the attention of the Stoic philosophers. Posidonius enumerates, as belonging to the province of the theory of morals, precept, exhortation, and advice. His teacher, Panætius, discussed the practical side of morality² in three books on duties, which formed the groundwork of Cicero's well-known treatise.³ The division of ethics attributed to Diogenes, and by him referred to Chrysippus, leaves a place for such discussions;⁴ and, not to mention the opposition of Aristo, which supposes the existence of applied moral science, the example of a fellow-student Persæus, whose precepts for a banquet have been already referred to, proves how early practical ethics had obtained a footing within the Stoic School. Moreover, the elaborate theory of virtue propounded

¹ *Sen. Ep.* 94, 4: Cleanthes utilem quidem iudicat et hanc partem, sed imbecillam nisi ab universo fluit, nisi decreta ipsa philosophiæ et capita cognovit.

² See *Cic. Off.* i. 2, 7; 3, 9; iii. 2, 7. Cicero himself said that he chiefly followed Panætius (*περὶ τῶν καθηκόντων*), not as a mere translator, but correctione quadam adhibita.

³ *Cic. Off.* i. 3, 7: Omnis de officio duplex est quaestio: unum genus est, quod pertinet ad finem bonorum: alterum, quod positum est in præceptis, quibus in omnes partes usus vitæ conformari pos-

sit. He would devote his attention to officia; quorum præcepta traduntur. Cicero then goes fully into particulars. He treats of amusement and occupation (i. 29, 103); of the peculiar duties of the young and the old, of officials, citizens, foreigners (i. 34); of outward appearance, gait, conversation (i. 36); of the means of winning others (ii. 6, 21). Panætius must have given a similar treatment to the subject.

⁴ Particularly in the portions treating *περὶ τῶν καθηκόντων* and *περὶ προτροπῶν τε καὶ ἀποτροπῶν*.

by Chrysippus and his followers can hardly have failed to include many of the principal occurrences in life. Thus a number of particular precepts are known to us, which are partly quoted by other writers as belonging to the Stoics, and are partly to be found in the pages of Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, and in Cicero's treatise on duties. Indeed, the Stoics were the first who went at all deeply into the subject of casuistry.¹ At a later epoch, when more general questions had been settled by Chrysippus, the preference for particular enquiries on the domain of applied moral science appears to have increased among the Stoics.² Probably, however, none but the later members of the School advanced the unscientific assertion³ that we ought to confine ourselves to precepts for particular cases, since only these have any practical value.

In this extension of the moral theory, the longing

¹ According to *Cic. Off. i. 2*; *7*, *Ad Att. xvi. 11*, Panætius, in the third chief division of his treatise on duties, intended to discuss cases of collision between apparent interest and duty, but his intentions were never carried out. It appears, however, from *Off. i. 45*, *159*; *iii. 12*, *50*; *13*, *55*; *23*, *89*, that these cases were frequently discussed, not only by the pupils of Panætius, Posidonius, and Hecato, but by Diogenes of Seleucia and Antipater of Tarsus.

² The treatise of Panætius appears to have been used as a

chief authority, not only by Cicero, but by others. Antipater of Tyre, a cotemporary of Cicero, had added discussions on the care of health and wealth (*Cic. Off. ii. 24*, *86*); and Hecato, in his treatise on duties, had added further casuistical investigations (*Cic. iii. 23*, *89*); as also Brutus, who, like his teacher Antiochus, was devoted to a moderate Stoicism. At least, *Sen. Ep. 95*, *45*, reports that he had considered the relations of parents, children, and brothers in his treatise *περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος*.

³ *Sen. Ep. 94*, *1*; *95*, *1*.

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for scientific completeness may be observed as active, no less than the wish to subordinate all sides of human activity to moral considerations. In the virtuous man, as the Stoics held, everything becomes virtue;¹ and hence everything is included in the moral theory. Without doubt, the Stoic School thus contributed in no small degree towards settling and defining moral ideas, not only for its immediate contemporaries, but also for all subsequent times. Nevertheless, the more the teaching of the School entered into the details of everyday life, the more impossible it became to prevent practical considerations from overriding the natural severity of Stoic principles, or to keep the strictness of scientific procedure from yielding to the less accurate bias of experience.

The order and division which the Stoics adopted, in treating particular parts of applied moral science, are not known to us; nor, indeed, is it known whether that order was uniform in all cases.² It will be most convenient for the purpose of our present description to distinguish, in the first place, those points which refer to the moral activity of the individual, and afterwards to go on to those which relate to social life. Subsequently, the teaching of

¹ *Stob.* ii. 128: ἐν ἑξει δὲ οὐ μόνως εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας τὰς ἐν τῷ σπουδαίῳ ἀνδρὶ, ἀλλοιωθεῖσας ὑπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ γενομένης ἀμεταπτώτους, οἷον εἰ γὰρ ἀρετὰς γίγνεσθαι.

² The treatise of Panætius—we learn from *Cic.* *Off.* i. 3, 9;

iii. 2, 7; 7, 33—discussed its subject first from the platform of duty, and then from that of interest. The third part, which Panætius proposed to himself—the collision between duty and interest—was never carried out.

the Stoics on the relation of man to the course of the world and to necessity will engage our attention.

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It was quite in accordance with the Stoic system that, in ethics, the conduct and duties of the individual should command more attention than had been the case in previous philosophy. Not that the individual had been hitherto altogether ignored. Aristotle, in his investigations into individual virtue, had been led to consider the question of the morality of the individual. But still, with Aristotle, the influence of classic antiquity was sufficiently strong to colour his whole tone of mind, to lead him to throw the individual into the shade, when compared with the community, and to subordinate ethics to politics. In the post-Aristotelian philosophy, the relation of these two divisions of science was exactly reversed. With the decline of public life in Greece, scientific interest in the state declined also; and, in equal degree, the personality of the individual and the circumstances of private life came into prominence. This feature may be already noticed in some of the older Schools, as in the Academy and Peripatetic School. The Peripatetics, in particular, had continued to follow the course which their founder had marked out for them. In the Stoic School, the same points were brought into prominence, and were, indeed, required by the whole spirit of their system. If happiness depends upon man's internal state only, nothing external having power to affect it, the science which professes to lead man to happiness must primarily busy itself with man's moral activity.

A. *The individual.*
(1) *Importance attached to the individual.*

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This science can only consider human society in as far as action for society forms part of the moral duty of the individual. Hence, in the Stoic philosophy, researches into the duties of the individual occupy a large space, and there is a corresponding subordination of politics. These duties form the subject of by far the greater part of the applied moral science of the Stoics; and attention has already been drawn to the way in which they treated them with minute accuracy.¹ At the same time, the scientific value of these researches is by no means in proportion to their extent.

To form some idea of the treatise of Panætius, let us confine our attention to the two first books of Cicero's work, *De Officiis*. After a few introductory remarks, with which the treatise begins, morality as such (*honestum*) is described—the four cardinal virtues being taken as the groundwork (i. 5–42). In discussing intelligence, the first of these virtues, love of research is recommended, and useless subtlety is deprecated. Justice and injustice are next discussed, in all their various forms, due regard being had to the cases of ordinary occurrence in life. Liberality, kindness, and benevolence are treated as subdivisions of justice; and this leads to a consideration of human society in all its manifold varieties (c. 16–18, 60).

¹ Amongst other things, as we learn from *Athen.* xiii. 565, a, Chrysippus discussed at length the question of shaving; and *Alex. Aphr.* Top. 26, quotes, in illustration of the useless en-

quiries of the Stoics, *ἐν τοῖς περὶ καθηκόντων*, an enquiry whether it is proper to take the largest portion before one's father, and whether it is proper to cross one's legs in the school of a philosopher.

Next, turning to bravery (18, 61), the philosopher reminds us of the fact that bravery is inseparably connected with justice. He then proceeds to describe it partly as it appears in the form of greatness of soul and endurance, regardless of external circumstances, partly as it appears as active courage; and, in so doing, he discusses various questions which suggest themselves, such as the nature of true and false courage, military and civil courage, and the exclusion of anger from valour. Lastly, the object of the fourth chief virtue (c. 27) is described, in general terms, as what is proper (*decorum*, *πρέπον*), and the corresponding state as propriety, both in controlling the impulses of the senses, in jest and play, and in our whole personal bearing. The peculiar demands of the individual nature, of time of life, and of civil position, are discussed. Even external proprieties—of speech and conversation, of domestic arrangement, tact in behaviour,¹ honourable and dishonourable modes of life—do not escape attention.²

In the second book of Cicero's work, the relation of interest to duty is next considered; and having proved, at length,³ that most advantages and disadvantages are brought on us by other men, the author proceeds to lay down the means by which we may gain the support of others, and by which affection, trust, and admiration may be secured.

¹ *εὐταξία, εὐκαιρία*, talis ordo ² i. 43.

actionum ut in vita omnia sint ³ Panætius still more diffusely,
apta inter se et convenientia. i. 5, 16.

40, 142; 144.

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He reviews various kinds of services for individuals and the state, and embraces, at the same time, the opportunity of venting his spleen on despotism and demagogical fawning on the people. The principles on which this review is conducted are such that objection can be rarely taken to them from the platform of modern morality. In the treatment and support of the rules of life, and, in particular, in the definitions of various virtues, the Stoic bias is unmistakeably present. Few of the moral judgments, however, are such as might not have been equally well expressed from the platform of the Platonic and Aristotelian ethics.¹ Nor is it otherwise with some other points on record, by means of which the Stoics gave a further expansion to their picture of the wise man.² Revolting as their tenets at times appear, there was yet little in their application that deviated from the moral ideas generally current.

(2) *Cynicism of the Stoics.*
(a) *Connection of Stoics with Cynics.*

More peculiar, and at the same time more startling, is another feature about the Stoics. Let not too much be made of the fact that they allowed a lie to be, under circumstances, admissible.³ Socrates and

¹ Such, for instance, as the prohibition against being angry with enemies (i. 25, 88), which recalls at once the difference of the Stoics and Peripatetics on the admissibility of emotions.

² *Diog.* 117, says: The σόφος or σπουδαῖος is free from vanity (ἔνυφος), earnest (αὐστηρὸς), frank (ἀκίβδηλος), and with no inclination to pretence. He stands aloof from the affairs of life (ἀπράγμων), lest he should do

anything contrary to duty. *Stob.* ii. 240, says: The wise man is gentle (πρᾶος), quiet (ἡσύχιος), and considerate (κόσμιος), never exciting angry feelings against others, never deferring what he has to do.

³ Chrysippus, in *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 47, 1: βλάψουσιν οἱ σοφοὶ ψευδεῖς φαντασίας ἐμποιοῦντες ἂν οἱ φαντασίαι ποιῶσιν αὐτοτελῶς τὰς συγκαταθέσεις· πολλάκις γὰρ οἱ σοφοὶ ψεύδει χρῶνται πρὸς τοὺς φαύλους

Plato were, at least, of the same opinion; and, to be frank, we must admit that, although in this respect our moral theories are very strict, yet our practice is commonly far too lax. There are, nevertheless, assertions attributed to the Stoics, respecting the attitude of the wise man to the so-called intermediate things, which are exceedingly revolting. Was not this very independence of externals, and this indifference to everything but the moral state, which found expression in the doctrine of things indifferent and of the wise man's apathy, at the root of that onesidedness of life and principle which is so prominent in the Cynic School, the parent School of the Stoics? Granting that, in the Stoic School, this onesidedness was concealed and supplemented by other sources, still, owing to the origin of that School, a tendency to onesidedness was deeply rooted, and closely bound up with its fundamental view of life—too closely indeed to be ever fully eradicated. For although that School did not require

καὶ φαντασίαν παριστᾶσι πιθανήν, οὐ μὴν αἰτίαν τῆς συγκαταθέσεως· ἐπεὶ καὶ τῆς ὑπολήψεως αἰτία τῆς ψευδοῦς ἔσται καὶ τῆς ἀπάτης. *Stob.* ii. 230: μὴ ψεύδεσθαι τὸν σόφον ἀλλ' ἐν πᾶσιν ἀληθεύειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ λέγειν τι ψεύδους τὸ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ διαψευστῶς τὸ ψεῦδος λέγειν καὶ ἐπὶ ἀπάτῃ τῶν πλησίον. τῷ μέντοι ψεύδει ποτὲ συγχρῆσθαι νομίζουσιν αὐτὸν κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους ἄνευ συγκαταθέσεως· καὶ γὰρ κατὰ στρατηγίαν πρὸς τῶν ἀντιπάλων, καὶ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ συμφέροντος προόρασιν, καὶ κατ' ἄλλας οἰ-

κονομίας τοῦ βίου πολλὰς. By the help of this passage, too, the statement of Procl. in *Alcib.* (Op. ed. Cons. iii. 64)—that the Stoics differ from their predecessors in that they reject all lies—must be explained: οὐτε γὰρ ἐξαπατᾶν ἔστι δικαίως κατ' αὐτοὺς οὐτε βιάζεσθαι οὐτε ἀποστερεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐκάστη τῶν πράξεων τούτων ἀπὸ μοχθηρᾶς πρόεισιν ἕξως καὶ ἄδικός ἐστιν. The question here raised is simply one of words; the Stoics were, in reality, at one with Plato, only they did not call permitted untruth untruth.

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the Cynic life from its members, nay more, even avowed that, except in rare cases, such a life ought not to be followed,¹ still the Cynic's life was its ideal; and when it asserted that it was not necessary for a wise man to be a Cynic, it implied that, if once a Cynic, he would always remain a Cynic.² Stoicism took for its patterns³ Antisthenes and Diogenes quite as much as Socrates; and those who asserted, with Seneca,⁴ that a philosopher ought to accommodate himself to prevailing customs, and, from regard to others, do what he would not himself approve, did not therefore cease to bestow their highest admiration on Diogenes' independence of wants, with all its eccentricities.⁵ More consistent thinkers even approximated to Cynicism in their moral precepts,⁶ and in later times a School of younger Cynics grew out of the Stoic School.

(b) *In-
stances of
Cynicism.*

Bearing so close a relationship as the Stoics did to the Cynics, it cannot appear astonishing that many instances should be found amongst them of the most

¹ *Cic. Fin. iii. 20, 68*: Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam alii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si quis ejusmodi forte casus inciderit, ut id faciendum sit alii nullo modo. The latter must, however, have been in a minority.

² *Diog. 121*: κυνιεύειν τ' αὐτὸν [τὸν σοφόν]: εἶναι γὰρ τὸν κυνισμὸν σύντομον ἐπ' ἀρετὴν ὁδόν, ὡς Ἀπολλόδαμος ἐν τῇ ἠθικῇ. *Stob. 238*: κυνιεύειν τε τὸν σοφὸν λέγουσιν, ἴσον τῷ ἐπιμένειν τῷ κυνισμῷ, οὐ μὴν σοφὸν ὄντ' ἂν ἄρξασθαι τοῦ κυνισμοῦ.

³ According to the epigrams of

Timon, in *Diog. vii. 16*, *Athen. iv. 158, a*, *Sext. Math. xi. 172*, Zeno's School must have presented a very Cynical appearance. Probably, however, the reference is only to the earlier history of that School.

⁴ *Ep. 5, 1*; *103, 5*; *Fr. 19*, in *Lactant. Inst. iii. 15*.

⁵ See, on this point, *Tranq. An. 8, 4*; *Benef. v. 4, 3*; *6, 1*; *Ep. 90, 14*. *Sen. Ep. 29, 1*, does not, however, agree with the Stoic custom of sowing exhortations broadcast.

⁶ As may be seen in Musonius and Epictetus.

revolting traits in Cynicism—the contempt for cultivated habits, the violation of right feelings—nor that such traits should call forth the righteous indignation of their opponents. Chrysippus thought many things perfectly harmless which the religious feeling of Greece pronounced to be impure, and pleaded, in defence of his opinion, the example of animals, to show that they were according to nature.¹ He proposed to limit the care for deceased relatives to the simplest mode of burial, which should be undertaken in the most quiet manner; and he even conceived the abominable project, which he described in full, of using for purposes of nourishment the flesh of amputated limbs and the corpses of the nearest relatives.² Great offence, too, was given by the way in which the Stoics—and, in particular, Chrysippus—treated the relations of the sexes to each other; nor can it be denied that some of their utterances on this subject sound exceedingly insidious. The Cynic assertion, that anything which is in itself allowed may be mentioned plainly and without a periphrasis, is also attributed to the Stoics.³ Zeno offended against propriety and modesty by his proposals for the dress of women;⁴ and both Zeno and Chrysippus

¹ *Plut.* Sto. Rep. 22.

² Besides *Diog.* vii. 188, and *Sext.* Pyrrh. iii. 207, see Chrysippus' own words, in *Sext.* Pyrrh. iii. 247 (*Math.* xi. 193). The majority of the Stoics appear to have limited cannibalism to cases of extreme necessity. *Diog.* 121. Chrysippus had probably been speaking, in the context, of the

different modes of treating the dead among various nations (*Cic.* Tusc. i. 45, 108), intending to prove that no uniformity of practice prevailed.

³ *Cic.* Off. i. 35, 128, with the limitation: Cynici aut si qui fuerunt Stoici pæne Cynici.

⁴ *Diog.* vii. 33: καὶ ἐσθῆτι δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ κελεύει χρῆσθαι καὶ ἄνδρας

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advocated community of wives for their state of wise men.¹ It is, moreover, asserted that the Stoics raised no objection to the prevalent profligacy and the trade in unchastity,² nor to the still worse vice of unnatural crime.³ The leaders of the School considered marriage among the nearest relatives as quite according to nature;⁴ and even the atrocious shamelessness of Diogenes found a supporter in Chrysippus,⁵ perhaps too in Zeno.⁶

(c) *Cynicism a theoretical consequence of Stoic principles.*

It would, however, be doing the Stoics a great injustice to take these statements for anything more than mere theoretical consequences of the principles to which they were pledged. The moral character of Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus is pure beyond suspicion. It seems, therefore, all the more strange that these men should have felt themselves compelled to admit in theory what strikes our natural feeling with horror. It should, however, be borne in mind that the assertions laid to their charge, as they used them, do not imply all that historians find in them. Far from it, some statements not only do not justify conduct recognised to be immoral, but, on the contrary, are directed against actions allowed by custom, the line of argument being, that between

καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ μηδὲν μόνον ἀποκεκρύφθαι. The latter act is only conditional, and allowed in certain cases, such as for purposes of gymnastics.

¹ *Diog.* 33; 131.

² *Sext.* *Pyrrh.* iii. 201.

³ *Sext.* *Pyrrh.* iii. 200; 245; *Math.* xi. 190; *Clement.* *Homil.* v. 18.

⁴ *Sext.* *Pyrrh.* i. 160; iii. 205; 246; *Math.* xi. 191; *Plut.* *Sto. Rep.* 22; *Clement.* *Hom.* v. 18.

⁵ *Plut.* l. c. 21, 1.

⁶ Sextus, however (*Pyrrh.* iii. 206), attributes to him, as the representative of the School, what properly only belongs to Chrysippus: τό τε αἰσχροπρεπεῖν . . . ὁ Ζήνων οὐκ ἀποδοκιμάζει.

such actions and actions admittedly immoral there is no real difference. This remark applies, in particular, to Zeno's language on unnatural vice.¹ It was not, therefore, in opposition to the older Stoics, or in denial of their maxim, that love is permitted to a wise man,² that the younger Stoics condemned most explicitly any and every form of unchastity, and, in particular, the worst form of all, unnatural vice.³ In the same way, the language permitting marriage between those nearest of kin, when examined, is very much gentler than it seems.⁴

¹ His words (*Sext. Math. xi.* 190; *Pyrrh. iii.* 245; *Plut. Qu. Con. iii.* 6, 1, 6) are as follows: διαμυρίζειν δὲ μηδὲν μᾶλλον μηδὲ ἥσσον παιδικὰ ἢ μὴ παιδικὰ μηδὲ θήλεα ἢ ἄρσεν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλα παιδικοῖς ἢ μὴ παιδικοῖς οὐδὲ θηλείαις ἢ ἄρρεσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ πρέπει τε καὶ πρέποντά ἐστι; and: διαμεμήρικας τὸν ἐρώμενον; οὐκ ἔγωγε· πότερον οὖν ἐπεθύμησας αὐτὸν διαμυρίσαι; καὶ μάλα. ἀλλὰ ἐπεθύμησας παρασχεῖν σοι αὐτὸν ἢ ἐφοβήθης κελεῦσαι; μὰ Δί'. ἀλλ' ἐκέλευσας; καὶ μάλα. εἶπ' οὐχ ὑπηρέτησέ σοι; οὐ γάρ. The form of expression is certainly very Cynic-like, but the meaning is not what Sextus supposes. Zeno's object is not to justify unnatural vice, but to show that those who allow any form of unchastity cannot forbid this form, and that the wish and the attempt are morally on a par with the deed.

² See the following note.

³ Musonius, in *Stob. Serm. 6*, 61 (conf. *Cic. Fin. iii.* 20, 68): Ne amores quidem sanctos alienos a sapiente esse volunt. According to *Diog. vii.* 129, *Stob. ii.* 238,

love is really directed to beauty of soul. By *Diog., Stob., Alex. Aphr. Top.* 75, and *Cic. Tusc. iv.* 34, 72, it is defined to be ἐπιβολὴ φιλοποίας διὰ κάλλος ἐμφαινόμενον; and, according to *Plut. C. Not.* 28, ἐμφασίς κάλλους is an incentive to love; but these statements are guarded by adding that the bad and irrational are ugly, and the wise are beautiful. It was probably in imitation of *Plat. Sym.* 203, E, that the Stoics nevertheless stated τοὺς ἐρασθέντας αἰσχροῦν παύεσθαι καλῶν γυνομένων. Love is excited by a sensation of εὐφύια πρὸς ἀρετὴν, its object being to develop this capacity into real virtue. Until this end has been attained, the loved one is still foolish, and therefore ugly. When it has been attained, the striving, in which Eros consists, has reached its object, and the love of the teacher to his pupil goes over into friendship between equals.

⁴ Conf. *Orig. c. Cels. iv.* 45: The Stoics made good and evil depend alone on the intention

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And Zeno's proposition for a community of wives may be fairly laid to the charge of Plato, and excused by all the charitable excuses of which Plato is allowed the benefit.¹

Still, taking the most unprejudiced view of the Stoic propositions, there remains enough to raise an extreme aversion to them, unless they could, without difficulty, be deduced from the fundamental principles of their system. A moral theory which makes such a sharp distinction between what is without and what is within, which regards the latter alone as essential, the former as altogether indifferent, which attaches no value to anything except virtuous intention, and places the highest value in being independent of everything—such a moral theory must of necessity prove wanting, whenever it is the business of morality to use the senses as instruments for expressing the mind. Such a theory can never raise natural impulses to the sphere of free will. Its prominent feature is, that it allowed less to the senses than naturally belonged to them; but there was a danger connected therewith. In particular cases, in which intentions are not so obvious,

and declare external actions, independent of intentions, to be indifferent: εἶπον οὖν ἐν τῷ περὶ ἀδιαφόρων τόπῳ ὅτι τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ θυγατράσι μίγνυσθαι ἀδιάφορόν ἐστιν, εἰ καὶ μὴ χρὴ ἐν ταῖς καθεστώσαις πολιτείαις τὸ τοιοῦτον ποιεῖν. καὶ ὑποθέσεως χάριν . . . παρειλήφασι τὸν σοφὸν μετὰ τῆς θυγατρὸς μόνῃς καταλελειμμένον παντὸς τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένους

διεφθαρμένον, καὶ ζητοῦσιν εἰ καθήκοντως ὁ πατὴρ συνελεύσεται τῇ θυγατρὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ ἀπολέσθαι . . . τὸ πᾶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος.

¹ How strictly he respected chastity and modesty in women is proved by the fragment, preserved by *Clem. Pædag.* iii. 253, c, respecting the dress and conduct of maidens.

the moral importance of actions would often be ignored, and those actions would be treated as indifferent.

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The same observation will have to be made with regard to other positions which the Stoics laid down in reference to social relations. But yet it was not their intention to detach man from his natural relation to other men. On the contrary, they held that the further man carries in himself the work of moral improvement, the stronger he will feel the impulse to society. By the idea of society, two relatively-opposite tendencies were introduced into their ethics—one towards individual independence, the other in the direction of an ordered social life. The former tendency is the earlier one, and continues throughout to predominate; still, the latter was not surreptitiously introduced—nay, more, it was the logical result of the Stoic principles, and to the eye of an Epicurean must have seemed a distinctive feature of Stoicism. In attributing absolute value only to rational thought and will, Stoicism had declared man to be independent of everything external, and, consequently, of his fellow-men. But since this value only attaches to *rational* thought and intention, the freedom of the individual at once involves the recognition of the community, and brings with it the requirement that everyone must subordinate his own ends to the ends and needs of the community. Rational conduct and thought can only, then, be said to exist when the conduct of the individual is in harmony with general law; and this is the same for all rational beings. All

B. *Social relations.*

(1) *Origin and use of society.*
(a) *Origin of social claims.*

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rational beings must therefore aim at the same end, and recognise themselves subject to the same law. All must feel themselves portions of one connected whole. Man must not live for himself, but for society.

The connection between the individual and society was clearly described by the Stoics. The desire for society, they hold, is immediately involved in reason. By the aid of reason, man feels that he is a part of a whole, and, consequently, that he is pledged to subordinate his own interests to the interests of the whole.¹ Like has always an attraction for like; and this remark holds true of everything endowed with reason, since the rational soul is in all cases identical. From the consciousness of this unity, the desire for society at once arises in individuals endowed with reason.² They are all in the service of reason; there is, therefore, for all but one right course and one law,³ and they all contribute to the general welfare

¹ *Cic. Fin.* iii. 19, 64: Mundum autem consent regi numine Deorum cumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et Deorum; et unumquemque nostrum ejus mundi esse partem, ex quo illud consequi, ut communem utilitatem nostræ anteponamus.

² *M. Aurel.* ix. 9; xii. 30. *Sen.* Ep. 95, 52: The whole world is a unit; membra sumus corporis magni. Natura nos cognatos edidit. Hence mutual love, love of society, justice, and fairness. Ep. 48, 2: Alteri vivas oportet, si vis tibi vivere. Hæc societas . . . nos homines hominibus miscet et judicat aliquod esse commune jus generis humani.

³ *Cic. Legg.* 12, 33: Quibus enim ratio a natura data est, iisdem etiam recta ratio data est: ergo et lex, quæ est recta ratio in jubendo et vetando: si lex, jus quoque. At omnibus ratio. Jus igitur datum est omnibus. *Ibid.* 7, 23: Est igitur . . . prima homini cum Deo rationis societas. Inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem etiam recta ratio communis est. Quæ cum sit lex, lege quoque consociati homines cum Diis putandi sumus. Inter quos porro est communio legis, inter eos communio juris est. Quibus autem hæc sunt inter eos communia, et civitatis ejusdem habendi sunt. *Ps. Plut.* V. Hom. 119: The Stoics teach *ἕνα μὲν εἶναι τὸν*

in obeying this law. The wise man, as a Stoic expresses it, is never a private man.¹

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At other times, social relations were explained by the theory of final causes.² Whilst everything else exists only for the sake of what is endowed with reason, individual beings endowed with reason exist for the sake of each other. Their social connection is therefore a direct natural command.³ Towards animals, we never stand in a position to exercise justice, nor yet towards ourselves.⁴ Justice can only be exercised towards other men and towards God.⁵ On the combination of individuals and their mutual support rests all their power over nature. A single man by himself would be the most helpless of creatures.⁶

The consciousness of this connection between all rational beings finds ample expression in Marcus Aurelius, the last of the Stoics. The possession of reason is, with him, at once love of society (vi. 14;

κόσμον, συμπολιτεύεσθαι δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους, δικαιοσύνης μετέχοντας φύσει.

¹ *Cic.* Tusc. iv. 23, 51.

² *Cic.* Fin. iii. 20, 67; *Off.* i. 7, 22; *Sen.* Clement. i. 3, 2; *Benef.* vii. 1, 7; *M. Aurel.* v. 16, 30; vii. 55; viii. 59; ix. 1; xi. 18; *Diog.* vii. 129; *Sext.* Math. ix. 131.

³ Hence, according to *Cic.* Fin. iii. 21, 69, not only *ὠφελήματα* and *βλάμματα*, but *εὐχρησθήματα* and *δυσχρησθήματα* are common to all men.

⁴ According to *Plut.* Sto. Rep. 16, Chrysippus denied that a man could wrong himself. If, in

other passages, he seems to assert the contrary, this apparent inconsistency is probably due to the double meaning of *ἀδικεῖν*, which sometimes means 'to wrong,' at others, simply 'to harm.' Strictly speaking, a relation involving justice can only exist towards another.

⁵ Towards the Gods, man stands, according to the above passages, in a relation involving justice. There is, therefore (*Sext.* ix. 131), a justice towards the Gods, of which piety is only a part.

⁶ *Sen.* Benef. iv. 18.

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Σ. 2). Rational beings can only be treated on a social footing (*κοινωνικῶς*) (vi. 23), and can only feel happy themselves when working for the community (viii. 7). All rational beings are related to one another (iii. 4): all form one social unit (*πολιτικὸν σύστημα*), of which every individual is an integral part (*συμπληρωτικός*) (ix. 23); one body, of which every individual is an organic member (*μέλος*) (ii. 1; vii. 13). Hence the social instinct is a primary instinct in man (vii. 55), every manifestation of which contributes, either directly or indirectly, to the good of the whole (ix. 23). Our fellow-men ought to be loved from the heart. They ought to be benefited, not for the sake of outward decency, but because the benefactor is penetrated with the joy of benevolence, and thereby benefits himself.¹ Whatever hinders union with others has a tendency to separate the members from the body, from which all derive their life (viii. 34); and he who estranges himself from one of his fellow-men voluntarily severs himself from the stock of mankind (xi. 8). We shall presently see that the language used by the philosophic emperor is quite in harmony with the Stoic principles.

(2) *Justice
and
mercy.*

In relation to our fellow-men, two fundamental points are insisted on by the Stoics—the duty of justice and the duty of mercy. Cicero, without doubt following Panætius, describes these two virtues

¹ *M. Aurel.* vii. 13: If you only consider yourself a part, and not a member, of human society, οὕτω ἀπὸ καρδίας φιλεῖς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους·

οὕτω σε καταληπτικῶς εὐφραίνει τὸ εὐεργετεῖν· ἔτι ὥς πρέπον αὐτὸ ψιλὸν ποιεῖς· οὕτω ὥς αὐτὸν εὖ ποιῶν.

as the bonds which keep human society together,¹ and, consequently, gives to each an elaborate treatment.² In expanding these duties, the Stoics were led by the fundamental principles of their system to most distracting consequences. On the one hand, they required from their wise man that strict justice which knows no pity and can make no allowances; and hence their ethical system had about it an air of austerity, and an appearance of severity and cruelty. On the other hand, their principle of the natural connection of all mankind imposed on them the practice of the most extended and unreserved charity, of beneficence, gentleness, meekness, of an unlimited benevolence, and a readiness to forgive in all cases in which forgiveness is possible. This last aspect of the Stoic teaching appears principally in the later Stoics—in Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and Musonius;³ and it is quite possible that they may have given more prominence to it than their predecessors. But the fact is there, that this aspect is due, not only to the peculiar character of these individuals, but is based on the spirit and tone of the whole system.⁴

¹ Off. i. 7, 20: De tribus autem reliquis [virtutibus] latissime patet ea ratio, qua societas hominum inter ipsos et vitæ quasi communitas continetur, cujus partes duæ sunt: justitia, in qua virtutis splendor est maximus, ex qua viri boni nominantur, et huic conjuncta beneficentia, quam eandem vel benignitatem vel liberalitatem appellari licet.

² Off. i. 7-13; ii. 14-17.

³ We shall subsequently have occasion to prove this in detail. It may here suffice to refer to the treatises of Seneca, De Beneficiis, De Clementia, and De Ira. On the value of mercy, he remarks (De Clem. i. 3, 2): Nullam ex omnibus virtutibus magis homini convenire, cum sit nulla humanior.

⁴ Conf. Panætius, in Cic. Off. i. 25, 88.

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The question then naturally arises, how these two demands may be reconciled—how stern justice may be harmonised with forgiveness and mercy. Seneca, who investigated the question fully, replies: Not severity, but only cruelty, is opposed to mercy; for no one virtue is opposed to another: a wise man will always help those in distress, but without sharing their emotion, without feeling misery or compassion; he will not indulge, but he will spare, advise, and improve; he will not remit punishments in cases in which he knows them to be deserved, but, from a sense of justice, he will take human weakness into consideration in allotting punishments, and make every possible allowance under the circumstances.¹ These statements may fail, indeed, of removing every difficulty; still, those difficulties which remain apply more to the Stoic demand for apathy than to the reconciliation of the two virtues which regulate our relations to our fellow-men.²

(3) *Friendship.*

The society for which all men are intended will naturally be found to exist principally among those who have become alive to their rational nature and destiny—in other words, among the wise. All who are wise and virtuous are friends, because they agree in their views of life, and because they all love one another's virtue.³ Thus every action of a wise man

¹ De Clem. ii. 5–8.

² Among the points characteristic of Stoicism, the reprobation deserves notice with which Sen. (Ep. 7, 3; 95, 33; Tranq. An. 2, 13) speaks of gladiatorial shows, and the Roman thirst for

war. The attitude of the Stoics to slavery will be considered hereafter.

³ Stob. ii. 184: τήν τε δμόνοιαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι κοινῶν ἀγαθῶν, διὰ καὶ τοὺς σπουδαίους πάντας ὁμο- νοεῖν ἀλλήλοις διὰ τὸ συμφωνεῖν

contributes to the well-being of every other wise man—or, as the Stoics pointedly express it, if a wise man only makes a rational movement with his finger, he does a service to all wise men throughout the world.¹ On the other hand, only a wise man knows how to love properly: true friendship only exists between wise men.² Only the wise man possesses the art of making friends,³ since love is only won by love.⁴ If, however, true friendship is a union between the good and the wise, its value is thereby at once established; and hence it is distinctly enumerated among goods by the Stoics.⁵

On this point, difficulties reappear. How can this need of society be reconciled with the wise man's freedom from wants? If the wise man is self-

ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον. Cic. N. D. i. 44, 121: Censent autem [Stoici] sapientes sapientibus etiam ignotis esse amicos, nihil est enim virtute amabilius. Quam qui adeptus erit, ubicumque erit gentium, a nobis diligetur. See Off. i. 17, 55.

¹ *Plut.* C. Not. 22, 2; 33, 2.

² *Sen.* Benef. vii. 12; *Ep.* 81, 11; 123, 15; 9, 5; *Stob.* ii. 118; *Diog.* 124. According to *Diog.* 32, Zeno, like Socrates, was blamed for asserting that only the good among themselves are fellow-citizens, friends, and relations; whilst all the bad are enemies and strangers.

³ He is, as *Sen.* *Ep.* 9, 5, puts it, faciendarum amicitiarum artifex.

⁴ Si vis amari, ama, says *Hecato*, in *Sen.* *Ep.* 9, 6.

⁵ We have already encountered

friendship in the Stoic list of goods. *Stob.* 186, says, more accurately, that friendship, for the sake of the commonwealth, is not a good, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐκ διεστηκότων ἀγαθὸν εἶναι; on the other hand, friendship, in the sense of friendly relations to others, belongs to external goods; in the sense of a friendly disposition merely, it belongs to intellectual goods. On the value of friendship, *Sen.* 99, 3. Friendship is defined as κοινωνία βίου (*Stob.* 130); κοινωνία τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον, χρωμένων ἡμῶν τοῖς φίλοις ὡς ἑαυτοῖς (*Diog.* 124). Similar definitions are given by *Stob.* of varieties of friendship: γγνωμότης, συνήθεια, κ.τ.λ. On the absolute community of goods among friends, see *Sen.* *Ep.* 47, 2; 3, 2; Benef. vii. 4, 1; 12, 1.

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sufficient, how can another help him? How can he stand in need of such help? The answers given by Seneca are not satisfactory. To the first question, he replies, that none but a wise man can give the right inducement to a wise man to make his powers actual.¹ He meets the second by saying, that a wise man suffices himself for happiness, but not for life.² Everywhere the wise man finds inducements to virtuous action; if friendship is not a condition of happiness, it is not a good at all. Nor are his further observations more conclusive. The wise man, he says,³ does not *wish* to be friendless, but still he *can* be friendless. But the question is not whether he *can* be, but whether he can be without loss of happiness. If the question so put is answered in the negative, it follows that the wise man is not altogether self-sufficing; if in the affirmative—and a wise man, as Seneca affirms, will bear the loss of a friend with calmness, because he comforts himself with the thought that he can have another at any moment—then friendship is not worth much. Moreover, if a wise man can help another by communicating to him information and method, since no wise man is omniscient,⁴ we ask, Is not a wise man, if not in possession of all knowledge, at least in possession of all knowledge contributing to virtue and happiness? If it is added, that what

¹ Ep. 109, 3 and 11.² Ep. 9, 13: Se contentus est sapiens ad beate vivendum, non ad vivendum. Ad hoc enim multis illi rebus opus est, ad illud

tantum animo sano et erecto et despiciente fortunam.

³ Ep. 9, 5.⁴ Sen. Ep. 109, 5.

one learns from another he learns by his own powers, and is consequently himself helping himself, does not this addition still ignore the fact that the teacher's activity is only the condition of the learner's? True and beautiful as is the language of Seneca: Friendship has its value in itself alone; every wise man must wish to find those like himself; the good have a natural love for the good; the wise man needs a friend, not to have a nurse in sickness and an assistant in trouble, but to have someone whom he can tend and assist, and for whom he can live and die¹—nevertheless, this language does not meet the critical objection, that one who requires the help of another, be it only to have an object for his moral activity, cannot be wholly dependent on himself. If friendship, according to a previously-quoted distinction, belongs to external goods, it makes man, in a certain sense, dependent on externals. If its essence is placed in an inward disposition of friendliness, such a disposition depends on the existence of those for whom it can be felt. Besides, it involves the necessity of being reciprocated, and of venting itself in outward conduct, to such an extent that it is quite subversive of the absolute independence of the individual.

Nor yet is the friendship of the wise the only form of society which appeared to the Stoics necessary and essential. If man is intended² to associate with

(4) *The family and political life.*

¹ Ep. 109, 13; 9, 8; 10, 12; *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν πόλιν. ἱκανῶς δὲ καὶ Κλεάνθης περὶ τὸ σπουδαῖον*

² *Stob. ii. 208: τὸν γὰρ νόμον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν λόγον ἡρώτησε εἶναι, καθάπερ εἵπομεν, σπουδαῖον, τοῦτον· πόλις μὲν εἰ ἔστιν αἰκη-*

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his fellow-men in a society regulated by justice and law, how can he withdraw from the most common institution—the state? If virtue does not consist in idle contemplation, but in action, how dare he lose the opportunity of promoting good and repressing evil by taking part in political life?¹ If laws further the well-being and security of the citizens, if they advance virtue and happiness, how can the wise man fail to regard them as beautiful and salutary?² For the same reason, matrimony will command his respect. He will neither deny himself a union so natural and intimate, nor will he deprive the state of relays of men nor society of the sight of well-ordered family life.³ Hence, in their writings and

τήριον κατασκευάσμα εἰς ὃ κατα-
φεύγοντας ἔστι δίκην δοῦναι καὶ
λαβεῖν, οὐκ ἀστέιον δὲ πόλις ἐστίν;
Floril. 44, 12.

¹ *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 2, 3: Chrysippus recommends political life, placing βίος σχολαστικός on the same footing with βίος ἡδονικός. *Diog.* vii. 121: πολιτεύεσθαι φασιν τὸν σοφὸν ἂν μὴ τι κωλύη, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν πρώτῳ περὶ βίων· καὶ γὰρ κακίαν ἐφέξειν καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετὴν ἐφορμήσειν. *Sen. De Ot.* 3, 2: Epicurus ait: non accedet ad rempublicam sapiens, nisi si quid intenderit. Zenon ait: accedet ad rempublicam, nisi si quid impedierit. *Cic. Fin.* iii. 20, 68: Since man exists for the sake of other men, consentaneum est huic naturæ, ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rempublicam: atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adjungere et velle ex ea liberos procreare. *Stob.* ii. 184: τό τε

δίκαιόν φασι φύσει εἶναι καὶ μὴ θέσει. ἐπόμενον δὲ τούτοις ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν . . . καὶ τὸ νομοθετεῖν τε καὶ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους, κ.τ.λ.

² *Cic. Legg.* ii. 5, 11.

³ *Diog. Ibid.*: καὶ γαμήσειν, ὥς δὲ Ζήνων φησὶν ἐν πολιτείᾳ, καὶ παιδοποιήσεσθαι. *Ibid.* 120: The Stoics consider love towards children, parents, and kindred to be according to nature. Chrysippus (in *Hieron. Ad. Jovin.* i. 191): The wise man will marry, lest he offend Zeus γαμήλιος and γενέθλιος. Antipater (in *Stob. Floril.* 67, 25): Wife and child are necessary to give completeness to civil and domestic life; a citizen owes children to his country, and family love is the purest. Musonius (*Ibid.* 67, 20): A philosopher ought to be a pattern in married life, as in every other natural relation, and discharge

precepts, the Stoics paid great attention to the state and to domestic life.¹ They required chastity, and moderation in marriage. Love was to be a matter of reason, not of emotion—not a yielding to personal attractions, nor a seeking sensual gratification.² As to their views on the constitution of a state, we know³ that they prefer a mixed constitution, compounded of the three simple forms, without objecting to other forms of government. The wise man, according to Chrysippus, will not despise the calling of a prince, if his interest so require, and, if he cannot govern himself, will reside at the court and in the camp of princes, particularly of good princes.⁴

The ideal of the Stoics, however, was not realised in any one of the existing forms of government, but in that polity of the wise which Zeno described,

his duties as a citizen by founding a family; love for wife and children is the deepest love.

¹ *Plut.* Sto. Rep. 2, 1: ἐπεὶ τοίνυν πολλὰ μὲν, ὡς ἐν λόγοις, αὐτῷ Ζήνωνι, πολλὰ δὲ Κλεάνθει, πλεῖστα δὲ Χρυσίππῳ γεγραμμένα τυγχάνει περὶ πολιτείας καὶ τοῦ ἔρχεσθαι καὶ ἔρχειν καὶ δικάζειν καὶ ῥητορεύειν. Conf. the titles in *Diog.* vii. 4; 166; 175; 178. Diogenes' list contains no political writings of Chrysippus. It is, however, known to be incomplete; for *Diog.* vii. 34; 131, quotes Chrysippus's treatise περὶ πολιτείας, a treatise also quoted by *Plut.* Sto. Rep. 21 (1, 3, 5). According to *Cic.* Legg. iii. 6, 14, Diogenes and Panætius were the only Stoics before his time who had entered into particulars re-

specting legislation, though others might have written much on politics.

² Conf. the fragment of *Sen.* De Matrimonio, in *Hieron.* Ad. Jovin. i. 191, which requires absolute abstinence from pregnant women. A few unimportant fragments are also preserved of Chrysippus' treatise on the education of children. See *Quintil.* Inst. i. 11, 17; 1, 4 and 16; 3, 14; 10, 32; *Baguet*, De Chrys. (Annal. Lovan. iv.). He is reproached by Posidonius (*Galen.* Hipp. et Plat. v. 1) for neglecting the first germs of education, particularly those previous to birth.

³ *Diog.* vii. 131.

⁴ *Plut.* Sto. Rep. 20, 3-5; 7; 30, 3; C. Not. 7, 6.

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undoubtedly when a Cynic,¹ but which was fully set forth by Chrysippus²—a state without marriage, or family, or temples, or courts, or public offices, or coins³—a state not in hostility with any other state, because all differences of nationality have been lost in a common brotherhood of all men.⁴ Such an ideal is enough to prove that, for the Stoic philosophers, there could be no hearty sympathy with the state or the family. It was, in truth, no longer a state. Nor would the whole tone of Stoicism—and still less the condition of the age to which it owed, in a great measure, its rise and spread—tend to promote such a sympathy. If Plato could find no scope for a philosopher in the political institutions of his time, might not a similar difficulty occur in the case of the Stoics? Looking more exclusively in seclusion from the world to their own inward self for happiness; contrasting, too, the wise man more sharply with the multitude of fools; and living for the most part under political circumstances far less favourable than Plato had enjoyed; to them the private life of a philosopher must have seemed far more attractive than a public career. They must have held, with Chrysippus,⁵ that a prudent man

¹ *Diog.* vii. 4.² *Diog.* vii. 131.

³ *Diog.* 33: κοινὰς τε γὰρ γυναῖ-
κας δογματίζειν ὁμοίως ἐν τῇ Πολι-
τείᾳ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς διακοσίους στί-
χας, μήθ' ἱερὰ μήτε δικαστήρια
μήτε γυμνάσια ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν
οἰκοδομεῖσθαι . . . νόμισμα δ' οὐτ'
ἀλλαγῆς ἔνεκεν οἰεσθαι δεῖν κατα-
σκευάζειν οὐτ' ἀποδημίας. *Ibid.*
131.

⁴ *Plut.* Alex. Virt. i. 6.

⁵ *Plut.* Sto. Rep. 20, 1: οἷμαι
γὰρ ἔγωγε τὸν φρόνιμον καὶ ἀπρά-
γμονα εἶναι καὶ ὀλιγοπράγμονα καὶ
τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν, ὁμοίως τῆς τε
αὐτοπραγίας καὶ ὀλιγοπραγμοσύνης
ἀστέων ὄντων . . . τῷ γὰρ ὄντι
φαίνεται ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἡσυχίαν βίος
ἀκινδυνόν τε καὶ ἀσφαλὲς ἔχειν,
κ.τ.λ.

avoids business, that he withdraws to peaceful retirement; and, though he may consider it his duty not to withdraw from public life, still he can only actively take a part in it in states which present an appreciable progress towards perfection.¹ But where could such states be found? Did not Chrysippus state it as his conviction that a statesman must either displease the Gods or displease the people?² And did not later philosophers accordingly advise aspirants to philosophy not to intermeddle at all in civil matters?³ Labour for the commonwealth is only a duty, they say, when there is no obstacle to such labour; but, in reality, there is always some obstacle, and now, in particular, the condition of existing states.⁴ A philosopher who teaches and improves his fellow-men benefits the state quite as

¹ *Stob.* Ecl. ii. 186: πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πολιτείαις ταῖς ἐμφαινούσαις τινὰ προκοπὴν πρὸς τὰς τελείας πολιτείας.

² *Stob.* Floril. 45, 29: In answer to the question, why he withdrew from public life, he replied: διότι εἰ μὲν πονηρὰ πολιτεύεται, τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπαρέσσει, εἰ δὲ χρηστὰ, τοῖς πολίταις.

³ *Sen.* Ep. 29, 11: Quis enim placere potest populo, cui placet virtus? malis artibus popularis favor quaeritur. Similem te illi: facias oportet . . . conciliari nisi turpe ratione amor turpium non potest.

⁴ *Sen.* De Ot. 3, 3: It needs a special cause for devoting oneself to private life. Causa autem illa late patet: si respublica corruptior

est quam ut adjuvari possit, si occupata est malis . . . si parum habebit [sapiens] auctoritatis aut virium nec illum admissura erat respublica, si valetudo illum impedit. *Ibid.* 8, 1: Negant nostri sapientem ad quamlibet rempublicam accessurum: quid autem interest, quomodo sapiens ad otium veniat, utrum quia respublica illi deest, an quia ipse reipublicæ, si omnibus defutura respublica est. Semper autem deerit fastidiose quaerentibus. Interrogo ad quam rempublicam sapiens sit accessurus. Ad Atheniensium, etc.? Si percensere singulas voluero, nullam inveniam, quæ sapientem aut quam sapiens pati possit. Similarly Athenodorus, in *Sen.* Tranq. An. 3, 2.

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much as a warrior, an administrator, or a civil functionary.¹

Epictetus, following out this idea,² dissuades from matrimony and the begetting of children. Allowing that the family relation may be admitted in a community of wise men, he is of opinion that it is otherwise under existing circumstances; for how can a true philosopher engage in connections and actions which withdraw him from the service of God? The last expression already suggests that the state of the times was not the only cause deterring this Stoic from caring for family or the state, but that the care for state or family seemed to him confined and limited; and this suggestion becomes open avowal with Seneca and Epictetus. He who feels himself, they plead, a citizen of the world, finds in an individual state a sphere far too limited—he prefers to owe allegiance to the universe only;³ man is no

¹ *Athenodor.* l. c. 3, 3.

² *Diss.* iii. 22, 67.

³ *Sen.* *De Otio*, 4, 1: *Duas respublicas animo complectamur, alteram magnam et vere publicam, qua Di atque homines continentur, in qua non ad hunc angulum respicimus aut ad illum, sed terminos civitatis nostræ cum sole metimur: alteram cui nos adscripsit condicio nascendi.* Some serve the great, others the small state; some serve both. *Majori reipublicæ et in otio deservire possumus, immo vero nescio an in otio melius.* *Ep.* 68, 2: *Cum sapienti rempublicam ipso dignam dedimus, id est mundum, non est extra rempublicam etiamsi recesserit: immo fortasse relicto*

uno angulo in majora atque ampliora transit, &c. *Epict.* *Diss.* iii. 22, 83: *Do you ask whether a wise man will busy himself with the state? What state could be greater than the one about which he does busy himself? Not the citizens of one city alone are consulted by him for the purpose of obtaining information about the revenues of a state, and such like, but the citizens of the world, that with them he may converse of happiness and unhappiness, of freedom and slavery.* *τηλικαύτην πολιτείαν πολιτευσαμένου ανθρώπου, σύ μοι πυνθάνη, εἰ πολιτεύσεται; πυθοῦ μου καὶ, εἰ ἔρξει· πάλιν ἐρῶ σοι· μωρὲ, ποίαν ἀρχὴν μείζονα ἧς ἔρχει;*

doubt intended to be active, but the highest activity is intellectual research.¹ On the subject of civil society, opinions were likely to vary, according to the peculiarities and circumstances of individuals. The philosopher on the throne was more likely than the freedman Epictetus to feel himself a citizen of Rome as well as a citizen of the world,² and to lower the demands made on a philosophic statesman.³ At the same time, the direction taken by the Stoic philosophy cannot be ignored. A philosophy which attaches moral value to the cultivation of intentions only, considering all external circumstances at the same time as indifferent, can hardly produce a taste or a skill for overcoming those outward interests and circumstances with which a politician is chiefly concerned. A system which regards the mass of men as fools, which denies to them every healthy endeavour and all true knowledge, can hardly bring itself unreservedly to work for a state, the course and institutions of which depend upon the majority of its members, and are planned with a view to their needs, prejudices, and customs. Undoubtedly, there were able statesmen among the Stoics of the Roman period; but Rome, and not Stoicism, was the cause of their statesmanship. Taken alone, Stoicism could form excellent men, but hardly excellent statesmen.

¹ *Sen. De Otio*, 5, 1; 7; 6, 4. φρόντιζε στιβαρῶς ὡς Ῥωμαῖος καὶ

² *Marcus Aurelius*, vi. 44: πόλις καὶ πατρίς ὡς μὲν Ἀντωνίου
μοι ἡ Ῥώμη, ὡς δὲ ἀνθρώπου ὁ
κόσμος. τὰ ταῖς πόλεσιν οὖν
τούταις ὠφέλιμα μόνα ἐστὶ
μοι ἀγαθὰ. ii. 5: πάσης ὥρας
ἄρῃην.
³ *Ibid.* ix. 29: ὁρμησον ἐὰν δι-
δῶται καὶ μὴ περιβλέπου εἴ τις εἴσ-
εται μηδὲ τὴν Πλάτωνος πολιτείαν
ἔλπιζε, ἀλλὰ ἀρκοῦ εἰ τὸ βραχύτα-
τον πρόεισι.

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And, looking to facts, not one of the old masters of the School ever had or desired any public office. Hence, when their opponents urged that retirement was a violation of their principles,¹ Seneca could with justice meet the charge by replying, that the true meaning of their principles ought to be gathered from their actual conduct.²

(c) *Citizenship
of the
world.*

The positive substitute wherewith the Stoics thought to replace the ordinary relations of civil society was by a citizenship of the world. No preceding system had been able to overcome the difficulty of nationalities. Even Plato and Aristotle shared the prejudice of the Greeks against foreigners. The Cynics alone appear as the precursors of the Stoa, attaching slight value to the citizenship of any particular state, and great importance to citizenship of the world.³ Still, with the Cynics, this idea had not attained to the historical importance which afterwards belonged to it; nor was it used so much with a positive meaning, to express the essential oneness of all mankind, as, in a negative sense, to imply the philosopher's independence of country and home. From the Stoic philosophy it first received a definite meaning, and became an idea of general utility. The causes of this change may be sought, not only in the historical surroundings amongst which Stoicism grew up, but also in the person of its founder. Far easier was it for

¹ *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 2, 1.

³ See Socrates and Socratic

² *De Otio*, 6, 5; *Tranq. An. Schools*, p. 231.

philosophy to overcome national dislikes, when the genial Macedonian conqueror had united the vigorous nationalities comprised within his monarchy, not only under the forms of a central government, but also under those of a common culture.¹ Hence the Stoic citizenship of the world may be appealed to, to prove the assertion, that philosophic Schools only reflect the existing facts of history. And, taking into account the bias given to a philosopher's teaching by his personal circumstances, it is clear that Zeno, being only half a Greek, would be more ready to underestimate the distinction of Greek and barbarian than any one of his predecessors.

However much these two causes—and, in particular, the first—must have contributed to bring about the Stoic idea of a citizenship of the world, nevertheless the connection of this idea with the whole of their system is most obvious. If human society, as we have seen, has for its basis the equality of reason in individuals, what ground have we for limiting this society to a single nation? What reason have we to feel ourselves more nearly related to some men than to others? All men, apart from what they have made themselves by their own exertions, are equally near, since all equally participate in reason. All are members of one body; for one and the same nature has fashioned them all from the same elements for the same destiny.² Using religious language,³ Epictetus

¹ This connection is already indicated by Plutarch's grouping the Stoics and Alexander together.

² *Sen. Ep.* 95, 52; *M. Aurel.* See p. 311, note ⁴.

³ *Diss.* i. 13, 3.

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calls all men brethren, since all have in the same degree God for their Father. Man, therefore, who and whatever else he may be, is the object of our solicitude, simply as being a man.¹ No hostility and illtreatment should quench our benevolence.² No one is so low but that he has claims on the love and justice of his fellow-men.³ Even the slave is a man deserving our esteem, and able to claim his rights from us.⁴

¹ *Sen. Ep. 95, 52*: Ex illius [naturæ] constitutione miserius est nocere quam lædi. Ex illius imperio paratæ sint juvantis manus. Ille versus et in pectore et in ore sit: homo sum, nihil humani a me alienum puto. *V. Be. 24, 3*: Hominibus prodesse natura me jubet, et servi liberine sint hi, ingenui an libertini, justæ libertatis an inter amicos datæ, quid refert? Ubicumque homo est, ibi beneficii locus est. *De Clem. i. 1, 3*: Nemo non, cui alia desint, hominis nomine apud me gratus est. *De Ira, i. 5*.

² *Sen. De Otio, i. 4*: Stoici nostri dicunt . . . non desinemus communi bono operam dare, adjuvare singulos, opem ferre etiam inimicis. We shall subsequently meet with similar explanations from Musonius, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. In particular, Seneca's treatise, *De Ira*, deserves to be mentioned here, and especially *i. 5, 2*: Quid homine aliorum amantius? quid ira infestius? Homo in adiutorium mutuum genitus est, ira in exitium. Hic congregari vult, illa discedere. Hic prodesse, illa nocere. Hic etiam ignotis succurrere, illa etiam carissimos perdere. *Ibid. ii.*

32, 1: It is not praiseworthy to return injury for injury, as benefit for benefit. Illic vinci turpe est, hic vincere. Inhumanum verbum est . . . ultio et talio. Magni animi est injurias despiciere. *Conf. Cic. Off. i. 25, 88*: Violent anger towards enemies must be blamed: nihil enim laudabilius, nihil magno et præclaro viro dignius placabilitate atque elementia. Even when severity is necessary, punishment ought not to be administered in anger, since such an emotion cannot be allowed at all.

³ *Sen. Ep. 95, 52*; *Cic. Off. i. 13, 41*.

⁴ *Cic. l. c.*: Even towards slaves, justice must be observed. Here, too, belongs the question, discussed at full by *Sen. Benef. iii. 18-28*, Whether a slave can do a kindness to his master? He who denies that he can, says Seneca (*18, 2*), is ignarus juris humani. Refert enim cujus animi sit, qui præstat, non cujus status: nulli præclusa virtus est, omnibus patet, omnes admittit, omnes invitat, ingenuas, libertinos, servos, reges, exules. Non eligit domum nec censum, nudo homine contenta est. Slavery, he continues, does not affect the whole man. Only

Nor yet did the Stoics go so far in their recognition of the universal rights of mankind as to disapprove of slavery. In fact, the less value they attached to external circumstances,¹ the less they cared to run counter to the social institutions and arrangements of their age. But still they could not suppress a confession that slavery is unjust,² nor cease to aim at mitigating the evil both in theory and practice.³ If all men are, as rational beings, equal, all men together form one community. Reason is the common law for all, and those who owe allegiance to one law are members of one state.⁴ If the Stoics, therefore, compared the world, in its more extended sense, to a society, because of the

the body belongs to his lord ; his heart belongs to himself. The duties of the slave have limits, and over against them stand certain definite rights. He enumerates many instances of self-sacrifice and magnanimity in slaves, and concludes by saying: *Eadem omnibus principia eademque origo, nemo altero nobilior, nisi cui rectius ingenium . . . unus omnium parens mundus est . . . neminem despexeris . . . sive libertini ante vos habentur sive servi sive exterarum homines: erigite audacter animos, et quicquid in medio sordidi est transilite: expectat vos in summo magna nobilitas, &c.* So Ep. 31, 11; V. Be. 24, 3. Conf. Ep. 44: Rank and birth are of no consequence.

¹ Only the wise man is really free; all who are not wise are fools.

² *Diog.* 122, at least, calls *δεσποτεία*, the possession and government of slaves, something bad.

³ According to *Sen. Benef.* iii. 22, 1, *Cic.* l. c., Chrysippus had defined a slave, *perpetuus mercenarius*; and hence inferred that as such he ought to be treated: *operam exigendam, justa præbenda.* *Sen. Ep.* 47, expresses a very humane view of treating slaves. He regards a slave as a friend of lower rank, and, since all men stand under the same higher power, speaks of himself as *conservus*.

⁴ *M. Aurel.* iv. 4: *εἰ τὸ νοερὸν ἡμῶν κοινόν, καὶ ὁ λόγος καθ' ὃν λογικοὶ ἔσμεν κοινός· εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁ προστακτικὸς τῶν ποιητέων ἢ μὴ λόγος κοινός· εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁ νόμος κοινός. εἰ τοῦτο, πολιτεύματος τινος μετέχοντες· εἰ τοῦτο, ὁ κόσμος ὡσανεὶ πόλις ἐστί.*

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connection of its parts,¹ they must have allowed, with far more reason, that the world, in the narrower sense of the term, including all rational beings, forms one community,² to which individual communities are related, as the houses of a city are to the city collectively.³ Wise men, at least, if not others, will esteem this great community, to which all men belong, far above any particular community in which the accident of birth has placed them.⁴ They, at least, will direct their efforts towards making all men feel themselves to be citizens of one community; and, instead of framing exclusive laws and constitutions, will try to live as one

¹ *Plut. Com. Not.* 34, 6, who makes the Stoics assert: τὸν κόσμον εἶναι πόλιν καὶ πολίτας τοὺς ἀστέρας. *M. Aurel.* x. 15: ζῆσον . . . ὡς ἐν πόλει τῷ κόσμῳ. iv. 3: ὁ κόσμος ὥσανει πόλις.

² *M. Aurel.* iv. 4, and ii. 16. *Cic. Fin.* iii. 20, 67: Chrysippus asserts that men exist for the sake of each other; quoniamque ea natura esset hominis ut ei cum genere humano quasi civile jus intercederet, qui id conservaret, eum justum qui migraret, injustum fore. Therefore, in the sequel: in urbe mundove communi. *Sen. De Ira*, ii. 31, 7: Nefas est nocere patriæ: ergo civi quoque . . . ergo et homini, nam hic in majore tibi urbe civis est. Musonius (in *Stob. Floril.* 40, 9): νομίζει [ὁ ἐπιεικής] εἶναι πολίτης τῆς τοῦ Διὸς πόλεως ἢ συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ θεῶν. *Epict. Diss.* iii. 5, 26; *Ar. Didym. in Eus. Pr. Ev.* xv. 15, 1.

³ *M. Aurel.* iii. 11: ἀνθρώπον πολίτην ὄντα πόλεως τῆς ἀνωτάτης ἧς αἱ λοιπαὶ πόλεις ὥσπερ οἰκίαι εἰσὶν.

⁴ *Sen. De Ot.* 4; *Ep.* 68, 2. *Vit. B.* 20, 3 and 5: Unum me donavit omnibus [natura rerum] et uni mihi omnis . . . patriam meam esse mundum sciam et præsides Deos. *Tranq. An.* 4, 4: Ideo magno animo nos non unius urbis mœnibus clusimus, sed in totius orbis commercium emisimus patriamque nobis mundum professi sumus, ut liceret latiore virtuti campum dare. *Epict. Diss.* iii. 22, 83. *Ibid.* i. 9: If the doctrine that man is related to God is true, man is neither an Athenian nor a Corinthian, but simply κόσμος and υἱὸς Θεοῦ. *Muson.* l. c.: Banishment is no evil, since κοινὴ πατρὶς ἀνθρώπων ἀπάντων ὁ κόσμος ἐστίν. It is, says *Cic. Parad.* 2, no evil for those qui omnem orbem terrarum unam urbem esse ducunt.

family, under the common governance of reason.¹ The platform of social propriety receives hereby a universal width. Man, by withdrawing from the outer world into the recesses of his own intellectual and moral state, becomes enabled to recognise everywhere the same nature as his own, and to feel himself one with the universe, by sharing with it the same nature and the same destiny.

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But, as yet, the moral problem is not exhausted. Reason, the same as man's, rules pure and complete in the universe; and if it is the business of man to give play to reason in his own conduct, and to recognise it in that of others, it is also his duty to subordinate himself to collective reason, and to the course of the world, over which it presides. In conclusion, therefore, the relation of man to the course of the world must be considered.

C. Man
and the
course of
the world.

However decidedly the Stoics may, in principle, insist upon social propriety of conduct, this demand for propriety resolves itself really into a demand for absolute resignation to the course of the universe, and is based quite as much upon the historical surroundings of their system as upon its intellectual principles. How, in an age in which political freedom was stifled by the oppression of Macedonian, and subsequently of Roman dominion, even the

(1) Sub-
mission to
the course
of nature.

¹ *Plut. Alex. M. Virt. i. 6*: καὶ μὴν ἡ πολλὴ θαυμάσιον πολιτεία τοῦ τὴν Στωϊκῶν αἵρεσιν καταβυλλομένου Ζήνωνος εἰς ἓν τοῦτο συντείνει κεφάλαιον, ἵνα μὴ κατὰ πόλεις μὴδὲ κατὰ δήμους οἰκῶμεν,

ἰδίοις ἕκαστοι διωρισμένοι δικαίοις, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἡγώμεθα δημότας καὶ πολίτας, εἰς δὲ βίος ἡ καὶ κόσμος, ὥσπερ ἀγέλης συννόμου νόμῳ κοῖνῃ τρεφόμενης.

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Roman conquerors surrendering themselves to the despotism of an empire, in which Might, like a living fate, crushed every attempt at independent action—how, in such an age, could those aiming at a higher object than mere personal gratification have any alternative but to resign themselves placidly to the course of circumstances which individuals and nations were alike powerless to control? In making a dogma of fatalism, Stoicism was only following the current of the age. At the same time, as will be seen from what has been said, it was only drawing the necessary inferences from its own principles. All that is individual in the world being only a consequence of a general connection of cause and effect—being only a carrying out of a universal law—what remains possible, in the face of this absolute necessity, but to yield unconditionally? How can yielding be called a sacrifice, when the law to which we yield is nothing less than the expression of reason? Hence resignation to the world's course was a point chiefly insisted upon in the Stoic doctrine of morality. The verses of Cleanthes,¹ in which he submits without reserve to the leading of destiny, are a theme repeatedly worked out by the writers of this School. The virtuous man, they say, will honour God by submitting his will to the divine

¹ In *Epictet.* Man. c. 53; more fully, *Ibid.* Diss. iv. 1, 131; 4, 34; and translated by *Sen.* Ep. 107, 11. The verses are:
 ἄγου δέ μ' ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ σύ γ' ἦ Πεπρω-
 μένη

ἅποι ποθ' ὑμῖν εἰμι διατεταγ-
 μένος·
 ὥς ἔψομαι γ' ἄοκνος· ἦν δὲ μὴ
 θέλω
 κακὸς γενόμενος οὐδὲν ἥττον ἔψο-
 μαι.

will; God's will he will think better than his own will; he will remember that under all circumstances we must follow destiny, but that it is the wise man's prerogative to follow of his own accord; that there is only one way to happiness and independence—that of willing nothing except what is in the nature of things, and what will realise itself independently of our will.¹

Similar expressions are not wanting amongst other philosophers; nevertheless, by the Stoic philosophy, the demand is pressed with particular force, and is closely connected with its whole view of the world. In resignation to destiny, the Stoic picture of the wise man is completed. Resignation involves that peace and happiness of mind, that gentleness and friendliness, that idea of duty, and that harmony of life, which together make up the Stoic definition of virtue.² Morality begins by recognising the

¹ *Sen. Prov.* 5, 4 and 8: *Boni viri laborant, impendunt, impenduntur, et volentes quidem, non trahuntur a fortuna, etc.* . . . *Quid est boni viri? Præbere se fato. Vit. Be.* 15, 5: *Deum sequere.* . . . *Quæ autem dementia est, potius trahi quam sequi?* . . . *Quicquid ex universi constitutione patiendum est, magno excipiat animo. Ad hoc sacramentum adacti sumus, ferre mortalia.* . . . *In regno nati sumus: Deo parere libertas est.* *Ep.* 97, 2: *Non pareo Deo, sed adsentior. Ex animo illum, non quia necesse est, sequor, etc.* *Ep.* 74, 20; 76, 23; 107, 9. *Epictet. Diss.* ii. 16, 42: *τόλμησον ἀναβλέψας πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι χρῶ μοι λοιπὸν εἰς*

ὃ ἂν θέλῃς· ὁμογνωμονῶ σοι, σὸς εἰμι. οὐδὲν παραιτοῦμαι τῶν σοι δοκούντων· ὅπου θέλεις, ἔγωγε. i. 12, 7: The virtuous man submits his will to that of God, as a good citizen obeys the law. *iv.* 7, 20: *κρεῖττον γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι ὃ ὁ θεὸς θέλει, ἢ [δ] ἐγώ.* *iv.* 1, 131, in reference to the verses of Cleantes: *αὐτῇ ἢ ὁδῷ ἐπ' ἐλευθερίαν ἔγει, αὐτῇ μόνῃ ἀπαλλαγῇ δουλείας.* *Man.* 8: *θέλε γίνεσθαι τὰ γινόμενα ὥς γίνεται καὶ εὐρήσεις.* *Fragm.* 134. *M. Aurel.* x. 28: *μόνῃ τῇ λογικῇ ζῶω δέδοται τὸ ἐκουσίως ἔπεσθαι τοῖς γινόμενοις· τὸ δὲ ἔπεσθαι ψιλὸν πᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖον.* *Ibid.* viii. 45; x. 14.

² *Sen. Ep.* 120, 11, investigates the question, How does mankind

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XII.2) *Suicide.*

existence of a general law; it ends by unconditionally submitting itself to the ordinances of that law.

The one case in which this resignation would give place to active resistance to destiny is when man is placed in circumstances calling for undignified action or endurance.¹ Properly speaking, the first case can never happen, since, from the Stoic platform, no state of life can be imagined which might not serve as an occasion for virtuous conduct. It does, however, seem possible that even the wise man may be placed by fortune in positions which are for him unendurable; and in this case he is allowed to withdraw from them by suicide.² The importance of this point for the Stoic ethics will become manifest from the language of Seneca, who asserts that the independence of the wise man from externals

arrive at the conception of virtue? and replies, By the sight of virtuous men. Ostendit illam nobis ordo ejus et decor et constantia et omnium inter se actionum concordia et magnitudo super omnia efferens sese. Hinc intellecta est illa beata vita, secundo defluens cursu, arbitrii sui tota. Quomodo ergo hoc ipsum nobis adparuit? Dicam: Nunquam vir ille perfectus adeptusque virtutem fortunæ maledixit. Nunquam accidentia tristis excepit. Civem esse se universi et militem credens labores velut imperatos subiit. Quicquid inciderat, non tanquam malum aspernatus est, et in se casu delatum, sed quasi delegatum sibi. . . . Necessario itaque magnus adparuit, qui nunquam malis in-

gemuit, nunquam de fato suo questus est: fecit multis intellectum sui et non aliter quam in tenebris lumen effulsit, advertitque in se omnium animos, cum esset placidus et lenis, humanis divinisque rebus pariter æquus, &c.

¹ Conf. *Baumhauer*, Vet. Phil. præcipue Stoicorum Doct. de Mor. Volunt.: Ut. 1842.

² *Diog.* vii. 130: εὐλόγως τέ φασιν ἐξάξειν ἑαυτὸν τοῦ βίου τὸν σοφὸν καὶ ὑπὲρ πατρίδος καὶ ὑπὲρ φίλων κἂν ἐν σκληροτέρᾳ γένηται ἀλγηδόνι ἢ πηρώσειν ἢ νόσοις ἀνιάτοις. *Stob.* Ecl. ii. 226. Conf. the comædian Sopater, in *Athen.* iv. 160, who makes a master threaten to sell his slave to Zeno ἐπ' ἐξαγωγῇ.

depends, among other things, on his being able to leave life at pleasure.¹ To Seneca, the deed of the younger Cato appears not only praiseworthy, but the crowning-point of success over destiny, the highest triumph of the human will.² By the chief teachers of the Stoic School this doctrine was carried into practice. Zeno, in old age, hung himself, because he had broken his finger; Cleanthes, for a still less cause, continued his abstinence till he died of starvation, in order to traverse the whole way to death; and, in later times, the example of Zeno and Cleanthes was followed by Antipater.³

In these cases, suicide appears not only as a way of escape, possible under circumstances, but absolutely as the highest expression of moral freedom. Whilst all are far from being required to adopt this course,⁴ everyone is required to embrace the opportunity of

¹ Ep. 12, 10: *Malum est in necessitate vivere. Sed in necessitate vivere necessitas nulla est. Quidni nulla sit? Patent undique ad libertatem viæ multæ, breves, faciles. Agamus Deo gratias, quod nemo in vita teneri potest. Calcare ipsas necessitates licet. Id. Prov. c. 5, 6, makes a God say: Contemnite mortem quæ vos aut finit aut transfert. . . . Ante omnia cavi, ne quis vos teneret invitos. Patet exitus. . . . Nihil feci facilius, quam mori. Prono animam loco posui. Trahitur. Attendite modo et videbitis, quam brevis ad libertatem et quam expedita ducat via, &c. Ep. 70, 14: He who denies the right of committing*

suicide non videt se libertatis viam eludere. Nil melius æterna lex fecit, quam quod unum introitum nobis ad vitam dedit, exitus multos. Ep. 65, 22; 117, 21; 120, 14; M. Aurel. v. 29; viii. 47; x. 8 and 32; iii. 1; Epictet. Diss. i. 24, 20; iii. 24, 95.

² De Prov. 2, 9; Ep. 71, 16.

³ In the passages already quoted.

⁴ See Epictetus' discussion of suicide committed simply to despise life (Diss. i. 9, 10), against which he brings to bear the rule to resign oneself to the will of God. ii. 15, 4; *M. Aurel.* v. 10. Conf. *Plato*, Phæd. 61, 2.

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dying with glory, when no higher duties bind him to life.¹ Everyone is urged, in case of need, to receive death at his own hand, as a pledge of his independence. Nor are cases of need decided by what really makes a man unhappy—moral vice or folly. Vice and folly must be met by other means. Death is no deliverance from them, since it makes the bad no better. The only satisfactory reason which the Stoics recognised for taking leave of life is, when circumstances over which we have no control make continuance in life no longer desirable.²

Such circumstances may be found in the greatest variety of things. Cato committed suicide because of the downfall of the republic; Zeno, because of a slight injury received. According to Seneca, it is a sufficient reason for committing suicide to anticipate merely a considerable disturbance in our life and peace of mind.³ Weakness of age, incurable disease, a weakening of the powers of the mind, a great degree of want, the tyranny of a despot, from which there is no escape, justifies us—and even, under circumstances, obliges us—to have recourse to this remedy.⁴

¹ Muson. in *Stob.* Floril. 7, 24, says: ἄρπαξε τὸ καλῶς ἀποθνήσκειν ὅτε ἔξεστι, μὴ μετὰ μικρὸν τὸ μὲν ἀποθνήσκειν σοι παρῇ, τὸ δὲ καλῶς μηκέτι ἐξῇ; and, again: He who by living is of use to many, ought not to choose to die, unless by death he can be of use to more.

² *M. Aurel.* v. 29: Even here you may live as though you were free from the body: εἴαν δὲ μὴ ἐπιτρέπωσι, τότε καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἐξιθί.

οὕτως μέντοι ὥς μηδὲν κακὸν πάσχω.

³ Ep. 70. *Clem. Strom.* iv. 485, A, likewise speaks of the restriction of rational action as the really deciding reason: αὐτίκα ἐβλογον ἐξαγωγὴν τῷ σπουδαίῳ συγχωροῦσι καὶ οἱ φιλόσοφοι, εἴ τις τοῦ πράσσειν αὐτὸν οὕτως τηρήσειεν, ὥς μηκέτι ἀπολελείφθαι αὐτῷ μηδὲ ἐλπίδα τῆς πράξεως.

⁴ Ep. 58, 33; 98, 16; 17, 9; *De Ira*, iii. 15, 3.

Seneca, indeed, maintains that a philosopher should never commit suicide in order to escape suffering, but only to withdraw from restrictions in following out the aim of his life; but he is nevertheless of opinion that anyone may rightly choose an easier mode of death, instead of a more painful one in prospect—thus avoiding a freak of destiny and the cruelty of man.¹ Besides pain and sickness, Diogenes also mentions a case in which suicide becomes a duty, for the sake of others.² According to another authority,³ five cases were enumerated by the Stoics in which it was allowed to put oneself to death, if, by so doing, a real service could be rendered to another—the case of sacrificing oneself for one's country, or else to avoid being compelled to an unlawful action; otherwise, on the ground of poverty, chronic illness, or incipient weakness of mind.

In nearly all these cases, the things referred to belonged to the class of things which were reckoned as indifferent by the Stoics; and hence arises the apparent paradox, with which their opponents immediately twitted them, that no absolute and moral evils, but only outward circumstances, are admitted as justifying suicide.⁴ The paradox, however, loses

¹ See Ep. 58, 36, and 70, 11.

² See p. 316, note ².

³ Olympiod. in *Phædr.* 3 (Schol. in Arist. 7, b, 25). The favourite comparison of life to a banquet is here so carried out, that the five occasions for suicide are compared with five occasions for leaving a banquet.

⁴ *Plut.* C. Not. 11, 1: παρὰ τὴν ἔννοιάν ἐστιν, ἄνθρωπον ᾧ πάντα τὰγαθὰ πάρεστι καὶ μηδὲν ἐνδεῖ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ τὸ μακάριον, τούτῳ καθήκειν ἐξάγειν ἑαυτόν· ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον, ᾧ μηθὲν ἀγαθόν ἐστι μηδ' ἔσται τὰ δὲ δεινὰ πάντα καὶ τὰ δυσχερῆ καὶ κακὰ πάρεστι καὶ πάρεσται διὰ τέλους, τούτῳ

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its point when it is remembered that, to the Stoics, life and death are quite as much indifferent as all other external things.¹ To them, nothing really good appears to be involved in the question of suicide—the question being, How to choose between two things morally indifferent, between life and death, one of which is preferable to the other only whilst the essential conditions for a life according to nature are satisfied?² The philosopher, therefore, says Seneca,³ chooses his mode of death just as he chooses a ship for a journey or a house to live in.

μὴ καθήκειν ἀπολέγεσθαι τὸν βίον
ἀν μὴ τι νῆ Δία τῶν ἀδιαφόρων
αὐτῷ προσγένηται. *Ibid.* 22, 7;
33, 3; *Sto. Rep.* 14, 3; *Alex.*
Ap̄hr. De An. 156, b; 158, b.

¹ *Plut.* *Sto. Rep.* 18, 5: ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὧς, φασιν, οἴεται δεῖν Χρύσιππος οὔτε μονὴν ἐν τῷ βίῳ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, οὔτ' ἐξαγωγήν τοῖς κακοῖς παραμετρεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μέσοις κατὰ φύσιν. διὸ καὶ τοῖς εὐδαιμονοῦσι γίνεται ποτὲ καθήκον ἐξάγειν ἑαυτοὺς, καὶ μένειν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ ζῆν τοῖς κακοδαιμονοῦσιν. *Ibid.* 14, 3. *Sen.* Ep. 70, 5: Simul atque occurrunt molesta et tranquillitatem turbantia, emittet se. Nec hoc tantum in necessitate ultima facit, sed cum primum illi cœpit suspecta esse fortuna, diligenter circumspicit, numquid illo die desinendum sit. Nihil existimat sua referre, faciat finem an accipiat, tardius fiat an citius. Non tanquam de magno detrimento timet: nemo multum ex stillicidio potest perdere. *Conf.* 77, 6.

² *Cic.* *Fin.* iii. 18, 60: Sed cum ab his [the media] omnia proficiscantur officia, non sine causa

dicitur, ad ea referri omnes nostras cogitationes; in his et excessum e vita et in vita mansionem. In quo enim plura sunt, quæ secundum naturam sunt, hujus officium est in vita manere: in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria aut fore videntur, hujus officium est e vita excedere. E quo apparet, et sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, cum beatus sit, et stulti manere in vita, cum sit miser. . . . Et quoniam excedens e vita et manens æque miser est [stultus], nec diuturnitas magis e vitam fugiendam facit, non sine causa dicitur iis qui pluribus naturalibus frui possint esse in vita manendum. *Stob.* 226: The good may have reasons for leaving life, the bad for continuing in life, even though they never should become wise: οὔτε γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν κατέχειν ἐν τῷ ζῆν, οὔτε τὴν κακίαν ἐκβάλλειν τοῖς δὲ καθήκουσι καὶ τοῖς παρὰ τὸ καθήκον μετρεῖσθαι τὴν τε ζωὴν καὶ τὸν θάνατον.

³ Ep. 70, 11.

He leaves life as he would leave a banquet—when it is time. He lays aside his body when it no longer suits him, as he would lay aside worn-out clothes; and withdraws from life as he would from a house no longer weather-proof.¹

A very different question, however, is that, whether life can be treated in this way as something indifferent, and whether the attempt to evade what destiny, with its unalterable laws, has decreed for us, can be reconciled with an unconditional resignation to the course of the world. Stoicism may, indeed, allow this course of action. But does not the difficulty here suggested prove the impossibility of ever uniting two tendencies so different as that towards individual independence and that towards submission to the universe, without involving some inconsistencies, greater or less?

¹ Teles. in *Stob.* Floril. 5, 67.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE RELATION OF THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION.

CHAP.
XIII.

*A. General
connection
of Stoic-
ism and
religion.*

IT would be impossible to give a full account of the philosophy of the Stoics without, at the same time, treating of their theology; for no early system is so closely connected with religion as that of the Stoics. Founded, as their whole view of the world is, upon the theory of one Divine Being—begetting from Himself and containing in Himself all finite creatures, upholding them by His might, ruling them according to an unalterable law, and thus manifesting Himself everywhere—their philosophy bears in general a decidedly religious tone. There is hardly a single prominent feature in the Stoic system which is not, more or less, connected with theology. A very considerable portion of that system, moreover, consists of strictly theological questions; such as arguments for the existence of God, and for the rule of Providence; investigations into the nature of God, his government, and presence in the world; into the relation of human activity to the divine ordinances; and all the various questions connected with the terms freedom and necessity. The natural science of the Stoics begins by evolving things from God;

it ends with resolving them again into God. God is thus the beginning and end of the world's development. And, in like manner, their moral theory begins with the notion of divine law, which, in the form of eternal reason, controls the actions of men; and ends by requiring submission to the will of God, and resignation to the course of the universe. A religious sanction is thus given to all moral duties. All virtuous actions are a fulfilment of the divine will and the divine law. That citizenship of the world, in particular, which constitutes the highest point in the Stoic morality, is connected with the notion of a common relationship of all men to God. Again, that inward repose of the philosopher, those feelings of freedom and independence, on which so much stress was laid, rest principally on the conviction that man is related to God. In a word, Stoicism is not only a philosophic, but also a religious system. As such it was regarded by its first adherents, as the fragments of Cleanthes prove;¹ and as such, together with Platonism, it afforded in subsequent times, to the best and most cultivated men, a substitute for declining natural religion, a satisfaction for religious cravings, and a support for moral life, wherever the influence of Greek culture extended.

¹ The well-known hymn to Zeus, in *Stob. Ecl.* i. 30. Nor is the poetic form used by Cleanthes without importance. He asserted, at least according to *Philodem. De Mus.* Vol. Herc. i. col. 28: ἀμείνονά γε εἶναι τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ μουσικὰ παραδείγματα καὶ τοῦ λό-

γου τοῦ τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ἱκανῶς μὲν ἐξαγγέλλειν δυναμένου τὰ θεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα, μὴ ἔχοντος δὲ ψιλοῦ τῶν θείων μεγεθῶν λέξεις οἰκείας. τὰ μέτρα καὶ τὰ μέλη καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς ὡς μάλιστα προσικνεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῆς τῶν θείων θεωρίας.

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XIII.(1) *Con-
nection of
Stoicism
with po-
pular faith.*

In itself, this philosophic religion is quite independent of the traditional religion. The Stoic philosophy contains no feature of importance which we can pronounce with certainty to be taken from the popular faith. Even the true worship of God, according to their view, consists only in the mental effort to know God, and in a moral and pious life.¹ A really acceptable prayer can have no reference to external goods; it can only have for its object a virtuous and devout mind.² At the same time, there were reasons which led the Stoics to seek a closer union with the popular faith. Attaching a great importance to general opinion, particularly in the attempt to prove the existence of God,³ they could not, without extreme danger to themselves, declare the current opinions about the Gods erroneous. Moreover, the ethical basis of the Stoic philosophy imposed on them the duty of supporting, rather than destroying, the popular creed—that creed forming a barrier against the violence of human passions.⁴ The practical value of the popular faith

¹ Compare the celebrated dictum of the Stoic in *Cic. N. D.* ii. 28, 71: *Cultus autem Deorum est optimus idemque castissimus plenissimusque pietatis, ut eos semper pura integra incorrupta et mente et voce veneremur*; and *Epict. Man.* 31, 1: *τῆς περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς εὐσεβείας ἴσθι ὅτι τὸ κυριώτατον ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν, ὁρθὰς ὑπολήψεις περὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν . . . καὶ σαυτὸν εἰς τοῦτο κατατεταχέναι, τὸ πείθεσθαι αὐτοῖς καὶ εἰκεῖν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς γινομένοις, κ.τ.λ.* *Id.* *Diss.* ii. 18, 19.

² *M. Aurel.* ix. 40: We ought not to pray the Gods to give us something, or to protect us from something, but only to pray: *διδόναι αὐτοὺς τὸ μῆτε φοβεῖσθαι τι τούτων μῆτε ἐπιθυμεῖν τίνος τούτων.* *Diog.* vii. 124: We ought only to pray for what is good.

³ *Sext. Math.* ix. 28, says that some of the younger Stoics traced the belief in Gods back to the golden age.

⁴ In this spirit, *Epict. Diss.* ii. 20, 32, blames those who throw doubts on the popular Gods,

may, then, be the principal cause of their theological orthodoxy. Just as the Romans—long after all faith in the Gods had been lost under the influence of Greek culture¹—found it still necessary and useful to uphold the traditional faith, so the Stoics may have feared that, were the worship of the people's Gods to be suspended, that respect for God and the divine law on which they depended for the support of their own moral tenets would, at the same time, be exterminated.

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Meantime, they did not deny that much in the popular belief could not harmonise with their principles; and that both the customary forms of religious worship, and also the mythical representations of the Gods, were altogether untenable. So little did they conceal their strictures, that it is clear that conviction, and not fear (there being no longer occasion for fear), was the cause of their leaning towards tradition. Zeno spoke with contempt of the erection of sacred edifices; for how can a thing be holy which is erected by builders and labourers?² Seneca denies the good of prayer.³ He considers it absurd to entertain fear for the Gods, those ever-beneficent beings.⁴ He would have God

(2) *Free criticism of popular belief.*

without considering that by so doing they deprive many of the preservative from evil.

¹ Characteristic are the utterances of the sceptic pontifex Cotta, in *Cic. N. D.* i. 22, 61; iii. 2.

² *Plut. Sto. Rep.* 6, 1; *Diog.* vii. 33.

³ *Ep.* 41, 1: Non sunt ad

cælum elevandæ manus nec exorandus ædituus, ut nos ad aures simulacri, quasi magis exaudiri possimus, admittat: prope est a te Deus, tecum est, intus est. *Nat. Qu.* ii. 35, 1: What is the meaning of expiations, if fate is unchangeable? They are only ægræ mentis solatia.

⁴ *Benef.* iv. 19, 1: Deos nemo

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worshippéd, not by sacrifices and ceremonies, but by purity of life; not in temples of stone, but in the shrine of the heart.¹ He speaks with strong disapprobation of pictures of the Gods, and the devotion paid to them;² with bitter ridicule of the unworthy fables of mythology;³ and he calls the

sanus timet. Furor est enim metuere salutaria nec quisquam amat quos timet. Not only do the Gods not wish to do harm, but such is their nature that they cannot do harm. De Ira, ii. 27, 1; Benef. vii. 1, 7; Ep. 95, 49. It hardly needs remark, how greatly these statements are at variance with the Roman religion, the prominent feature in which was fear.

¹ Ep. 95, 47: Quomodo sint Di colendi, solet præcipi: accendere aliquem lucernas sabbatis prohibeamus, quoniam nec lumine Di egent et ne homines quidem delectantur fuligine. Vetemus salutationibus matutinis fungi et foribus adsidere templorum: humana ambitio istis officiis capitur: Deum colit, qui novit. Vetemus lintea et strigiles ferre et speculum tenere Junoni: non quærit ministros Deus. Quidni? Ipse humano generi ministrat, ubique et omnibus præsto est. . . . Primus est Deorum cultus Deos credere. Deinde reddere illis majestatem suam, reddere bonitatem, &c. Vis Deos propitiare? Bonus esto. Satis illos coluit, quisquis imitatus est. Fr. 123 (in *Lactant.* Inst. vi. 25, 3): Vultisne vos Deum cogitare magnum et placidum . . . non immolationibus et sanguine multo colendum—quæ enim ex trucidatione immerentium voluptas est?

—sed mente pura, bono honestoque proposito. Non templa illi congestis in altitudinem saxis extruenda sunt: in suo cuique consecrandus est pectore. Conf. Benef. vii. 7, 3: The only worthy temple of God is the universe.

² In Fr. 120 (in *Lact.* ii. 2, 14), Seneca shows how absurd it is to pray and kneel before images, the makers of which are thought little of in their own profession. On this point, he expressed his opinion with great severity in the treatise, De Superstitione, fragments of which *August.* Civ. D. vi. 10, communicates. The immortal Gods, he there says, are transformed into lifeless elements. They are clothed in the shape of men and beasts, and other most extraordinary appearances; and are honoured as Gods, though, were they alive, they would be designated monsters. The manner, too, in which these Gods are honoured is most foolish and absurd; such as by mortification and mutilation, stupid and immoral plays, &c. The wise man can only take part in such acts tanquam legibus jussa, non tanquam Diis grata. This view of worship had been previously set forth by Heraclitus.

³ Fr. 119 (in *Lact.* i. 16, 10): Quid ergo est, quare apud poëtas salacissimus Jupiter desierit li-

popular Gods, without reserve, creations of superstition, whom the philosopher only invokes because it is the custom to do so.¹ Moreover, the Stoic in Cicero, and the elder authorities there quoted, allow that the popular belief and the songs of the poets are full of superstition and foolish legends.² Chrysippus is expressly said to have declared the distinction of sex among the Gods, and other features, in which they are compared to men, to be childish fancies.³ Zeno denied any real existence to the popular Gods, transferring their names to natural objects;⁴ and Aristo⁵ is charged with having denied shape and sensation to the Deity.⁶

beros tollere? Utrum sexagenarius factus est, et illi lex Papia fibulam imposuit? An impetravit jus trium liberorum? An . . . timet, nequis sibi faciat, quod ipse Saturno? Fr. 39 (in *August. l. c.*); Brent. Vit. 16, 5; Vit. Be. 26, 6.

¹ *August. l. c.* Fr. 33: Quid ergo tandem? Veriora tibi videntur T. Tatii aut Romuli aut Tulli Hostilii somnia? Cloacinam Tatius dedicavit Deam, Picum Tiberinumque Romulus, Hostilius Pavorem atque Pallorem, teterrimos hominum adfectus. . . . Hæc numina potius credes et cælo recipies? Fr. 39: Omnem istam ignobilem Deorum turbam, quam longo ævo longa superstitione congestit, sic adorabimus ut meminerimus cultum ejus magis ad morem quam ad rem pertinere.

² N. D. ii. 24, 63: Alia quoque ex ratione et quidem physica fluxit multitudo Deorum; qui induti specie humana fabulas poetis

suppeditaverunt hominum autem vitam superstitione omni refererunt. Atque hic locus a Zenone tractatus post a Cleanthe et Chrysippo pluribus verbis explicatus est . . . physica ratio non inelegans inclusa est in impiis fabulas. Still stronger language is used by the Stoics, c. 28, 70, respecting the commentitii et ficti Dei, the superstitiones pæne aniles, the futilitas summaque levitas of their anthropomorphic legends.

³ *Phædrus* (Philodemus), col. 2 of his fragment, according to Petersen's restoration. Conf. *Cic. N. D.* ii. 17, 45; *Diog.* vii. 147; both of whom assert that the Stoics do not think of the Gods as human in form; and *Lactant. De Ir. D. c.* 18: Stoici negant habere ullam formam Deum.

⁴ The Epicurean in *Cic. N. D.* i. 14, 36.

⁵ *Cic. l. c.* 37. Conf. *Krische, Forschung.* i. 406 and 415.

⁶ *Clem.*, indeed, says (*Strom.*

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The Stoics were, nevertheless, not disposed to give up the current beliefs. Far from it, they thought to discover germs of truth in these beliefs, however inadequate they were; and they accordingly made it their business to give a relative vindication to the existing creed. Holding that the name God belongs, in its full and original sense, only to the one primary Being, they did not hesitate to apply it, in a limited and derivative sense, to all those objects by means of which the divine power is especially manifested. Nay, more, in consideration of man's relationship to God, they found it not unreasonable to deduce from the primary Being Gods bearing a resemblance to men.¹ Hence they distinguished, as Plato had done, between the eternal and immutable God and Gods created and transitory,² between God the Creator and Sovereign of the world and subordinate Gods;³ in other words, between the universal divine power as a Unity working in the world, and its individual parts and manifestations.⁴

vii. 720, D): οὐδὲ αἰσθήσεων αὐτῶ [τῷ θεῷ] δεῖ, καθάπερ ἤρεσε τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς, μάλιστα ἀκοῆς καὶ ὕψεως· μὴ γὰρ δύνασθαι ποτε ἑτέρως ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι. But, according to all accounts, this must be a misapprehension. Clement confounds what Stoic writers have conditionally asserted, for the purpose of disproving it, with their real opinion.

¹ *Plut.* Plac. i. 6, 16, in a description of the Stoic theology, evidently borrowed from a good source: The Gods have been represented as being like men:

διότι τῶν μὲν πάντων τὸ θεῖον κυριώτατον, τῶν δὲ ζώων ἄνθρωπος κάλλιστον καὶ κεκοσμημένον ἀρετῇ διαφόρως κατὰ τὴν τοῦ νοῦ συνίστασιν, τοῖς οὖν ἀριστεύουσιν τὸ κράτιστον ὁμοίως καὶ καλῶς ἔχειν διανοήθησαν.

² *Plut.* St. Rep. 38, 5; C. Not. 31, 5; Def. Orac. 19.

³ The numina, quæ singula adoramus et colimus, which are dependent on the Deus omnium Deorum, and whom ministros regni sui genuit. *Sen.* Fr. 26, 16 (in *Lact. Inst.* i. 5, 26).

⁴ *Diog.* vii. 147.

The former they denoted by the term Zeus; to the latter, they applied the names of the other subordinate Gods.

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The divinity of many beings was recognised by the Stoics in this derivative sense, and, in particular, the divinity of the stars, which Plato had called created Gods, which Aristotle had described as eternal divine beings, and the worship of which lay so near to the ancient cultus of nature. Not only by their lustre and effect on the senses, but far more by the regularity of their motions, do these stars prove that the material of which they consist is the purest, and that, of all created objects, they have the largest share in the divine reason.¹ And so seriously was this belief held by the Stoics, that a philosopher of the type of Cleanthes went so far as to charge Aristarchus of Samos, the discoverer of the earth's motion round the sun, with impiety, on the ground that he wished to remove the hearth of the universe from its proper place.² This deification of the stars prepares us to find years, months, and seasons called Gods,³ as was really done by Zeno. At the same time, it must not be forgotten that the Stoics referred these times and seasons to heavenly bodies, as their material embodiments.⁴

(3) *The truth in Polytheism.*

As the stars are the first manifestation, so the elements are the first particular forms of the Divine Being, and the most common materials for the exercise of the divine powers. It is, however,

¹ See p. 194, note 2.

² *Cic. N. D. i. 14, 36.*

³ *Plut. De Fac. Lun. 6, 3.*

⁴ See p. 126.

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becoming that the all-pervading divine mind should not only be honoured in its primary state, but likewise in its various derivative forms, as air, water, earth, and fire.¹

All other things too, which, by their utility to man, display in a high degree the beneficent power of God, appeared to the Stoics to deserve divine honours, those honours not being paid to the things themselves, but to the powers active within them. They did not, therefore, hesitate to give the names of Gods to fruits and wine, and other gifts of the Gods.²

How, then, could they escape the inference that, among other beneficent beings, the heroes of antiquity, in particular, deserve religious honours, since in these benefactors of mankind, of whom legends tell, the Divine Spirit did not show Himself under the lower form of a *ἕξις*, as in the elements, nor yet as simple *φύσις*, as in plants, but as a rational soul? And, in truth, according to the Stoic view—which, on this point, agrees with the well-known theory of Euemerus—such deified men had, in a great measure, contributed to swell the mass of the popular Gods; nor had the Stoics themselves any objection to their worship.³ Add to this the per-

¹ *Cic. N. D.* i. 15, 39; ii. 26; *Diog.* vii. 147.

² *Plut. De Is.* c. 66; *Cic. l. c.* ii. 23, 60; i. 15, 38, in which this view is attributed, in particular, to Zeno's pupil Persæus. *Krische* (Forschung. i. 442) reminds, with justice, of the assertion of Pro-

dicus, that the ancients deified everything which was of use to man.

³ *Phædr.* (Philodemus), *Nat. De. col.* 3, and *Cic. N. D.* i. 15, 38, attribute this assertion specially to Persæus and Chrysippus. *Id.* ii. 24, 64, after speaking of the

sonification of human qualities and states of mind,¹ and it will be seen what ample opportunity the Stoics had for recognising everywhere in nature and in the world of man divine agencies and powers, and, consequently, Gods in the wider sense of the term.² When once it had been allowed that the name of God might be diverted from the Being to whom it properly belonged and applied, in a derivative sense, to what is impersonal and a mere

deification of Hercules, Bacchus, Romulus, &c., continues: *Quorum cum remanerent animi atque æternitate fruerentur, Dii rite sunt habiti, cum et optimi essent et æterni.* *Diog.* vii. 151.

¹ This is done in *Plut.* *Plac.* i. 6, 9. Belief in the Gods, it is there said, is held in three forms—the physical, the mythical, and the form established by law. All the Gods belong to seven classes: (1) τὸ ἐκ τῶν φαινόμενων καὶ μετεώρων: the observation of the stars, and their regularity of movement, the changes of season, &c., has conducted many to faith; and, accordingly, heaven and earth, sun and moon, have been honoured. (2 and 3) τὸ βλέπτον καὶ ὠφελοῦν: beneficent Beings are Zeus, Here, Hermes, Demeter; baleful Beings are the Erinnyes, Ares, &c. (4 and 5) πράγματα, such as Ἑλπις, Δίκη, Εὐνομία; and πάθη, such as Ἔρως, Ἀφροδίτη, Πόθος. (6) τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πεπλασμένον, such as the Gods invented by Hesiod for the purpose of his genealogies—Coios, Hyperion, &c. (7) Men who are honoured for their services to mankind—Hercules, the

Dioscouri, Dionysus. This list only contains those Beings who have received divine honours, not those to whom such honours are due; and hence it includes beings whom the Stoics can never have regarded as Gods, such as the baleful Gods and emotions. On the other hand, they could raise no objection to the worship of personified virtues. In the above list, the Gods of the elements, such as Here, are grouped, together with the Gods of fruits, under the category of useful. Another grouping was that followed by Dionysius, who, according to Tertullian (*Ad Nat.* ii. 2), divided Gods into three classes: the visible—the sun and moon, for instance; the invisible, or powers of nature—Neptune and the elements; and those *facti*, or deified men.

² *Plut.* *Com. Not.* 31, 5: ἀλλὰ Χρυσίππος καὶ Κλεάνθης, ἐμπεπηκότες, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τῷ λόγῳ θεῶν τὸν οὐρανὸν, τὴν γῆν, τὸν ἄέρα, τὴν θάλατταν, οὐδένα τῶν τοσούτων ἀφθαρτον οὐδ' αἰδιον ἀπολεοίπασιν πλὴν μόνου τοῦ Διὸς, εἰς δὲ πάντας καταναλίσκουσι τοὺς ἄλλους.

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XIII.(4) *Doc-
trine of
demons.*

manifestation of divine power, the door was opened to everything; and, with such concessions, the Stoic system could graft into itself even the most exceptional forms of polytheism.

With the worship of heroes is also connected the doctrine of demons.¹ The soul, according to the Stoic view already set forth, is of divine origin, a part of and emanation from God. Or, distinguishing more accurately in the soul one part from the rest, to reason, as the governing part, this honour only belongs. Now, since reason alone protects man from evil, and conducts him to happiness—this, too, was the popular belief—reason may be described as the guardian spirit, or demon, in man. Not only by the younger members of the Stoic School—by Posidonius, Seneca, Epictetus, and Antonius—are the popular notions of demons, as by Plato aforetime,² explained in this sense,³ but the same method is

¹ Conf. *Wachsmuth*, Die Ansichten der Stoiker über Mantik und Dämonen.

² Tim. 90, A.

³ Posid. in *Galen*. Hipp. et Plat. v. 6: τὸ δὴ τῶν παθῶν αἴτιον, τούτεστι τῆς τε ἀνομολογίας καὶ τοῦ κακοδαίμονος βίου, τὸ μὴ κατὰ πᾶν ἔπεσθαι τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ δαίμονι συγγενεῖ τε ὄντι καὶ τὴν ὁμοίαν φύσιν ἔχοντι τῷ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον διοικούντι, τῷ δὲ χειρόνι καὶ ζῶδει ποτὲ συνεκκλινόντας φέρεσθαι. *Sen.* Ep. 41, 2: Sacer intra nos spiritus sedet, malorum bonorumque nostrorum observator et custos. His prout a nobis tractatus est, ita nos ipse tractat. Ep. 31, 11: Quid aliud voces hunc

[animus rectus] quam Deum in corpore humano hospitantem? *Epict.* Diss. i. 14, 12: ἐπίτροπον [ὁ Ζεὺς] ἐκάστω παρέστηκεν τὸν ἐκάστου δαίμονα, καὶ παρέδωκε φυλάσσειν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦτον ἀκοίμητον καὶ ἀπαρλόγιστον. He who retires within himself is not alone, ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς ἔνδον ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ ὑμέτερος δαίμων ἐστὶ. To him each one has taken an oath of allegiance, as a soldier has to his sovereign, but ἐκεῖ μὲν ὁμνύουσιν, αὐτοῦ μὴ προτιμήσειν ἕτερον· ἐνταῦθα δ' αὐτοὺς ἀπάντων; so that, consequently, the demon is lost in the αὐτὸς within. *M. Aurel.* v. 27: ὁ δαίμων, ὃν ἐκάστω προστάτην καὶ ἡγεμόνα ὁ Ζεὺς ἔδωκεν,

pursued by Chrysippus, who made εὐδαιμονία, or happiness, consist in a harmony of the demon in man (which, in this case, can only be his own will and understanding) with the will of God.¹ Little were the Stoics aware that, by such explanations, they were attributing to popular notions a meaning wholly foreign to them. But it does not therefore follow that they shared the popular belief in guardian spirits.² Their system, however, left room for believing that, besides the human soul and the spirits of the stars, other rational souls might exist, having a definite work to perform in the world, subject to the law of general necessity, and knit into the chain of causes and effects. Nay, more, such beings might even seem to them necessary for the completeness of the universe.³ What reason have we, then, to express doubt, when we are told that the Stoics believed in the existence of demons, playing a part in man and caring for him?⁴ Is there anything

ἀπόσπασμα ἑαυτοῦ. οὗτος δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ ἐκάστου νοῦς καὶ λόγος. ii. 13 and 17; iii. 3; v. 10; viii. 45.

¹ See the passage quoted from *Diog.* vii. 88, on p. 214, note 1.

² In this sense, the words of *Sen.* Ep. 110, 1, must be understood: *Sepono in præsentiæ quæ quibusdam placent, unicuique nostrum pædagogum dari Deum, non quidem ordinarium, sed hunc inferioris notæ . . . ita tamen hoc seponas volo, ut memineris, majores nostros, qui crediderunt, Stoicos fuisse: singulis enim et genium et Junonem dederunt.*

³ Conf. *Sext.* Math. ix. 86.

Amongst other things, it is there said: If living beings exist on the earth and in the sea, there must be νοερά ζῶα in the air, which is so much purer; and these are the demons.

⁴ *Diog.* vii. 151: *φανὶ δ' εἶναι καὶ τινες δαίμονας ἀνθρώπων συμπάθειαν ἔχοντας, ἐπόντας τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων· καὶ ἦρας τὰς ὑπολειμμένας τῶν σπουδαίων ψυχὰς.* *Plut.* De Is. 25: Plato, Pythagoras, Xenocrates, and Chrysippus hold, with the old theologians, that the demons are stronger than men. *Def. Oracl.* 19: The Stoics believe demons

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extraordinary from a Stoic platform, in holding that some of these demons are by nature inclined to do harm, and that these evil spirits are used by God for the punishment of the wicked,¹ especially when in any system of necessity such demons could only work, like powers of nature, conformably with the laws of the universe, and without disturbing those laws, occupying the same ground as lightning, earthquakes, and drought? And yet the language of Chrysippus, when speaking of evil demons who neglect the duties entrusted to them,² sounds as though it were only figurative and tentative language, not really meant. Besides, the later Stoics made themselves merry over the Jewish and Christian notions of demons and demoniacal possession.³

B. *The
Allegoris-
ing Spirit.*
(1) *Alle-
gorical
inter-
pretation
of myths.*

Yet, even without accepting demons, there were not wanting in the Stoic system objects to which the popular beliefs could be referred, if it was necessary to find in these beliefs some deeper meaning. Not

to be mortal. Plac. i. 8, 2: Θαλῆς, Πυθαγόρας, Πλάτων, οἱ Στωϊκοί, δαίμονας ὑπάρχειν οὐσίας ψυχικάς. A special treatise *περὶ ἡρώων καὶ δαιμόνων* proceeded from the pen of Posidonius, an extract from which is given by *Macrobius*. Sat. i. 23, containing the etymology of δαίμων.

¹ *Plut.* Quæst. Rom. 51: καθ' ἃπερ οἱ περὶ Χρύσιππον οἰοῦνται φιλόσοφοι φᾶντα δαιμόνια περινοσθεῖν, οἷς οἱ θεοὶ δημίους χρῶνται κολασταῖς ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀνοσίους καὶ ἀδίκους ἀνθρώπους. *Id.* Def. Orac. 17: φαύλους . . . δαίμονας οὐκ ἔμπεδοκλῆς μόνον . . . ἀπέλιπεν,

ἀλλὰ καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Χρύσιππος — a statement which, taken by itself, would prove little. The baleful Gods of mythology were explained as being evil demons by those who did not deny their existence altogether. Those demons, however, which purify the soul in another world (*Sallust.* De Mund. c. 19) are not borrowed from Stoicism, but from Plato (*Rep.* x. 615, e) and the Neoplatonists.

² *Plut.* Sto. Rep. 37, 2.

³ *Tertull.* Test. An. 3, after speaking of demons, adds: Aliqui Chrysippi sectator illudit ea.

but that these beliefs were often so distorted in the process of accommodation as to be no longer recognisable; and a regular code of interpretation became necessary, by means of which a philosophic mind might see its own thoughts in the utterances of commonplace thinkers. By the Stoics, as by their Jewish and Christian followers, this code of interpretation was found in the method of allegorical interpretation—a method which now received a most extended application, in order to bridge over the gulf between the older types of culture and the more modern.¹ Zeno, and more particularly Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and their successors, sought to discover

¹ The Stoics are not the first who resorted to allegorical explanations of myths. Just as formerly, before philosophy had broken away from mythology, a Pherecydes, an Empedocles, the Pythagoreans had, whether consciously or unconsciously, veiled their thoughts in the language of legend, even Plato using a veil of poetry, so, now that the breach between the two was open, many attempts were made to conceal it, and individual beliefs were being represented as the real meaning of popular beliefs. The original framers were supposed to have had an eye to this meaning. Thus a twofold method of treating the myths resulted—that by natural explanation, and that by allegorical interpretation. The former method referred them to facts of history, the latter to general truths, whether moral or scientific; and both methods agreed in looking for a hidden

meaning, besides the literal one. This method of treating myths had been already encountered among the older teachers, such as Democritus, Metrodorus of Lampsacus, and other followers of Anaxagoras. It appears to have been a favourite method in the time of the Sophists (*Plato*, *Theæt.* 153, c; *Rep.* ii. 378, d; *Phædr.* 229, c; *Crat.* 407, A, to 530, c; *Gorg.* 493, A; *Xen. Sym.* 3, 6). It follows naturally from the view of Prodicus on the origin of belief in the Gods. Plato disapproved of it. Aristotle occasionally appealed to it to note glimmers of truth in popular notions. The founder of Cynicism and his followers pursued it zealously. From the Cynics the Stoics appear to have derived it. They carried it to a much greater extent than any of their predecessors, and they, too, exercised a greater influence on posterity than the Cynics.

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the natural principles and moral ideas—the *λόγοι φυσικοί*, or *physicæ rationes*—which were represented, in a sensuous form,¹ in the Gods of popular belief and the stories of these Gods.² In this attempt, they clung to the poems of Homer and Hesiod, the Bible of the Greeks,³ without, however, excluding other mythology from the sphere of their investigation. One chief instrument which they, and modern lovers of the symbolical after them, employed was that capricious playing with etymologies of which so many instances are on record.⁴ Like most allegorisers, they also laid down certain principles of interpretation sensible enough in themselves,⁵ but proving, by the use which was made of them, that their scientific appearance was only a blind to conceal the most capricious vagaries.

¹ The definition of allegory: ὁ γὰρ ἄλλα μὲν ἀγορεύων τρόπος, ἕτερα δὲ ὧν λέγει σημαίνων, ἐπὶ νόμος ἀλληγορία καλεῖται (*Heracl.* Alleg. Hom. c. 5). Accordingly, it includes every kind of symbolical expression. In earlier times, according to *Plut.* Aud. Po. c. 4, it was termed ὑπόνοια, which term is found in *Plato*, Rep. ii. 378, D, to 530, D; *Xen.* Symp. 3, 6.

² *Cic.* N. D. ii. 24, 63; iii. 24, 63.

³ Zeno treated in this way all the poems of Homer and Hesiod (*Dio Chrysost.* Or. 53; *Diog.* vii. 4; *Krische*, Forsch. 393), and so did Cleanthes (*Diog.* vii. 175; *Phædr.* [Philodem.] De Nat. De. col. 3; *Plut.* Aud. Po. 11; De Fluv. 5, 3; *Krische*, 433) and *Persæus*. Chrysippus explained

the stories in Homer, Hesiod, Orpheus, and Musæus (*Phædr.* col. 3; *Galen.* Hipp. et Plat. iii. 8; *Krische*, 391 and 479), and was followed by Diogenes (*Phædr.* col. 5; *Cic.* N. D. i. 15, 41). Among the Romans, the same method was followed by Varro (*Preller*, Röm. Myth. 29), and his writings supplied the material to Heraclitus and Cornutus, the two Stoics whose writings we now possess.

⁴ *Cic.* N. D. iii. 24, 63.

⁵ *Corn.* c. 17: δεῖ δὲ μὴ συγχεῖν τοὺς μύθους, μήδ' ἐξ ἑτέρου τὰ ὀνόματα ἐφ' ἑτερον μεταφέρειν, μηδ' εἴ τι προσεπλάσθη ταῖς κατ' αὐτοὺς παραδιδόμεναις γενεαλογίαις ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ συνέντων ἀαινίττονται κεχρημένων δ' αὐτοῖς ὡς τοῖς πλάσμασιν, ἀλόγως τίθεσθαι.

Approaching in some of their explanations to the original sources of mythological development, they were still unable to shake off the perverted notion that the originators of myths, fully conscious of all their latent meanings, had framed them as pictures to appeal to the senses;¹ and, in innumerable cases, they resorted to explanations so entirely without foundation that they would have been impossible to anyone possessing a sound view of nature and the origin of legends. To make theory tally with practice, the founder of the School—following Antisthenes, and setting an example afterwards repeated by both Jews and Christians—maintained that Homer only in some places expressed himself according to truth, at other times according to popular opinion.² Thus had Stoicism surrounded itself with the necessary instruments for the most extended allegorical and dogmatic interpretation.

Proceeding next to the enquiry, how they applied this method to particular stories, the first point which attracts attention is the contrast which they drew between Zeus and the remaining Gods. From their belief in one divine principle everywhere at

(2) *Interpretation of the myths respecting the gods.*

¹ Proofs may be found in abundance in Heraclitus and Cornutus. Conf. *Sen. Nat. Qu.* ii. 45, 1: The ancients did not believe that Jupiter hurled his thunderbolts broadcast; sed eundem, quem nos, Jovem intelligunt, rectorem custodemque universi, animum ac spiritum mundi, &c.

² *Dio Chrysost.* Or. 53, speaking of Zeno's commentaries on Homer, says: ὁ δὲ Ζήνων οὐδὲν τῶν τοῦ Ὀμήρου λέγει, ἀλλὰ διηγούμενος καὶ διδάσκων, ὅτι τὰ μὲν κατὰ δόξαν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν γέγραπεν. . . . ὁ δὲ λόγος οὗτος Ἀντισθένης εἶστι πρότερον . . . ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἐξεργάσατο αὐτὸν οὐδὲ κατὰ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἐδήλωσεν.

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work, it followed as a corollary that this contrast, which elsewhere in Greek mythology was only a difference of degree, was raised to a specific and absolute difference. Zeus was compared to other Gods as an incorruptible God to transitory divine beings. To the Stoics, as to their predecessor Heraclitus, Zeus is the only primary Being, who has engendered, and again absorbs into himself, all things and all Gods. He is the universe as a unity, the primary fire, the ether, the spirit of the world, the universal reason, the general law or destiny.¹ All other Gods, as being parts of the world, are only parts and manifestations of Zeus—only special names of the one God who has many names.² That part of Zeus which goes over into air is called Here (ἄήρ); and in its lower strata, full of vapours, Hades; that which becomes elementary fire is called Hephæstus; that which becomes water, Poseidon; that which becomes earth, Demeter, Hestia, and Rhea; lastly, that portion which remains in the upper region is called Athene in the more restricted sense. And since, according to the Stoics, the finer elements are the same as spirit, Zeus is not only

¹ Special references are hardly necessary after those already quoted p. 144, note 1; 146, note 1; 156, note 1; 157, note 2. Conf. the hymn of *Cleanthes*; Chrysippus, in *Stob. Ecl.* i. 48; *Arat.* Phæn. Begin.; *Plut. Aud. Poët.* c. 11; Varro, in *August. Civ. D.* vii. 5; 6; 9; 28; Servius, in *Georg.* i. 5; *Heraclit.* c. 15; 23, 24; *Corn.* pp. 7; 26; 35;

38, where Zeus is derived from ζῆν, and Διὸς from διὰ, ὅτι δι' αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα; θεὸς from θέειν or τιθέσθαι; αἰθήρ from αἰθεῖν or αἰεῖ θέειν.

² Πολυώνυμος, as he is called by Cleanthes (v. 1). Conf. *Diog.* 147; *Corn.* c. 9 and 26. The further expansion of this idea may be found in the Neoplatonic doctrine.

the soul of the universe, but Athene, Reason, Intelligence, Providence.¹ The same Zeus appears in other respects as Hermes, Dionysus, Hercules.² The Homeric story of the binding and liberation of Zeus³ points to the truth, already established in Providence, that the order of the world rests on the balance of the elements. The rise and succession of the elements is implied in the hanging of Here;⁴ the arrangement of the spheres of the universe, in the golden chain, by which the Olympians thought to pull down Zeus.⁵ The lameness of Hephæstus goes partly to prove the difference of the earthly from the heavenly fire, and partly implies that earthly fire can as little do without wood as the lame without a wooden support; and if, in Homer, Hephæstus is hurled down from heaven, the meaning of the story is, that in ancient times men lighted their fires by lightning from heaven and the rays

¹ See *Diog.*; *Cic.* N. D. ii. 26, 66; *Phæd.* (Philodem.), *Fragm.* col. 2-5; *Heracl.* c. 25. On Here, consult *Heracl.* c. 15 and 41; *Corn.* c. 3; on Hephæstus, *Heracl.* c. 26, 55; 43, 91; *Corn.* c. 19; *Plut.* De Is. c. 66; on Poseidon, *Heracl.* c. 7, 15; 18, 77; 46, 117; *Corn.* 12; *Plut.* De Is. c. 40; on Hades, *Heracl.* 23; 41, 87; *Corn.* 5; on Demeter and Hestia, *Corn.* c. 28; *Plut.* l. c.; on Athene, *Heracl.* 19, 39; 28, 59; 61, 123; *Corn.* 20, 103. It is only in deference to a passage in Homer, that (*Heraclit.* 25, 53) Athene is made to be earth. It seems probable that even Zeno treated individual Gods in this way, as

portions of one general divine power.

² *Sen.* Benef. iv. 8, 1: Hunc [Jovem] et Liberum patrem et Herculem et Mercurium nostri putant. Liberum patrem, quia omnium parens sit. . . . Herculem, quia vis ejus invicta sit, quandoque lassata fuerit operibus editis, in ignem recessura. Mercurium, quia ratio penes illum est numerusque et ordo et scientia. The reference of Helios to Zeus (*Macrob.* Sat. i. 23) appears also to be of Stoic origin.

³ *Heracl.* c. 25, 52.

⁴ *Heracl.* 40, 83; *Il.* xv. 18.

⁵ *Ibid.* 37, 73; *Il.* viii. 18.

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of the sun.¹ The connection of Here with Zeus² was referred to the relation of the ether to the air surrounding it; and the well-known occurrence on Mount Ida was referred to the same event.³ The still more offensive scene in the Samian picture was expounded by Chrysippus as meaning that the fertilising powers (λόγοι σπερματικοί) of God are brought to bear upon matter.⁴ A similar meaning is found by Heraclitus in the story of Proteus,⁵ and in that of the shield of Achilles. If Hephæstus intended this shield to be a representation of this world, what else is thereby meant but that, by the influence of primary fire, matter has been shaped into a world?⁶

In a similar way, the Homeric theomachy was referred by many to a conjunction of the seven planets, which would involve the world in great trouble;⁷ Heraclitus, however, gives the preference to an interpretation, half physical and half moral, which may have been already advanced by Cleanthes.⁸ Ares and Aphrodite, rashness and pro-

¹ *Heracl.* 26, 54, who applies the same method of interpretation to the legend of Prometheus. *Corn.* c. 19. On Hephæstus, *Plut.* *Fac. Lun.* 5, 3.

² According to Eustath. in *Il.* 93, 46, Here is the spouse of Zeus, because the air is surrounded by the ether; but does not agree with him, because the two elements are opposed to one another.

³ *Heracl.* c. 39, 78. The occurrence on Mount Ida is said to represent the passage of winter into spring. Here's hairs are the foliage of trees, &c.

⁴ *Diog.* vii. 187; *Procem.* 5; *Orig. con. Cels.* iv. 48; *Theoph.* ad *Autol.* iii. 8; *Clement.* *Homil.* v. 18.

⁵ *K.* 64. Proteus, according to this explanation, denotes unformed matter; the forms which he assumes denote the four elements.

⁶ See the description, *Alleg. Hom.* 43-51, of which the above is a scanty abstract.

⁷ According to *Heraclit.* 53, 112.

⁸ We learn from *Ps. Plut. De Fluv.* 5, 3, that Cleanthes wrote a *θεομαχία*, a small fragment of

fligacy, are opposed by Athene, or prudence; Leto, forgetfulness, is attacked by Hermes, the spoken word;¹ Apollo, the sun, by Poseidon, the God of the water, with whom, however, he comes to terms, because the sun is fed by the vapours of the water; Artemis, the moon, is opposed by Here, the air, through which it passes, and which often obscures it; Fluvius, or earthly water, by Hephæstus, or earthly fire.² That Apollo is the sun, and Artemis the moon, no one doubts;³ nor did it cause any difficulty to these mythologists to find the moon also in Athene.⁴ Many subtle discussions were set on foot by the Stoics respecting the name, the form, and the attributes of these Gods; and, in particular, by Cleanthes, for whom the sun had particular importance, as being the seat of the power which rules the world.⁵ The stories of the birth of the Lotoides and the defeat of the dragon Pytho are, according to

which is there preserved. This treatise was not on the Homeric *θεομαχία*, but on the struggle of the Gods with the giants and Titans, and not different from the book *περὶ γιγάντων* (*Diog.* vii. 175).

¹ Further particulars on Hermes, Alleg. Hom. c. 72, 141.

² Alleg. Hom. c. 54.

³ Conf. *Heracl.* c. 6, 11; *Corn.* 32, 191; 34; *Cic.* N. D. ii. 27, 68; *Phædr.* (Philodem.) Nat. De. col. 5 and 2.

⁴ *Plut.* Fac. Lun. 5, 2.

⁵ The name Apollo is explained by Cleanthes, in *Macrobi.* Sat. i. 17, ὡς ἀπ' ἑλλων καὶ ἑλλων τόπων τὰς ἀνατολὰς ποιούμενον; by Chrysippus, as coming from α +

πολὺς, ὡς οὐχὶ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ φαύλων οὐσιῶν τοῦ πυρὸς ὄντα. The latter explanation is quoted by *Plotin.* τ. 5, 6, as Pythagorean, and Chrysippus may have borrowed it thence, or the later Pythagoreans from Chrysippus. Cicero, in imitation, makes his Stoic derive *sol* from *solus*. The epithet of Apollo, *Loxias*, is referred by Cleanthes to the *ἐλικες λοχαί* of the sun's course, or the *ἀκτῖνες λοχαί* of the sun; and by *Ænopides*, to the *λοχὸς κύκλος* (the ecliptic). The epithet *Λύκιος* is explained by Cleanthes, quod veluti lupi pecora rapiunt, ita ipse quoque humorem eripit radiis; Antipater, ἀπὸ τοῦ λευκαίνεσθαι πάντα φωτίζοντος ἡλίου.

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Antipater, symbolical of events which took place at the formation of the world, and the creation of the sun and moon.¹ Others find in the descent of two Gods from Leto the simpler thought, that sun and moon came forth out of darkness.² In the same spirit, Heraclitus, without disparaging the original meaning of the story, sees in the swift-slaying arrows of Apollo a picture of devastating pestilence;³ but then, in an extraordinary manner, misses the natural sense, in gathering from the Homeric story of Apollo's reconciliation (Il. i. 53) the lesson, that Achilles stayed the plague by the medical science which Chiron had taught him.⁴

Far more plausible is the explanation given of the dialogue of Athene with Achilles, and of Hermes with Ulysses. These dialogues are stated to be simply soliloquies of the two heroes respectively.⁵ But the Stoic skill in interpretation appears in its fullest glory in supplying the etymological meanings of the various names and epithets which are attributed to Athene.⁶ We learn, for instance, that

¹ The first of these stories is explained by *Macrob. Sat. i. 17*, down to the most minute details; and likewise the story of the slaying of the Pytho, the dragon being taken to represent the vapours of the marshy earth, which were dried up by the sun's heat.

² *Cornutus*, c. 2, points to this in explaining Leto as *Ληθαία*, and referring it to night, because everything is forgotten in sleep at night.

³ c. 8.

⁴ c. 15.

⁵ *Ibid.* c. 19.

⁶ See *Corn. c. 20, 105*, and *Villoisin's* notes. The most varied derivations of Athene are given: from *ἀθρεῖν*, by *Heracl. c. 19, 40*; *Tzetz. in Hesiod. 'Ep. καὶ 'Ημε. 70*; *Etymol. Mag.*—from *θηλας* or *θηλάζειν* (*'Αθήνη = ἀθήλη = ἡ μὴ θηλάζουσα*), by *Phædr. Nat. D. col. 6*; *Athenag. Leg. pro Christ. c. 17*—from *θεῖνα*, because virtue never allows itself to be beaten—from *αἰθῆρ + νάω*, so that *'Αθηναία = Αἰθεροναία*.

the name *Τριτογένεια* refers to the three divisions of philosophy.¹ Heraclitus discovers the same divisions in the three heads of Cerberus.² Chrysippus, in a diffuse manner, proves that the coming forth of the Goddess from the head of Zeus is not at variance with his view of the seat of reason.³ It has been already observed that Dionysus means wine, and Demeter, fruit;⁴ but, just as the latter was taken to represent the earth and its nutritious powers,⁵ so Dionysus was further supposed to stand for the principle of natural life, the productive and sustaining breath of life;⁶ and since this breath comes from the sun, according to Cleanthes, it was not difficult to find the sun represented by the God of wine.⁷ Moreover, the stories of the birth of

¹ This explanation had been already given by Diogenes, according to *Phædr.* col. 6. Cornutus also mentions it, but he prefers the derivation from *τρεῖν* (20, 108).

² c. 33.

³ It is to be found in *Galen.* Hipp. et Plat. iii. 8, but, according to *Phædr.* l. c., was already put forward by Diogenes. For himself, he prefers the other explanation, according to which Athene comes forth from the head of Jupiter, because the air which she represents occupies the highest place in the universe. *Cornut.* 20, 103, leaves us to choose between this explanation and the assumption that the ancients regarded the head as the seat of the *ἡγεμονικόν*. *Heracl.* 19, 40, states the latter, Eustath. in Il. 93, 40, the former, as the REASON.

⁴ *Corn.* 30.

⁵ *Plut.* De Is. c. 40: Demeter and Core are τὸ διὰ τῆς γῆς καὶ τῶν κάρπων διήκον πνεῦμα. *Phædr.* col. 2: τὴν Δήμητρα γῆν ἢ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ γόνευμα. On Demeter as γῆ μήτηρ or Δηὸ μήτηρ, see *Corn.* c. 28.

⁶ *Plut.* l. c.. Dionysus is τὸ γόνιμον πνεῦμα καὶ τροφίμον.

⁷ *Macrobi.* Sat. i. 18: Cleanthes derived the name Dionysus from *διανύσαι*, because the sun daily completes his course round the world. It is well known that, before and after his time, the identification of Apollo with Dionysus was common. *Servius*, on Georg. i. 5, says that the Stoics believed the sun, Apollo, and Bacchus—and likewise the moon, Diana, Ceres, Juno, and Proserpine—to be identical. See *Corn.* c. 30, 173.

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Dionysus, his being torn to pieces by Titans, his followers,¹ no less than the rape of Proserpine,² and the institution of agriculture,³ and the names of the respective Gods, afforded ample material for the interpreting taste of the Stoics.

The Fates (*μοῖραι*), as their name already indicates, stand for the righteous and invariable ordinances of destiny;⁴ the Graces (*χάριτες*), as to whose names, number, and qualities Chrysippus had given the fullest discussion,⁵ represent the virtues of benevolence and gratitude;⁶ the Muses, the divine origin of culture.⁷ Ares is war;⁸ Aphrodite, unrestrained passion, or, more generally, absence of control;⁹ other interpreters, and among them Empedocles, consider Ares to represent the separating,

¹ *Corn.* 30, discusses the point at large, referring both the story and the attributes of Dionysus to wine. He, and also *Heracl.* c. 35, refer the story of Dionysus and Lycurgus to the vintage.

² *Corn.* c. 28, who also refers the story and worship of Demeter, in all particulars, to agriculture; and the rape of Persephone, to the seed of fruit. Conf. *Cic.* N. D. ii. 26, 66. According to *Plut.* De Is. 66, Cleanthes had already called *Περσεφόνη, τὸ διὰ τῶν καρπῶν φερόμενον καὶ φονεύμενον πνεῦμα*. A somewhat different explanation is given in a passage of Mythograph of Mai, vii. 4.

³ The legend of Triptolemus, which is explained by Cornutus as referring to the discovery of agriculture by Triptolemus.

⁴ Chrysippus, in *Stob.* i. 180; *Eus.* Pr. Ev. vi. 8, 7. Conf. *Plut.*

Sto. Rep. 47, 5; *Corn.* c. 13; and *Plato, Rep.* x. 617, c.

⁵ According to *Sen. Benef.* i. 3, 8; 4, 4, he had filled a whole book with these ineptiæ—ita ut de ratione dandi accipiendi reddendique beneficii pauca admodum dicat, nec his fabulas, sed hæc fabulis inserit—a portion of which was made use of by Hecato.

⁶ Chrysippus, in *Phædr.* (Philodemus), col. 4. Further particulars in *Sen.* l. c., and *Corn.* 15, 55. Somewhat similar is the explanation of *Λιταί.* *Corn.* 12, 37; *Heracl.* 37, 75.

⁷ *Corn.* 14, 43, who, at the same time, mentions their names and number; *Philodem.* De Mus. Vol. Herc. i. col. 15; *Ibid.* 10, 33, on the Erinnyes; 29, 171, on the Horoi.

⁸ *Heracl.* 31, 63; *Plu. Am.* 13, 15.

⁹ *Heracl.* 28, 60; 30, 62.

Aphrodite the uniting, power of nature.¹ The stories of the two deities being wounded by Diomedes,² of their adulterous intrigues, and their capture by Hephæstus,³ are explained in various ways—morally, physically, technically, and historically.

In the case of another God, Pan, the idea of the Allnear was suggested simply by the name. His shaggy goat's feet were taken to represent the solid earth, and the human form of his upper limbs implied that the sovereign power in the world resides above.⁴ Unsurpassed as the Stoics were in these and similar explanations,⁵ it was a matter of small difficulty to them to make the Titan 'Ιάπερος stand for language or 'Ιάφετος, and Κοῖος for quality or ποιότης.⁶ Add to this the many more or less ingenious explanations of the well-known stories of

¹ *Ibid.* 69, 136. In this sense, Aphrodite might be identified with Zeus, which was really done by *Phædr.* Nat. De. col. 1: ἀνάλογον εἶν . . . θαι τὸν Δία καὶ τὴν κοινὴν πάντων φύσιν καὶ εἰμαρμένην καὶ ἀνάγκην καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι καὶ Εὐνομίαν καὶ Δίκην καὶ Ὁμόνοϊαν καὶ Εἰρήνην καὶ Ἀφροδίτην καὶ τὸ παραπλήσιον πᾶν.

² The story of Ares, *νείατον ἐς κενεῶνα*, means, according to *Heracl.* 31, 64, that Diomedes, ἐπὶ τὰ κενὰ τῆς τῶν ἀντεπάλων τάξεως παρεισελθὼν, defeated the enemy; that of Aphrodite (*ἄφροσύνη*), that, by his experience in war, he overcame the inexperienced troops of barbarians.

³ In *Plut.* Aud. Po. c. 4, the connection of Ares and Aphrodite is explained as meaning a con-

junction of the two planets. *Heracl.* 69, 136, gives the alternative of referring this connection to the union of *φιλία* and *νεῖκος*, which produces harmony, or to the fact that brass (Ares) is moulded in the fire (Hephæstus) into objects of beauty (Aphrodite). The latter interpretation is given by *Corn.* 19, 102, who also explains the relation of Ares to Aphrodite to mean the union of strength and beauty.

⁴ *Corn.* 27, 148; *Plut.* *Krat.* 408, c.

⁵ His lewdness was said to indicate the fullness of the *σπερματικοὶ λόγοι* in nature; his sojourn in the wilderness, the solitariness of the world.

⁶ *Corn.* 17, 91.

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XIII.(3) *Allegory applied to heroic myths.*

Uranos and Cronos,¹ and we are still far from having exhausted the resources of the Stoic explanations of mythology. The most important attempts of this kind have, however, been sufficiently noticed.

Besides the stories of the Gods, the stories of the heroes attracted considerable attention in the Stoic School. The persons of Hercules and Ulysses were specially singled out, for the sake of illustrating the ideal of the wise man.² But here, too, various modes of interpretation meet and cross. According to Cornutus,³ the God Hercules must be distinguished from the hero of the same name—the God being nothing less than Reason, ruling in the world without a superior;⁴ and the grammarian makes every effort to unlock with this key his history and attributes. Nevertheless, with all his respect for

¹ Besides the etymologies of οὐρανός in *Corn.* c. 1, and the observation of *Plut.* Pl. i. 6, 9, that heaven is the father of all things, because of its fertilising rains, and earth the mother, because she brings forth everything, the words in *Cic.* N. D. ii. 24, 63, deserve notice. It is there said: Uranos is the Ether, and was deprived of his vitality, because he did not need it for the work of begetting things. Cronos is Time, and consumes his children, just as Time does portions of time. Cronos was bound by Zeus, the unmeasured course of time having been bound by the courses of the stars. A second explanation is given by *Corn.* 7, 21, after making vain attempts at etymological interpretations of

Cronos and Rhea. Cronos stands for the order of nature, making for the too-violent atmospheric currents an earth, by diminishing the vapour-masses; and he is bound by Zeus, to represent that change in nature is limited. *Macrob.* Sat. i. 8, gives another explanation: Before the separation of elements, time was not; after the seeds of all things had flowed from heaven down to the earth in sufficient quantity, and the elements had come into being, the process came to an end, and the different sexes were left to propagate animal life.

² *Sen.* Benef. i. 13, 3.

³ c. 31, 187.

⁴ *Plut.* De Is. 40: He is τὸ πληκτικὸν καὶ διαιρετικὸν πνεῦμα. *Sen.* Benef. iv. 8, 1, and *Corn.*

Cleanthes,¹ he could not accept that Stoic's explanation of the twelve labours of Hercules. Heraclitus has probably recorded the chief points in this explanation. Hercules is a teacher of mankind, initiated into the heavenly wisdom. He overcomes the wild boar, the lion, and the bull, i.e. the lusts and passions of men; he drives away the deer, i.e. cowardice; he purifies the stall of Augeas from filth, i.e. he purifies the life of men from extravagances; he frightens away the birds, i.e. empty hopes; and burns to ashes the many-headed hydra of pleasure. He brings the keeper of the nether world to light, with his three heads—these heads representing the three chief divisions of philosophy. In the same way, the wounding of Here and Hades by Hercules is explained. Here, the Goddess of the air, represents the fog of ignorance, the three-barbed arrow undeniably (so thought the Stoics) pointing to philosophy, with its threefold division, in its heavenly flight. The laying prostrate of Hades by that arrow implies that philosophy has access even to things most secret.² The Odyssey is explained by Heraclitus in the same strain; nor does it appear that Heraclitus was the first to do so.³ Ulysses is described as a pattern of all virtues, and an enemy of all vices. He flees from the country of the Lotophagi, i.e. from wicked pleasures; he stays the wild rage of the Cyclops; he calms the winds, having

¹ *Pers. Sat.* v. 63.

introduction, expressly refers to

² *Heraclit.* c. 33, who, in the δοκιμώτατοι Στωϊκῶν.³ c. 70-75.

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first secured a prosperous passage by his knowledge of the stars; the attractions of pleasure in the house of Circe he overcomes, penetrates into the secrets of Hades, learns from the Sirens the history of all times, saves himself from the Charybdis of profligacy and the Scylla of shamelessness, and, in abstaining from the oxen of the sun, overcomes sensuous desires. Such explanations may suffice to show how the whole burden of the myths was resolved into allegory by the Stoics, how little they were conscious of foisting in foreign elements, and how they degraded to mere symbols of philosophical ideas those very heroes on whose real existence they continually insisted.

C. *Prophetic powers.*

The Stoic theology has engaged a good deal of our attention, not only because it is instructive to compare their views, in general and in detail, with similar views advanced nowadays, but also because it forms a very characteristic and important part of their entire system. To us, much of it appears to be an obvious and worthless trifling; but, to the Stoics, these explanations were solemnly earnest. To the Stoics, they seemed to be the only means of rescuing the people's faith, of meeting the severe charges brought against tradition and the works of the poets, on which a Greek had been fed from infancy.¹ They could not agree to tear themselves entirely away from tradition, nor to sacrifice to it their scientific and moral convictions. Can we,

¹ Conf. the way in which *Heraclitus*, 74, 146, expresses himself as to Plato's and Epicurus' attacks upon Homer.

then, wonder that they attempted the impossible, and sought to unite contradictions, or that such an attempt should land them in forced and artificial methods of interpretation?

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Illustrative of the attitude of the Stoics towards positive religion are their views on divination.¹ The importance attached by them to the prophetic art appears in the diligence which the chiefs of this School devoted to discussing it. The ground for the later teaching having been prepared by Zeno and Cleanthes, Chrysippus gave the finishing touch to the Stoic dogmas on this subject.² Particular treatises respecting divination were drawn up by Sphærus, Diogenes, Antipater, and, last of all, by Posidonius.³ The subject was also fully treated by Boëthus, and by Panætius from a somewhat different side.⁴ The common notions as to prognostics and

(1) *Divi-
nation.*

¹ Conf. *Wachsmuth*.

² *Cic. Divin.* i. 3, 6. He there mentions two books of Chrysippus on divination, which are also referred to by *Diog.* vii. 149; *Varro* (in *Lactant.* Inst. i. 6, 9); *Phot.* Amphiloch. Quæst. (*Mont-faucon*, Bibl. Coisl. p. 347); *Philodemus*, *περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς*, Vol. Herc. vi. 49, col. 7, 33; and from which Cicero has borrowed *Divin.* i. 38, 82; ii. 17, 41; 49, 101; 15, 35; 63, 130; and *De Fato*, 7. Chrysippus wrote a book, *περὶ χρησμῶν* (*Cic. Divin.* i. 19, 37; ii. 56, 115; 65, 134; *Suid.* νεοτρός); and one *περὶ ὀνείρων* (*Cic. Divin.* i. 20, 39; ii. 70, 144; 61, 126; 63, 130; i. 27, 56; *Suid.* τιμωροῦντας). In the former, he col-

lected oracular responses; in the latter, prophetic dreams.

³ *Diog.* vii. 178, mentions a treatise of Sphærus *περὶ μαντικῆς*. *Cic.* mentions a treatise having the same title of Diogenes of Seleucia (*Divin.* i. 3, 6; i. 38, 83; ii. 17, 41; 43, 90; 49, 101); and two books of Antipater *περὶ μαντικῆς* (*Divin.* i. 3, 6; 20, 39; 38, 83; 54, 123; ii. 70, 144; 15, 35; 49, 101). Posidonius wrote a treatise *περὶ μαντικῆς*, in five books (*Diog.* vii. 149; *Cic. Divin.* i. 3, 6; 30, 64; 55, 125; 57, 130; ii. 15, 35; 21, 47; *De Fato*, 3; *Boëth.* De Diis et Præsciis).

⁴ Boëthus, in his commentary on Aratus, attempted to determine and explain the indications

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oracles could not commend themselves to these philosophers, and just as little could they approve of common prophecy. In a system so purely based on nature as theirs,¹ the supposition that God works for definite ends, after the manner of men, exceptionally announcing to one or the other a definite result—in short, the marvellous—was out of place. But to infer thence—as their opponents, the Epicureans, did—that the whole art of divination is a delusion, was more than the Stoics could do. The belief in an extraordinary care of God for individual men was too comforting an idea for them to renounce;² they appealed to divination as the strongest proof of the existence of Gods and the government of Providence;³ and they also drew the

of a storm. *Cic. Divin. i. 8, 14; ii. 21, 47.*

¹ *Cic. Divin. i. 52, 118:* Non placet Stoicis, singulis jecorum fissis aut avium cautibus interesse Deum; neque enim decorum est, nec Diis dignum, nec fieri ullo pacto potest. *Ibid. 58, 132:* Nunc illa testabor, non me sortilegos, neque eos, qui quæstus causa hariolentur, ne psychomantia quidem . . . agnoscere. In *Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 32, 2*, the difference between the Stoic view and the ordinary one is stated to be, that, according to the Stoics, auguries non quia significatura sunt fiant, but quia facta sunt significant. In c. 42, it is said to be an absurd opinion that Jupiter hurls bolts which as often hit the innocent as the guilty, an opinion invented ad coercendos animos imperitorum.

² Diogenian, in *Eus. Pr. Ev. iv. 3, 5*: τὸ χρεῖωδες αὐτῆς (divination) καὶ βιωφελές, δι' ὃ καὶ μάλιστα Χρύσιππος δοκεῖ ὑμνεῖν τὴν μαντικὴν; and *M. Aurel. ix. 27*; God cares even for the wicked means of prophecies and by dreams.

³ *Cic. N. D. ii. 5, 13*, mentions præsensio rerum futurarum as the first and extraordinary natural phenomena—pestilence, earthquakes, monsters, meteors, &c., as the third—among the four causes from which Cleanthes deduced belief in the Gods. *Ibid. 65, 165*: The Stoic says of divination: Mihi videtur vel maxime confirmare, Deorum providentia consuli rebus humanis. *Sext. Math. ix. 132*: If there were no Gods, all the varieties of divination would be unmeaning. *Cic. Divin. i. 6.*

converse conclusion, that, if there are Gods, there must also be divination, since the benevolence of the Gods would not allow them to refuse to mankind so inestimable a gift.¹ The conception of destiny, too, and the nature of man, appeared to Posidonius to lead to the belief in divination;² if all that happens comes from an unbroken chain of cause and effect, there must be signs indicating the existence of causes, from which certain effects result;³ and if the soul of man is in its nature divine, it must also possess the capacity of observing, under circumstances, what generally escapes its notice.⁴ Lest, however, the certainty of their belief should suffer from lacking the support of experience, the Stoics had collected a number of instances of verified

¹ *Cic. Divin. i. 5, 9*: Ego enim sic existimo: si sint ea genera divinandi vera, de quibus accepimus quæque colimus, esse Deos, vicissimque si Dii sint, esse qui divinent. Arcem tu quidem Stoicorum, inquam, Quinte, defendis. *Ibid.* 38, 82: Stoic proof of divination: Si sunt Dii neque ante declarant hominibus quæ futura sunt, aut non diligunt homines, aut quid eventurum sit ignorant, aut existimant nihil interesse hominum, scire quid futurum sit, aut non censet esse suæ majestatis præsignificare hominibus quæ sunt futura, aut ea ne ipsi quidem Dii præsignificare possunt. At neque non diligunt nos, &c. Non igitur sunt Dii nec significant futura: sunt autem Dii: significant ergo: et non, si significant, nullas vias dant nobis ad significationis scientiam, frustra enim

significarent: nec, si dant vias, non est divinatio. Est igitur divinatio. This proof, says Cicero, was used by Chrysippus, Diogenes, Antipater. It may be easily recognised as belonging to Chrysippus. *Cic. ii. 17, 41; 49, 101*, again reverts to the same proof. Conf. *Id. i. 46, 104*: Id ipsum est Deos non putare, quæ ab iis significantur, contemnere. *Diog. vii. 149*: καὶ μὴν καὶ μαντικὴν ὑφεστάναι πᾶσάν φασιν, εἰ καὶ πρόνοιαν εἶναι. Some read ἡ πρόνοιαν εἶναι, in which case the argument would prove the opposite.

² *Cic. Div. i. 55, 125*: Primum mihi videtur, ut Posidonius facit, a Deo . . . deinde a fato, deinde a natura vis omnis divinandi ratioque repetenda.

³ *Cic. l. c. 55, 126.*

⁴ *Ibid.* 57, 129.

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prophecies; but with so little discrimination, that we should only have to wonder at their credulity, unless we already knew the abject state of such historical criticism as then existed, and the readiness with which, in all ages, men believe whatever agrees with their prejudices.¹

(2) *Prophecy explained by a reference to natural causes.*

In what way, then, can the two facts be combined—the belief in prophecy, on the one hand, and, on the other, the denial of strange omens due to an immediate divine influence? In answering this question, the Stoics adopted the only course which their system allowed. The marvellous, which, as such, they could not admit, was referred to natural laws,² from which it was speculatively deduced. The admirable Panætius is the only Stoic who is reported as having maintained the independence of his judgment by denying omens, prophecy, and astrology.³ Just as in modern times Leibnitz, and so many others, both before and after him, thought to purge away from the marvellous all that is accidental and

¹ *Cic. Divin. i. 27, 56 (Suid. τιμωροῦντος)*, ii. 65, 135 (*Suid. νεοττός*), ii. 70, 144, mentioning Chrysippus; i. 54, 123, mentioning Antipater; i. 30, 64, *De Fat.* 3, 5, naming Posidonius—gives instances of stories to which the Stoics attached great value, but which their opponents pronounced to be either false or deceptive.

² Aristotle, in a somewhat different sense, had explained the marvellous by a reference to natural causes, even allowing the existence of presentiments within certain limits.

³ *Cic. Divin. i. 3, 6*: Sed a Stoicis vel princeps ejus disciplinæ Posidonii doctor discipulus Antipatri degeneravit Panætius, nec tamen ausus est negare vim esse divinandi, sed dubitare se dixit. *Ibid. i. 7, 12*; ii. 42, 88; *Acad. ii. 33, 107*; *Diog. vii. 149*; *Epiphan. Adv. Hær.* Cicero appears to have borrowed from Panætius this denial of Astrology (*Divin. ii. 42–46*), and he allows that Panætius was the only Stoic who rejected it.

superhuman, and to find in wonders links in the general chain of natural causes, so, too, the Stoics, by assuming a natural connection between the token and its fulfilment, made an effort to rescue omens and divination, and to explain prognostications as the natural symptoms of certain occurrences.¹ Nor did they confine themselves to cases in which the connection between the prophecy and the event can be proved.² They insisted upon divination in cases in which it cannot possibly be proved. The flight of birds and the entrails of victims were stated to be natural indications of coming events; and there was said to be even a formal connection between the positions of the stars and the individuals born under those positions.³ If it was urged, that in this case omens must be far more numerous than they were supposed to be, the Stoics answered, that such was indeed the case, but that only the meaning of a few was known to men.⁴ If the question were asked, how it was that, in public sacrifices, the priest should always offer those very animals whose entrails

¹ *Sen. Nat. Quæ. ii. 32, 3*: Nimis illum [Deum] otiosum et pusillæ rei ministrum facis, si aliis somnia aliis exta, disponit. Ista nihilominus divina ope geruntur. Sed non a Deo pennæ avium reguntur nec pecudum viscera sub securi formantur. Alia ratione factorum series explicatur . . . quicquid fit alicujus rei futuræ signum est . . . cujus rei ordo est etiam prædictio est, &c. *Cic. Divin. i. 52, 118*: Sed ita a principio inchoatum esse mundum, ut certis rebus certa

signa præcurrerent, alia in extis, alia in avibus, &c.

² As in the passage quoted from Boëthius on p. 349, note 4.

³ *Cic. Div. ii. 43, 90*, according to which, Diogenes of Seleucia conceded so much to astrology as to allow that, from the condition of the stars at birth, it might be known quali quisque natura et ad quam quisque maxime rem aptus futurus sit. More he would not yield.

⁴ *Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 32, 5*.

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contained omens, Chrysippus and his followers did not hesitate to affirm that the same sympathy which exists between objects and omens also guides the sacrificer in the choice of a victim.¹ And yet so bald was this hypothesis, that they had, at the same time, a second answer in reserve, viz. that the corresponding change in its entrails did not take place until the victim had been chosen.² In support of such views, their only appeal was to the almighty power of God; but, in making this appeal, the deduction of omens from natural causes was at an end.³

Nor, again, could the Stoics altogether quiet a suspicion that an unchangeable predestination of all events had rendered individual activity superfluous, nor meet the objection⁴ that, on the hypothesis of necessity, divination itself was unnecessary.⁵ They quieted themselves, however, with the thought that divination, and the actions resulting from divination, are included among the causes foreordained by destiny.⁶

¹ *Cic.* l. c. ii. 15, 35: Chrysippus, Antipater, and Posidonius assert: Ad hostiam deligendam ducem esse vim quandam sentientem atque divinam, quæ tota confusa mundo sit.

² *Cic.* ii. 15, 35: Illud verum multum etiam melius, quod . . . dicitur ab illis: cum immolare quispiam velit, tum fieri extorum mutationem, ut aut absit aliquid, aut supersit: Deorum enim numeri parere omnia.

³ *Cic.* i. 53, 120, defends auguries by arguing: If an animal

can move its limbs at pleasure, must not God have greater power over His?

⁴ *Cic.* *Divin.* ii. 8, 20; Diogenian, in *Eus.* *Pr. Ev.* iv. 3, 5; *Alex. Aph.* *De Fat.* 31.

⁵ Upon the use of divination depends the argument for its reality. *Cic.* i. 38, 83.

⁶ *Sen.* *Nat. Qu.* ii. 37, 2: Effugiet pericula si expiaverit prædictas divinitus minas. At hoc quoque in fato est, ut expiet, &c. This answer probably came from Chrysippus, who, as it appears

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Divination, accordingly, consists in the capacity to read and interpret omens¹—a capacity which, according to the Stoics, is partly an affair of natural talent, and partly acquired by art and study.² The natural gift of prophecy is based, as other philosophers had already laid down,³ on the relationship of the human soul to God.⁴ Sometimes it manifests itself in sleep, at other times in ecstasy.⁵ A taste for higher revelations will be developed, in proportion as the soul is withdrawn from the world of sense, and from all thought respecting things external.⁶ The actual causes of the prophetic gift were referred to influences coming to the soul partly from God or the universal spirit diffused throughout the world,⁷ and partly from the souls which haunt the air or

(3) *Causes of divination.*

from *Cic. Divin. ii. 63, 130*, and *Philodem. περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς*, Vol. Herc. vi. col. 7, 33, defended the use of expiation.

¹ According to the definition in *Sext. Math. ix. 132*, which *Cic. Divin. ii. 63, 130*, attributes to Chrysippus, it is an ἐπιστήμη θεωρητικὴ καὶ ἐξηγητικὴ τῶν ὑπὸ θεῶν ἀνθρώποις διδομένων σημείων. *Stob. Ecl. ii. 122 and 238*; *Eus. Pr. Ev. iv. 3, 5*.

² *Plut. Vit. Hom. 212*: [τῆς μαντικῆς] τὸ μὲν τεχνικὸν φασιν εἶναι οἱ Στωϊκοί. οἷον ἱεροσκοπίαν καὶ οἰωνοὺς καὶ τὸ περὶ φήμας καὶ κληδόνας καὶ σύμβολα, ἅπερ συλλήβδην τεχνικὰ προσηγόρευσαν· τὸ δὲ ἄτεχνον καὶ ἀδίδακτον, τοῦτέστιν ἐνύπνια καὶ ἐνθουσιασμούς. To the same effect, *Cic. Divin. i. 18, 34*; *ii. 11, 26*.

³ Conf. the fragment quoted in

'Aristotle and the Peripatetics,' p. 300.

⁴ *Cic. Divin. i. 30, 64*; *ii. 10, 26*: The naturale genus divinandi is, quod animos arriperet aut exciperet extrinsecus a divinitate, unde omnes animos haustos aut acceptos aut libatos haberemus. *Plut. Plac. v. 1*; *Galen. Hist. Phil. p. 320*.

⁵ *Cic. Divin. i. 50, 115*, and *Plut.* Compare the many Stoic stories of dreams and presentiments in *Cic. i. 27, 56*; *30, 64*; *ii. 65, 134*; *70, 144*.

⁶ See *Cic. Divin. i. 49, 110*; *50, 113*; *51, 115*; *57, 129*. Hence the prophecies of the dying.

⁷ Conf. *Cic. Divin. ii. 10, 26*; *15, 35*; and his remarks on the instinctus afflatusque divinus. *Cic. i. 18, 34*.

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demons.¹ External causes, however, contribute to put people in a state of enthusiasm.²

The artificial gift of prophecy, or the art of divination, depends upon observation and guess-work.³ Observation would not indeed be necessary for one who could survey all causes in their effects on one another. Such a person would be able to deduce the whole series of events from the given causes. But God alone is able to do this. Hence men must gather the knowledge of future events from the indications by which their coming is announced.⁴ These indications may be of every variety; and hence all possible forms of foretelling the future were allowed by the Stoics; the inspection of entrails, divination by lightning and other natural phenomena, by the flight of birds, and omens of every kind.⁵ Some idea of the mass of superstition

¹ According to *Cic. Divin. i.* 30, 64, Posidonius thought prophetic dreams were realised in one of three ways: uno, quod prævideat animus ipse per sese, quippe qui Deorum cognitione teneatur; altero, quod plenus ær sit immortalium animorum, in quibus tanquam insignitæ notæ veritatis appareant; tertio, quod ipsi Dii cum dormientibus colloquantur. Of these three modes, not the first only, but also the second, correspond with the Stoic hypotheses. Indeed, in *Stob. Ecl. ii.* 122, 238, *μαντική* is defined = *ἐπιστήμη θεωρητική σημείων τῶν ἀπὸ θεῶν ἢ δαιμόνων πρὸς ἀνθρώπινον βίον συντελούντων*. Posidonius can only have spoken of Gods in condescension to popular

views; as a Stoic, he would only know of that connection with the soul of the universe which is referred to in the first mode.

² Amongst such external helps, the Stoic in *Cic. Divin. i.* 50, 14; 36, 79, enumerates music, natural scenery, and vapour arising from the earth. But it is difficult to understand how, on Stoic principles, he can have attached value to oracles.

³ *Cic. i.* 18, 34; 33, 72.

⁴ *Ibid. i.* 56, 127.

⁵ *Cicero*, ii. 11, 26, enumerates the above-named varieties, after having previously treated them separately. Similarly, *Ps. Plut. V. Hom.* 212. *Stob. Ecl. ii.* 238, mentions tentatively, as varieties of *μαντική τὸ τε ὀνειροκριτικόν*,

which the Stoics observed and encouraged, may be gathered from the first book of Cicero's treatise on divination. The explanation of these omens being a matter of skill, individuals in this, as in every other art, may often go wrong in their interpretation.¹ To ensure against mistakes tradition is partly of use, establishing by manifold experiences the meaning of each omen; ² and the moral state of the prophet is quite as important for scientific divination as for the natural gift of prophecy. Purity of heart is one of the most essential conditions of prophetic success.

In all these questions the moral tone of Stoic piety is preserved, and great pains were taken by the Stoics to bring their belief in prophecy into harmony with their philosophic view of the world. Nevertheless it is clear that success could neither be theirs in making this attempt, nor indeed in dealing with any other parts of the popular belief. Toiling with indefatigable zeal in an attempt so hopeless, they proved at least the sincerity of their wish to reconcile religion and philosophy. But not less did they disclose by these endeavours a misgiving that science, which had once come forward with so bold a face, was not sufficient in itself, but needed support from the traditions of religion, and from a belief

καὶ τὸ οἰωνοσκοπικὸν, καὶ θυτικόν. *Sext. Math.* ix. 132, says: If there were no Gods, there would be no μαντική nor θεοληπτική, ἀστρομαντική or λογική πρόβησις δι' ὀνείρων. *Macrob. Somn. Scip.* i. 3, gives a theory of dreams; but in how far it represents the views

of the Stoics, it is impossible to say. *Sen. Nat. Qu.* ii. 39, i. 41, clearly distinguishes the discussion of natural omens from the doctrines of philosophy.

¹ *Cic.* i. 55, 124; 56, 128.

² *Ibid.* i. 56, 127.

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in divine revelations.¹ Probably we shall not be far wrong in referring to this practical need the seeming vagaries of men like Chrysippus, who with the clearest intellectual powers could be blind to the folly of the methods they adopted in defending untenable and antiquated opinions. These vagaries show in Stoicism practical interests preponderating over science. They also establish the connection of Stoicism with Schools which doubted altogether the truth of the understanding, and thought to supplement it by divine revelations. Thus the Stoic theory of divination is the immediate forerunner of the Neopythagorean and Neoplatonic doctrine of revelation.

¹ *Cic. i. 53, 121*: Ut igitur qui se tradet quiete præparato animo cum bonis cogitationibus tunc rebus ad tranquillitatem accommodatis, certa et vera cernit in

somnis; sic castus animus purusque vigilantis et ad astrorum et ad avium reliquorumque signorum et ad extorum veritatem est paratior.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY AS A WHOLE AND ITS HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS.

HAVING now investigated the details of the Stoic system, we shall be in a position to estimate the Stoic philosophy as a whole, and the mutual relations of its parts, and at the same time to review its historical antecedents. The characteristic features of the system consist in three points to which attention has been drawn at the very outset ;—a pre-eminently practical tendency, the shaping of practical considerations by the notions of the good and virtue, the use of logic and natural science as a scientific basis. Science, as we have seen, was not to the Stoics an end in itself, but only a means for producing a right moral attitude ; all philosophical research standing directly or indirectly in the service of virtue. Both in its earlier as well as in the later days of its existence the Stoic School re-echoed this principle decidedly and exclusively, nor was it ever denied by Chrysippus, the chief representative of its science and learning.

If it be then asked what is this right moral attitude, the Stoic replied : acting according to nature and reason, in short, virtue. Virtue, however,

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(1) *Ethical side of
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implies two things. On the one hand it implies the resignation of the individual to the universe, obedience to the universal law; on the other hand it involves the harmony of man with himself, the dominion of his higher over his lower nature, of reason over emotion, and the rising superior to every thing which does not belong to his true nature. Both aspects have a common ground. The law of morality is addressed to a reasonable being; and this law, as the law of man's reasonable nature, must be carried into execution by his own exertions. Still, in the Stoic Ethics two currents of thought may be clearly distinguished, which from time to time come into actual collision; the one requiring the individual to live for the common good and for society, the other impelling him to live for himself only, to emancipate himself from all that is not himself, and to console himself with the feeling of virtue. The first of these tendencies brings man to seek the society of others; the second enables him to dispense with it. From the former spring the virtues of justice, sociability, love of man; from the latter the inner freedom and happiness of the virtuous man. The former culminates in citizenship of the world; the latter in the self-sufficingness of the wise man. In as far as virtue includes everything that can be required of man, happiness depends on it alone; nothing is a good but virtue, nothing an evil but vice; all that does not fall in with our moral nature is indifferent. On the other hand, in as far as virtue is based on human nature, it stands on the same

footing with other things that are according to nature. It cannot, without detracting from its own value, allow that anything else according to nature should be treated as indifferent, nor that such things have no positive or negative value for us, nor in any way affect our feelings. The doctrine of things indifferent and the wise man's freedom from emotions begins to totter. Lastly, if we consider in what way virtue exists in man, the result is found to differ according as we take into account the essence of virtue or its mode of manifestation. Since virtue consists in acting conformably to reason, and reason is one and undivided, it follows that virtue forms an undivided unity, and must, therefore, be possessed whole and entire or not at all. From this proposition the contrast of the wise and the foolish man with all its strangeness and extravagances is only a legitimate consequence. Or again, if the conditions are considered to which human nature must submit in order to acquire and possess virtue, the conviction arises that the wise man as conceived by the Stoics never occurs in reality. Hence the consequence is undeniable that the contrast between the wise man and the foolish man is not so definite as it was supposed to be. Thus all the main features of the Stoic ethics may be simply deduced from the one fundamental notion, that rational action or virtue is the only good.

Not only does this view of ethics require a peculiar theory of the world to serve as its scientific basis, but it reacts in turn on science, influencing alike its

(2) *Scientific side of the Stoic system.*

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tone and its results. If it is the duty of man to bring his actions into harmony with the laws of the universe, it becomes also necessary that he should take pains to know the universe and its laws. The more his knowledge of the universe advances the greater will be the value which he attaches to the forms of science. If moreover man is required to be nothing more than an instrument of the universal law, it is only consistent to suppose an absolute regularity of procedure in the universe, an unbroken connection of cause and effect, and ultimately a reference to one highest all-moving cause and one primary substance. If in human life the individual is powerless against the laws of the universe, individual occurrences in the world must be powerless against universal necessity. On the other hand, if in the case of man everything depends upon strength of will, then the highest and ultimate power in the world must be explained as active force. There arises thus that way of regarding the world as a series of forces which constitutes one of the most peculiar and everywhere recurring characteristics of the Stoic view of nature. Lastly, if such high importance is attached to action and practice, a materialistic view of the world is engendered, which colours science and finds expression in Materialism and appeals to the senses. At the same time the Materialism of the Stoics is bounded by a reference to the universe and to a divine power and reason penetrating everything. Their appeal to the senses is restricted by the demand for the formation of con-

ceptions, and the general application of the process of demonstration. The truth of knowledge is thus made to depend on a practical postulate, and the greater or less certainty of this postulate is measured by the strength of personal conviction. If these elements proved too contradictory to be harmonised; if materialism was at variance with the view which regarded the world as a series of forces, and appeals to the senses were opposed to any logical method, it was at least clearly established by the contrast that a practical and not a speculative interest really lay at the root of their system.

Of course this statement must not be taken to mean that the Stoics first developed their ethical principles independently of their theory of the universe and afterwards brought the two into connection with each other, for it was on this connection of theory and practice that Stoicism itself was based. The leading thought and aim of Zeno was to indicate the supremacy of virtue by a scientific knowledge of the laws of the world; and he deserves to be considered the founder of a new School only because he united to Cynicism those scientific ideas which he had either learnt in the School of Polemo, Stilpo and Diodorus, or had otherwise gathered from a study of ancient philosophy. Science and practice are not therefore accidentally thrown together in Stoicism, but are co-extensive, and dependent the one upon the other. In discussing natural science, and in giving a theory of knowledge, it was impossible to conceal the experimental basis on which the

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Stoic system was built. Not less, however, does the peculiar development of their ethics suppose those ideas of the universe and a power working within it, which form the most important part of their system. Only by a scientific treatment of this kind was Stoicism at all able to repress the onesidedness of the Cynic ethics, and to accommodate itself to the wants of human nature so far as to be able to influence society. Only upon this union of ethics and metaphysics does that religious attitude of the Stoic School repose, to which it owes in a great measure its historical importance. Only by combining theory with practice could it make itself felt in an age in which scientific originality was indeed declining, but in which the interest for science was still keen. Its ethical tone was no doubt the reason why natural and speculative sciences adopted in Stoicism the precise line they did, and why Zeno and his followers, who embody former systems in their own on the most extensive scale, borrowed from these systems a few and no other points, and expanded them in one particular direction. All that bore on the subject of ethics and supported morality they embraced; all that was opposed to morality they rejected. Stoicism may owe its rise to the union of ethical and speculative elements, both being intermingled, but the ethical ground is nevertheless the one on which it rests, and the power which primarily determined its course and subsequent history.

B. *Relation of*

In order to obtain a clearer idea of the rise of Stoicism, the premises on which it proceeded, and

the grounds on which it is based, we must take a glance at its relations to preceding systems. The Stoics themselves deduced their philosophical pedigree directly from Antisthenes, and indirectly from Socrates.¹ But although their connection with both these philosophers may be clearly established, it would be a mistake to regard their teaching as a revival of Cynicism, still less to regard it as a simple following of Socrates. Undoubtedly it borrowed much from both. The self-sufficiency of virtue, the distinction of things good, evil, and indifferent, the ideal picture of the wise man, the whole withdrawal from the outer world within the precincts of the mind, and the strength of a moral will, are ideas taken from the Cynics. It was in the spirit of Cynicism too that general ideas were explained as simply names. Not to mention many peculiarities of ethics, the contrasting of one God with the many popular Gods, and the allegorical explanation of myths, were likewise points borrowed from Cynicism. The identification of virtue with intelligence, the belief that virtue was one, and could be imparted by teaching, were at once in the spirit of Socrates and also in that of the Cynics. The argument for the existence of God based on the subordination of means to

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*Stoicism
to previous
systems.*

(1) *Its re-
lation to
Socrates
and the
Cynics.*

¹ Whether Diogenes, in connecting the Stoics with the Cynics, was following a Stoic authority, is a moot point; nevertheless, the view comes to us from a time in which the relations of the two must have been well known. *Diog.* vi. 14, speaking of Anti-

sthenes, says: δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀνδρωδεστάτης στωϊκῆς κατάρξεαι . . . οὗτος ἡγήσατο καὶ τῆς Διογέנוῦς ἀπαθείας καὶ τῆς Κράτητος ἐγκρατείας καὶ τῆς Ζήνωνος καρτερίας, αὐτὸς ὑποθέμενος τὰ θεμέλια; and *Juven.* xiii. 121, calls the Stoic dogmas a Cynicistunica distantia.

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ends, the whole view of the world as a system of means and ends, and the Stoic theory of Providence, are views peculiarly Socratic;¹ and the Stoics followed Socrates in ethics by identifying the good and the useful.

And yet the greatness of the interval which separates the Stoics from the Cynics becomes at once apparent on considering the relation of Aristo to the rest of the Stoic School. In refusing to meddle with natural or mental science, or even with ethical considerations at all, Aristo faithfully reflects the principles of Antisthenes. In asserting the unity of virtue to such an extent that all virtues are merged in one, he was only repeating similar expressions as Antisthenes. In denying any difference in value to things morally indifferent, and in placing the highest morality in this indifference, he was, according to the older writers, reasserting a Cynic tenet. Other Stoics, the majority by far, in denying these statements, show in what points Stoicism differed from Cynicism.² The Cynic, in his feeling of moral independence, and in his invincible strength of will, is opposed to the whole world; he needs for virtue no scientific knowledge of the world and its laws; he regards nothing external to himself; he allows nothing to influence his conduct, and attaches value to nothing. But, in consequence, he remains with his

¹ *Krische*, *Forschung*. i. 363.

² Aristo cannot, therefore, be considered (as he is by *Krische*, *Forsch.* 411) the best representative of the original Stoic theory.

On the contrary, he only represents a reaction of the Cynic element in Stoicism against the other divisions of philosophy.

virtue confined to himself. Virtue makes him independent of men and circumstances, but it has neither the will nor the power to interpose in the affairs of life, and to infuse new moral notions into life. Stoicism certainly insists quite as strongly as Cynicism upon the self-sufficiency of virtue, and will quite as little allow that anything except virtue can be a good in the strictest sense of the term. But in Stoicism the individual is not nearly so sharply opposed to the outer world as in Cynicism. The Stoic is too cultivated; he knows too well that he is a part of the universe to ignore the value of a scientific study of the world, or to neglect the natural conditions of moral action. What he aims at is not a negation—independence from externals—but a positive position—life according to nature; and that life only he considers according to nature which is in harmony with the laws of the universe as well as with human nature. Hence Stoicism is not only far in advance of Cynicism in scientific interest, but also its moral tone breathes a freer and more gentle spirit. Let the principles of the Stoics on the necessity and value of scientific knowledge be compared with the sophistical assertions of Antisthenes, which destroy all knowledge; or let the developed logical accuracy of the Stoics be compared with the chaotic ideas of the Cynics; or let the careful researches and the copious learning of the School of Chrysippus be compared with the Cynic contempt for all theory and all learned research; and it will be at once seen how deep-seated the difference between the two

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systems is, and how little Stoicism can be deduced from Cynicism.

The difference of the two Schools is also fully apparent in ethics. The Stoic morality recognises, at least, conditionally, a positive and negative value in external things and circumstances, the Cynic allows absolutely no such value. The former forbids affection contrary to reason, the latter any and every kind of affection. The former refers the individual to human society, the latter isolates him. The former teaches citizenship of the world in a positive sense, requiring all to feel themselves one with their fellow-men, the latter in the negative sense, of feeling indifferent to home and family. The former has a pantheistic tone about it, due to the lively feeling of the connection between man and the universe, and a theological stamp owing to its connection with positive religion, the latter has a rationalistic character, owing to the enfranchisement of the wise man from the prejudices of popular belief. In all these respects Stoicism preserved the original character of the Socratic philosophy far better than Cynicism, which was simply a caricature. But it departs from Socrates in two respects. In point of theory the Stoic doctrine has a systematic form and development such as Socrates never contemplated; and in natural science, however much the Stoic doctrine of Providence, and its view of nature as a system of means subordinated to ends, may remind of Socrates, it traverses a field avoided on principle by Socrates. On the other hand, interest in science

is with Socrates far deeper and stronger than with the Stoics, although it is limited to the subject of ethics. By the Stoics scientific research was only pursued as a means for solving several problems, but the Socratic theory of a knowledge of conceptions, simple though it may sound, contained a fruitful germ of unexpanded speculations, in comparison with which all that the Stoics did is comparatively fragmentary. The Stoic ethics are not only more expanded and more carefully worked out in detail than those of Socrates, but they are also more logical in clinging to the principle of regarding virtue alone as an unconditional good. There are no appeals to current modes of thought, such as those of Socrates, who practically based his doctrine of externals upon utility. On the other hand, the moral science of the Stoics also falls far short of the frankness and cheerfulness of the Socratic view of life. In important particulars their morality may abate somewhat from the severe demands of Cynicism; still, it appropriated the leading principles of Cynicism far too unreservedly to avoid adopting in a great measure its conclusions.

Asking in the next place in how far the Stoics were induced by other influences to change and extend the platform of the Socratic philosophy, we may look beyond the influence of Cynicism and the general tendency of the post-Aristotelian philosophy. These influences determined indeed the practical side of Stoicism. But other influences were also active. The speculative development of Stoicism was con-

(2) *Relation to Megarians and Heraclitus.*

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nected with the Megarians and Heraclitus. With the Megarians it was connected from the fact of the personal relations existing between Zeno and Stilpo. Its connection with Heraclitus is proved by the fact that the Stoics derived their views on natural science from him, and expanded them in the form of commentaries on his writings.¹

(a) *The
Megarians.*

Probably the Megarian influence must not be estimated very high. Zeno may have learnt from the Megarians that love of critical argument which appears with him in the form of compressed sharp-pointed syllogisms.² But in post-Aristotelian times that form of argument was not confined to the Megarians; and the greatest reasoner among the Stoics, Chrysippus, appears not only in no personal relations to them, but his logic is throughout a simple continuation of that of Aristotle.

(b) *Hera-
clitus.*

Far greater, and more generally recognised, is the importance of the influence which the doctrines of the philosopher of Ephesus exercised on the Stoics. A system which laid such emphasis as did that of Heraclitus on the subordination of everything individual to the law of the universe, and which exalted universal reason above the flux of things as the one thing everlastingly and permanently the same—a

¹ Apart from the testimony of Numenius (in *Eus. Pr. Ev.* xiv. 5, 10), to which no great value can be attached, the acquaintance of Zeno with Heraclitus is established by the fact that Zeno was not only the founder of the Stoic ethics, but also of their natural science. *Diog.* (vii. 174; ix. 15)

mentions treatises of Cleanthes, (ix. 5) of Aristo, (vii. 178; ix. 15) of Sphærus, treating of Heraclitus; and *Phædrus* (Philodem.), *Fragm.* col. 4, says that Chrysippus explained the old myths after the manner of Heraclitus.

² Instances have often occurred. See *Sen. Ep.* 83, 9.

system, too, so nearly related to their own, must have strongly commended itself to their notice, and offered them many points on which they might build their own. If for us it is unpleasant to think that life is dependent for its existence on matter, it was otherwise to the Stoics, for whom this very theory possessed special attractions. Hence, with the exception of the threefold division of the elements, there is hardly a single point in the Heraclitean theory of nature which the Stoics did not appropriate:—fire or ether as the primary element, the oneness of this element with universal reason, the law of the universe, destiny, God, the flux of things, the gradual change of the primary element into the four elements, and of these back to the primary element, the regular alternation of creation and conflagration in the world, the oneness and eternity of the universe, the description of the soul as fiery breath, the identification of the mind with the demon, the unconditional sovereignty of the universal law over individuals—these and many other points in the Stoic system, originally derived from Heraclitus,¹ prove how greatly this system is indebted to its predecessor.

Nor yet must it be forgotten that neither the critical reasoning of the Stoics can be found in Heraclitus, nor their ethical views be referred to his few and undeveloped observations. Moreover, with all the importance attached to natural science, it is with

¹ Besides meteorological and scientific views, the Stoic attitude towards the popular faith was probably in imitation of Heraclitus.

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the Stoics only subordinate to moral science; and the very fact that it is referred to Heraclitus as its author, proves how subordinate a position it held, resting on no independent basis. Still less must it be forgotten that even in natural science the Stoics only partially follow Heraclitus, and that principles taken from Heraclitus often bear an altered meaning when wrought into the Stoic system. Omitting minor points, the Stoic doctrine of nature is in a formal point of view far more developed, and with regard to its extension, far more comprehensive than the corresponding doctrine of Heraclitus. Indeed, the Stoic view of the world is by no means so completely identical with that of Heraclitus as might be supposed. The flux of things, which the Stoics teach equally with Heraclitus, has not for them that overwhelming importance that it had for him. The matter of which the universe consists may be always going over into new forms, but, at the same time, it is with the Stoics the permanent material and essence of things. Individual substances, too, are treated by the Stoics as corporeally permanent. Moreover, from matter they distinguish the active principle, Reason or God, far more definitely than Heraclitus had done, and the same clearness of distinction is applied by them to the distinction between material and quality. It becomes thus possible to contrast much more sharply than their predecessors had done the reason of the world, and the blindly working power of nature. Heraclitus, it would appear, confined his attention to observing nature and

describing its elementary meteorological processes. But the natural science of the Stoics embodies the idea of means working for ends. It tries to refer all arrangements in the world to man, and it pursues this line of thought exclusively, neglecting in consequence proper science. Hence the idea of sovereign reason or the universal law had not the same meaning in the minds of both. Heraclitus sees in reason, primarily and chiefly, the orderly sequence of natural phenomena, the regularity of the course which it prescribes to each individual phenomenon, its place in the world, its extent and duration, in short, the unchanging course of nature. On the other hand, the Stoics, without excluding these proofs of the existence of God and the rule of Providence, attach the chief importance to the purpose obvious in the order of nature. The reason which rules the world appears in Heraclitus more as a natural power; in the Stoics, as intelligence working with a purpose. Nature is the highest object for Heraclitus, the object of independent and absolute interest, and hence the infinite Being is no more than a power forming the world. The Stoics regard nature from the platform of humanity, as a means for the wellbeing and activity of man. With them duty accordingly does not work as a simple power of nature, but essentially as a wisdom caring for the wellbeing of man. The highest conception in the system of Heraclitus is that of nature or destiny. Stoicism accepted this conception, but at the same time expanded it to the higher idea of Providence.

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nection
with Aris-
totle.*

Shall we be wrong if we attribute this change of the Heraclitean theory of nature in a great measure to the idea of purpose introduced by Socrates and Plato, but in a still greater degree to the influence of Aristotle? To Aristotle belongs properly the idea of matter without qualities, no less than the distinction between a material and a formal cause. Aristotle applied the idea of purpose to natural science as no other system had done before; and although the mode in which the Stoics expressed this idea has more resemblance to the popular theological statements of Socrates and Plato than to those of Aristotle; still the Stoic conception of a natural power working with a purpose, such as is contained in the idea of artificial fire and *λόγοι σπερματικοὶ*, is essentially Aristotelian. Even many positions which appear to be advanced in opposition to Aristotle were yet connected with him. Thus the existence of ether as a body distinct from the four elements is denied, and yet in point of fact it is asserted under a new name—that of artificial fire. The Peripatetic doctrine that the rational soul comes into existence is contradicted by the Stoic theory that it is inherited, and yet the latter assertion is based on a statement in Aristotle to the effect that the germ of the animal soul lies in the warm air which surrounds the seed; for Aristotle distinguishes this warm air from fire quite as carefully as Zeno and Cleanthes distinguished the two kinds of fire. The definition of the human soul and the divine mind as something corporeal—the point

of most decided deviation from Aristotelian teaching, might yet be connected with Aristotle, and, indeed, the Stoics were met halfway over this doubtful ground by the Peripatetics. Had not Aristotle described the ether as a most divine body, the stars formed out of it as divine and happy beings? Had he not brought down the acting and moving powers from a heavenly sphere to the region of earth? If he could place the germ of the soul in an ethereal matter, might not others go a little further and arrive at materialistic views? And was it not all the more natural to take this course owing to the difficulty of forming a notion of the extra-mundane intelligence of Aristotle, at once incorporeal, and yet touching and encircling the world of matter, and the difficulty of harmonising the personal oneness of the human soul with its origin in a reason coming from above?

The Aristotelian theory of the origin of notions and conceptions had still more directly paved the way for Stoicism. On this point the Stoics did little more than omit (in conformity with their principles) all that their predecessors had said as to an original possession and immediate knowledge of truth. How closely their formal logic adhered to that of Aristotle has been remarked on an earlier occasion. Its efforts were confined to building on Aristotelian foundations, and even the new additions have more reference to grammar than to logic. The material influence of the Peripatetic School appears to have been least on the domain of ethics. The sharpness

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of the Stoic conception of virtue, their entire suppression of emotions, their absolute exclusion of everything external from the circle of moral goods, their antithesis between the wise and the foolish man, their polemic against a purely speculative life, present a pointed contrast to the caution and many-sidedness of Aristotle's moral theory, to his careful weighing of current opinions and the possibility of carrying them out, to his recognition of propriety in every shape and form, and to the praise which he lavishes on a purely speculative life. Here they owe little to Aristotle except the formal treatment of the materials for ethics and the psychological analysis of individual moral faculties. In this province we must, on the contrary, look for traces of the teaching which Zeno received from Polemo, and, perhaps, from Xenocrates.

(4) *Con-
nection
with Plato.*

The speculative portions of Plato's teaching could offer no strong attractions to such practical men and materialists as the Stoics, either in their original form or in the form which they assumed in the older Academy under Pythagorean influence. But, on the other hand, there were not wanting in Platonism features possessing for them attractions—the Socratic building of virtue on knowledge, the comparative depreciation of external goods, the retreat from sensuality, the elevation and the purity of the moral ideal, and, in the older Academy, the demand for life according to nature, the doctrine of the self-sufficingness of virtue, and the growing tendency to confine philosophy to practical questions. Unfounded

as the notion of the later Eclectics is, that the Stoic and Academician systems of morality were altogether the same ; the Stoics, nevertheless, appear to have received impulses from the Academy which they carried out in a more determined spirit. Thus the theory of living according to nature originally comes from the Academy, although the Stoics adopted it with a peculiar and somewhat different meaning. The position assumed by the older Academy towards positive religion may also have had some influence on the orthodoxy of the Stoics. The most decided representative of the Stoics, Cleanthes, is in his philosophic character the counterpart of Xenocrates. Nor was the new Academy, although later in its origin than Stoicism, without influence on that system, owing to the intervention of Chrysippus. Its influence, however, was more indirect than direct. By its logical contradiction it obliged the Stoics to look about for a more logical basis for their system, and hence to attempt a more systematic expansion of their teaching. The case is somewhat similar with Epicureanism, which by its strong opposition in the field of ethics contributed to impart decision and accuracy to the Stoic doctrine, and, perhaps, in the same way, may have helped to bring it into existence.

By the aid of these remarks it now becomes possible to give a satisfactory account of the historical ingredients in Stoicism. Belonging to an age of moral corruption and political oppression, its founder, Zeno, conceived the idea of liberating himself and all who would follow him from the degeneracy and

C. *The Stoic philosophy as a whole.*

(1) *Its historical position.*

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slavery of the age by means of philosophy, and his system was to be one which by purity and strength of the will would procure independence from all external things, and unruffled inward peace. That his endeavours should have taken a practical turn, that he should have proposed to himself not knowledge but the exercise of knowledge as the object to be realised, was in part due to the personal character of the philosopher, and in part to the general circumstances of the times. On nobler and more serious minds these circumstances pressed too heavily not to call forth opposition and resistance. Such minds could not yield to contemplation and indifference. And yet the sway of the Macedonian, and afterwards of the Roman Empire, was far too despotic to allow the least prospect of open resistance. Philosophy, too, had reached a pass at which satisfactory answers to theoretical problems were no longer forthcoming, and hence attention was naturally directed to questions of morals.

Haunted by this longing for virtue, Zeno must have found his first satisfaction in that system which had at an earlier period experienced the same need. Captivated by Cynicism on the one hand, and the old Socratic teaching which he identified with Cynicism;¹ and on the other hand, looking for some positive meaning and scientific basis for virtue, Zeno strove to appropriate from every source whatever agreed with the bent of his own mind. By using all

¹ The story in *Diog.* vii. 3, that Zeno was first won for philosophy by Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, bears out this view.

the labours of his predecessors, and keeping his eye steadily fixed upon the practical end of philosophy, he succeeded in forming a new and more comprehensive system, which was afterwards completed by Chrysippus. In point of form this system was most indebted to the Peripatetic School; in point of matter its chief obligation was to Heraclitus, besides its debt to the Cynics which has been already mentioned. But the moral theory of the Stoics was as little identical with that of the Cynics, as the natural science of the Stoics was with that of Heraclitus. The divergence was, no doubt, in the first instance due to the influence of the Stoic principles; but yet the influence of the Peripatetic teaching may be observed in the natural and speculative science of the Stoics, and the influence of the Academy may be traced in the science of Ethics. Stoicism was not simply a continuation of Cynicism, nor yet a new and isolated system, but like every other form of thought which marks an epoch, it combined in one all previous materials, producing from their combination a new result. In this process of assimilation much that was beautiful and full of meaning was omitted; everything was absorbed that could be of use in the new career on which the Greek mind was about to enter.

It was the fault of the age that it could no longer come up to the manysidedness of an Aristotle or a Plato. Nevertheless, Stoicism more nearly than any other of the post-Aristotelian systems approximates to this manysidedness in its practical view of philo-

(2) *Its one-sidedness.*

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sophy, and in its materialistic appeal to the senses. In theoretical self-sufficiency, the wise man rising superior to the weaknesses and wants of human nature; in citizenship of the world, throwing political interest into the background; and in so many other traits expressing the character of its age, it is the fit exponent of an epoch in which the taste for purely scientific research and the happiness resulting from practical action was at an end. Meantime, amid the overthrow of states, the idea of humanity was rising to fuller recognition. Of such an age Stoicism represented most powerfully the moral and religious convictions, yet not, however, without one-sidedness and exaggeration. To secure Man's freedom and happiness by an exercise of the will and by rational understanding, was the aim of the Stoics; but this aim was pursued with such sternness that the natural conditions of human existence and the claims of individuality were ignored. To man, regarded as the organ of universal law, no freedom was allowed either by the Stoic natural science (the course of nature being absolutely supreme) nor yet by the Stoic ethics, the demands of duty being altogether inexorable. The universal claims of morality were alone acknowledged; the right of the individual to act according to his peculiar character, and to develop that character, were completely set at nought. The individual, as such, dwindled into obscurity, whilst a high place in the world was assigned to mankind collectively. The individual was subordinated to the law of the universe, but by regarding nature as a

system of means and ends, and introducing the belief in Providence and Prophecy, the universe was again subordinated to the interests of man. In both these respects Epicureanism stood in marked opposition to Stoicism. Otherwise it agreed with it in the general tone of its practical philosophy, and in its aim to make man independent of the outer world and happy in himself.

PART III.

THE EPICUREANS.

CHAPTER XV.

EPICURUS AND THE EPICUREAN SCHOOL.¹

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A. *Epi-
curus.*

EPICURUS, the son of the Athenian Neocles,² was born in Samos³ in the year 342 or 341 B.C.⁴ His early education appears to have been neglected;⁵

¹ Consult, on this subject, the valuable treatise of *Steinhart*, in *Ersch and Gruber's Encyclopædia*, sect. i. vol. 35, pp. 459–477.

² *Diog.* x. i. He is frequently mentioned as an Athenian, belonging to the δῆμος Gargettos. *Diog.* l. c.; *Lucret.* Nat. Rer. vi. 1; *Cic.* Ad Fam. xv. 16; *Ælian*, V. H. iv. 13.

³ *Diog.* i.; *Strabo*, xiv. 1, 18. According to these authorities, and *Cic.* N. D. i. 26, 72, his father had gone there as a κληροῦχος.

⁴ *Apollodorus* (in *Diog.* x. 14) mentions 7 Gamelion as the birthday of Epicurus. It was observed τῇ προτέρᾳ δεκάτῃ τοῦ Γαμηλιῶνος. Gamelion being the seventh month of the Attic year, the time of his birth must have been either early

in 341 B.C. or the last days of 342 B.C.

⁵ His father, according to *Strabo*, was a schoolmaster, and Epicurus had assisted him in teaching (*Hermippus* and *Timon*, in *Diog.* 2; *Athen.* xiii. 588, a). His mother is said to have earned money by repeating charms (καθαρμολ), and Epicurus to have assisted in this occupation (*Diog.* 4). Although the latter statement evidently comes from some hostile authority, it would seem that his circumstances in early life were not favourable to a thoroughly scientific education. His language in disparagement of culture would lead us to this conclusion, even were the express testimony of *Sext.* Math. i. 1, wanting: ἐν πολλοῖς γὰρ ἀμαθῆς

and at the time when he first came forward as an independent teacher his knowledge of previous philosophical systems was very superficial. He can, however, hardly have been so entirely self-taught as he wished to appear at a later period in life. At least the names of the individuals are on record who instructed him in the systems of Democritus and Plato;¹ and although it is by no means an ascertained fact that he subsequently attended the lectures of Xenocrates² on the occasion of a visit to Athens,³ no doubt can be felt that he was acquainted with the writings of that philosopher as well as with those of Democritus, from whom he borrowed important parts of his doctrine.⁴

Ἐπίκουρος ἐλέγχεται, οὐδὲ ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς ὁμιλίαις καθαρεύων. *Cic.* *Fin.* i. 7, 26: Vellem equidem, aut ipse doctrinis fuisset instructor—est enim . . . non satis politus in artibus, quas qui tenent eruditi appellantur—aut ne deterruisset alios a studiis. *Athen.* xiii. 588, a: ἐγκυκλίου παιδείας ἀμύητος ὢν.

¹ According to his own statement (*Diog.* 2), he was not more than fourteen (*Suid.* Ἐπικ. has twelve) years of age when he began to philosophise, i.e. to think about philosophical subjects. He subsequently boasted that he had made himself what he was without a teacher, and refused to own his obligations to those shown to be his teachers. *Cic.* *N. D.* i. 26, 72; 33, 93; *Sext.* *Math.* i. 2. It is, however, established that in his youth he enjoyed the instruction of Pamphilus and Nausiphanes (*Cic.*; *Sext.*; *Diog.* x. 8;

13; 14; ix. 64; 69; *Proem.* 15; *Suid.* Ἐπικ.; *Clem. Strom.* i. 301, D. The names of two others are also mentioned as his teachers, Nausicydes and Praxiphanes (*Diog.* *Proem.* 15; x. 18), but they almost seem to be corruptions for Pamphilus and Nausiphanes.

² According to *Cic.* l. c., he denied the fact. Others, however, asserted it, and, among them, Demetrius of Magnesia. *Diog.* 13.

³ Whither he came, in his eighteenth year, according to Heraclides Lembus, in *Diog.* 1. Conf. *Strabo*, l. c.: τραφήναι φασιν ἐνθάδε (in Samos) καὶ ἐν Τέφῳ καὶ ἐφηβεῦσαι Ἀθήνῃσι.

⁴ According to Hermippus (*Diog.* 2) Democritus first gave him the impulse to pursue philosophy; but this is only a conjecture. Besides Democritus, Aristippus is also mentioned as

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After having been active as a teacher in several schools¹ in Asia Minor, he repaired to Athens about the year 306 B.C.,² and there founded a School of his own.³ The meeting-place of this School was the founder's garden,⁴ and its centre of attraction was the founder himself, around whom a circle of friends gathered, knit together by a common set of principles, by a common affection for a master whom they almost worshipped, and by a common enjoyment of his cultivated society.⁵ Opponents charged the Epicureans with gross impropriety because they admitted not only women,⁶ but women of loose morality,⁷ to

a philosopher whose doctrines he followed (*Diog.* 4). Epicurus is even said to have expressed a disparaging opinion of Democritus (*Cic.* N. D. i. 33, 93; *Diog.* 8). Nor is this denied by *Diog.* 9; but it probably only refers to particular points, or it may have reference to the attitude of later Epicureans, such as Colotes (*Plut.* Adv. Col. 3, 3). *Plut.* l. 9 says, not only that Epicurus for a long time called himself a follower of Democritus, but he also quotes passages from Leonteus and Metrodorus, attesting Epicurus' respect for Democritus. *Philodem.* *περὶ παρρησίας*, Vol. Herc. v. 2, col. 20, seems to refer to expressions of Epicurus, exculpating certain mistakes of Democritus. *Lucret.* iii. 370, v. 620, also speaks of Democritus with great respect; and *Philodem.* De Mus. Vol. Herc. i. col. 36, calls him ἀνὴρ οὐ φυσιο-λογώτατος μόνον τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἰστορουμένων οὐδενὸς ἡ-τον πολυπράγμων.

¹ *Diog.* 1, mentions Colophon, Mytilene, and Lampsacus. *Strabo*, xiii. 1, 19, also affirms that Epi-

curus resided for some time at Lampsacus, and there made the acquaintance of Idomeneus and Leonteus.

² *Diog.* 2, on the authority of Heraclides and Sotion. According to him, Epicurus returns to Athens in the archonship of Anaxicrates, 307-6 B.C.

³ Not immediately, however, since *Diog.* 2, says, on the authority of Heraclides: μέχρι μὲν τινος κατ' ἐπιμίξιν τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλοσοφεῖν, ἔπειτ' ἰδίᾳ πως τὴν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ κληθεῖσαν αἵρεσιν συστήσασθαι.

⁴ On this celebrated garden, after which the Epicureans were called οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν κήπων, see *Diog.* 10, 17; *Plin.* H. N. xix. 4, 51; *Cic.* Fin. i. 20, 65; v. 1, 3; Ad Fam. xiii. 1; *Sen.* Ep. 21, 10; *Steinhart.* Epicurus had purchased it for 80 minæ.

⁵ This subject will be discussed at a later period.

⁶ Such as Themista or Themisto, the wife of Leonteus (*Diog.* 5; 25; 26; *Clem.* Strom. iv. 522, D).

⁷ *Diog.* 4; 6; 7; *Cleomed.*

this circle of philosophic culture; but in the then state of Greece such conduct does not appear extraordinary. In this society Epicurus laboured for six and thirty years, and succeeded in impressing such a definite stamp on his School that it is now clearly recognisable after the lapse of centuries. In the year 270 B.C.¹ he succumbed to disease, the pains and troubles of which he bore with great fortitude.² Out of the multitude of his writings³ only a few have come down to us, and these are for the most part unimportant ones.⁴ On the whole these fragments⁵ bear out the unfavourable opinions which opponents expressed with regard to his style.⁶

Meteor. p. 92; *Plut.* N. P. Suav. Viv. 4, 8; 16, 1 and 6; *Lat. Viv.* 4, 2. The best-known among these *ἐκταίρια* is Leontion, who lived with Metrodorus (*Diog.* 6; 23), and wrote with spirit against Theophrastus (*Cic.* N. D. i. 33, 93; *Plut.* Hist. Nat. Præf. 29). *Conf. Diog.* 5; *Philodem.* *περὶ παρρησίας*, Vol. Herc. v. 2; *Athen.* xiii. 593, b, tells a fine story of self-sacrifice of her daughter Danaë.

¹ Ol. 127, 2, in the archonship of Pythæctus, and in his seventy-second year. *Diog.* 15; *Cic.* De Fat. 9, 19.

² *Diog.* 15; 22; *Cic.* Ad Fam. vii. 26; Fin. ii. 30, 96; *Sen.* Ep. 66, 47; 92, 25. Hermippus (*Diog.* 15) by no means implies that he put an end to his own life.

³ According to *Diog.* Pro. 16, x. 26, he was, next to Chrysippus, the most voluminous writer of the ancient philosophers, his writings filling 300 rolls. The

titles of his most esteemed works are given by *Diog.* 27. *Conf. Fabric.* Bibl. Græ. iii. 595.

⁴ Three epistles in *Diog.* 35; 84; 122; and the *κύρια δόξαι*, an epitome of his ethics, mentioned by *Cic.* N. D. i. 30, 85. Of his 37 books *περὶ φύσεως*, fragments of books 2 and 11 have been edited (*Vol. Herc.* ii.).

⁵ Fragments in *Diog.* 5; 7. Besides the testament and the letter to Idomeneus (*Diog.* 16-22), many individual expressions of Epicurus have been preserved by Seneca.

⁶ Aristophanes (in *Diog.* 13) calls his style *ιδιωτικωτάτη*. *Cleomed.* Meteor. p. 91, complains of his awkward and barbarous expressions, instancing: *σαρκὸς εὐσταθῇ καταστήματα*· τὰ περὶ ταύτης πιστὰ ἐλπίσματα· λιπάσμα ὀφθαλμῶν· ἱερὰ ἀνακρανυράσματα· γαργαλισμοὺς σώματος. In this respect, Chrysippus may be compared with him.

CHAP.
XV.B. *Scholars
of Epi-
curus.*

Among the numerous scholars of Epicurus¹ the best known are the following: Metrodorus,² and Polyænus,³ both of whom died before their master; Hermarchus,⁴ upon whom the presidency of the School devolved after the death of Epicurus;⁵ and Colotes,⁶ against whom Plutarch, four hundred years later, wrote a treatise. Many others are also known, at least, by name.⁷ The garden which Epicurus in

¹ See *Fabric. Bib. Gr.* iii. 598. They were, no doubt, very numerous. *Diog.* x. 9, probably exaggerates their number. *Cic. Fin.* i. 20, 65, speaks of magni greges amicorum. *Plut. Lat. Viv.* 3, 1, also mentions his friends in Asia and Egypt. In Greece, however, on his own testimony, and that of Metrodorus (*Sen. Ep.* 79, 15), they attracted little notice.

² A native of Lampsacus (*Strabo*, xiii. 1, 19), and, next to Epicurus, the most celebrated teacher of the School. *Cicero*, *Fin.* ii. 28, 92, calls him pæne alter Epicurus, and states (*Fin.* ii. 3, 7) that Epicurus gave him the name of a wise man (*Diog.* 18; *Sen. Ep.* 52, 3). Further particulars as to himself and his writings in *Diog.* x. 6; 18; 21-24; *Philodem. De Vitiis*, ix. (Vol. Herc. iii.), col. 12; 21; 27; *Athen.* vii. 279; *Plut.* N. P. Suav. *Vivi.* 7, 1; 12, 2; 16, 6 and 9; *Adv. Col.* 33, 2 and 6; *Sen. Ep.* 98, 9; 99, 25. According to *Diog.* 23, he died seven years before Epicurus, in his fifty-third year, and must therefore have been born 330 or 329 B.C.

³ Son of Athenodorus, likewise a native of Lampsacus (*Diog.* 24), a capital mathematician, according to *Cic. Acad.* ii. 33, 106; *Fin.*

i. 6, 20. *Diog.* l. c., calls him ἐπιεικής καὶ φιλήκοος; Metrodorus, in *Philodem. περὶ παβήσιας*, col. 6, ἀποφθεγματίας. *Sen. Ep.* 6, 6, calls him, Metrodorus and Hermarchus viros magnos. *Philodemus*, l. c., praises his frankness towards his teacher. A son of his is also mentioned (*Diog.* 19), whose mother would appear to have been a courtesan.

⁴ This individual's name, formerly written Hermachus, appears as Hermarchus in the modern editions of Diogenes, Cicero, and Seneca. The latter form is now established beyond doubt. His birthplace was Mytilene, Agemarchus being his father. *Diog.* 24, gives a list of his books. Epicurus (*Diog.* 20) describes him as one of his oldest and most faithful friends, in the words: μετὰ τοῦ συγκαταγεγενηρακότος ἡμῖν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ. On his character, see *Sen. Ep.* 6, 6.

⁵ According to what is stated in the testament of Epicurus. *Diog.* 16.

⁶ Colotes, a native of Lampsacus. *Diog.* 25. Further particulars about him may be obtained from *Plut. Adv. Col.* 17, 5; 1, 1; N. P. Suav. *Viv.* 1, 1; *Macrob. Somn. Scip.* i. 2.

⁷ In particular, Neocles, Chai-

his testament left to the School¹ continued after his death to be its external rallying-point for his followers. Hermarchus was succeeded by Polystratus² together with whom Hippoclidides is also mentioned³ as president. Hermarchus and Hippoclidides were succeeded by Dionysius, and Dionysius again by Basilides.⁴ Protarchus of Bargylium⁵ and his pupil Demetrius the

redemus, and Aristobulus, the brothers of Epicurus (*Diog.* 3, 28; *Plut.* N. P. Suav. Viv. 5, 3; 16, 3; *De Lat. Viv.* 3, 2); Idomeneus, a native of Lampsacus (*Diog.* 25; 22; 23; 5; *Plut.* Adv. Col. 18, 3; *Strabo*, xiii. 1, 19; *Athen.* vii. 279; *Philodem.* περὶ παρθένιας, Fr. 72, Vol. Herc. v. 2; *Sen.* Ep. 21, 3 and 7; 22, 5; *Phot.* Lex.; and *Suid.* Πόθια καὶ Δήλια), from whose historical writings many fragments are quoted; Leonteus, likewise a native of Lampsacus (*Diog.* 5; 25; *Plut.* Adv. Col. 3, 3; *Strabo*, l. c.); Herodotus (*Diog.* 4 and 34); Pythocles (*Diog.* 5 and 83; *Plut.* N. P. Suav. Vi. 12, 1; Adv. Col. 29, 2; *Philodem.* περὶ παρθένιας, Fr. 6); Apelles (*Plut.* N. P. Suav. Vi. 12, 1); Menceceus (*Diog.* 121); Nicanor (*Diog.* 20); Timocrates, the brother of Metrodorus, who afterwards fell out with Epicurus (*Diog.* 4 and 6; 23 and 28; *Cic.* N. D. i. 33, 43; *Plut.* N. P. Suav. Vivi. 16, 9; Adv. Col. 32, 7; *Comment.* in *Hesiod.* Fr. 7, 1; *Philodem.* περὶ παρθένιας, Vol. Herc. v. col. 20). This Timocrates must not be confounded with the Athenian Timocrates, whom Epicurus appointed his heir, together with Amynomachus (*Diog.* 16; *Cic.* Fin. ii. 31, 101). Both the latter were probably pupils of Epicurus. Other names

of pupils are: Mithras, a Syrian, an official under Lysimachus (*Diog.* 4 and 28; *Plut.* Adv. Col. 33, 2; N. P. Suav. Viv. 15, 5); Mys, a slave of Epicurus, on whom he bestowed liberty (*Diog.* 21; 3; 10; *Gell.* ii. 18, 8; *Macrob.* Sat. i. 11); Anaxarchus and Timarchus (*Plut.* Adv. Col. 17, 3); Hegesianax (*Plut.* N. P. Sua. Vi. 20, 5); the poet Menander; and probably Dionysius ὁ μεταθέμενος.

¹ *Diog.* 16. In Cicero's time, the plot of ground was in the hands of C. Memmius, a distinguished Roman, to whom Cicero wrote (*Ad Fam.* xiii. 1), begging him to restore it to the School.

² *Diog.* 25, does not say that Polystratus was a personal disciple of Epicurus, but it seems probable.

³ According to *Valer. Max.* i. 8, both these individuals were born on the same day, and passed their whole lives together with a common purse. Lysias, according to the older text of *Diog.* x. 25, was a cotemporary.

⁴ *Diog.* 25. The Dionysius referred to can hardly be Dionysius ὁ μεταθέμενος.

⁵ *Strabo*, xiv. 2, 20. He is probably the Protarchus whose sayings are quoted by *Simpl.* Phys. 78, a; *Themist.* Phys. 27, a.

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Laconian,¹ appear to belong to the second century before Christ; but the time in which these philosophers flourished cannot be established with certainty; and the same remark applies to several others whose names are on record.²

C. *Epi-
cureans
of the
Roman
period.*

Already, before the middle of the second century B.C. Epicureanism is said to have obtained a footing in Rome.³ It is certain that it was existing there not long after. C. Amafinius is mentioned as the first who paved the way for the spread of Epicurean doctrines by discussing them in Latin;⁴ and it is stated that these doctrines soon found many supporters, who were attracted partly by their merits,

¹ According to *Strabo*, l. c., *Diog.* 26, *Sext. Empir.* *Pyrrh.* iii. 137, *Math.* viii. 348, x. 219, *Erotian*, *Lex. Hippocr.* Κλαγγώδη, Demetrius was one of the most distinguished Epicureans. Whether a treatise on mathematics in Vol. Herc. iv. is his, or belongs to another Demetrius mentioned by *Strabo*, xii. 3, 16, it is impossible to say.

² Both the Ptolemies of Alexandria (*Diog.* 25); Diogenes of Tarsus (*Diog.* vi. 81; x. 26; 97; 118; 136; 138); Orion (*Diog.* 26); Timagoras (*Cic. Acad.* ii. 25, 80); and also Metrodorus of Stratonice, who went over from Epicurus to Carneades (*Diog.* 9).

³ According to *Athen.* xii. 547, a, *Ælian*, V. H. ix. 12, two Epicureans, Aleius and Philiscus, were banished from Rome, in the consulate of L. Postumius (173 or 155 B.C.; see *Clinton's Fasti*), because of their evil influence on youth. Although the story is

obviously taken from a hostile authority, it can hardly be altogether without some foundation. *Plut.* N. P. *Suav.* V. 19, 4, says, that in some cities severe laws were passed against the Epicureans, and just at that time there was a strong feeling in Rome against innovations.

⁴ According to *Cic. Tusc.* iv. 3, 6, Amafinius seems to have come forward not long after the philosophic embassy of 156, B.C.; nor is this at variance with *Lucr.* v. 336. His works made a great impression at the time. According to *Acad.* i. 2, 5, he pursued natural science, following Epicurus. Cicero then complains of him and Rabirius, qui nulla arte adhibita de rebus ante oculos positis vulgari sermone disputant: nihil definiunt, nihil partiuntur, &c. *Conf. Tusc.* ii. 3, 7. Cassius, too (*Cic. Ad Fam.* xv. 19), calls him and Catius mali verborum interpretes.

but more often by the simplicity and the ease with which they could be understood.¹

Towards the close of the second century Apollodorus, one of the most voluminous writers on philosophy, taught at Athens.² His pupil, Zeno of Sidon, the most important of the Epicureans of that age, laboured for a long time successfully both orally and by his writings.³ About the same time Phædrus is heard of in Rome and Athens,⁴ and at a little later

¹ *Cic.* Tusc. iv. 3, 7: Post Amafinium autem multi ejusdem æmuli rationis multa eum scripserunt, Italiam totam occupaverunt, quodque maximum argumentum est non dici illa subtiliter, quod et tam facile ediscantur et ab indoctis probentur, id illi firmamentum esse disciplinæ putant. Conf. in *Fin.* i. 7, 25, the question: Cur tam multi sint Epicurei?

² Surnamed *δ κηποτύραννος*, the writer of more than 400 books. *Diog.* 25; 2; 13; vii. 181.

³ *Diog.* vii. 35, x. 25, and Procl. in *Euclid.* 55, say that Zeno was a native of Sidon, and a pupil of Apollodorus; nor can these statements be referred to an older Zeno, instead of to the one mentioned by Cicero. According to *Cic.* Acad. i. 12, 46, Zeno attended the lectures of Carneades; and since Carneades died not later than 129 B.C., Zeno cannot have been born much later than 150 B.C. If, therefore, Zeno was the successor of Apollodorus, the latter must be placed entirely in the second century. But this fact is not sufficiently established. Cicero, in company with Atticus, attended his lectures (*Cic.* l. c.;

Fin. i. 5, 16; Tusc. iii. 17, 38), on his first visit to Athens, 78 to 79 B.C.; but this cannot possibly be the same Zeno whom he mentions as living in 50 and 43 B.C. (*Ad Att.* v. 10 and 11; xvi. 3). *Cic.* N. D. i. 21, calls him princeps Epicureorum; Tusc. l. c., acriculus senex, istorum (Epicureans) acutissimus. *Diog.* x. 25, calls him *πολύγραφος ἀνὴρ*. From Procl. in *Euclid.* 55; 59; 60, we hear of a treatise of Zeno, in which he attacked the validity of mathematical proofs. *Philodemus'* treatise *περὶ παβήσεως* seems, from the title, to have been an abstract from Zeno. Cotemporary with Zeno was that Aristio, or Athenio, who played a part in Athens during the Mithridatic war, and is sometimes called a Peripatetic, and sometimes an Epicurean (*Plut.* Sulla, 12; 14; 23).

⁴ Cicero (N. D. i. 33, 93; *Fin.* i. 5, 16; v. 1, 3; *Legg.* i. 20, 33) had also studied under him in Athens, and previously in Rome, where Phædrus must then have been residing (*Ad Fam.* xiii. 1). He was old when Cicero had, for the second time, relations with him. According to Phlegon, in

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period Philodemus.¹ Syro or Sciro in Rome,² and Patro³ in Athens, are also mentioned as followers of Phædrus. The number of Epicureans at this epoch in Rome was not small. They are known to us chiefly by Cicero's writings.⁴ But no individual

Phot. Bibl. Cod. 97, he was succeeded by Patron (Ol. 177, 3, or 70 B.C.) in the headship of the School, after holding it only for a very short time; but this is not a well-ascertained fact. Cicero, l. c., praises the character of Phædrus. He calls him *nobilis philosophus* (*Philip. v. 5, 13*). It was supposed that Cicero's description (*N. D. i. 10, 25; 15, 41*), and that the fragments first published by Drummond (*Herculansia*: London, 1810), and then by Petersen (*Phædri . . . Fragm.*: Hamb. 1833), and illustrated by Krische (*Forschungen*), were from a treatise of Phædrus on the Gods. But Spengel and Sauppe have shown that the Neapolitan editors are right in regarding these fragments as the remains of a treatise of Philodemus *περὶ εὐσεβείας*.

¹ Philodemus (see Vol. Herc. i. 1; *Gros*, *Philod. Rhet. cxii.*; *Preller*, *Allg. Encyclo. Sect. iii. Bd. xxiii. 345*) was a native of Gadara, in Coele-Syria (*Strabo*, xvi. 2, 29). He lived at Rome in Cicero's time, and is mentioned by Cicero as a learned and amiable man (*Fin. ii. 35, 119; Or. in Piso, 28*). Besides philosophic works, he also wrote poems (*Cic. In Pis.; Hor. Sat. i. 2, 121*). A number of the latter, in the shape of epigrams, are preserved. Of his philosophical works mentioned by *Diog. x. 3; 24*, no fewer

than thirty-six books were discovered in Herculaneum, which have, for the most part, been published (*Vol. Herc. iv.*). Spengel and Gros have separately edited *Rhet. IV.*; *Sauppe, De Vitiis X.*; and Petersen and Sauppe, the fragments *περὶ εὐσεβείας*.

² *Cic. Acad. ii. 33, 106; Fin. ii. 35, 119; Ad Fam. vi. 11*. According to *Virgil*, *Catal. 7, 9; 10, 1, Donat. Vita Virg. 79, Serv. Ad Ecl. vi. 13, Æn. vi. 264*, he was the teacher of Virgil. The name is variously written as Syro, Siro, Sciro, Scyro. Somewhat earlier is the grammarian Pompius Andronicus, from Syria, who, according to *Sueton. Illust. Gram. c. 8*, lived at Rome at the same time as Gniphio, the teacher of Cicero, and afterwards at Cumæ.

³ *Cic. Ad Fam. xiii. 1; Ad Att. v. 11; vii. 2; Ad Quint. Fratr. i. 2, 4*.

⁴ Besides Lucretius, the most important among them are T. Albutius, called by *Cic. Brut. 35, 131*, perfectus Epicureus (*Cic. Brut. 26, 102; Tusc. v. 37, 108; N. D. i. 33, 93; Fin. i. 3, 8; In Pison. 38, 92; Offic. ii. 14, 50; Orator. 44, 149; In Cæcil. 19, 63; Provin. Cons. 7, 15; De Orat. ii. 70, 281*), and Velleius, who, as *Krische* (*Forsch. 20*) proves, was a native of Lanuvium, and was considered the most distinguished Stoic of his time (*Cic.*

obtained a higher repute than T. Lucretius Carus,¹ whose poem, carefully reproducing the Epicurean notions on natural science, is one of the most valuable illustrations of their system we possess. Contemporary with Lucretius the celebrated physician Asclepiades of Bithynia² resided at Rome, but to judge by the views on nature attributed to him, Asclepiades can have been no genuine Epicurean although connected with the Epicurean School.³

N. D. i. 6, 15; 21, 58; De Orat. iii. 21, 78). Other Epicureans were: C. Catus, a native of Gaul, some time anterior to Cicero (Ad Fam. xv. 16)—by *Quintilian*, x. 1, 124, he is called *levis quidem sed non injucundus tamen auctor*; and the Comment. Cruqu. in *Hor.* Sat. ii. 4, 1, says that he wrote four books *De Rerum Natura et De Summo Bono*;—C. Cassius, the well-known leader of the conspiracy against Cæsar (*Cic.* Ad Fam. xv. 16, 19; *Plut.* Brut. 37); C. Vibius Pansa, who died at Mutina, in 43 B.C. (*Cic.* Ad Fam. vii. 12; xv. 19); Gallus (Ad Fam. vii. 26); L. Piso, the patron of Philodemus (*Cic.* in Pis. 28; l. c. 9, 20; 16, 37; 18, 42; 25, 59; Post. Red. 6, 14); Statilius (*Plut.* Brut. 12); a second Statilius (Cat. Min. 65); L. Manlius Torquatus (*Cic.* Fin. i. 5, 13). Moreover, T. Pomponius Atticus, the well-known friend of Cicero, approached nearest to the Epicurean School, calling its adherents *nostri familiares* (*Cic.* Fin. v. 1, 3) and *condiscipuli* (Leg. i. 7, 21), and being a friend of Patro's; but his relations to philosophy were too free to entitle him properly to be ranked in any one

School (*Cic.* Fam. xiii. 1). The same observation applies also to his friend, L. Saufeius (*Nepos*, Att. 12; *Cic.* Ad Att. iv. 6). Still less can C. Sergius Orata (*Cic.* Fin. ii. 22, 70; Off. iii. 16, 67; De Orat. i. 39, 178), L. Thorius Balbus (Fin. l. c.), and Postumius (*Ibid.*) be called Epicureans. Nor can anything be stated with certainty respecting L. Papirius Pactus (*Cic.* Ad Fam. vii. 12) or C. Memmius (*Cic.* Ad Fam. xiii. 1; *Lucret.* De Rer. Nat. i. 24; v. 9).

¹ Born, according to Hieron. (in *Eus.* Chron.), 95 B.C., he died in his 44th year, or 51 B.C. In *Vita Virgilii*, 659 ought therefore to be substituted for 699 A.V.C. It is clear, from *Nepos*, Att. 12, that he was dead before the assassination of Cæsar. Teuffel (in *Pauly's Realencycl.* iv. 1195) justly disputes the statement of Hieronymus, that he committed suicide in a fit of madness.

² According to *Sext.* Math. vii. 201, a cotemporary of Antiochus of Ascalon, and reckoned by *Galen.* Isag. c. 4, among the leaders of the logical School of Physicians.

³ Known for three things—his

Several supporters of the practical philosophy of the Epicureans in the following century are also known to us,¹ but no one appears who comes up to Zeno or Phædrus in scientific importance. Rehabili-

theory of atoms, his theory of acquiring knowledge, and his resolution of the soul into matter.

All bodies, he held, consist of atoms, differing, however, from the atoms of Democritus in that they owe their origin to the meeting and breaking up of greater masses, and are not in quality alike and unchangeable (*ἀπαθείς*). *Sext.* Pyrrh. iii. 32; *Math.* ix. 363; x. 318; viii. 220; iii. 5; *Galen.* l. c. 9; *Dionys.*; *Alex.* (in *Eus.* Pr. Ev. xiv. 23, 4); *Cæl. Aureliam.* De Pass. Acut. i. 14. Although in this respect he resembled Heraclides, with whom he is generally classed, and applied, like him, the name *ἄτομοι* to atoms, still it is probable that his knowledge of Heraclides was traditionally derived from the Epicureans.

He also asserted, with Epicurus (*Antiochus*, in *Sext.* *Math.* vii. 201): τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ὅντως καὶ ἀληθῶς ἀντιλήψεις εἶναι, λόγῳ δὲ μηδὲν ὅλως ἡμᾶς καταλαμβάνειν.

He differs, however, entirely from Epicurus in denying the existence of a soul apart from body, and in referring every kind of notion, including the soul itself, to the action of the senses (*Sext.* *Math.* vii. 380; *Plut.* *Plac.* iv. 2, 6; *Cæl. Aureliam.* l. c.; *Ter-tullian.* De An. 15). All that is otherwise stated of Asclepiades is not at variance with Epicurean principles.

¹ *Quint.* *Inst.* vi. 3, 78, names L. Varus as an Epicurean, a

friend of Augustus, perhaps the individual who, according to *Donat.* V. Virg. 79, *Serv.* on *Ecl.* vi. 13, attended the lectures of Syro, in company with Virgil. Horace, notwithstanding *Ep.* i. 4, 15, was no Epicurean, but only a man who gathered everywhere what he could make use of (*Sat.* i. 5, 101). In Caligula's time, a senator Pompedius was an Epicurean (*Joseph.* *Antiquit.* ix. 1, 3); under Nero, Aufidius Bassus, a friend of Seneca (*Sen.* *Ep.* 30, 1 and 3 and 5; 14), the elder Celsus (*Orig.* c. Cels. i. 8), and Diodorus, who committed suicide (*Sen.* *Vi.* Be. 19, 1); under Vespasian or his sons, Pollius (*Stat.* *Silv.* ii. 2, 113). In the first half of the second century, *Cleomedes*, *Met.* 87, complained of the honours paid to Epicurus. In the second half of the same century lived Antonius, mentioned by *Galen.* De Prop. An. Affe. v. 1, and Zenobius, who, according to *Simpl.* *Phys.* 113, was an opponent of Alexander of Aphrodisias. In the first half of the third century lived Diogenes Laërtius, who, if not a perfect Epicurean himself, was at least a friend of the Epicureans. Amongst other Epicureans, the names of Athenæus (whose epigram on Epicurus is quoted by *Diog.* x. 12), Antodorus (*Diog.* v. 92), and Hermodorus (*Lucian.* *Icaromen.* 16) may be mentioned; but *Diog.* x. 11, has no right to set down Diocles as an Epicurean.

tated under the Antonies by the establishment of a public chair in Athens, Epicureanism survived longer than most other systems, and continued to exist as late as the fourth century after Christ.¹

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¹ *Diog.* x. 9, in the first half of the third century, writes: ἡ τε διδαχὴ πασῶν σχεδὸν ἐκλείπουσάν τῶν ἄλλων ἔσαε διαμένουσα καὶ νηρίθμους ἀρχὰς ἀπολύουσα ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης τῶν γνωρίμων. The testimony of *Lactantius*, *Inst.* iii. 17, to the wide spread of Epicureanism, is not so trustworthy.

CHAPTER XVI.

CHARACTER AND DIVISIONS OF THE EPICUREAN
TEACHING: THE TEST-SCIENCE OF TRUTH.CHAP.
XVI.A. Cha-
racter of
Epicurean
system.(1) *Its
power of
self-pre-
servation.*

THE scientific value and capacity for development of the Epicurean teaching bears no proper proportion to the extensive diffusion and the length of time during which that teaching continued to flourish. No other system troubled itself so little about the foundation on which it rested; none confined itself so exclusively to the utterances of its founder. Such was the dogmatism with which Epicurus propounded his precepts, such the conviction he entertained of their usefulness, that his pupils were required to commit summaries of them to memory;¹ and the superstitious devotion for the founder was with his approval² carried to such a length, that not the

¹ *Cic. Fin. ii. 7, 20*: Quis enim vestrum non edidicit Epicuri *κυρίας δόξας*? *Diog. 12.* Epicurus often exhorted his scholars (*Ibid.* 83; 85; 35) to commit to memory what they had heard. His last exhortation to his friends was: *τῶν δογμάτων μνησθαι.*

² He speaks of himself and Metrodorus as wise men. *Cic. Fin. ii. 3, 7. Plut. N. P. Suav. Viv. 18, 5,* quotes, as his ex-

pressions: *ὡς Κολώτης μὲν αὐτὸν φυσιολογοῦντα προσκυνήσειεν γονάτων ἀψάμενος· Νεοκλῆς δὲ ὁ ἀδελφὸς εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων ἀποφαίνοιτο μηδένα σοφώτερον Ἐπικούρου γεγονέναι μηδ' εἶναι· ἥ δὲ μήτηρ ἀτόμους ἔσχεν ἐν αὐτῇ τοαύτας, οἶαι συνελθοῦσαι σοφὴν ἂν ἐγέννησαν.* *Conf. Id. Frat. Am. 16; Adv. Col. 17, 5; Cleomed. Meteor. p. 89.* Not only was Epicurus' birthday observed by the Epi-

slightest deviation from his tenets were on a single point permitted, whereas in Cicero's time the writings of Epicurus and Metrodorus found hardly a reader beyond the School;¹ it is asserted that as late as the first and second centuries before Christ the Epicureans still kept closely to their master's teaching.² Probably it was easier for an Epicurean to act thus than it would have been for any other thinker; the Epicurean, like his master,³ being indifferent to the

curean School during his lifetime, but the 20th of every month was celebrated as a festival, in honour of him and Metrodorus. In his testament, Epicurus especially ordered this twofold observance for the future. *Diog.* 18; *Cic.* *Fin.* ii. 31, 101; *Plut.* *N. P. Suav.* *Viv.* 4, 8; *Plin.* *H. N.* xxxv. 5. *Athen.* vii. 298, d: 'Επικούρειός τις εἰκαδιστής. The extravagant importance attached to Epicurus is proved by the high eulogies in *Lucret.* i. 62; iii. 1 and 1040; v. 1; vi. 1. Metrodorus, in *Plut.* *Adv. Col.* 17, 4, praises τὰ 'Επικούρου ὡς ἀληθῶς θεόφαντα ὄργια.

¹ *Cic.* *Tusc.* ii. 3, 8.

² *Sen.* *Ep.* 33, 4, compares the scientific independence of the Stoics with the Epicurean's dependence on the founder: Non sumus sub rege: sibi quisque se vindicat. Apud istos quicquid dicit Hermarchus, quicquid Metrodorus, ad unum refertur. Omnia quæ quisquam in illo contubernio locutus est, unius ductu et auspiciis dicta sunt. On the other hand, Numenius (in *Eus. Pr. Ev.* xiv. 5, 3), little as he can agree with their tenets, commends the Epicureans for faithfully ad-

hering to their master's teaching, a point in which only the Pythagoreans are their equals. Of the Epicureans, it may be said: μηδ' αὐτοῖς εἰπεῖν πῶ ἐναντίον οὔτε ἀλλήλοις οὔτε 'Επικούρῳ μηδένα εἰς μηδέν, ὅτου καὶ μνησθῆναι ἄξιον, ἀλλ' ἔστιν αὐτοῖς παρανόμημα, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀσέβημα, καὶ κατέγνωσται τὸ καινοτομηθέν. Thus the Epicurean School resembles a state animated by one spirit, in which there are no divisions of party.

³ It has been already observed that Epicurus ignored his obligations to his teachers Pamphilus and Nausicydes, and only confessed his debt to Democritus. All other philosophers provoked, not only his contempt, but likewise his abuse. *Diog.* 8, communicates his remarks on Plato, Aristotle, and others. *Cic.* *N. D.* i. 33, 93: Cum Epicurus Aristotelem vexarit contumeliosissime, Phædoni Socratico turpissime maledixerit. *Plut.* *N. P. Suav.* V. 2, 2: Compared with Epicurus and Metrodorus, Colotes is polite; τὰ γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποις αἰσχίστα βήματα, βωμολοχίας, ληκυθισμούς, κ.τ.λ. συναγαγόντες 'Αριστοτέ-

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labours of other philosophers, or little able to appreciate their merits.¹ For us this conduct of theirs has one advantage; we can be far more certain that the Epicureans reflect the teaching of their founder than we can that this is the case with the Stoics. But this philosophical sterility, this mechanical handing down of unchangeable principles places the good done to science by Epicureanism on the lowest level. The servile dependence of the Epicurean School on its founder can neither excuse its mental idleness nor recommend a system so powerless to give an independent training to its supporters.

(2) *Aim of philosophy according to the Epicureans.*

The want of scientific appreciation here expressed also appears in the view taken by Epicurus of the aim and business of philosophy. If among the Stoics the subordination of theory to practice was frequently felt injuriously to the interests of science, among the Epicureans this subordination was carried to such an extent as to lead to a depreciation of all science. The aim of philosophy was, with them, to promote human happiness. Indeed, philosophy is nothing else but an activity helping us to happiness by means of speech and thought.² Nor is happiness,

λους καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πρωταγόρου καὶ Θεοφράστου καὶ Ἡρακλείδου καὶ Ἰππάρχου, καὶ τίνος γὰρ οὐχὶ τῶν ἐπιφανῶν, κατεσκεύασαν.

¹ *Cic.* N. D. ii. 29, 73: Nam vobis, Vellei, minus notum est, quem ad modum quidque dicatur; vestra enim solum legis, vestra amatis, ceteros causa incognita condemnatis. *Ibid.* i. 34, 93: Zeno not only despised cotemporary philosophers, but he even

called Socrates a scurra Atticus. *Macrobi.* Somn. i. 2.

² *Sext.* Math. xi. 169: Ἐπίκουρος ἔλεγε τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι λόγοις καὶ διαλογισμοῖς τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον περιποιούσαν. *Conf. Epic.* in *Diog.* 122: The demand to study philosophy in youth, as well as in age, is supported on the ground, that it is never too early nor too late to be happy.

according to Epicurus, directly promoted by knowledge, but only indirectly in as far as knowledge ministers to practical needs or clears away hindrances to their attainment. All science which does not serve this end is superfluous and worthless.¹ Hence Epicurus despised learning and culture, the researches of grammarians and the lore of historians, and declared that it was most conducive to simplicity of feeling to be uncontaminated by learned rubbish.² Nor was his opinion different respecting mathematical science, with which he was quite unacquainted.³ The calculations of mathematicians, he maintained, are based on false principles;⁴ at any rate, they contribute nothing to human happiness, and it is therefore useless and foolish to trouble oneself about them.⁵

¹ Epicurus' own education was defective. Not content with that, he upholds this defectiveness on principle. Nullam eruditionem, says the Epicurean in *Cic. Fin.* i. 21, 71, esse duxit, nisi quæ beatæ vitæ disciplinam adjuvaret. In poets, nulla solida utilitas omnisque puerilis est delectatio. Music, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy et a falsis initiis profecta vera esse non possunt, et si essent vera nihil afferrent, quo jucundius, i.e. quo melius viveremus.

² *Cic. Fin.* ii. 4, 12: Vestri quidem vel optime disputant, nihil opus esse eum, philosophus qui futurus sit, scire literas. They fetch their philosophers, like Cincinnatus, from the plough. In this spirit, Epicurus (*Diog.* 6; *Plut. N. P. Suav.* V. 12, 1) wrote to Pythocles: παιδείαν δὲ πᾶσαν, μακάριε, φεύγε τὸ ἀκάτιον ἀρά-

μενος; and to Apelles (*Plut.* l. c.; *Athen.* xiii. 588, a): μακαρίζω σε, ὦ οὗτος, ὅτι καθαρὸς πάσης αἰτίας ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν ὄρμησας. Metrodorus asserted, that it need not be a source of trouble to anyone, if he had never read a line of Homer, and did not know whether Hector was a Trojan or a Greek. The art of reading and writing, γραμματικὴ in the limited sense, was the only art recognised by Epicurus. *Sext. Math.* i. 49.

³ *Sext. Math.* i. 1; *Cic. Fin.* i. 6, 20.

⁴ *Cic. Fin.* i. 21, which probably only means, that mathematical ideas cannot be applied to phenomena. Hence *Acad.* ii. 33, 106: Polyænus . . . Epicuro adsentiens totam geometriam falsam esse credidit. Conf. Procl. in *Eucl.* p. 85.

⁵ *Sext. Math.* i. 1: Epicurus rejects mathematics ὡς τῶν μαθη-

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The theory of music and poetry he likewise found exceedingly irksome, although he took pleasure in music itself and the theatre;¹ and rhetoric as an artificial step to eloquence seemed to him as worthless as the show speeches which are the result—so he thought—of learning rhetoric. The power of public speaking is a matter of practice and of momentary feeling, and hence the skilful speaker is far from being a good statesman.² Nor did the greater part of logical enquiries fare any better in his judgment. Definitions are of no use: the theory of division and proof may be dispensed with; the philosopher does best to confine himself to words, and to leave all the logical ballast alone.³ Of all the questions which engrossed the attention of Stoic logicians, one only, the theory of knowledge, was studied by Epicurus, and that in a very superficial way.

Far greater, comparatively, was the importance he

μάτων μηδὲν συνεργούντων πρὸς σοφίας τελείωσιν. According to *Diog.* 93, Epicurus calls astronomy τὰς ἀνδραποδάδεις τῶν ἀστρολόγων τεχνιτείας. Conf. *Diog.* 70.

¹ *Plut.* l. c. 13, 1. Philodemus, in his treatise *περὶ μουσικῆς*, had discussed at length the value of music; in particular, rejecting the notion that it has a moral effect. He was even opposed to music at table (*Plut.* l. c.). The statement of *Diog.* 121, that only the wise man can give a right opinion on poetry and music, is not at variance with these passages.

² *Philodemus*, *De Rhet.* Vol. Herc. iv. col. 3.

³ *Cic.* *Fin.* i. 7, 22: In logic iste vester plane, ut mihi quidem videtur, inermis ac nudus est. Tollit definitiones: nihil de dividendo ac partiendo docet. Non quomodo efficiatur concludaturque ratio, tradit, non qua via captiosa solvantur, ambigua distinguantur, ostendit. *Ibid.* 19, 63: In dialectica autem vestra nullam existimavit [*Epic.*] esse nec ad melius vivendum nec ad commodius disserendum viam. *Acad.* ii. 30, 97: Ab Epicuro, qui totam dialecticam et contemnit et invidet. *Diog.* 31: τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ὥς παρέλκουσαν ἀποδοκιμάζουσιν· ἀρκεῖν γὰρ τοὺς φυσικοὺς χωρεῖν κατὰ τοὺς τῶν πραγμάτων φθόγγους.

attached to the study of nature,¹ but even natural science was deemed valuable not so much for its own sake as because of its practical use. The knowledge of natural causes is the only means of liberating the soul from the shackles of superstition; this is the only use of natural science. If it were not for the thought of God and the fear of death there would be no need of studying nature.² The investigation of our instincts is also of use, because it helps us to control them, and to keep them within their natural bounds.³ Thus the onesided practical view of philosophy which we have already encountered in Stoicism was carried by the Epicureans to an extreme length.

Nor did logic receive a fuller or more perfect treatment in the further development of their system. Even the study of nature, going as it did far more into particulars than logic, was guided entirely by practical considerations, all scientific interest in nature being ignored. Following the usual method,

(3) *Divisions of philosophy.*

¹ *Cic. Fin. i. 19, 63*: In physicis plurimum posuit [Epic.]. *Ibid. 6, 17*: In physicis, quibus maxime gloriatur, primum totus est alienus.

² *Epic. in Diog. x. 82 and 85*: *μη ἄλλο τι τέλος ἐκ τῆς περὶ μετεώρων γνώσεως . . . νομίζειν δεῖ εἶναι ἥπερ ἀταραξίαν καὶ πίστιν βέβαιον καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. Ibid. 112*: εἰ μὴθὲν ἡμᾶς αἰ περὶ τῶν μετεώρων ὑποψίαι ἡνώχλων καὶ αἰ περὶ θανάτου . . . οὐκ ἂν προσεδεόμεθα φυσιολογίας; but this becomes necessary, since, without knowledge of nature, we

cannot be perfectly free from fear. The same in *Plut. N. P. Suav. Viv. 8, 7*; *Diog. 79 and 143*; *Cic. Fin. iv. 5, 11*; *Lucret. i. 62*; *iii. 14*; *vi. 9*.

³ In *Cic. Fin. i. 19, 63*, the Epicurean speaks of a fivefold, or, excluding Canonic, of a fourfold use of natural science: fortitudo contra mortis timorem; constantia contra metum religionis; sedatio animi omnium rerum occultarum ignoratione sublata; moderata natura cupiditatum generibusque earum explicatis.

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however, the Epicureans divided philosophy into three parts¹—logic, natural science, and moral science; but limited the first of these parts to one branch of logic, the part which deals with the tests of truth, and which they called Canonic. They really reduced logic to a mere introductory appendage to the two other parts,² and studied Canonic as a part of natural science.³ Moreover, natural science was so entirely subordinated to moral science that we might almost feel tempted to follow some modern writers⁴ in their view of the Epicurean system, giving to moral science the precedence of the two other parts, or at least to natural science.⁵ The School, however, followed the usual order, and not without reason;⁶ for although the whole tendency of the Epicurean Canonic and natural science can only be explained by a reference to their moral science, yet their moral science presupposes the test-

¹ *Diog.* 29: διαίρεται τοίνυν [ἡ φιλοσοφία] εἰς τρία, τό τε κανονικὸν καὶ φυσικὸν καὶ ἠθικόν. Canonic was also called περὶ κριτηρίου καὶ ἀρχῆς καὶ στοιχειωτικόν; natural science, περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς καὶ περὶ φύσεως; ethics, περὶ αἰρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ περὶ βίων καὶ τέλους.

² *Diog.* 30: τὸ μὲν οὖν κανονικὸν ἐφόδους ἐπὶ τὴν πραγματείαν ἔχει.

³ *Diog.* l. c.: εἰδῶσι μέντοι τὸ κανονικὸν ὁμοῦ τῷ φυσικῷ συντάττειν. *Cic. Fin.* i. 19. Hence *Sext. Math.* vii. 14: Some reckon Epicurus amongst those who only divide philosophy into natural and moral science; whilst ac-

cording to others, he adhered to a threefold division, at the same time rejecting the Stoic logic. *Sen. Ep.* 89, 11: Epicurei duas partes philosophiæ putaverunt esse, naturalem atque moralem: rationalem removerunt, deinde cum ipsis rebus cogereantur, ambigua secernere, falsa sub specie veri latentia coarguere, ipsi quodque locum, quem de iudicio et regula appellat, alio nomine rationalem induxerunt: sed eum accessionem esse naturalis partis existimant.

⁴ *Ritter*, iii. 463; *Schleiermacher*, *Gesch. d. Phil.* p. 123.

⁵ *Steinhart*.

⁶ *Diog.* 29; *Sext. Math.* vii. 22.

science of truth and natural science. We shall, therefore, do well to treat of Canonic in the first place, and subsequently to prove how this branch of study depends on Ethics.

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Canonic, or the test-science of truth, as has been observed, is occupied with investigating the standard of truth, and with enquiring into the mode of acquiring knowledge. The purely formal logic which deals with the formation of conceptions and conclusions is omitted by Epicurus.¹ Even the theory of the acquisition of knowledge assumes with him a very simple form. If the Stoics, notwithstanding their ideal ethics, and their pantheistic speculations, had been obliged ultimately to take their stand on materialism, could Epicurus avoid doing the same? In seeking a scientific basis for his view of life he appealed far more unreservedly than they had done to sensation, and referred everything to the feeling of pleasure or pain. Now, since the senses can alone inform us what is pleasant or unpleasant, and what is desirable or the contrary, our judgment as to truth or falsehood must ultimately depend on the senses. Viewed speculatively, sensation is the standard of truth; viewed practically, the feeling of pleasure or pain.² If the senses may not be trusted, still less may knowledge derived from reason be trusted, since reason itself is primarily and entirely

B. *Canonic or the test-science of truth.*

(1) *Sensation and perception.*

¹ *Cic. Fin. i. 7, 22.*

² *Cic. Fin. i. 7, 22; Sext. Math. vii. 203.* If, according to *Diog. 31*, and *Cic. Acad. ii. 46, 142*, Epicurus named three criteria—

πρόληψις, αἴσθησις, and *πάθη*—instead of the above two, it is only an inaccuracy of expression, *πρόληψις*, as we have seen, being derived from sensation.

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from the senses. There remains, therefore, no distinctive mark of truth, and no possibility of certain connection. We are at the mercy of unlimited doubt. If, however, this doubt is contradictory of itself—for how can men declare they *know*, that they can *know* nothing?—it is also contradictory of human nature, since it would do away not only with all knowledge but with every possibility of action, in short, with all the conditions on which human life depends.¹ To avoid doubt we must allow that sensation as such is always, and under all circumstances, to be trusted; nor ought the delusions of the senses to shake our belief; the causes of these deceptions not lying in sensation as such but in our judgment about sensation. What the senses supply is only that an object produces this or that effect upon us, and that this or that picture has impressed our soul. The facts thus supplied are always true, only it does not follow that the object exactly corresponds with the impression we receive of it, nor that it produces on others the same impression that it produces on us. On the contrary, many different pictures may emanate from one and the same object, and these pictures may be changed on their way to the ear or eye. Pictures, too, may strike our senses to which no real objects correspond. To confound the picture with the thing,

¹ Epicurus, in *Diog.* x. 146; *Lucr.* iv. 467–519; *Cic.* *Fin.* i. 19, 64. Colotes (in *Plut.* *Adv.* Col. 24, 3) replies to the Cyrenaic scepticism by saying: *μη δύνασθαι ζῆν μηδὲ χρῆσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν.*

In this case, as in the case of the Stoics, the dogmatism in favour of the senses is based on a practical postulate, the need of a firm basis of conviction for human life.

the impression made with the object making the impression, is certainly an error, but this error must not be laid to the blame of the senses, but to that of opinion.¹ Indeed, how is it possible, asks Epicurus,² to refute the testimony of the senses? Can reason refute it? But reason is itself dependent on the senses, and cannot bear testimony against that on which its own claims to belief depend. Or can one sense convict another of error? But different sensations do not refer to the same object, and similar sensations have equal value. Nothing remains, therefore, but to attach implicit belief to every impression of the senses. Every such impression is directly certain, and is accordingly termed by Epicurus clear evidence (*ἐνάργεια*).³ Nay, more, its truth is so paramount that the impressions of madmen, and appearances in dreams, are true because they are caused by something real,⁴ and error only becomes possible when we go beyond sensation.

This going beyond sensation becomes, however, (2) *No-*
a necessity. By a repetition of the same perception *tions.*
(*πρόληψις*) a notion arises. A notion, therefore, is nothing else but the general picture retained in the mind of what has been perceived.⁵ On these notions

¹ Epic. in *Diog.* x. 50 and 147; *Sext. Math.* vii. 203-210; viii. 9; 63; 185; *Plut. Adv. Col.* 4, 3; 5, 2; 25, 2; *Plac. iv.* 9, 2; *Lucr.* iv. 377-519; *Cic. Acad.* ii. 25, 79; 32, 101; *Fin. i.* 7, 22; *N. D. i.* 25, 70; *Tertull. De An.* 17.

² *Diog.* x. 31; *Lucr.* iv. 480.

³ *Sext. Math.* vii. 203 and 216; *Diog.* x. 52. Besides this peculiar

expression, Epicurus uses sometimes *αἴσθησις*, sometimes *φαντασία*, for sensation. An impression on the senses, he calls *φανταστική ἐπιβολή*.

⁴ *Diog.* 32.

⁵ *Diog.* 33: τὴν δὲ πρόληψιν λέγουσιν οἰοῦν κατὰληψιν ἢ δόξαν ὁρθὴν ἢ ἔννοϊαν ἢ καθολικὴν νόησιν ἐναποκειμένην, τουτέστι μνήμην

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retained by memory depends all speaking and thinking. They are what commonly go under the name of things; and speech is only a means of recalling definite perceptions¹ to the memory. Notions are presupposed in all scientific knowledge.² Together with sensations they form the measure of the truth of our convictions;³ and it holds true of them as it did of sensations—that they are true in themselves and need no proof.⁴ Taken by themselves, notions, like perceptions, are reflections in the soul of things on which the transforming action of the mind, changing external impressions into conceptions, has not as yet been brought to bear.

(3) *Opinion.*

For this very reason notions are not sufficient.

τοῦ πολλάκις ἔξωθεν φανέντος. Cicero's description, N. D. i. 16, 43, must be corrected by the help of this passage.

¹ *Diog. l. c.*: ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ῥηθῆναι ἄνθρωπος εὐθὺς κατὰ πρόληψιν καὶ ὁ τύπος αὐτοῦ νοεῖται προηγουμένων τῶν αἰσθήσεων. παντὶ οὖν ὀνόματι τὸ πρῶτως ὑποτεταγμένον ἐναργές ἐστι· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐξητήσαμεν τὸ ζητούμενον, εἰ μὴ πρότερον ἐγνώκειμεν αὐτὸ . . . οὐδ' ἂν ὠνομάσαμεν τι μὴ πρότερον αὐτοῦ κατὰ πρόληψιν τὸν τύπον μαθόντες. Hence the exhortation in Epicurus' letter to Herodotus (in *Diog. x. 37*): πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὰ ὑποτεταγμένα τοῖς φθόγγοις δεῖ εἰληφέναι ὅπως ἂν τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἢ ζητούμενα ἢ ἀπορούμενα ἔχωμεν εἰς τὸ ἀνάγοντες ἐπικρίνειν, κ.τ.λ. Every impression must be referred to definite perceptions; apart from perceptions, no reality belongs to our impressions; or, as it is expressed *Sext. Pyrrh. ii.*

107, *Math. viii. 13*: The Epicureans deny the existence of a λεκτὸν, and that between a thing and its name there exists a third intermediate something—a conception.

² *Diog. 33. Sext. Math. i. 57* (xi. 21): οὐτε ζητεῖν οὐτε ἀπορεῖν ἔστι κατὰ τὸν σόφον Ἐπίκουρον ἄνευ προλήψεως. *Ibid. viii. 337. Plut. De An. 6*: The difficulty, that all learning presupposes knowledge, the Stoics met by φυσικαὶ ἔννοιαι, the Epicureans by προλήψεις.

³ *Diog. l. c.*: ἐναργεῖς οὖν εἰσιν αἱ προλήψεις καὶ τὸ δοξαστὸν ἀπὸ προτέρου τινὸς ἐναργοῦς ἡρτηται, ἐφ' ᾧ ἀναφέροντες λέγομεν.

⁴ *Epic. in Diog. 38*: ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἐννόημα καθ' ἑκαστον φθόγγον βλέπεσθαι καὶ μηθὲν ἀποδείξωσ προσδεῖσθαι, εἴπερ ἔχομεν τὸ ζητούμενον ἢ ἀπορούμενον καὶ δοξαζόμενον ἐφ' ᾧ ἀνάξομεν.

From appearances we must advance to their secret causes; from the known to the unknown.¹ But far too little value was attached by Epicurus to the logical forms of thought, or he would have investigated more accurately the nature of this process of advancing.² Thoughts in his view result from sensations spontaneously, and although a certain amount of reflection is necessary for the process, yet it requires no scientific guidance.³ The thoughts arrived at in this way do not stand as a higher genus above perceptions, but they are only opinions (*ὑπόληψις*, *δόξα*) without a note of truth in themselves, and depending for their truth upon sensation. That opinion may be considered a true one which is based on the testimony of the senses, or is at least not contrary to the senses, and that a false opinion in which the opposite is the case.⁴ Sometimes we suppose that upon certain present impressions other impressions will follow; for instance, that a tower which appears

¹ *Diog.* 33: περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀπὸ τῶν φαινομένων χρὴ σημειοῦσθαι.

² *Steinhart* goes too far, in saying that Epicurus defied all law and rule in thought.

³ *Diog.* 32: καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐπίνοιαί πάσαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων γεγόνασιν, κατὰ τε περίπτωσιν καὶ ἀναλογία καὶ ὁμοιότητα καὶ σύνθεσιν, συμβαλλομένην τι καὶ τοῦ λογισμοῦ.

⁴ *Diog.* 33: καὶ τὸ δοξαστὸν ἀπὸ προτέρου τινὸς ἐναργοῦς ἤρτηται . . . τὴν δὲ δόξαν καὶ ὑπόληψιν λέγουσιν. ἀληθὴν τέ φασι καὶ ψευδῆ· ἂν μὲν γὰρ ἐπιμαρτυρῇται ἢ μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρῇται ἀληθὴ εἶναι· εἰδὼν δὲ μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρῇται ἢ ἀντι-

μαρτυρῇται ψευδῆ τυγχάνειν. *Sext.* *Math.* vii. 211: τῶν δοξῶν κατὰ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον αἱ μὲν ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν αἱ δὲ ψευδεῖς· ἀληθεῖς μὲν αἱ τε ἀντιμαρτυρούμεναι πρὸς τῆς ἐναργείας, ψευδεῖς δὲ αἱ τε ἀντιμαρτυρούμεναι καὶ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρούμεναι πρὸς τῆς ἐναργείας. *Ritter*, iii. 486, observes that these statements are contradictory. According to *Sextus*, an opinion is only then true when it can be proved *and* not refuted; according to *Diogenes*, when it can be proved *or* not refuted. The latter is, however, clearly meant by *Sextus*, and is affirmed by *Epicurus*. *Diog.* 50 and 51.

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round at a distance will appear round close at hand. In that case if the real perception corresponds to our supposition, our opinion is true, otherwise it is false.¹ At other times we suppose that certain appearances are due to secret causes; for instance, that empty space is the cause of motion. If all appearances tally with their explanations we may consider our suppositions correct; if not our suppositions are incorrect.² In the first case the test of the truth of an opinion is that it is supported by experience; in the latter that it is not refuted by experience.³ Have we not here all the leading features of a theory of knowledge based purely on sensation? The Epicurean's interest in these questions was, however, far too slight to construct with them a developed theory of materialism.

(4) *Standard of truth subjective.*

Little pains seem to have been taken by Epicurus to overcome the difficulties by which his view was beset. If all sensations as such are true, the saying of Protagoras necessarily follows that for each individual that is true which seems to him to be true, that contrary impressions about one and the same object are true, and that deceptions of the senses, so many instances of which are supplied by experience, are

¹ Epicur. in *Diog.* 50; *Ibid.* 33; *Sext.* vii. 212. The object of a future sensation is called by *Diog.* 38, τὸ προσμένον. *Diog.* x. 34, himself gives a perverted explanation of this term, which probably misled Steinhart.

² *Sext.* l. c. 213.

³ The two tests of truth, proof and absence of refutation, do not,

therefore, refer to the same cases. Our suppositions in respect of external appearances must be proved, in order to be true; our impressions of the secret causes of these appearances must not be refuted. The former test applies to opinions regarding τὸ προσμένον; the latter, to opinions regarding τὸ ἄδηλον. *Diog.* 38.

really impossible. To avoid these conclusions Epicurus maintained that for each different impression there is a different object-picture. What immediately affects our senses is not the object itself, but a picture of the object, and these pictures may be innumerable, a different one being the cause of each separate sensation. Moreover, although the pictures emanating from the same object are in general nearly alike, it is possible that they may differ from one another owing to a variety of causes. If, therefore, the same object appears different to different individuals the cause of these different sensations is not one and the same, but a different one, and different pictures must have affected their senses. If our own sensations deceive us, the blame does not belong to our senses, as though they had depicted to us unreal objects, but to our judgment for drawing unwarranted inferences from pictures¹ as to their causes.

This line of argument, however, only removes the difficulty one step further. Sensation is said always to reproduce faithfully the picture which affects the organs of sense, but the pictures do not always reproduce the object with equal faithfulness. How then can a faithful picture be known from one which is not faithful? To this question the Epicurean system can furnish no real answer. To say that the wise man knows how to distinguish a faithful from an unfaithful picture² is to despair of an absolute

¹ Compare the passages in Epicurus iis, qui videntur conturbare veri cognitionem, dixitque sapientis esse opinionem a
Sext. vii. 206.

² *Cic. Acad.* ii. 14, 45: Nam qui voluit subvenire erroribus perspicuitate sejungere, nihil pro-

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standard at all, and to make the decision of truth or error depend upon the individual's judgment. Such a statement reduces all our impressions of the properties of things to a relative level. If sensation does not show us things themselves but only those impressions of them which happen to affect us, it does not supply us with a knowledge of things as they are, but as they happen to be related to us. It was, therefore, a legitimate inference from this theory of knowledge for Epicurus to deny that colour belongs to bodies in themselves, since some only see colour in the dark, whilst others do not.¹ Like his predecessor, Democritus, he must have been brought to this view by his theory of atoms. Few of the properties belong to atoms which we perceive in things, and hence all other properties must be explained as not belonging to the essence, but only belonging to the appearance of things.² The taste for speculation was, however, too weak, and the need of a direct truth of the senses too strong in Epicurus for him to be able to turn his thoughts in this direction for long. Whilst allowing to certain properties of things only a relative value, he had no wish to doubt the reality

fecit, ipsius enim opinionis errorem nullo modo sustulit.

¹ *Plut. Adv. Col.* 7, 2 (*Stob. Ecl.* i. 366; *Lucr.* ii. 795): ὁ Ἐπίκουρος οὐκ εἶναι λέγων τὰ χρώματα συμφυῆ τοῖς σώμασιν, ἀλλὰ γεννᾶσθαι κατὰ ποιὰς τινὰς τάξεις καὶ θέσεις πρὸς τὴν ὕψιν. For, says Epicurus, οὐκ οἶδα ὅπως δεῖ τὰ ἐν σκότει ταῦτα ὄντα φῆσαι χρώματα ἔχειν. Often some see colour where others do not; οὐ

μᾶλλον οὖν ἔχειν ἢ μὴ ἔχειν χρῶμα ῥηθήσεται τῶν σωμάτων ἕκαστον.

² *Simpl. Categ.* 109, β (Schol. in *Arist.* 92, a, 10): Since Democritus and Epicurus deprive atoms of all qualities except those of form and mode of combination, ἐπιγίνεσθαι λέγουσι τὰς ἄλλας ποιότητας, τὰς τε ἀπλᾶς, οἷον θερμότητος καὶ λειότητος, καὶ τὰς κατὰ χρώματα καὶ τοὺς χυμούς. *Lucret.* l. c.

of objects nor to disparage the object-pictures which furnish us with sensations.¹

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¹ Compare the passages already quoted, on the truth of the impressions on the senses, and the words of Epicurus, in *Diog.* 68: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τὰ χρώματα καὶ τὰ μεγέθη καὶ τὰ βάρη καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα κατηγορεῖται κατὰ τοῦ σώματος ὥς ἂν εἰς αὐτὸ βεβηκότα καὶ πᾶσιν ἐνόντα· ἢ τοῖς ὁρατοῖς καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθη-

σιν αὐτὴν γνωστοῖς, οὐθ' ὥς καθ' ἑαυτὰς εἰσι φύσεις δοξαστέον (οὐ γὰρ δυνατόν ἐπινοῆσαι τοῦτο), οὐθ' ἕλως ὥς οὐκ εἰσιν, οὐθ' ὥς ἕτερά τινα προσυπάρχοντα τούτῳ ἁσώματα οὐθ' ὥς μορία τούτου, ἀλλ' ὥς τὸ ὅλον σῶμα καθόλου μὲν ἐκ τούτων πάντων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον αἰδιδιον, κ.τ.λ.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE EPICUREAN VIEWS ON NATURE.

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views on
nature.(1) *Object,
value, and
method of
the study
of nature.*

IF EPICURUS and his followers underrated logic, to natural science they attached a very considerable value. This value was, however, given to science simply from a sense of the practical advantages which a knowledge of nature was seen to confer in opposing superstition. Otherwise the study of nature was a thing they would have readily dispensed with.¹ Such being their attitude of mind, the Epicureans were, as might have been expected, indifferent about giving a complete and accurate explanation of phenomena. Their one aim was to put forward such a view of nature as would do away with the necessity of supernatural intervention, without at the same time pretending to offer a sufficient solution of the problems raised by science.² Whilst, therefore, devoting considerable attention to natural science,³ Epicurus does not seem to have considered certainty to

¹ Epic. in *Diog.* 143: οὐκ ἦν τὸν φοβούμενον περὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων λύειν μὴ κατειδότα τίς ἢ τοῦ σύμπαντος φύσις ἀλλ' ὑποπτευόμενόν τι τῶν κατὰ τοὺς μύθους. ὥστε οὐκ ἦν ἄνευ φυσιολογίας ἀκεραίας τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀπολαμβάνειν.

² οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἰδιολογίας καὶ κενῆς δόξης ὁ βίος ἡμῶν ἔχει χρεῖαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἀθอรύβως ἡμᾶς ζῆν. Epic. in *Diog.* 87.

³ *Diog.* 37, mentions 37 books of his περὶ φύσεως, besides smaller works.

be of any importance, or even to be possible, in dealing with details of scientific study. Of the general causes of things we ought to entertain a firm conviction, since the possibility of our overcoming religious prejudices and the fears occasioned by them depends on these convictions. No such result, however, follows from the investigation of details, but, on the contrary, that study of details only tends to confirm prejudices in those who are not already emancipated from them. It is, therefore, enough for Epicurus in dealing with details to show that various natural causes for phenomena may be imagined, and to suggest various expedients which do not require the intervention of the Gods or appeal to the belief of the myths of a Providence.¹ To say that any one of these expedients is the only possible one, is in most cases to exceed the bounds

¹ Epic. in *Diog.* 78: καὶ μὴν καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν κυριωτάτων αἰτίαν ἐξακριβῶσαι φυσιολογίας ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν καὶ τὸ μακάριον ἐν τῇ περὶ τῶν μετεώρων γνῶσει ἐνταῦθα πιπτωκέναι· καὶ ἐν τῷ, τίνες φύσεις αἱ θεωρούμεναι κατὰ τὰ μετέωρα ταυτὶ, καὶ ὅσα συγγενῇ πρὸς τὴν εἰς ταῦτα ἀκρίβειαν· ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ πλεοναχῶς ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοῖς εἶναι, καὶ τὸ εὐδεχομένως καὶ ἄλλως πῶς ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀφθάρτῳ καὶ μακαρίᾳ φύσει τῶν διακρίσιν ὑποβαλλόντων ἢ τάραχον μὴθέν· καὶ τοῦτο καταλαβεῖν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔστιν ἀπλῶς οὕτως εἶναι. τὸ δ' ἐν τῇ ἱστορίᾳ πεπτωκὸς τῆς δύσεως καὶ ἀνατολῆς καὶ τροπῆς καὶ ἐκλείψεως καὶ ὅσα συγγενῇ τούτοις μὴθέν ἔτι

πρὸς τὸ μακάριον τῆς γνώσεως συντείνειν, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως τοὺς φόβους ἔχειν τοὺς ταῦτα κατιδόντας τίνες δὲ αἱ φύσεις ἀγνοοῦντας καὶ τίνες αἱ κυριώταται αἰτίαι, καὶ εἰ μὴ προσήδεσαν ταῦτα, τάχα δὲ καὶ πλείους, ὅταν τὸ θάμβος ἐκ τῆς τούτων προκατανοήσεως μὴ δύνῃται τὴν λύσιν λαμβάνειν κατὰ τὴν περὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων οἰκονομίαν. (Conf. *Lucr.* vi. 50; v. 82.) διὸ δὴ καὶ πλείους αἰτίας εὐρίσκομεν τροπῶν, κ.τ.λ. καὶ οὐ δεῖ νομίζειν τὴν ὑπὲρ τούτων χρεῖαν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ἀπειληφέναι ὅση πρὸς τὸ ἀτάραχον καὶ μακάριον ἡμῶν συντείνειν, κ.τ.λ. *Ibid.* 104: καὶ κατ' ἄλλους δὲ τρόπους πλείονας ἐνδέχεται κεραννοῦς ἀποτελεῖσθαι. μόνον ὁ μῦθος ἀπέστω.

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of experience and human knowledge, and to go back to the capricious explanations of mythology.¹ Possibly the world may move, and possibly it may be at rest. Possibly it may be round, or else it may be triangular, or have any other shape. Possibly the sun and the stars may be extinguished at setting, and be lighted afresh at their rising: it is, however, equally possible that they may only disappear under the earth and reappear again, or that their rising and setting may be due to yet other causes. Possibly the waxing and waning of the moon may be caused by the moon's revolving; or it may be due to an atmospheric change, or to an actual increase and decrease in the moon's size, or to some other cause. Possibly the moon may shine with borrowed light, or it may shine with its own, experience supplying us with instances of bodies which give their own light, and of those which have their light borrowed.² From these and such-like statements it appears that questions of natural science in themselves have no value for Epicurus. Whilst granting that only one

¹ *Ibid.* 87: πάντα μὲν οὖν γίνε-
ται ἀσειστώσ κατὰ πάντων, κατὰ
πλεοναχὸν τρόπον ἐκκαθαίρομένων
συμφώνως τοῖς φαινομένοις, ὅταν
τις τὸ πιθανολογούμενον ὑπὲρ αὐ-
τῶν δεόντως καταλίπη. ὅταν δέ
τις τὸ μὲν ἀπολίπη, τὸ δὲ ἐκβάλη
ὁμοίως σύμφωνον ὃν τῷ φαινομένῳ
δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐκ παντὸς ἐκπίπτει
φυσιολογήματος ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν μῦθον
καταρρεῖ. *Ibid.* 98: οἱ δὲ τὸ ἐν
λαμβάνοντες τοῖς τε φανομένοις
μάχονται καὶ τοῦ τί δυνατὸν ἀν-
θρώπῳ θεωρῆσαι διαπεπτόκασιν. In
investigating nature, they pro-

ceed on suppositions chosen at
random (ἀξιώματα κενὰ καὶ νομο-
θεσία). *Conf.* 94; 104; 113;
Lucret. vi. 703.

² *Epic.* in *Diog.* 88; 92-95.
Many other similar instances
might be quoted. In support of
the view that the sun was ex-
tinguished at setting, Epicurus,
according to *Cleomed.* *Meteor.* p.
89, is said to have appealed to
the story in *Strabo*, iii. 1, 5, that
the hissing of the sea may be
heard on the coast of Oceanus.

natural explanation of phenomena is generally possible, yet in any particular case he is perfectly indifferent which explanation is adopted.

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Great stress is, however, laid by him on giving general explanations. In contrast with the religious view which regards the world as a system of means leading to ends, the leading business of the natural science of the Epicureans is to refer all phenomena to natural causes. To an Epicurean nothing appears more absurd than to suppose that the arrangements of nature have for their object the wellbeing of mankind, or that they have any object at all. The tongue is not given us for the purpose of speaking, nor the ears for the purpose of hearing. It would, indeed, be more correct to say, that we speak because we have a tongue, and hear because we have ears. Natural powers have acted purely under the pressure of necessity, and among their various products, there could not fail to be some presenting the appearance of purpose in their arrangements. In the case of man there have resulted many such resources and powers. But this result is by no means intentional; it is simply an accidental consequence of natural causes. In explaining nature no thought of Gods must be obtruded, whose happiness is inconceivable, on the supposition that they care for mankind and his welfare.¹

(2) *Me-
chanical
explana-
tion of
nature.*

¹ The principle is thus expressed by *Lucret.* i. 1021 :
Nam certe neque consilio primordia rerum
Ordine se suo quæque sagaci
mente locarunt,

Nec quos quæque darent motus
pepigere profecto :
Sed quia multa modis multis mu-
tata per omne
Ex infinito vexantur percita
plagis,

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Confining his interest in nature to this general view of things, Epicurus was disposed, in carrying out this view, to rely upon some older system. No system appeared more to harmonise with his tone of mind than that of Democritus, and this system, moreover, commended itself to him not only by absolutely banishing the idea of final cause, but in particular by referring everything to matter, and by its theory of atoms. Epicurus placed the ultimate end of action in each individual thing taken by itself. And had not Democritus made all that is real to consist in what is absolutely individual or atoms? Did not the natural science of Democritus seem the most natural basis for the Epicurean Ethics? The Stoics had already consulted Heraclitus for their

Omne genus motus et cœtus experiundo,
Tandem deveniunt in tales disposituras,
Qualibus hæc rebus consistit summa creata.

v. 156 :

Dicere porro hominum causa voluisse [Deos] parare
Præclaram mundi naturam, &c.
Desipere est. Quid enim immortalibus atque beatis

Gratia nostra queat largiri emolumentum,

Ut nostra quidquam causa gerere adgrediantur?

Quidve novi potuit tanto post ante quietos

Illicere, ut cuperent vitam mutare priorem? . . .

Exemplum porro gignundis rebus et ipsa

Notities hominum, Dis unde est insita primum; . . .

Si non ipsa dedit specimen natura creandi?

Conf. iv. 820; v. 78; 195; 419. In these views, he is only following Epicurus. Heavenly phenomena, says Epicurus, in *Diog.* 76, μήτε λειτουργούντός τινος νομίζειν δεῖ γίνεσθαι καὶ διατάσσοντος ἢ διατάξαντος καὶ ἅμα τὴν πᾶσαν μακαριότητα ἔχοντος μετ' ἀφθαρσίας· οὐ γὰρ συμφωνοῦσι πραγματεῖαι καὶ φροντίδες καὶ ὄργαι καὶ χάριτες τῇ μακαριότητι, ἀλλ' ἀσθενεία καὶ φόβος καὶ προσδεήσει τῶν πλησίων ταῦτα γίνεται. *Ibid.* 97: ἡ θεία φύσις πρὸς ταῦτα μηδαμῇ προσαγέσθω, ἀλλ' ἀλειτούργητος διατηρείσθω καὶ ἐν τῇ πάσῃ μακαριότητι. *Ibid.* 113. With these passages, *Cic.* N. D. i. 20, 52, and *Plut.* Plac. i. 7, 7, are quite in agreement.

views of nature. Epicurus now followed him more closely than they had done, and hence, with the exception of one single point, the additions made by Epicurus to the theory of Heraclitus are philosophically unimportant.

With Heraclitus Epicurus agreed in holding that there is no other form of reality except that of bodily reality. Every substance, he says, in the words of the Stoics, must affect others, and be affected by them; and whatever affects others or is itself affected, is corporeal. Corporeal substance is, therefore, the only kind of substance.¹ The various qualities of things, properties as well as accidents, are not therefore incorporeal existences, but simply chance modes of body, the former being called by Epicurus *συμβεβηκότα*, the latter, *συμπτώματα*.²

(3) *Atoms and empty space.*

¹ *Lucr.* i. 440:

Præterea per se quodcumque erit
aut faciet quid
Aut aliis fungi debebit agentibus
ipsum,
Aut erit, ut possint in eo res esse
gerique.
At facere et fungi sine corpore
nulla potest res,
Nec præbere locum porro nisi
inane vacansque.
Ergo præter inane et corpora
tertia per se
Nulla potest rerum in numero
natura relinqui.

Epic. in *Diog.* 67: καθ' ἑαυτὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι νοῆσαι τὸ ἀσώματον πλὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ κενοῦ. τὸ δὲ κεκὸν οὔτε ποιῆσαι οὔτε παθεῖν δύναται, ἀλλὰ κίνησιν μόνον δι' ἑαυτοῦ τοῖς σώμασι παρέχεται. ὥσθ' οἱ λέγοντες ἀσώματον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ματαιά-

ζουσιν. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐδύνατο ποιεῖν οὔτε πάσχειν εἰ ἦν τοιαύτη.

² *Diog.* 68; 40. *Lucr.* i. 449, who calls *συμβεβηκότα* conjuncta, and *συμπτώματα* eventa. Among the latter, Lucretius reckons *time*, because in itself it is nothing, and only comes to our knowledge through motion and rest. Epicurus, in *Diog.* 72, likewise shows that time is composed of days and nights, and divisions of time, of states of feeling or unconsciousness, of motion or rest, and hence that it is only a product (*σύμπτωμα*) of these phenomena; and since these are again *συμπτώματα*, time is defined by the Epicurean Demetrius (*Sext.* Math. x. 219; *Pyrrh.* iii. 137): σύμπτωμα συμπτωμάτων παρεπόμενον ἡμέραις τε καὶ νυξὶ καὶ ὥραις καὶ πάθεσι καὶ ἀπαθείαις καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ μοναῖς.

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But a second something is necessary besides corporeal substance in order to explain phenomena, viz. empty space. That empty space exists is proved by the differences of weight in bodies. For what else could be the cause of this difference? ¹ It is proved still more conclusively by nature, motion being impossible without empty space.² With mind as a moving cause, however, Epicurus dispenses altogether. Everything that exists consists of body and empty space, and there is no third thing.³

Democritus had resolved the two conceptions of body and empty space into the conceptions of being and not being, but true to his position, Epicurus dispensed with this speculative basis: he holds to the ordinary notions of empty space, and of a material filling space,⁴ and simply proves these notions by the qualities of phenomena. But for this very reason

A distinction between abstract and sensuous time does not appear to exist in Diogenes. The χρόνοι διὰ λόγου θεωρητοὶ (*Diog.* 47) are imperceptibly small divisions of time, tempora multa ratio, quæ comperit esse, which, according to *Lucret.* iv. 792, are contained in every given time.

¹ *Lucret.* i. 358.

² *Lucret.* l. c. and i. 329; *Diog.* 40 and 67; *Sext. Math.* vii. 213; viii. 329. Most of the remarks in *Lucret.* i. 346 and 532 point to the same fundamental idea: Without vacant interstices, nourishment cannot be diffused over the whole bodies of plants or animals, nor could sand, cold, fire, and water penetrate through solid bodies, or any body be

broken up into parts. *Themist.* 40, b; *Simpl.* De Cælo, Schol. in Arist. 484, a, 26.

³ *Lucr.* i. 440; *Diog.* 39; *Plut.* Adv. Col. 11, 5.

⁴ Body is defined by Epicurus (*Sext. Math.* i. 21; x. 240; 257; xi. 226) as τὸ τριχῇ διαστατὸν μετὰ ἀντιτυπίας, or as σύννοδος κατὰ ἀθροισμὸν μεγέθους καὶ σχήματος καὶ ἀντιτυπίας καὶ βάρους. Emptiness is (according to *Sext.* x. 2) φύσις ἀναφής or ἔρημος παντὸς σώματος. When occupied by a body, it is called τόπος; when bodies pass through it, it is χώρα; so that all three expressions, as *Stob. Ecl.* i. 388, rightly observes, are only different names for the same thing.

Democritus' division of body into innumerable primary particles or atoms appeared to him most necessary. All bodies known to us by sensation are composed of parts.¹ If the process of division were to go on for ever all things would ultimately be resolved into the non-existent—so Epicurus and Democritus argue—and conversely all things must have arisen out of the non-existent, in defiance of the first principle of natural science that nothing can come from the non-existent, and that nothing can be resolved into what is non-existent.² Hence,

¹ Hence, in *Diog.* 69, ἄθροισμα and συμπεφορήμενον are used of bodies; in *Diog.* 71, all bodies are called συμπτώματα; and, according to Epicurus (*Sext. Math.* x. 42), all changes in bodies are due to local displacement of the atoms. *Plut. Amator.* 24, 3, observes that Epicurus deals with ἀφή and συμπλοκή, but never with ἐνότης.

² Epic. in *Diog.* 40: τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ συγκρίσεις τὰ δ' ἐξ ὧν αἱ συγκρίσεις πεποιήνται· ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶν ἄτομα καὶ ἀμετάβλητα εἴπερ μὴ μέλλει πάντα εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν φθαρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' ἰσχύοντα ὑπομένειν ἐν ταῖς διαλύσεσι τῶν συγκρίσεων . . . ὥστε τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀτόμους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι σωμάτων φύσεις. *Ibid.* 56; *Lucr.* i. 147; ii. 551; 751; 790. Further arguments for the belief in atoms in *Lucret.* i. 498: Since a body and the space in which it is are entirely different, both must originally have existed without any intermingling. If things exist composed of the full and the empty, the full by itself must

exist, and likewise the empty. Bodies in which there is no empty space, cannot be divided. They may be eternal, and must be so, unless things have been produced out of nothing. Without empty space, soft bodies could not exist, nor hard bodies without something full. If there were no indivisible parts, everything must have been long since destroyed. The regularity of phenomena presupposes unchangeable primary elements. All that is composite must ultimately consist of simple indivisible parts. If there were no indivisible parts, every body would consist of innumerable parts, the large and the small of parts equally innumerable. If nature did not reduce things to their smallest parts, it could not make new things. These arguments, very unequal in value, were borrowed by Lucretius from Epicurus. *Plut. in Eus. Pr. Ev.* i. 8, 9, quotes, as an Epicurean principle, that unchangeable Being must be at the bottom of everything.

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we must conclude that the primary component parts of things can neither have come into existence nor cease to exist, nor yet be changed in their nature.¹ These primary bodies contain no empty space in themselves, and hence can neither be divided nor destroyed, nor be changed in any way.² They are so small that they do not impress the senses, and it is a matter of fact that we do not see them. Nevertheless they must not be regarded as mathematical atoms, the name atoms being only assigned to them because their bodily structure will not admit of division.³ Moreover, they have neither colour, warmth, smell, nor any other property; properties only belonging to distinct materials;⁴ and for this reason they must not be sought in the four elements, all of which, as experience shows, come into being and pass away.⁵ They only possess the universal qualities of all corporeal things, viz. shape, size, and weight.⁶

Not only must atoms, 'like all other bodies, have shape, but there must exist among them indefinitely many varieties of shape, or it would be impossible to account for the innumerable differences of things. There cannot, however, be really an infinite number

¹ Epicurus and Lucretius. *Lucr.* i. 529; *Sext. Math.* ix. 219; x. 318; *Stob. Ecl.* i. 306; *Plut. Pl. Phil.* i. 3, 29.

² Epic. in *Diog.* 41; *Lucret.* i. 528; *Simpl. De Cælo*, Schol. in Arist. 484, a, 23.

³ *Diog.* 44 and 55; *Lucret.* i. 266, where it is proved, by many analogies, that there may be in-

visible bodies; *Stob.* l. c.; *Plut.* l. c.; *Simpl. Phys.* 216, a.

⁴ *Diog.* 44; 54; *Lucr.* ii. 736 and 841; *Plut.* l. c.

⁵ *Lucret.* v. 235.

⁶ *Diog.*; *Plut. Plac.* i. 3, 29. The statement there made, that Democritus only allowed to atoms size and shape, and that Epicurus added weight, is not a correct one.

of such shapes as Democritus maintained in any limited body, nor yet in the whole universe,¹ since an unlimited number would make the arrangement of the world impossible; for in the world everything is circumscribed by certain extreme limits.² Again, atoms must be different in point of size; for all materials cannot be divided into particles of equal size; but even to this difference there must be some bounds. An atom must neither be so large as to become an object of sense, nor can it, after what has been said, be infinitely small.³ From difference in point of size the difference of atoms in point of weight follows.⁴ In point of number atoms must be unlimited, and in the same way empty space must be unbounded also; for everything bounded must be bounded by something, but it is impossible to imagine any bounds of the universe beyond which nothing exists, and hence there can be no bounds at all. The absence of bounds must apply to the mass of atoms quite as much as to empty space. If an indefinite number of atoms would not find room in a limited space, conversely a limited number of atoms would be lost in empty space, and never able to form a world.⁵ In all these views Epicurus closely follows

¹ *Diog.* 42; *Lucr.* ii. 333 and 478; *Plut.* Plac. i. 3, 30; *Alex. Aphr.* in *Philop.* Gen. et Corr. 3, 6; *Cic.* N. D. i. 26, 66. It does not appear that *Lucret.* ii. 333, made the variety of figures as great as the number of atoms.

² *Lucret.* i. 500.

³ *Diog.* x. 55; *Lucr.* ii. 381.

⁴ See the passages just quoted.

⁵ *Epic.* in *Diog.* 41: ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἀπειρόν ἐστι· τὸ γὰρ πεπερασμένον ἄκρον ἔχει· τὸ δ' ἄκρον παρ' ἑτερόν τι θεωρεῖται. ὥστε οὐκ ἔχον ἄκρον πέρασ οὐκ ἔχει, πέρασ δ' οὐκ ἔχον ἀπειρον ἂν εἴη καὶ οὐ πεπερασμένον. The same argument is used by *Lucret.* i. 951; 1008-1020: If space were limited, all bodies would collect

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Democritus, and, no doubt, also agrees with him in the way in which he deduces the qualities of things from the composition of atoms.¹

B. *The world.*

(1) *The swerving aside of atoms.*

In deducing the origin of things from their primary causes, Epicurus, however, deviates widely from his predecessor. Atoms—so it was taught by both—are by virtue of their weight engaged in a downward motion.² To Epicurus it seemed a matter of course that all bodies should move downwards in empty space; for whatever is heavy must fall unless it is supported.³ He was therefore opposed to the Aristotelian view that heaviness shows itself in the form of attraction towards a centre, and consequently to his further supposition that downward

towards its lower part by reason of their weight, and their motion would cease. Unless the quantity of matter were unlimited, the amount lost by bodies in their mutual contact could not be supplied. Conf. also *Plut. Adv. Col.* 13, 3; in *Eus. Pr. Ev.* i. 8, 9; *Plac.* i. 3, 28; *Alex. in Simpl. Phys.* 107, b.

¹ We have but little information; but it has been already shown, and follows too as a matter of course, that he referred all the properties of bodies to the shape and arrangement of the atoms. Whenever he found in the same body different qualities combined, he assumed that it was composed of different kinds of atoms. For instance, he asserted of wine: οὐκ εἶναι θερμὸν αὐτοτελῶς τὸν οἶνον, ἀλλ' ἔχειν τινὰς ἀτόμους ἐν αὐτῷ θερμασίας ἀποτελεστικὰς, ἐτέρας δ' αὖ ψυχρό-

τητος. According to the difference of constitution, it has on some a cooling, on others a heating effect. *Plut. Qu. Conviv.* iii. 5, 1, 4; *Adv. Col.* 6.

² *Diog.* 43; 47; *Cic. N. D.* i. 20, 54. What idea Epicurus formed to himself of motion we are not told. We learn, however, from *Themist. Phys.* 52, b, that he replied to Aristotle's proof of motion, that no constant quantities can be composed of indivisible particles, by saying: Whatever moves in a given line, moves in the whole line, but not in the individual indivisible portions of which the line consists. With reference to the same question, the Epicureans, according to *Simpl. Phys.* 219, b, asserted that everything moves equally quickly through indivisible spaces.

³ *Cic. Fin.* i. 6, 18; *Lucret.* i. 1074.

mode of motion only belongs to certain bodies, circular motion being for others more natural.¹ The objection that in endless space there is no above or below he could only meet by appealing to experience,² some things being always above our heads, others beneath our feet.³ But whilst Democritus held that atoms in their downward motion meet together, and that hence a rotatory motion arises, no such view commended itself to Epicurus. To him it appeared that all atoms would fall equally fast, since empty space offers no resistance, and that falling perpendicularly it is impossible for them to meet.⁴ To render a meeting possible he supposed the smallest possible swerving aside from the perpendicular line in falling. This supposition seemed absolutely necessary, since it would be otherwise impossible to assert the freedom of the human will. For how can the will be free if everything falls according to the strict law of gravity? And for the same reason this swerving aside was not supposed to proceed from any natural necessity, but simply from the power of self-motion in the atoms.⁵ In consequence of their

¹ *Lucr.* ii. 1052; *Simpl.* De Cœlo, Schol. in Arist. 510, b, 30; 486, a, 7. The latter writer inaccurately groups Epicurus together with others. The same point, according to *Simpl.* Phys. 113, divided Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Epicurean Zeno-bius, at the close of the second century after Christ.

² As Aristotle had already done.

³ *Diog.* 60; *Plut.* Def. Orac. 28.

⁴ *Epic.* in *Diog.* 43; 61; *Lucr.* ii. 225; *Plut.* C. Not. 43, 1. This objection was borrowed from Aristotle by Epicurus.

⁵ *Lucr.* ii. 216; 251; *Cic.* Fin. i. 6, 18; N. D. i. 25, 69; De Fato, 10, 22; *Plut.* An. Procr. 6, 9; Solert. Anim. 7, 2; Plac. i. 12, 5; 23, 4; *Stobæus*, Ecl. i. 346, 394.

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meeting one part of the atoms rebounds—so Democritus also taught—the lighter ones are forced upwards, and from the upward and downward motions combined a rotatory motion arises.¹ When this motion takes place a clustering of atoms is the consequence, which by their own motion separate themselves from the remaining mass, and form a world of themselves.² As atoms are eternal and unchangeable it follows that the process of forming worlds must go on without beginning or end;³ and as atoms are infinite in number, and empty space is infinite also, there must be an innumerable number of worlds.⁴ The greatest possible variety may be expected in the qualities of these worlds, since it is most unlikely that the innumerable combinations of atoms which have only been brought together by chance, would all fall out alike. But it is equally impossible to assert that all these worlds are absolutely dissimilar. Epicurus, however, assumed that they are in general extremely different both in point of size and arrangement, and that several may be similar to our own.⁵ And since eternity affords time for all imaginable combinations of atoms, nothing can ever be brought about now which has not already

¹ *Diog.* 44; 62; 90; *Plut.* *Plac.* i. 12, 5; *Fac. Lun.* 4, 5; *Stob.* i. 346; *Lucret.* v. 432.

² *Diog.* 73; *Lucr.* i. 1021; *Plut.* *Def. Or.* 19.

³ *Cic.* *Fin.* i. 6, 17.

⁴ *Diog.* 45; 73; *Lucret.* ii. 1048; *Plut.* *Plac.* ii. 1, 3. It need hardly be remarked, that world-bodies are not meant by

worlds. In *Diog.* 88, Epicurus defines the world as a part of the heaven, surrounding an earth and stars, having a definite shape, and, towards other parts of the heaven, bounded.

⁵ *Diog.* 45; 77; 88; *Plut.* *Plac.* ii. 2, 2; 7, 3; *Stob.* i. 490; *Cic.* *N. D.* ii. 18, 48; *Acad.* ii. 40, 125.

existed.¹ In one respect all worlds are alike; they come into existence, are liable to decay, and, like all other individual elements, are exposed to a gradual increase and decrease.² Between the individual worlds both Democritus and Epicurus inserted intermediate world-spaces, in which from time to time new worlds come into being, by the clustering of atoms.³

The origin of our world is thus described. At a certain period of time—Lucretius⁴ believes at no very distant period—a cluster of atoms of varying shape and size was formed in this definite portion of space. As the atoms met there arose at first, amid the pressure and rebound on all sides of the quickly-falling particles, every variety of motion. Soon the greater atoms pressed downwards by dint of weight, and forced upwards the smaller and lighter atoms, the fiery ones topmost and with the greatest impetus to form the ether, and afterwards those which form the air.⁵ The upward pressure ceasing, the atom-cluster under the pressure of particles still joining it from below, spread forth sideways, and thus the belts of fire and air were formed. Next, those atoms were forced upwards out of which the sun and stars are formed, and at the same

(2) *Origin
of the
world.*

¹ Plut. in *Eus.* Pr. Ev. i. 8, 9: Epicurus says, ὅτι οὐδὲν ξένον ἀποτελεῖται ἐν τῷ παντὶ παρὰ τὸν ἤδη γεγενημένον χρόνον ἀπειρον.

² *Diog.* 73; 89; *Lucret.* ii. 1105; v. 91 and 235, where the transitory character of the world is elaborately proved; *Cic.* Fin. i. 6, 21. *Stob.* i. 418: Epicurus makes the world decay in the

greatest variety of ways. *Plut.* Plac. ii. 4, 2.

³ *Diog.* x. 89.

⁴ v. 324, arguing that historical memory would otherwise go much further back.

⁵ On this point, see *Lucret.* ii. 1112. The principle that similar elements naturally congregate is there explained in this way.

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time the earth settled down, its inner part being partially depressed in those places where the sea now is. By the influence of the warmth of the ether, and the sun-heat, the earth-mass was bound together more closely, the sea was pressed out of it, and the surface assumed an uneven character.¹ The world is shut off from other worlds and empty space by those bodies which form its external boundary.²

(3) *Arrangement
of the
universe.*

Asking, in the next place, what idea must be formed of the arrangement of the world, we are met by the two principles which Epicurus is never weary of inculcating; one, that we must refer nothing to an intentional arrangement of God, but deduce everything simply and solely from mechanical causes; the other, that in explaining phenomena the widest possible scope must be given to hypotheses of every kind, and that nothing is more absurd than to abridge the extensive range of possible explanations by exclusively deciding in favour of any one. Thereby the investigation of nature loses for him its value as such, nor is it of any great interest to us to follow his speculations on nature into detail. On one point he insists: the framework of heaven must not be considered the work of God, nor must life and reason

¹ *Lucr.* v. 416-508; *Plut.* *Plac.* i. 4. The views of Epicurus on the formation of the world do not entirely agree with those of Democritus. It was probably with an eye to Democritus that Epicurus, in *Diog.* 90, denied that the world could be increased from without, or that sun and moon could in this way be pos-

sibly absorbed in our world. *Lucret.* ii. 1105, however, supposes an increase of the world from without to be possible.

² On these *mœnia mundi*, which, according to Lucretius, coincide with the ether or fire-belt, see *Epic.* in *Diog.* 88; *Id.* *περὶ φύσεως*, xi. col. 2; *Plut.* *Plac.* ii. 7, 3; *Lucr.* i. 73; ii. 1144; v. 454.

be attributed to the stars.¹ Otherwise, on nearly all the questions which engaged the attention of astronomers at that time, he observes the greatest indifference, treating the views of his predecessors, good and bad alike, with an easy superficiality which can only be explained by supposing him altogether careless² as to their truth. The state of his own astronomical knowledge can, moreover, be easily seen by recalling the notorious assertion³ that the sun, the moon, and the stars are only a little larger, and may possibly be even less than they appear to be. The Epicureans also thought to support their theory that the earth, borne by the air, reposes in the middle of the world—a theory which on their hypothesis of the weight of bodies is impossible⁴—by the gradual diminution in weight of the surrounding bodies.⁵ It would be impossible here to go through the treatment which they gave to atmospheric and terrestrial phenomena,

¹ In *Diog.* 77; 81; *Lucret.* v. 78 and 114. By *ἡὰν ὁρᾶται*, in *Plut.* *Plac.* v. 20, 2, we must by no means think of the stars.

² A complete review of the Epicurean astronomy is not worth our while. It may be studied in the following passages: For the substance of the stars, consult *Plut.* *Plac.* ii. 13, 9; for their rising and setting, *Diog.* 92; *Lucret.* v. 648; *Cleomed.* *Met.* p. 87; for their revolution and deviation, *Diog.* 92; 112–114; *Lucret.* v. 574; 703; for the appearance of the moon, *Diog.* 95; for eclipses of sun and moon, *Diog.* 96; *Lucret.* v. 749; for changes in the length of day, *Diog.* 98; *Lucret.* v. 678.

³ *Diog.* 91; *Cic.* *Acad.* ii. 26,

82; *Fin.* i. 6, 20; *Sen. Qu. Nat.* i. 3, 10; *Cleomed.* *Met.* ii. 1; *Plut.* *Plac.* ii. 21, 4; 22, 4; *Lucret.* v. 564. The body of the sun was considered by Epicurus (*Plut.* *Plac.* ii. 20, 9; *Stob.* i. 530) to consist of earth-like and spongy matter, saturated with fire. According to *Lucret.* v. 471, sun and moon stand midway between ether and earth in point of density.

⁴ It is still more difficult to imagine the world as stationary.

⁵ *Lucret.* v. 534. Conf. *Epic.* in *Diog.* 74, and *περὶ φύσεως*, xi. col. 1. In the latter passage, Epicurus appeals to the fact that the earth is equidistant from the bounds of the world.

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XVII.(4) *Plants
and ani-
mals.*

particularly as the principle already indicated was most freely resorted to, and many explanations were given as being all equally possible.¹

Out of the newly-made earth plants at first grew,² and afterwards animals came forth, since the latter, according to Lucretius, can by no possibility have fallen from heaven.³ In other worlds also living beings came into existence, though not necessarily in all.⁴ Among these beings were originally, as Empedocles had previously supposed,⁵ all sorts of composite or deformed creatures. Those, however, alone continued to exist, which were fitted by nature to find nourishment, to propagate themselves, and protect themselves from danger. Romantic creatures, such as centaurs or chimæras, can never have existed here, because such beings would require conditions of life⁶ altogether different.

C. Man-
kind.

Aiming, as the Epicureans did, at explaining the origin of men and animals in a purely natural

¹ Further particulars: on clouds, *Diog.* 99; *Lucr.* vi. 451; *Plut.* Plac. iii. 4, 3; on rain, *Diog.* 100; *Lucret.* vi. 495; on thunder, *Diog.* 100; 103; *Lucret.* vi. 96; on lightning, *Diog.* 101; *Lucr.* vi. 160; on sirocco, *Diog.* 104; *Lucr.* vi. 423; Plac. iii. 3, 2; on earthquakes, *Diog.* 105; *Lucr.* vi. 535; Plac. iii. 15, 11; *Sen. Nat. Qu.* vi. 20, 5; on winds, *Diog.* 106; on hail, *Diog.* 106; Plac. iii. 4, 3; on snow, thaw, ice, frost, *Diog.* 107-109; on the rainbow, *Diog.* 109; on the halo of the moon, *Diog.* 110; on comets, *Diog.* 111; on shooting-stars, *Diog.* 114. Explanations

are given by Lucretius of volcanoes (vi. 639), of the overflow of the Nile (vi. 712), of Lake Avernus (vi. 738-839), of the magnet (vi. 906-1087).

² *Lucret.* ii. 1157; v. 780. Otherwise, we learn that the Epicureans, just as little as the Stoics, attributed to plants a soul. *Plut.* Plac. v. 26, 3.

³ *Lucr.* ii. 1155; v. 787.

⁴ Epic. in *Diog.* 74.

⁵ Anaximander, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, and Democritus, all taught the procreation of living beings from earth.

⁶ *Lucr.* v. 834-921.

manner, they likewise tried to form notions equally according to nature, of the original state and historical development of the human race, ignoring in this attempt all legendary notions. On this point, notwithstanding their leaning to materialistic views, they were more successful in propounding something rational. The men of early times, so thought Lucretius, were stronger and more powerful than the men of to-day. Rude and ignorant as beasts, they lived in the woods in a perpetual state of warfare with wild animals, without justice or society.¹ The first and most important step in a social direction was the discovery of fire, after which men learned to build huts, and clothe themselves in skins, when marriage and domestic life began,² when speech, originally not a matter of convention, but, like the noises of animals, the natural expression of thoughts and feelings, was developed.³ The older the human race grew the more they learnt of the arts and skill which ministers to the preservation and enjoyment of life. These arts were first learnt by experience, under the pressure of necessity or the needs of nature. What had thus

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(1) *Origin
of the
human
race.*

¹ v. 922-1008. Conf. *Plato*, *Polit.* 274, B; *Arist.* *Pol.* ii. 8. *Horace*, *Serm.* i. 3, 99, appears to have had an eye to Lucretius.

² *Lucr.* v. 1009-1025.

³ Epicurus, in *Diog.* 75, thus expresses his views as to the origin of language: τὰ ὀνόματα ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὴ θέσει γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' αὐτὰς τὰς φύσεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων καθ' ἕκαστα ἔθνη ἴδια πασχούσας πάθη καὶ ἴδια λαμβανούσας φαντάσματα ἰδίως τὸν ἀέρα ἐκπέμπειν

... ὕστερον δὲ κοινῶς καθ' ἕκαστα τὰ ἔθνη τὰ ἴδια τεθῆναι πρὸς τὸ τὰς δηλώσεις ἡττον ἀμφιβόλους γενέσθαι ἀλλήλοις καὶ συντομωτέρως δηλουμένας. He who invents any new thing puts, at the same time, new words into circulation. *Lucret.* v. 1026-1088, explains in detail that language is of natural origin. On the voice, *Ibid.* iv. 522; *Plut.* *Plac.* iv. 19; 2.

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been discovered was completed by reflection, the more gifted preceding the rest as teachers.¹ In exactly the same way civil society was developed. Individuals built strongholds, and made themselves rulers. In time the power of kings aroused envy, and they were massacred. To crush the anarchy which then arose magistrates were chosen, and order established by penal laws.² It will subsequently be seen that Epicurus explained religion in the same way by natural growth.

(2) *The
Syll.*

The apotheosis of nature, which has been apparent in Epicurus' whole view of history, becomes specially prominent in his treatment of psychology. This

¹ Epic. in *Diog.* 75: ἀλλὰ μὴν ὑποληπτέον καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτὴν περιστάσεων πραγμάτων δι-
δαχθῆναι τε καὶ ἀναγκασθῆναι· τὸν δὲ λογισμὸν τὰ ὑπὸ ταύτης παρεγ-
γνηθέντα καὶ ὕστερον ἐπακριβοῦν καὶ προσεξευρίσκειν, ἐν μὲν τισὶ θάπτον ἐν δὲ τισὶ βραδύτερον.

Lucr. v. 1450:

Usus et impigræ simul experientia
mentis
Paulatim docuit . . . all arts.

Ibid. 1103:

Inque dies magis hi victum vitam-
que priorem
Commutare novis monstrabant
rebu' benigni
Ingenio qui præstabant et corde
vigeabant.

Lucretius then tries to explain various inventions according to these premises. The first fire was obtained by lightning, or the friction of branches in a storm. The sun taught cooking (v. 1089).

Forests on fire, melting brass, first taught men how to work in metal (v. 1239–1294). Horses and elephants were used for help in war, after attempts had been previously made with oxen and wild beasts (v. 1295). Men first dressed themselves in skins; afterwards they wore twisted, and then woven materials (v. 1009; 1348; 1416). The first ideas of planting and agriculture were taken from the natural spread of plants (v. 1359). The first music was in imitation of birds; the first musical instrument, the pipe, through which the wind was heard to whistle; from this natural music, artificial music only gradually grew (v. 1377). The measure and arrangement of time was taught by the stars (v. 1434); and, comparatively late, came the arts of poetry and writing (v. 1438).

² *Lucr.* v. 1106.

treatment could, after all that has been said, be only purely materialistic. The soul, like every other real being, is a body. In support of this view the Epicureans appealed to the mutual relations of the body and the soul, agreeing on this point with the Stoics.¹ The body of the soul, however, consists of the finest, lightest, and most easily-moved atoms, as is manifest from the speed of thought, from the immediate dissolution of the soul after death, and, moreover, from the fact that the soulless body is as heavy as the body in which there is a soul.² Hence Epicurus, again agreeing with the Stoics, described the soul as consisting of a material resembling fire and air,³ or more accurately, as composed of four elements, fire, air, vapour, and a fourth nameless element. It consists of the finest atoms, and is the cause of feeling,⁴ and according as one or other of these elements preponderates, the character of man is of one or the other kind.⁵ Like the Stoics, Epicurus believed that the soul element is received by generation from the parents' souls,⁶ and that it is spread over the whole body,⁷ growing as the body grows.⁸ At the same

¹ *Lucr.* iii. 161; *Diog.* 67.

² *Lucr.* iii. 177; *Diog.* 63.

³ *Diog.* 63: ἡ ψυχὴ σώμα ἐστι λεπτομερὲς παρ' ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα παρειαρμένον· προσεμφερέστατον δὲ πνεύματι θερμοῦ τινα κρᾶσιν ἔχοντι. 66: ἐξ ἀτόμων αὐτὴν συγκεῖσθαι λειοτάτων καὶ στρογγυλοτάτων πολλῶ τινι διαφερουσῶν τῶν τοῦ πυρός.

⁴ *Lucr.* iii. 231; 269; *Plut.* *Plac.* iv. 3, 5; *Alex. Aphr.* *De An.* 127, b.

⁵ *Lucr.* iii. 288.

⁶ According to *Plut.* *Plac.* v. 3, 5, he considered the seed an ἀπόσπασμα ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος; and, since he believed in a feminine σπέρμα, he must have regarded the soul of the child as formed by the intermingling of the soul-atoms of both parents. *Ibid.* v. 16, 1.

⁷ *Diog.* 63; *Lucret.* iii. 216; 276; 323; 370.

⁸ *Metrodor.* περὶ αἰσθητῶν (Vol. Herc. vi.), col. 7.

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time he makes a distinction in the soul somewhat similar to that made by the Stoics in their doctrine of the sovereign part of the soul (ἡγεμονικόν).¹ Only the irrational part of the soul is diffused as a principle of life over the whole body, the rational part having its seat in the breast.² To the rational part belongs mental activity, sensation, and perception, the motion of the will and the mind, and in this sense life. Both parts together make up one being, yet they may exist in different conditions. The mind may be cheerful whilst the body and the irrational soul feel pain, or the reverse may be the case. It is even possible that portions of the irrational soul may be lost by the mutilation of the body, without detriment to the rational soul, or consequently to life.³ When, however, the connection between soul and body is fully severed, then the soul can no longer exist. Deprived of the surrounding shelter of the body its atoms are dispersed in a moment, owing to their lightness; and the body in consequence, being likewise unable to exist without the soul, goes over into corruption.⁴ If this view appears to hold out

¹ *Lucr.* iii. 98, denies the assertion that the soul is the harmony of the body.

² *Diog.* 66; *Lucr.* iii. 94; 136; 396; 613; *Plut.* *Plac.* iv. 4, 3. Lucretius calls the rational part *animus* or *mens*, and the irrational, *anima*. The statement, *Pl. Phil.* iv. 23, 2, that Epicurus made feeling reside in the organs of sense, because the ἡγεμονικόν was feelingless, can hardly be correct.

³ *Diog.* and *Lucr.* In sleep, a portion of the soul is supposed to leave the body (*Lucr.* iv. 913), whilst another part is forcibly confined within the body. Probably this is all that is meant, *Diog.* 66.

⁴ *Epic.* in *Diog.* 64. *Lucr.* iii. 417-827, gives an elaborate proof of the mortality of the soul. Other passages, *Plut.* *N. P. Sua.* Vi. 27, 1 and 3; 30, 5; *Sext. Math.* ix. 72, hardly need to be

the most comfortless prospect for the future, Epicurus replies that it is not really so. With life every feeling of evil ceases,¹ and the time when we shall no longer exist affects us just as little as the time before we existed.² Nay, more, he entertains the opinion that his teaching alone can reconcile us to duty, by doing away with all fear of the nether world and its terrors.³

Allowing that many of these statements are natural consequences of the principles of Epicurus, the distinction between a rational and an irrational soul must, nevertheless, seem strange in a system so thoroughly materialistic as was that of the Epicureans. And yet this distinction is not stranger than the corresponding part of the Stoic teaching. If the Stoic views may be referred to the distinction which they drew in morals between the senses and the reason, not less may the Epicureans have been led by the same causes to the same result, and have distinguished the general and the sense side of the mind. Hence Epicurus shares the Stoic belief in a divine origin of

referred to. Observe the contrast between Epicureanism and Stoicism. In Stoicism, the soul keeps the body together; in Epicureanism, the body the soul. In Stoicism, the soul survives the body; in Epicureanism, this is impossible. In Stoicism, the mind is a power over the world, and hence over the body; in Epicureanism, it is on a level with the body, and dependent on it.

¹ Epic. in *Diog.* 127: τὸ φρικωδέστατον οὐκ τῶν κακῶν· ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· ἐπειδὴ περ ὅταν μὲν ἡμεῖς ᾤμεν ὁ θάνατος οὐ πάρεστιν· ὅταν δὲ ὁ θάνατος παρῇ τόθ' ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἔσμεν. *Id.* in *Sext. Pyrrh.* iii. 229: ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς. *Lucr.* iii. 828-975.

² *Lucr.* iii. 830.

³ *Diog.* 81; 142; *Lucr.* iii. 37.

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the human race;¹ and although this belief as at first expressed only implies that man, like other living beings, is composed of etherial elements, yet there is connected with it the distinction already discussed in the case of the Stoics between the higher and the lower parts of man, which comes to be simply another mode of expressing the difference between mind and matter.

(3) *Sensation.*

Among the processes of the soul's life sensation is brought to harmonise with the Epicurean theory of nature by the aid of Democritus' doctrine of atom-pictures (*εἰδωλα*). From the surface of bodies—this is the pith of that doctrine—the finest possible particles are constantly thrown off, and by virtue of their fineness, traverse the furthest spaces in an infinitely short time, hurrying through the void.² Many of these exhalations are arrested by some obstacle soon after their coming forth, or are otherwise thrown into confusion. In the case of others the atoms for a long time retain the same position and connection which they had in bodies themselves, thus presenting a picture of things, and only lacking corporeal solidity. As these pictures are conveyed to the soul by the various organs of sense, our impressions of things arise.³ Even these impressions, which have

¹ *Lucr.* ii. 991:Denique cœlesti sumus omnes
semine oriundi, &c.

999:

Cedit item retro de terra quod
fuit anteIn terras: et quod missum est ex
ætheris orisId rursum cœli rellatum templa
receptant.² Democritus makes them
mould the air.³ *Epic.* in *Diog.* 46-50; 52;
and in the fragments of the
second book *περὶ φύσεως*; *Lucr.*
iv. 26-266; 722; vi. 921 *Cic. Ad*

no corresponding real object, must be referred to such pictures present in the soul.¹ Often pictures last longer than things themselves;² and often by a casual combination of atoms pictures are formed in the air resembling no one single thing. Sometimes, too, pictures of various kinds are combined on their way to the senses; thus, for instance, the impression of a Centaur is caused by the union of the picture of a man with that of a horse, not only in our imagination, but already previously in the atom-picture.³ If, therefore, sensation distorts or imperfectly represents real objects, it must be owing to some change or mutilation in the atom-pictures before they reach our senses.⁴

In thus explaining mental impressions, the Epicureans do not allow themselves to be disturbed by the reflection that we can recal at pleasure the ideas of all possible things. The cause of this power was supposed to be because we are surrounded by an innumerable number of atom-pictures, none of which we perceive unless our attention is directed to them. Again, the motion of the forms which we behold in dreams is explained by the hasty succession of similar atom-pictures, appearing to us as changes of one

Famil. xv. 16; *Plut. Qu. Conviv.* viii. 10, 2, 2; *Plac.* iv. 3, 1; 19, 2; *Sext. Math.* vii. 206; *Gell.* v. 16; *Macrob. Sat.* vii. 14; *Lucr.* iv. 267; 568; *Plut. Plac.* iv. 14, 2.

¹ For instance, the impressions in the minds of dreamers and madmen. *Diog.* 32; *Lucr.* iv. 730.

² *Plut. Def. Orac.* 19: εἰ δὲ χρόν

γελᾶν εἰ φιλοσοφία τὰ εἶδωλα γε-
λαστέον τὰ κωφὰ καὶ τυφλὰ καὶ
ἄψυχα, ἃ ποιμαίνουσιν ἀπλήτους
ἐτῶν περιόδους ἐμφαινόμενα καὶ
περινοσσοῦντα πάντα τὰ μὲν ἔτι
ζώντων τὰ δὲ πάλαι κατακαέντων
ἢ κατασπαέντων ἀπορρέευντα.

³ *Lucr.* l. c.

⁴ *Sext.* l. c.; *Lucr.* iv. 351.

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and the same picture.¹ But besides receiving pictures supplied from without, spontaneous motion with regard to these pictures takes place on our part, a motion derived in the first instance from the soul's motion when it receives the outward impression, but continuing afterwards, and being in fact an independent motion. This independent motion gives rise to opinion, and hence opinion is not so necessary or so universal as feeling. It may agree with feeling, or it may not agree with it. It may be true or it may be false.² The conditions of its being true or false have been previously investigated.³

(4) *Will.*

Impressions also give rise to will and action, the soul being set in motion by impressions, and this motion extending from the soul to the body.⁴ Epicurus does not, however, appear to have undertaken a more careful psychological investigation into the nature of will. It was enough for him to assert the freedom of the will. This freedom he considers wholly indispensable, if anything we do is to be considered our own; and it is indispensable, unless we are prepared to despair of moral responsibility altogether, and to resign ourselves to a comfortless and implacable necessity.⁵ To make freedom possible

¹ *Lucr.* iv. 766-819; v. 141; *Diog.* 48.

² *Epic.* in *Diog.* x. 51: τὸ δὲ διημαρτημένον οὐκ ἂν ὑπῆρχεν, εἰ μὴ ἐλαμβάνομεν καὶ ἄλλην τινα κίνησιν ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς συνημμένην μὲν, διάληψιν δ' ἔχουσαν κατὰ δὲ ταύτην τὴν συνημμένην τῇ φανταστικῇ ἐπιβολῇ, διάληψιν δ' ἔχουσαν ἔαν μὲν μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ τὸ ψεῦδος γίνεται, ἔαν

δὲ ἐπιμαρτυρηθῇ ἢ μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρηθῇ τὸ ἀληθές.

³ As to terminology, Epicurus, according to *Plut.* *Plac.* iv. 8, 2, *Diog.* 32, called the faculty of sensation αἴσθησις, and sensation itself, ἐπαίσθημα.

⁴ *Lucr.* iv. 874; *Galen.* *De Hipp.* et *Plat.* v. 2.

⁵ *Diog.* 133: τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμᾶς ἀδέσποτον· ᾧ καὶ τὸ μεμπτὸν καὶ

Epicurus had introduced into the motion of atoms that swerving aside which we have seen, and for the same reason he denies the truth of disjunctive propositions which apply to the future.¹ In the latter case, no doubt, he only attacked the material truth of the two clauses, without impugning the formal accuracy of the disjunction.² He did not deny that of two contradictory assumptions either one or the other must happen, nor did he deny the truth of saying: To-morrow Epicurus will either be alive or not alive. But he disputed the truth of each clause taken by itself. He denied the truth of the sentence, Epicurus will be alive; and equally that of the contradictory, Epicurus will not be alive; on the ground that the one or the other statement only *becomes* true by the actual realisation of an event at present uncertain.³ For this he deserves little blame. Our real charge against him is that he fails to investigate the nature of the will and the conception of freedom, and that he treats the subject of the soul as scantily and superficially as he had treated the subject of nature.

τὸ ἐναντίον παρακολουθεῖν πέφυκεν.
ἐπεὶ κρείττον ἦν τῷ περὶ θεῶν μύθῳ
κατακολουθεῖν ἢ τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν
εἰμαρμένῃ δουλεῖν.

¹ Cic. N. D. i. 25, 70: [Epicurus] pertimuit, ne si concessum esset hujusmodi aliquid: aut vivet cras aut non vivet Epicurus, alterutrum fieret necessarium; totum hoc; aut etiam aut non negavit esse necessarium. Acad. ii. 30, 97; De Fat. 10, 21.

² Steinhart, p. 466.

³ Cic. De Fato, 16, 37, at least

says, referring to the above question: Nisi forte volumus Epicureorum opinionem sequi, qui tales propositiones nec veras nec falsas esse dicunt, aut cum id pudet illud tamen dicunt, quod est impudentius, veras esse ex contrariis disjunctiones, sed quæ in his enuntiata essent eorum neutrum esse rerum. O admirabilem licentiam et miserabilem inscientiam dicendi! Cicero has no reason for his exclamation.

CHAPTER XVIII.

VIEWS OF EPICURUS ON RELIGION.

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A. Criticism of the gods and the popular faith.

THOROUGHLY satisfied with the results of his own enquiries into nature, Epicurus hoped by his view of the causes of things not only to displace the superstitions of a polytheistic worship, but also to uproot the prejudice in favour of Providence. In fact, these two objects were placed by him on exactly the same footing. So absurd did he consider the popular notions respecting the Gods, that not content with blaming those who attacked them¹ he believed it impious to acquiesce in them. Religion being, according to Lucretius, the cause of the greatest evils,² he who dethrones it to make way for rational views of nature deserves praise as having overcome the most dangerous enemy of mankind. All the language of Epi-

¹ *Diog.* x. 123: οἷους δ' αὐτοὺς [τοὺς θεοὺς] οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὐκ εἰσὶν· οὐ γὰρ φυλάττουσιν αὐτοὺς οἷους νομίζουσιν. ἀσεβῆς δὲ οὐχ ὁ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν θεοὺς ἀναιρῶν ἀλλ' ὁ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας θεοῖς προσάπτων. *Cic.* N. D. i. 16, 42.

² *iii.* 14; *vi.* 49; and, specially, *i.* 62:

Humana ante oculos fœde cum
vita jaceret

In terris oppressa gravi sub religione,
Quæ caput a cœli regionibus ostendebat
Horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans, &c.

ib. 101:

Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum.

Conf. Epic. in Diog. 81.

curus in disparagement of the art of poetry applies in a still higher degree to the religious errors fostered by poetry.¹ Belief in Providence is not one whit better than the popular faith. This belief is also included in the category of romance;² and the doctrine of fatalism, which was the Stoic form for the same belief, was denounced as even worse than the popular faith. For how, asks the Epicurean, could divine Providence have created a world in which evil abounds, in which virtue often fares ill, whilst vice is triumphant? How could a world have been made for the sake of man, when man can only inhabit a very small portion of it? How could nature be intended to promote man's well-being when it so often imperils his life and labour, and sends him into the world more helpless than any animal? How can we form a conception of beings ruling over an infinite universe, and everywhere present to administer everything in every place?³ What could have induced these beings to create a world, and how and whence could they have known how to create it, had not nature supplied them with an example?⁴ In fine, how could God be the happy Being He must be if the

¹ *Heracлит.* Alleg. Hom. c. 4: [Ἐπίκουρος] ἅπασαν ὁμοῦ ποιητικὴν ὥσπερ ὀλεθριον μύθων θέλει ἀφοσιούμενος. *Ibid.* c. 75.

² *Plut.* Def. Orac. 19: Ἐπικουρείων δὲ χλευασμοὺς καὶ γέλωτας οὗτι φοβητέον οἷς τολμῶσι χρῆσθαι καὶ κατὰ τῆς προνοίας μύθων αὐτὴν ἀποκαλοῦντες. N. P. *Suav.* Viv. 21, 2: διαβάλλοντες τὴν πρόνοιαν ὥσπερ παισὶν ἔμψουσιν ἢ Ποιῆν ἁλιτηριώδη καὶ

τραγικὴν ἐπιγεγραμμένην. In *Cic.* N. D. i. 8, 18, the Epicurean calls πρόνοια anus fatidica, to which it was often reduced, no doubt, by the Stoics.

³ *Lucr.* v. 196; ii. 1090; *Plut.* Plac. i. 7, 10. Conf. the disputation of the Stoic and Epicurean in *Lucian*, *Jup. Trag.* c. 35.

⁴ *Lucr.* v. 165; *Plut.* Plac. i. 7, 8.

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whole burden of caring for all things and all events lies upon Him, or He is swayed to and fro together with the body of the world? ¹ Or how could we feel any other feeling but that of fear in the presence of such a God? ²

B. *The gods according to Epicurus.*

(1) *Reasons for his belief.*

With the denial of the popular Gods, the denial of demons,³ of course, goes hand in hand, and, together with Providence, the need of prayer⁴ and of prophecy is at the same time refuted.⁵ All these notions, according to Epicurus, are the result of ignorance and fear. Pictures seen in dreams have been confounded with real existences; regularity of motion in the heavenly bodies has been mistaken by the ignorant for the work of God; events which accidentally happened in combination with others have been regarded as portents; terrific natural phenomena, storms and earthquakes, have engendered in men's minds the fear of higher powers.⁶ Fear is therefore the basis of religion;⁷ and, on the other hand, freedom from fear is the primary object aimed at by philosophy.

Nevertheless, Epicurus was unwilling to renounce belief in the Gods,⁸ nor is it credible that this un-

¹ *Diog.* 76; 97; 113; *Cic.* N. D. i. 20, 52; *Plut.* Plac. i. 7, 7.

² *Cic.* l. c.

³ *Plut.* Def. Or. 19; Plac. i. 83.

⁴ Conf. the captious argument of Hermarchus, in *Procl.* in Tim. 66, v: If prayer is necessary for everything, it is necessary for prayer, and so on, ad infin.

⁵ *Diog.* 135; *Lucr.* v. 379; *Plut.* Plac. i. 1, 2; *Cic.* N. D. i. 20, 55; *Divin.* ii. 17, 40; *Tertull.*

De An. 46.

⁶ *Lucr.* v. 1159-1238; iv. 33; vi. 49; *Sext. Math.* ix. 25; vi. 19; *Diog.* 98; 115.

⁷ This view is especially prominent in Lucretius. Conf. *Plut.* N. P. Suav. Viv. 21, 10; *Cic.* N. D. i. 20, 54.

⁸ He drew up separate treatises *περί θεῶν* and *περί δαιμόνων*. *Diog.* 27; *Cic.* N. D. i. 41, 115; *Plut.* N. P. Suav. Viv. 21, 11.

willingness was simply a yielding to popular opinion.¹ The language used by the Epicureans certainly gives the impression of sincerity; and the time was past when avowed atheism was attended with danger. Atheism would have been as readily condoned in the time of Epicurus as the deism which denied most unreservedly the popular faith. It is, however, possible to trace the causes which led Epicurus to believe that there are Gods. There was first the general diffusion of a belief in Gods which appeared to him to establish the truth of this belief, and hence he declared the existence of Gods to be something directly certain, and grounded on a primary notion (*πρόληψις*).² Moreover, with his materialistic theory of knowledge he no doubt supposed that our conviction of the existence of Gods was due to sensations derived from atom-pictures, Democritus having already deduced the belief in Gods³ from such pictures. And in addition to these theoretical reasons, Epicurus had also another, half æsthetical, half

¹ Posidonius, in *Cic. N. D. i.* 44, 123; 30, 85; iii. 1, 3; *Plut.*

² *Epic. in Diog.* 123: *θεοὶ μὲν γὰρ εἰσι· ἐναργὴς μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἡ γνώσις.* The Epicurean in *Cic. N. D. i.* 16, 43: Solus enim [Epicurus] vidit, primum esse Deos quod in omnium animis eorum notionem impressisset ipsa natura. Quæ est enim gens aut quod genus hominum quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quandam Deorum? quam appellat *πρόληψιν* Epicurus, &c. These statements must, however, be received with some

caution.

³ In support of this view, see *Cic. N. D. i.* 18, 46. It is there said of the form of the Gods: A natura habemus omnes omnium gentium speciem nullam aliam nisi humanam Deorum. Quæ enim alia forma occurrit umquam aut vigilanti cuiquam aut dormienti? *φυσικὴ πρόληψις* is here referred to sensations derived from εἶδωλα. *Ibid.* 19, 49. *Lucr.* vi. 76: De corpore quæ sancto simulacra feruntur In mentis hominum divinæ nuntia formæ.

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religious: the wish to see his ideal of happiness realised in the person of the Gods,¹ and it is this ideal which decides the character of all his notions respecting the Gods. His Gods are therefore, throughout, human beings. Such beings are alone known as the Gods of religious belief, or, as Epicurus expresses it, such beings alone come before us in those pictures of the Gods which present themselves to our minds, sometimes in sleep, sometimes when we are awake. Reflection, too, convinces us that the human form is the most beautiful, that to it alone reason belongs, and that it is the most appropriate form for perfectly happy beings.² Epicurus even went so far as to attribute to the Gods difference of sex.³ At the same time everything must be cast off which is not appropriate to a divine being.

(2) *Nature of the Epicurean gods.*

The two essential characteristics of the Gods, according to Epicurus, are immortality and perfect happiness.⁴ Both of these characteristics would be impaired if we were to attribute to the bodies of the Gods the

¹ *Diog.* 121. *Cic.* N. D. i. 17, 45: Si nihil aliud quæreremus, nisi ut Deos pie coleremus et ut superstitione liberaremur, satis erat dictum: nam et præstans Deorum natura hominum pietate coleretur, cum et æterna esset et beatissima . . . et metus omnis a vi atque ira Deorum pulsus esset. *Ibid.* 20, 56: We do not fear the Gods, et pie sancteque colimus naturam excellentem atque præstantem. *Ibid.* 41, 115. *Sen.* Benef. iv. 19, 3: Epicurus denied all connection of God with the world, but, at the same time, would have him honoured

as a father, propter majestatem ejus eximiam singularemque naturam.

² *Cic.* N. D. i. 18, 46; *Divin.* ii. 17, 40; *Sext.* Pyrrh. iii. 218; *Plut.* Ph. Phil. i. 7, 18 (*Stob.* i. 66); *Phædr.* *Fragm.* col. 7; *Metrodorus*, περί αἰσθητῶν, col. 10; col. 16, 21.

³ *Cic.* N. D. i. 34, 95.

⁴ *Epic.* in *Diog.* 123: πρῶτον μὲν τὸν θεὸν ζῶον ἀφθαρτον καὶ μακάριον νομίζων . . . μηδὲν μήτε τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἀλλότριον μήτε τῆς μακαριότητος ἀνοίκειον αὐτῷ πρόσ-
απτε, κ.τ.λ. *Cic.* N. D. i. 17, 45; 19, 51; *Lucr.* ii. 646; v. 165.

same dense capacity which belongs to our own. We must, therefore, only assign to them a body analogous to our body, etherial, and consisting of the finest atoms.¹ Such bodies would be of little use in a world like ours. In fact, they could not live in any world without being exposed to the ruin which will in time overwhelm them; and, in the meantime, they would feel in a state of fear, which would mar their bliss. Epicurus, therefore, assigns to them the space between the worlds as their habitation, where, as as Lucretius remarks, troubled by no storms, they live under a sky ever serene.²

Nor can these Gods be supposed to care for the world, else their happiness would be marred by the most troublesome affairs. Perfectly free from care and trouble, and absolutely regardless of the world, in eternal contemplation of their unchanging perfection they enjoy the most unalloyed happiness.³ The view which the School formed to itself of this happiness we learn from Philodemus.⁴ The Gods are exempt from sleep, sleep being a partial death, and not needed by beings who live without any exertion. And yet he believes that they require

¹ *Cic.* N. D. ii. 23, 59; i. 18, 49; 25, 71; 26, 74; *Divin.* ii. 17, 40; *Lucr.* v. 148; *Metrodor. περί αισθητών*, col. 7; *Plut.* Epicurus has, as Cicero remarks, monogrammos Deos; his Gods have only quasi corpus and quasi sanguinem. They are perlucidi and perflabiles, or, according to *Lucr.*, tenues, so that they cannot be touched, and are indestructible.

² *Cic.* *Divin.* ii. 17, 40; *Lucr.*

ii. 646; iii. 18; v. 146; *Sen.* *Benef.* iv. 19, 2.

³ *Epic.* in *Diog.* 77; 97; 139; *Cic.* N. D. i. 19, 51; *Legg.* i. 7, 21; *Lucr.* ii. 646; iii. 1092; iv. 83; vi. 57; *Sen.* *Benef.* 4, 1; 19, 2.

⁴ In the fragments of his treatise *περί τῆς τῶν θεῶν εὐστοχομένης διαγωγῆς, κατὰ Ζήνωνα*, col. 12.

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nourishment, though this must, of course, be of a kind in keeping with their nature. They also need dwellings,¹ since every being requires some place wherein to dwell. Were powers of speech to be refused to them they would be deprived of the highest means of enjoyment—the power of conversing with their equals. Philodemus thinks it probable they use the Greek or some other language closely allied to it.² In short, he imagines the Gods to be a society of Epicurean philosophers, who have everything that they can desire—everlasting life, no care, and perpetual opportunities of sweet converse. Only such Gods,—the Epicureans thought,³—need not be feared. Only such Gods are free and pure, and worshipped because of this very perfection.⁴ Moreover, these Gods are innumerable. If the number of mortal beings is infinite, the law of counterpoise requires that the number of immortal beings must not be less.⁵ If we have only the idea of a limited number of Gods, it is because, owing to their being

¹ The κλίσια discussed by Hermarchus and Pythocles, col. 13, 20, had reference to these, and not to ordinary feasts.

² Col. 14: Because λέγονται μὴ πολλὰ διαφερούσαις κατὰ τὰς ὁρθρώσεις χρῆσθαι φωναῖς, καὶ μόνον αἰδαμεν γεγυῖντας θεοὺς Ἑλληνίδι γλώττῃ χρωμένους. The first statement seems to refer to the words of the divine language quoted by Homer; the second statement, to stories of appearances of the Gods. The sceptical question, Whether the Gods possess speech? raised by Carneades

in *Sext. Math.* ix. 178, appears to refer to this μυθολογία Ἐπικούρου.

³ *Cic.* N. D. i. 20, 54; *Sen.* Benef. iv. 19, 1.

⁴ *Philodem.* De Mus. iv. col. 4, says that the Gods do not need this worship, but it is natural for us to show it: μάλιστα μὲν ὅσiais προλήψουσιν, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὸ πάτριον παραδεδομένοις ἐκάστῳ τῶν κατὰ μέρος.

⁵ *Cic.* l. c. i. 19, 50, the sentence, et si quæ interimant, belonging, however, to Cicero only.

so much alike,¹ we confound in our minds the innumerable pictures of the Gods which are conveyed to our souls.

Agreeing in their theology with the materialistic views of the popular belief, and not hesitating in their rivalry with the Stoics to assert this agreement; outdoing, moreover, polytheism in the number of Gods,² and willing to join in the services of the national religion, the Epicureans were, nevertheless,

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¹ *Cic.* N. D. i. 19, 49: (Epicurus) docet eam esse vim et naturam Deorum ut primum non sensu sed mente cernatur: nec soliditate quadam nec ad numerum ut ea, quæ ille propter firmitatem στερέμνια appellet, sed imaginibus similitudine et transitione perceptis: cum infinita simillimarum imaginum species ex innumerabilibus individuis exstat et ad Deos affluat, cum maximis voluptatibus in eas imagines mentem intentam infixamque nostram intelligentiam capere quæ sit et beata natura et æterna. The meaning of these words appears to be, that ideas of the Gods are not formed in the same way as the ideas of other solid bodies, by a number of similar pictures from the same object striking our senses (*Diog.* x. 95), but by single pictures emanating from innumerable divine individuals, all so much alike, that they leave behind them the impressions of perfect happiness and immortality. The passage of *Diog.* x. 139, ought probably to be corrected by that in Cicero. It runs: ἐν ἄλλοις δέ φησι, τοὺς θεοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητοὺς εἶναι· οὐς μὲν κατ' ἀριθμὸν ὕφ' ἐστῶτας, οὓς

δὲ κατὰ ὁμοειδίαν ἐκ τῆς συνεχοῦς ἐπιβρύσεως τῶν ὁμοίων εἰδῶλον ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτετελεσμένους ἀνθρωποειδῶς. The similarity of language leaves no doubt that Diogenes followed the same authority as Cicero.

² In *Phædrus*, *Fragm.* col. 7, 10, it is said of the Stoics: ἐπιδεικνύσθωσαν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἓνα μόνον [θεὸν] ἅπαντα λέγοντες οὐδὲ πάντας ὄσους ἢ κοινὴ φήμη παρέδωκεν, ἡμῶν οὐ μόνον ὄσους φασὶν οἱ Πανέλληνες ἀλλὰ καὶ πλείονας εἶναι λεγόντων ἔπειθ' ὅτι τοιούτους οὐδὲ μμήκασιν ἀπολείπειν, οἷους σέβονται πάντες καὶ ἡμεῖς ὁμολογοῦμεν. ἀνθρωποειδεῖς γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι οὐ νομίζουσιν ἀλλὰ ἀέρα καὶ πνεύματα καὶ αἰθέρα, ὥστ' ἔγωγε καὶ τεθαρβήκῳς εἶπαιμι τούτους Διαγόρου μάλλον πλημμελεῖν. It then goes on to show how little the natural substances of the Stoics resemble Gods: τὰ θεῖα τοιαῦτα καταλείπουσιν ἃ καὶ γεννητὰ καὶ φθαρτὰ φαίνεται, τοῖς δὲ πᾶσιν ἡμεῖς ἀκολουθῶς αἰδίου καὶ φθάρτου εἶναι δογματίζομεν. We have here a phenomenon witnessed in modern times, Deists and Pantheists mutually accusing one another of atheism.

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not nearly so interested as the Stoics in proving themselves in harmony with the popular creed. Whilst the Stoics wildly plunged into allegory, hoping thus to accomplish their purpose, no such tendency is observed on the part of the Epicureans. Only the poet of the School gives a few allegorical interpretations of mythical ideas, and does it with more taste and skill than is usual with the Stoics.¹ Otherwise the Epicureans observe towards the popular faith a negative attitude, that of opposing it by explanations; and by this attitude, without doubt, they rendered one of the most important services to humanity.

¹ *Lucr.* ii. 598, explains the Mother of the Gods as meaning the earth. ii. 655, he allows the expressions, Neptune, Ceres, Bacchus, for the sea, corn, and

wine. iii. 976, he interprets the pains of the nether-world as the qualms now brought on by superstition and folly.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE MORAL SCIENCE OF THE EPICUREANS. GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

NATURAL science is intended to overcome the prejudices which stand in the way of happiness ; moral science to give positive instruction as to the nature and means of attaining to happiness. The theoretical parts of the Epicurean system have already rendered familiar the idea that reality belongs only to individual things, and that all arrangements of a general character must be referred to the accidental harmony of individual forces. The same idea must now be indicated in the sphere of morals where individual feeling must be made the standard, and individual well-being the object of all human activity. Natural science, beginning with external phenomena, went back to the secret principles of these phenomena, which are alone accessible to thought. It led from an apparently accidental movement of atoms to a universe of regular motions. Not otherwise was the course followed by Epicurus in moral science. That science could not rest content with human feelings alone, nor with selfishly referring everything to the individual taken by himself alone. In more

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A. *Pleasure.*
(1) *Pleasure the highest good.*

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accurately defining the conception of well-being it passed beyond the domain of feeling, from the sphere of individual aims to the sphere of general aims, by a process which the Stoics declared to be the only path to happiness; it referred the individual mind to the universal nature of mind. It is for us now to portray the most prominent features of this leading thought as it found expression in the Epicurean ethics.

The only unconditional good, according to Epicurus, is pleasure; pain is an unconditional evil.¹ No proof of this proposition seemed to him to be necessary; it rests on a conviction supplied by nature herself, and is the ground and basis of all our doing and not doing.² If proof, however, were required, he appealed to the fact that all living beings from the first moment of their existence pursue pleasure and avoid pain,³ and that consequently pleasure is a natural good, and the normal condition of every being.⁴ Hence follows the proposition to which

¹ Epic. in *Diog.* 128: τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν . . . πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο καὶ σύμφυτον . . . πᾶσα οὖν ἡδονή . . . ἀγαθόν. . . καθάπερ καὶ ἀλγηδὼν πᾶσα κακόν. *Ibid.* 141. *Cic.* *Fin.* i. 9, 29; *Tusc.* v. 26, 73: Cum præsertim omne malum dolore definiat, bonum voluptate.

² *Diog.* 129: ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἐγνωμεν καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης καταρχόμεθα πάσης αἰρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην καταντῶμεν ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει τὸ ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες. *Plut.* *Adv. Col.* 27, 1.

³ *Diog.* 137; *Cic.* *Fin.* i. 7, 23; 9, 30; ii. 10, 31; *Senec.* *Pyrh.* iii. 194; *Math.* xi. 96.

⁴ *Stob.* *Ecl.* ii. 58: τοῦτο δ' οἱ κατ' Ἐπικούρου φιλοσοφούντες οὐ προσδέχονται λέγειν ἐνεργούμενον, διὰ τὸ παθητικὸν ὑποτίθεσθαι τὸ τέλος, οὐ πρακτικόν· ἡδονὴ γάρ· ὅθεν καὶ τὴν ἐννοιαν ἀποδίδουσι τοῦ τέλους, τὸ οἰκείως διατεθεῖσθαι ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν χωρὶς τῆς ἐπ' ἄλλο τε ἀπάσης ἐπιβολῆς. *Alex. Aphr.* *De An.* 154, a: ταῖς δὲ περὶ Ἐπικούρου ἡδονὴ τὸ πρῶτον οἰκείον ἔδοξε εἶναι ἀπλῶς· προϋόντων δὲ διαρθροῦσθαι ταύτην τὴν ἡδονὴν φασι.

Epicurus in common with all the philosophers of pleasure appealed, that pleasure must be the object of life.

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At the same time, this proportion was restricted in the Epicurean system by several considerations. In the first place, neither pleasure nor pain are simple things. There are many varieties and degrees of pleasure and pain, and the case may occur in which pleasure has to be secured by the loss of other pleasures, or even by pain, or in which pain can only be avoided by submitting to another pain, or at the cost of some pleasure. In this case Epicurus would have the various feelings of pleasure and pain carefully estimated, and in consideration of the advantages and disadvantages which they confer, would under circumstances advise the good to be treated as an evil, and the evil as a good. He would have pleasure forsworn if it would entail a greater corresponding pain, and pain submitted to if it holds out the prospect of greater pleasure.¹ He also agrees with Plato in holding that every positive pleasure rests upon a want, i.e. upon a pain which it proposes to remove; and hence he concludes that the real aim and object of all pleasure consists in obtaining freedom from pain,² and that the good is nothing else

(2) *Freedom from pain.*

¹ *Diog.* 129; *Cic.* *Fin.* i. 14, 48; *Tusc.* v. 33, 95; *Sen.* *De Otio*, 7, 3.

² *Epic.* in *Diog.* 139: ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἢ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγούντος· ὑπεξαίρεσις. *Id.* in *Diog.* 128: τούτων γὰρ [τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν] ἀπλανὴς θεωρία πᾶσαν αἴρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ἐπαναγαγεῖν

οἶδεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὀγίειαν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξίαν. ἐπεὶ τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν ἐστὶ τέλος. τούτου γὰρ χάριν ἅπαντα πράττομεν ὅπως μήτε ἀλγῶμεν μήτε ταρβῶμεν· ὅταν δὲ ἅπαξ τοῦτο περὶ ἡμᾶς γένηται λύεται πᾶς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς χειμῶν οὐκ ἔχοντος τοῦ

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but emancipation from evil.¹ By a Cyrenaic neither repose of soul nor freedom from pain, but a gentle motion of the soul, or, in other words, positive pleasure, was proposed as the object of life; and hence happiness was not made to depend on man's general state of mind, but in the sum-total of his actual enjoyments. But Epicurus, advancing beyond this position, recognised both the positive and the negative side of pleasures, both pleasure as repose, and pleasure as motion.² Both aspects of pleasure, however, do not stand on the same footing in his system. On the contrary, the essential and indirect cause of happiness is repose of mind—*ἀταραξία*. Positive pleasure is only an indirect cause of *ἀταραξία* in that it removes the pain of unsatisfied craving.³ This mental repose, however, depends essentially on man's tone of mind, and that in a system so materialistic is again made to depend upon the state of his senses. It was consistent in Aristippus to consider bodily gratification the highest pleasure. Epicurus is consistent in subordinating pleasure of the body to that of the mind.

In calling pleasure the highest object in life, says

ζῶον βαδίζειν ὡς πρὸς ἐνδεόν τι . . . τότε γὰρ ἡδονῆς χρεῖαν ἔχομεν, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ παρῆναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλγῶμεν· ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἀλγῶμεν οὐκέτι τῆς ἡδονῆς δεόμεθα. *Ibid.* 131; 144; *Plut.* N. P. Sua. Viv. 3, 10; *Stob.* Serm. 17, 35; *Lucr.* ii. 14; *Cic.* Fin. i. 11, 37.

¹ Epicurus and Metrodorus, in *Plut.* l. c. 7, 1.

² *Diog.* 136, quotes the words of Epicurus: ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία

καὶ ἀπονία καταστηματικά ἐσιν ἡδοναί, ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργεῖα βλέπονται. *Sen.* Ep. 66, 45: Apud Epicurum duo bona sunt, ex quibus summum illud beatumque componitur, ut corpus sine dolore sit, animus sine perturbatione.

³ Hence *Sen.* Brevit. Vit. 14, 2: Cum Epicuro quiescere. *Benef.* iv. 4, 1: Quæ maxima Epicuro felicitas videtur, nihil agit.

Epicurus, we do not mean the pleasures of profligacy, nor, indeed, sensual enjoyments at all, but the freedom of the body from pain, and of the soul from disturbance. Neither feasts nor banquets, neither the lawful nor unlawful indulgence of the passions, nor the joys of the table, make life happy, but a sober mind discriminating between the motive for action and for inaction, and dispelling that greatest bane of our peace, prejudices. The root of such conduct, and the highest good, therefore, is intelligence.¹ It is intelligence that leaves us free to pursue pleasure without being ever too eager or too remiss.² Our indispensable wants are simple, little being needed to ensure freedom from pain; other things only afford change in enjoyment, and hence increase of enjoyment, or else they rest on a mere sentiment.³ The little we need may be easily attained. Nature makes ample provision for our happiness if we would

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B. Intel-
lectual
happiness.
(1) Intel-
ligence.

¹ *Diog.* 131. Similar views are expressed by Metrodorus, in *Clement*, Strom. v. 614, B, in praise of philosophers who escape all evils by rising to the contemplation of the eternal καθαροὶ καὶ ἀσήμεντοι τούτου, ὃ νῦν σώμα περιφέροντες ὀνομάζουσιν. *Id.* in *Plut.* Adv. Col. 17, 4: ποιήσωμέν τι καλὸν ἐπὶ καλοῖς, μόνον οὐ καταδύντες ταῖς ὁμοιοπαθείαις καὶ ἀπαλλαγέντες ἐκ τοῦ χαμαὶ βίου εἰς τὰ Ἐπικούρου ὡς ἀληθῶς θεόφαντα ὄργια.

² *Epic.* in *Diog.* 122: μήτε νέος τις ὢν μελλέτω φιλοσοφεῖν μήτε γέρον ὑπάρχων κοπιάτω φιλοσοφῶν· οὔτε γὰρ ἄωρος οὐδεὶς ἐστὶν οὔτε πάρος πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν ὑγιαίνειν. He who says it is too

early or too late to study philosophy means πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μήπω παρῆναι τὴν ὥραν ἢ μηκέτι εἶναι. *Id.* in *Sen.* Ep. 8, 7: Philosophiæ servias oportet, ut tibi contingat vera libertas.

³ *Epic.* in *Diog.* 127: τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι φυσικαὶ αἱ δὲ κεναί· καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν αἱ μὲν ἀναγκαῖαι αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ μόνον. τῶν δὲ ἀναγκαίων αἱ μὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀσχησίαν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν. *Ibid.* 149, further particulars are given as to the classes. *Ibid.* 144; *Lucr.* ii. 20; *Cic.* Fin. i. 13, 45; *Tusc.* v. 33, 94; *Plut.* N. P. Sua. Viv. 3, 10; *Eustrat.* Eth. N. 48; *Sen.* Vit. Be. 13, 1.

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only receive her gifts thankfully, and not forget what she gives in our desire to obtain our wishes.¹ He who lives according to nature is never poor; the wise man living on bread and water has no reason to envy Zeus;² chance has little hold on him; with him intelligence is everything,³ and if a man is sure of intelligence he need trouble himself but little about external misfortunes.⁴ Even bodily pain did not appear to Epicurus so severe as to be able to cloud the wise man's happiness; and although he regards as unnatural the Stoic insensibility to pain,⁵ he is still of opinion that the wise man may be happy on the rack, that he can bear with a smile pains the most violent, and in the midst of torture exclaim, How sweet!⁶ But a touch of forced sentiment may be discerned in the last expression; and traces of self-satisfied exaggeration are manifest even in the beautiful utterances of the philosopher on the pains of disease.⁷ Nevertheless, the principle which these utterances involve is one quite in the spirit of the Epicurean philosophy, and borne out by the testimony of the founder. The main thing, accord-

¹ *Sen.* Benef. iii. 4, 1: Epicuro . . . qui adsidue queritur, quod adversus præterita simus ingrati. *Epic.* in *Sen.* Ep. 15, 10: Stulta vita ingrata est et trepida, tota in futurum fertur; and *Lucr.* iii. 929.

² *Diog.* 11; 130; 144; 146; *Stob.* Floril. 17; 23; 30; 34; *Sen.* Ep. 2, 5; 16, 7; 25, 4.

³ *Diog.* 144: βραχεία σοφῶ τύχη παρεμπίπτει, τὰ δὲ μέγιστα καὶ κυριώτατα ὁ λογισμὸς διέκκηκε. *Stob.* Ecl. ii. 354; *Cic.* Fin. i.

19, 63; *Sen.* De Const. 15, 4; *Cic.* Tusc. v. 9, 26; *Plut.* Aud. Po. 14.

⁴ *Diog.* 135: κρεῖττον εἶναι νομίσαν εὐλογίστως ἀτυχεῖν ἢ ἀλογίστως εὐτυχεῖν.

⁵ *Plut.* N. P. Sua. Viv. 20, 4.

⁶ *Diog.* 118; *Plut.* l. c. 3, 6; *Sen.* Ep. 66, 18; 67, 15; *Cic.* Tusc. v. 26, 73.

⁷ *Diog.* 22; *Cic.* Fin. ii. 30, 96; Tusc. ii. 7, 17; *M. Aurel.* ix. 41; *Sen.* Ep. 66, 47; 92, 25; *Plut.* N. P. Sua. Viv. 18, 1.

ing to Epicurus, is not the state of the body, but the state of the mind. Bodily pleasure is of short duration, and has much of a disturbing character about it; mental enjoyments are alone pure and incorruptible. Mental sufferings, too, are proportionately more severe than those of the body, since the body only feels the pangs of the moment, whilst the soul feels the torments of the past and the future.¹ In a life of limited duration the pleasures of the flesh never reach their end. Only intelligence, by consoling us for the limited nature of our bodily existence, can produce a life complete in itself, and not standing in need of unlimited duration.²

At the same time, the Epicureans, if they are consistent with their principles, cannot deny that bodily pleasure is the earlier form, and likewise the ultimate source, of all pleasure, and neither Epicurus nor his favourite pupil Metrodorus shrunk from making this admission; Epicurus declaring that he could not form a conception of the good apart from enjoyments³ of the senses; Metrodorus asserting that everything

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(2) *Reasons for rising superior to the senses.*

¹ *Diog.* 137: ἔτι πρὸς τοὺς Κυρηναίκοις διαφέρεται. οἱ μὲν γὰρ χείρους τὰς σωματικὰς ἀλγηδόνας λέγουσι τῶν ψυχικῶν . . . ὁ δὲ τὰς ψυχικὰς. τὴν γοῦν σάρκα διὰ τὸ παρὸν μόνον χειμάζειν, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν καὶ διὰ τὸ παρελθὼν καὶ τὸ παρὸν καὶ τὸ μέλλον. οὕτως οὖν καὶ μείζονας ἡδονὰς εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς. *Plut.* l. c. 3, 10; *Cic. Tusc.* v. 33, 96. The Epicureans designated bodily pleasure by ἡδεσθαι, neutral by χαίρειν. *Plut.* l. c. 5, 1.

² *Diog.* 145. Epicurus appears to have first used σὰρξ to express the body in contrast to the soul, σῶμα, in his system, including the soul. See *Diog.* 137; 140; 144; Metrodorus in *Plut. Colot.* 31, 2.

³ *Diog.* x. 6, from Epicurus περὶ τέλους: οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἔχω τί νοήσω τὰγαθὸν ἀφαιρῶν μὲν τὰς διὰ χυλῶν ἡδονὰς, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ καὶ τὰς δι' ἀφροδισίων καὶ τὰς δι' ἀκροαμάτων καὶ τὰς διὰ μορφῆς. *Cic. Tusc.* iii. 18, 41.

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good has reference to the belly.¹ Nevertheless, the Epicureans did not feel themselves thereby necessitated to yield to the body the preference which they claimed for goods of the soul. Nor, indeed, had the Stoics, notwithstanding the grossness in their theory of knowledge, ever abated their demand for a knowledge of conceptions, or ceased to subordinate the senses to reason, notwithstanding their founding moral teaching on nature. But mental pleasures and pains have lost with the Epicureans their peculiar character. Their only distinction from pleasures of the body consists in the addition of memory, or hope, or fear² to the present feeling of pleasure or pain; and their greater importance is simply ascribed to their greater force or duration when compared with the feelings which momentarily impress the senses.³ As a counterpoise to bodily pains the remembrance of philosophic discourses is mentioned;⁴ but properly speaking mental pleasures and pains are not different from other pleasures in kind, but only in degree, being stronger and more enduring.

¹ *Plut.* l. c. 16, 9: ὡς καὶ ἐχάρην καὶ ἐθραυσνάμην ὅτε ἔμαθον παρ' Ἐπικούρου ὁρθῶς γαστρὶ χαρίζεσθαι; and: περὶ γαστέρα γάρ, ὡς φυσιολόγε Τιμόκρατες, τὸ ἀγαθόν.

² *Epic.* in *Plut.* N. P. Suav. V. 4, 10: τὸ γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατὰσθημα καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἐλπίσμα τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχει τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις. *Ibid.* 5, 1: τὸ μὲν ἡδόμενον τῆς σαρκὸς τῷ χαίροντι τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπεριδόντες, αἰδοῖς δ' ἐκ τοῦ χαίροντος εἰς τὸ

ἡδόμενον τῇ ἐλπίδι τελευτῶντας.

³ *Conf. Cic. Fin.* i. 17, 55: Animi autem voluptas et dolores nasci fatemur e corporis voluptatibus et doloribus; it is only a misapprehension on the part of several Epicureans to deny this fact.

⁴ In his last letter (*Diog.* 22), after describing his painful illness, Epicurus continues: ἀντιπαρετάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τοῦτοις τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῶν γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμη.

Accordingly Epicurus allows that we have no cause for rejecting gross and carnal pleasures if they can liberate us from the fear of higher powers, of death, and of sufferings;¹ and the only consolation he can offer in pain is of the most uncertain kind. The most violent pains either do not last long, or they put an end to our existence; and the less violent ought to be endured since they do not exclude a counterbalancing pleasure.² Hence victory over the impression of the moment must be secured, not so much by a mental force stemming the tide of feeling, as by a proper adjustment of the condition and actions of the senses.

In no other way can the necessity of virtue be established in the Epicurean system. Agreeing with the strictest moral philosophers so far as to hold that virtue can be as little separated from happiness as happiness from virtue,³ having even the testimony of opponents as to the purity and strictness of his moral teaching, which in its results differed in no wise from that of the Stoics;⁴ Epicurus, never-

(3) *Virtue.*

¹ *Diog.* 142; *Cic. Fin.* ii. 7, 21.

² *Diog.* 140; 133; *Cic. Fin.* i. 15, 49; *Plut.* *Aud. Po.* 14; *M. Aurel.* vii. 33, 64.

³ *Diog.* 140: οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ δικαίως ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως. *Cic. Tusc.* v. 9, 26; *Fin.* i. 16, 50; 19, 62; *Sen. Ep.* 85, 18.

⁴ *Sen. Vit. Be.* 13, 1: In ea quidem ipse sententia sum, sancta Epicurum et recta præcipere, et si propius accesseris tristitia: vo-

luptas enim illa ad parvum et exile revocatur, et quam nos virtuti legem dicimus eam ille dixit voluptati . . . itaque non dico, quod plerique nostrorum, sectam Epicuri flagitiorum ministram esse, sed illud dico: male audit, infamis est, et immerito. Seneca not infrequently quotes sayings of Epicurus, and calls (*Ep.* 6, 6) Metrodorus, Hermarchus, Polyænus, magnos viros. *Cic. Fin.* ii. 25, 81.

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theless, holds a position strongly differing from that of the Stoics as to the grounds on which his moral theory is based. To demand virtue for its own sake seemed to him a mere phantom of the imagination. Those only who make pleasure their aim have a real object in life.¹ Only a conditional value belongs to virtue² as a means to happiness; or, as it is otherwise expressed,³ Not virtue taken by itself renders a man happy, but the pleasure arising from the exercise of virtue. This pleasure the Epicurean system does not seek in the consciousness of duty fulfilled, or of the possession of virtue, but in the freedom from disturbances, fears, and dangers, which follows as a consequence necessarily produced by virtue. Wisdom and intelligence contribute to happiness by liberating us from the fear of the Gods and death, by making us independent of immoderate passions and vain desires, by teaching us to bear pain as something subordinate and passing, and by pointing the way to a more cheerful and natural life.⁴

¹ Epic. in *Plut. Adv.* Col. 17, 3: ἐγὼ δ' ἐφ' ἡδονὰς συνεχεῖς παρακαλῶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρετὰς, κενὰς καὶ ματαίας καὶ παραχῶδεις ἐχούσας τῶν κάρπων τὰς ἐλπίδας.

² *Diog.* 138: διὰ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς δεῖν αἰρεῖσθαι οὐ δι' αὐτάς· ὥσπερ τὴν ἰατρικὴν διὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν, καθὰ φησι καὶ Διογενῆς. *Cic. Fin.* i. 13, 42: Istæ enim vestræ eximie pulcræque virtutes nisi voluptatem efficerent, quis eas aut laudabiles aut expetendas arbitraretur? ut enim medicorum scientiam non ipsius artis sed bonæ valetudinis causa probamus, &c. . . .; sic sapientia, quæ ars

vivendi putanda est, non expeteretur si nihil efficeret; nunc expetitur quod est tanquam artifex conquiendæ et comparandæ voluptates. *Alex. Aphr.* De An. 156, b: [ἡ ἀρετὴ] περὶ τὴν ἐκλογὴν ἐστὶ τῶν ἡδέων κατ' Ἐπικουρον.

³ *Sen. Ep.* 85, 18: Epicurus quoque judicat, cum virtutem habeat beatum esse, sed ipsam virtutem non satis esse ad beatam vitam, quia beatum efficiat voluptas quæ ex virtute est, non ipsa virtus.

⁴ *Diog.* 132; *Cic. Fin.* i. 13, 43; 19, 62.

Self-control aids in that it points out the attitude to be assumed towards pleasure and pain so as to receive the maximum of enjoyment and the minimum of suffering;¹ valour, in that it enables us to overcome fear and pain;² justice, in that it makes life possible without that fear of Gods and men, which ever haunts the transgressor;³ but all the individual virtues contribute to one and the same result. Virtue is never an end in itself, but only a means to an end—that end lying beyond it—a happy life. But yet it is means so certain and necessary that virtue can neither be conceived without happiness, nor happiness without virtue. Moreover, little as it might seem to be required by this theory, Epicurus insists upon it that an action to be right must be done not according to the letter, but according to the spirit of the law, not simply from regard to others, or by compulsion, but from delight in what is good.⁴

The same claims were advanced by Epicurus on behalf of his wise man as the Stoics had urged on behalf of theirs. Not only was a control over pain attributed to him, in nothing inferior to the Stoic

C. The
wise man

¹ *Cic. Fin. i. 13, 47.*

² *Cic. l. c. 13, 49. Diog. 120:*
τὴν δὲ ἀνδρείαν φύσει μὴ γίνεσθαι,
λογισμῷ δὲ τοῦ συμφέροντος.

³ *Cic. Fin. i. 16, 50; Diog. 144;*
Plut. N. P. Sua. Viv. 6, 1; Sen.
Ep. 97, 13 and 15. Lucr. v. 1152:
The criminal can never rest, and
often in delirium or sleep betrays
himself. Epicurus, however, re-
fused to answer the question,
Whether the wise man would do

what is forbidden, if he could be
certain of not being discovered?

⁴ *Philodemus, De Rhet. Vol.*
Herc. v. a, col. 25: The laws
ought to be kept τῷ μὴ τὰ διωρι-
σμένα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τὴν ὁμο-
εἰδειαν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντα διαφυλάτ-
τειν, καὶ κεῖνα μὴ μόνον συνειδόντων,
ἀλλὰ καὶ λανθάνωμεν ἀπαξά-παν-
τας, καὶ μεθ' ἡδονῆς, οὐ δι' ἀν-
άγκην, καὶ βεβαίως, ἀλλ' οὐ σα-
λευομένως.

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insensibility of feeling, but his life was also described as most perfect and satisfactory in itself. Albeit not free from emotions, being in particular susceptible to the higher feelings of the soul, such as compassion, he yet finds his philosophic activity in no wise thereby impaired.¹ Without despising enjoyment, he is altogether master of his desires, and knows how to restrain them by intelligence, so that they never exercise a harmful influence on life. He alone has an unwavering certainty of conviction;² he alone knows how to do the right thing in the right way; he alone, as Metrodorus observes,³ knows how to be thankful. Nay, more, he is so far exalted above ordinary men that Epicurus promises that by carefully observing his teaching, philosophers will dwell as Gods among men,⁴ and so little controlled by destiny that they will be, under all circumstances, happy.⁵ Happiness may, indeed, depend on certain external conditions; it may even be allowed that the disposition to happiness does not exist in every nature, nor in every person;⁶ but still, when it does exist, its existence is secure, nor can time affect its reality. For wisdom—so Epicurus and the Stoics alike believed—is indestructible,⁷ and the wise man's happiness can never be increased by time. A life

¹ *Diog.* 117; 118; 119.² *Plut.* Adv. Col. 19, 2.³ *Diog.* 118; *Sen.* Ep. 81, 11. The Stoic assertion of the equality of virtues and vices was, however, denied.⁴ *Diog.* 135; *Plut.* N. P. Sua. Vi. 7, 3; *Lucr.* iii. 323.⁵ *Cic.* Fin. i. 19, 61; v. 27, 80: Semper beatum esse sapientem. *Tusc.* v. 9, 26; *Stob.* Serm. 17, 30.⁶ *Diog.* 117.⁷ *Diog.* 117: τὸν ἀπαξ γενόμενον σοφὸν μηκέτι τὴν ἐναντίαν λαμβάνειν διάθεσιν μήδ' ἐπαλλάττειν ἐκόντα.

bounded by time may, therefore, be quite as perfect as one not so bounded.¹

Thus, however different the principles, and however different the tone of the systems of the Stoics and of Epicurus, one and the same endeavour may yet be observed in both. It is the tendency which characterises all the post-Aristotelian philosophy—the wish to place man in a position of absolute independence by emancipating him from connection with the external world, and by awakening in him the consciousness of the infinite freedom of thought.

¹ *Diog.* 126 ; 145 ; *Cic. Fin.* i. 19, 63.

CHAPTER XX.

THE EPICUREAN ETHICS CONTINUED: SPECIAL POINTS.

CHAP.
XX.A. *The individual.*

THE general principles which have been laid down in the previous chapter already determine the character of particular points in the moral science of the Epicureans. Epicurus, no doubt, never developed his views on morals into a system, however much his pupils, particularly in later times, busied themselves with morality and special points in a system of morals.¹ Moreover, his fragmentary statements and precepts on the subject of morals are very imperfectly recorded. Still, all that is known corresponds with the view which has been already stated as to his opinions. All the practical rules given by Epicurus aim at conducting man to happiness by controlling passions and desires. The wise man is easily satisfied. He sees that little is necessary for supplying the wants of nature, but to be free from pain; that the pursuit of riches knows no limit, whereas the riches required by

¹ We gather this from the fragments of Philodemus' treatise *περὶ κακιῶν καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν οἷς εἰσὶ καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν*. The 10th book of this

treatise gives a portrait of the *ὑπερήφανος*, after the manner of Theophrastus; the 9th, a mild criticism of Xenophon's and Aristotle's *οἰκονομικός*.

nature may be easily acquired.¹ He knows that the most simple nourishment affords as much enjoyment as the most luxurious, and is at the same time far more conducive to health;² that real wealth is therefore acquired, not by increasing our possessions but by restraining our wants;³ and that he who is not satisfied with little will never be satisfied at all.⁴ The wise man is able to live upon bread and water,⁵ and at the same time thinks himself as happy as Zeus.⁶ He eschews passions which disturb peace of mind and the repose of life; considering it foolish to throw away the present in order to obtain an un-

¹ *Diog.* 144; 146; 130; *Stob.* Floril. 17, 23; *Sen.* Ep. 16, 7; *Lucr.* ii. 20; iii. 59; v. 1115; *Philod.* De Vit. ix. col. 12: φιλοσόφῳ δ' ἐστὶ πλούτου μικρόν· ὃ παρεδῶκαμεν ἀκολούθως τοῖς καθηγεμόσιν ἐν τοῖς περὶ πλούτου λόγους.

² *Diog.* 130.

³ *Stob.* Floril. 17, 24 and 37; *Sen.* Ep. 21, 7; 14, 17; 2, 5: *Honestas, inquit, res est læta paupertas.* Ep. 17, 11: *Multis parasse divitias non finis miseriarum fecit, sed mutatio.*

⁴ *Stob.* Flor. 17, 30. *Sen.* Ep. 9, 20: *Si cui sua non videntur amplissima, licet totius mundi dominus sit tamen miser est.*

⁵ *Diog.* 11; *Stob.* Floril. 17, 34; *Cic.* Tusc. v. 31, 89; *Sen.* Ep. 25, 4. Epicurus lived very abstemiously. The charge of luxury brought against him was fully disposed of by *Gassendi*, De Vit. et Mor. Epic. 153. Timocrates, on the strength of one of his letters, asserts that he spent a mina every day on his table.

If this statement is not a pure invention, it must refer to the whole circle of his friends. It could otherwise only have happened at such a time as the siege of Athens by Demetrius Poliorcetes, when a modius of wheat cost 300 drachmæ, and when Epicurus counted out to his friends the beans on which they lived. *Plut.* Demetr. 33. The further statement of Timocrates—(*Diog.* 6) αὐτὸν δις τῆς ἡμέρας ἐμεῖν ἀπὸ τροφῆς)—is certainly an unfounded calumny. The moderation of Epicurus is recognised by *Sen.* Vit. B. 12, 4; 13, 1; and Epicurus flatters himself, in *Sen.* Ep. 18, 9: *Non toto asse pasci, Metrodorum, qui nondum tantum profecerit, toto; and, in Diog. 11, because he was satisfied with bread and water. Ibid.* he writes: πέμψον μοι τυροῦ Κυθνίου, ἵν' ὅταν βούλωμαι πολυτελεῖσθαι, δύναμαι. Still less have we any reason to attribute his illness to luxury.

⁶ *Stob.* Floril. 17, 30. See p. 450.

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certain future, or to sacrifice life itself to the means of a life which he can never enjoy.¹ He therefore neither gives way to passionate love, nor to forbidden acts of profligacy.² Fame he does not covet; and for the opinions of men he cares only so far as to wish not to be despised, since being despised would expose him to danger.³ Injuries he can bear with calmness.⁴ He cares not what may happen to him after his death;⁵ nor envies any for possessions about which he does not care himself.⁶

It has been already seen how Epicurus thought to

¹ Epicurus and Metrodorus, in *Stob. Floril.* 16, 28; 20. *Plut. Tran. An.* 16: ὁ τῆς αὐριον ἥκιστα δεόμενος, ὥς φησιν Ἐπίκουρος, ἡδίστα πρόσεισι πρὸς τὴν αὐριον.

² Serious charges on this subject are preferred against Epicurus by Timocrates, in *Diog.* 6; but neither the testimony of Timocrates, nor the fact that a woman of loose morality was in his society, can be considered conclusive. Chrysippus, in *Stob. Floril.* 63, 31, calls Epicurus ἀναίσθητος. Epicurus is, however, far below our standard of morality. Thus he reckons ἡδοναὶ δι' ἀφροδισίων among the necessary ingredients of the good. By *Eustrat.* in *Eth. N.* 48, such pleasures are included among φυσικαί, not among ἀναγκαί or ἡδοναί. They are treated in the same light by *Lucr.* v. 1050; and *Plut. Qu. Conviv.* iii. 6, 1, 1, quotes as the words of Epicurus: εἰ γέρον ὁ σοφὸς ὦν καὶ μὴ δυνάμενος πλησιάζειν ἔτι ταῖς τῶν καλῶν ἀφαῖς χαίρει καὶ ψηλαφήσεν. These enjoyments, according to

Epicurus, are only then allowed when they do not entail any bad consequences (*Diog.* 118). Hence he not only forbids unlawful commerce (*Diog.* 118), but declares οὐκ ἐρασθήσεσθαι τὸν σοφόν. *Diog.* 118; *Stob. Floril.* 63, 31. Eros is defined (*Alex. Aphr. Top.* 75) = σύντονος ὁρεξις ἀφροδισίων. It is consequently a passionate and disturbing state, which the wise man must avoid. The Stoics, on the contrary, allowed Eros to their wise man. The same view is taken of Eros by Lucretius, who cannot find words strong enough to express the restlessness and confusion entailed by love and the state of dependence in which it places man. His advice is to allay passion as quickly as possible by means of Venus volgivaga, and to gratify it in a calm way.

³ *Diog.* 120; 140; *Cic. Tusc.* ii. 12, 28; *Lucr.* iii. 59; 993.

⁴ *Sen. De Const.* 16, 1.

⁵ *Diog.* 118: οὐδὲ ταφῆς φροντιεῖν.

⁶ *Lucr.* iii. 74.

rise above pains, how to emancipate himself from the fear of the Gods and death.¹ And it has been further noticed that he longed to secure by means of his principles the same independence and happiness which the Stoics aspired to by means of theirs. But whilst the Stoics thought to attain this independence by crushing the senses, Epicurus was content to restrain and regulate the senses. Desires are not to be uprooted, but brought into proper proportion to the collective end and aim of life. Thus will the equilibrium be produced necessary for perfect repose of mind. Hence, notwithstanding his own simplicity, Epicurus is far from disapproving, under all circumstances, of a fuller enjoyment of life. The wise man will not live as a Cynic or a beggar.² Care for business he will not neglect; only he will not give too much time to business, and will prefer the business of education to any and every other.³ Nor will he despise the attractions of art, although he can be content to dispense with them.⁴ In short, his self-sufficiency will not consist in *using* little, but in *needing* little; and it is this freedom from wants which will add flavour to his more luxurious enjoyments.⁵ Nor is his attitude

¹ In *Plut.* N. P. *Suav. Viv.* 16, 3, he says: ὅτι νόσφ' νοσίων ἀσκήτη τινὰς ἐστιάσεις φίλων συνῆγε, καὶ οὐκ ἐφθόνηι τῆς προσαγωγῆς τοῦ ὕγρου τῷ ὕδρωπι, καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων Νεοκλέους λόγων μεμνημένος ἐτήκετο τῇ μετὰ δακρύων ἡδυνῇ.

² *Diog.* 119; *Philodem.* De Vit. ix. col. 12; 27, 40.

³ *Diog.* 120: κτήσεως προνοή-

σεσθαι καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος. 121: χρηματίσεσθαι τε ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μόνης σοφίας ἀπορήσαντα. *Philodem.* 23, 23, says that Epicurus received presents from his scholars.

⁴ *Diog.* 121: εἰκόνας τε ἀναθήσειν εἰ ἔχοι· ἀδιαφόρως ἔξειν ἂν μὴ σχοίη.

⁵ Epic. in *Diog.* 130: καὶ τὴν αὐτάρκειαν δὲ ἀγαθὸν μέγα νομί-

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towards death a different one. Not fearing death, rather seeking it when he has no other mode of escaping unendurable suffering, the Epicurean approves of the Stoic principle of suicide. Still, the cases in which he will resort to suicide will be rare, since he has learnt to be happy under all bodily pains.¹

B. *Civil society and the family.*
(1) *Civil society.*

Fully as the wise man can suffice for himself, Epicurus would not separate him from connection with others. Not, indeed, that he believed with the Stoics in the natural relationship of all rational beings.² But he could not form an idea of human life except in connection with human society. He does not, however, assign the same value to all forms of social life. Civil society and the state have for him the least attraction. Civil society is only an external association for the purpose of protection. Justice reposes originally on nothing but a contract entered into for purposes of mutual security.³ Laws

ζομεν οὐχ ἵνα πάντως τοῖς ὀλίγοις χρώμεθα, ἀλλ' ὅπως ἐὰν μὴ ἔχωμεν τὰ πολλὰ τοῖς ὀλίγοις χρώμεθα πεπεισμένοι γνησίως ὅτι ἡδίστα πολυτελείας ἀπολαύουσιν οἱ ἥκιστα αὐτῆς δεόμενοι.

¹ The Epicurean in *Cic. Fin.* i. 15, 49: Si tolerabiles sint [dolores] feramus, sin minus, æquo animo e vita, cum ea non placeat, tanquam e theatro exeamus. Epic. in *Sen.* Ep. 12, 10: Malum est in necessitate vivere, sed in necessitate vivere necessitas nulla est. On the other hand, Ep. 24, 22: Objurgat Epicurus non minus eos qui mortem concupiscunt, quam eos, qui timent,

et ait: ridiculum est currere ad mortem tædio vitæ, cum genere vitæ ut currendum esset ad mortem effeceris. *Diog.* 119: καὶ πηρωθεὶς τὰς ὕψεις μεθέξειν αὐτὸν τοῦ βίου. Suicide was only allowed by Epicurus in extreme cases. In Seneca's time, when an Epicurean, Diodorus, committed suicide, his fellow-scholars were unwilling to allow that suicide was permitted by the precepts of Epicurus (*Sen. Vit. B.* 19, 1).

² *Epict.* Diss. ii. 20, 6: Ἐπίκουρος ὅταν ἀναιρεῖν θέλῃ τὴν φυσικὴν κοινωνίαν ἀνθρώποις πρὸς ἀλλήλους, κ.τ.λ.

³ *Diog.* 150; 154. From this

are only made for the sake of the wise, not to prevent their committing, but to prevent their suffering injuries.¹ Law and justice are not, therefore, binding for their own sake, but for the general good; nor is injustice to be condemned for its own sake, but only because the culprit will never be free from fear of discovery and punishment.² There is not, therefore, any such thing as universal, unchangeable justice. The claims of justice only extend to a limited number of beings and nations—those nations, in fact, which were able and willing to enter into the social compact. Hence, those particular applications of justice which constitute positive right are different in different cases, and change with circumstances. What is felt to be advantageous for mutual security, must be taken to be just; and whenever a law is seen to be inexpedient, it is no longer binding.³ The wise man will therefore only enter into political life in cases in which it is necessary, and in as far as it is necessary for his own safety. Civil government is a good, inasmuch as it protects from harm. He who desires it, without thereby attaining this object, acts most foolishly.⁴

Holding these views, it was natural that the Epicureans should be averse to public life; for do not private individuals live much more calmly and safely than statesmen, and is not public life after all

point of view, *Lucr.* v. 1106, *Sen. Ep.* 97, 13 and 15; *Plut.* gives a long description of the rise of a state. *Ad. Col.* 34.

¹ *Stob. Floril.* 43, 139.

² *Diog.* 150; *Lucr.* v. 1149;

³ *Diog.* 150–153.

⁴ *Diog.* 140.

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a hindrance to what is the real end-in-chief—wisdom and happiness?¹ Λάθε βιώσας is the Epicurean watchword.² To them the golden mean seemed by far the most desirable lot in life.³ They only advise citizens to take part in public matters when special circumstances render it necessary,⁴ or when individuals have such a restless nature that they cannot be content with the quiet of private life.⁵ Otherwise deeply convinced of the impossibility of pleasing the masses they do not even wish to make the attempt.⁶ For the same reason they appear to have been in favour of a monarchical form of government. The stern and unflinching moral teaching of the Stoics had found its political expression in the unbending republican spirit, so often encountered at Rome. Naturally the soft and timid spirit of the Epicureans took shelter under a monarchical constitution. Of their political principles so much at least is known that they did not consider it degrading to pay court to princes, and under all

¹ *Plut.* Adv. Col. 31; 33, 4; N. P. Sua. Viv. 16, 9; *Epictet.* Diss. i. 23, 6; *Lucr.* v. 1125; *Cic.* pro Sext. 10, 23. *Philodem.* περί ῥητορικῆς, col. 14: οὐδὲ χρησίμην ἡγοούμεθα τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν, οὐτ' αὐτοῖς τοῖς κεκτημένοις, οὔτε ταῖς πόλεσιν, αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν· ἀλλὰ πολλάκις αἰτίαν καὶ συμφορῶν ἀνηκέστων, when combined with uprightness, it benefits the community, and is sometimes useful; at other times, harmful to statesmen themselves.

² *Plut.* De Latenter Vivendo, c. 4. In this respect, T. Pom-

ponius Atticus is the true type of an Epicurean. See *Nepos*, Att. 6.

³ Metrodorus, in *Stob.* Floril. 45, 26: ἐν πόλει μήτε ὡς λέων ἀναστρέφου μήτε ὡς κώνωψ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐκπατεύεται τὸ δὲ καιροφυλακεῖται.

⁴ Seneca well expresses the difference on this point between Epicureans and Stoics.

⁵ *Plut.* Tranqu. An. c. 2.

⁶ Epic. in *Sen.* Ep. 29, 10: Nunquam volui populo placere; nam quæ ego scio non probat populus, quæ probat populus ego nescio.

circumstances they recommended unconditional obedience.¹

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Family life is said to have shared the same fate as civil life in the system of Epicurus.² Deprecated as it was by him, still the terms in which it was deprecated are, no doubt, exaggerated. It would, however, appear to be established that Epicurus believed it to be generally better for the wise man to forego marriage and the rearing of children, since he would thereby save himself many disturbances.³ It is also quite credible that he declared the love of children towards parents to be no inborn feeling.⁴ This view is after all only a legitimate consequence of his materialism; but it did not oblige him to give up parental love altogether. Epicurus was, it would seem, anything but a stranger to family feeling⁵ himself.

The highest form of social life was considered by Epicurus to be friendship—a view which is characteristic of a system based on the theory of atoms

C. Friend-
ship.

¹ *Diog.* 121: καὶ μόναρχον ἐν καίρῳ θεραπεύσειν [τὸν σοφόν]. *Isocr.* v. 1125:

Ut satius multo jam sit parere quietum,

Quam regere imperio res velle et regna tenere.

² *Epict.* Diss. i. 23, 3 (against Epicurus): διατὶ ἀποσυμβουλεύεις τῷ σοφῷ τεκνοτροφεῖν; τί φοβῇ μὴ διὰ ταῦτα εἰς λύπας ἐμπέσῃ; ii. 20, 20: Ἐπίκουρος τὰ μὲν ἀνδρὸς πάντ' ἀπεκόψατο καὶ τὰ οἰκοδεσπότου καὶ φίλου.

³ *Diog.* 119. The passage is, however, involved in much obscurity, owing to a difference of

reading. Cobet's reading agrees with *Hieron.* Adv. Jovin. i. 191, quoting from *Seneca*, De Matrimonio: Epicurus . . . raro dicit sapienti ineunda conjugia quia multa incommoda admixta sunt nuptiis. Like riches, honours, health, ita et uxores sitas in bonorum malorumque confinio, grave aut esse viro sapienti venire in dubium, utrum bonum an malum ducturus sit.

⁴ *Plut.* Adv. Col. 27, 6; De Am. Prol. 2; *Epictet.* Diss. i. 23, 3.

⁵ *Diog.* 10: ἥ τε πρὸς τοὺς γονέας εὐχαριστία καὶ ἡ πρὸς τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς εὐπνοία.

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and regarding the individual as the atom of society. Such a system naturally attributes more value to a connection with others freely entered upon and based on individual character and individual inclination, than to a connection in which man finds himself placed without any choice, as a member of a society founded on nature or history. The basis, however, on which the Epicurean friendship rests is superficial. Friendship is cultivated, regard being had mainly to its advantages, and in some degree to the natural effects of common enjoyments;¹ but it is also treated in such a way, that its scientific imperfection has no influence on its moral importance. Only one portion of the School, and that not the most consistent, maintained that friendship was pursued in the first instance for the sake of its own use and pleasure, but that it subsequently became an unselfish love.² Moreover, the assumption that among the wise there exists a tacit agreement requiring them to love one another as much as they love themselves, is clearly only a lame shift.³

¹ *Diog.* 120: καὶ τὴν φιλίαν διὰ τὰς χρείας [γίνεσθαι] . . . συνίστασθαι δὲ αὐτὴν κατὰ κοινω- νίαν ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς. *Epic. Ibid.* 148: καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὀρίσ- μένοις ἀσφάλειαν φιλίας μάλιστα κτήσῃ δὲ νομίζειν συντελουμένην. *Sen. Ep.* 9, 8: The wise man needs a friend, non ad hoc quod Epicurus dicebat in hac ipsa epistola, ut habeat, qui sibi ægro adsideat, succurrat in vincula coniecto vel inopi; sed ut habeat aliquem, cui ipsi ægro adsideat, quem ipse circumventum hostili

custodia liberet. *Cic. Fin.* i. 20, 66: Cum solitudo et vita sine amicis insidiarum et metus plena sit, ratio ipsa monet amicitias comparare, quibus partis confirmatur animus et a spe parendarum voluptatum sejungi non potest, etc. On the same grounds, *Philodem.* De Vit. ix. col. 24, argues that it is much better to cultivate friendship than to withdraw from it.

² *Cic. Fin.* i. 20, 69.

³ *Ibid.* 70.

Still, the Epicureans were of opinion that a grounding of friendship on motives of utility was not at variance with holding it in the highest esteem. In short, friendly connection with others affords a pleasant feeling of security, entailing the most enjoyable consequences; and since this connection can only exist when friends love one another as themselves, it follows that self-love and the love of a friend must be equally strong.¹

Even this inference sounds forced, and does not fully state the grounds on which Epicurus' view of the value of friendship reposes. That view, in fact, was anterior to all the forced arguments urged in its support. What Epicurus requires is primarily enjoyment. The first conditions of such enjoyment, however, are inward repose of mind, and the removal of fear of disturbances. But Epicurus was far too effeminate and dependent on externals to trust his own powers for satisfying these conditions. He needed the support of others, not only to obtain their help in necessity and trouble, and to console himself for the uncertainty of the future, but still more to make sure of his principles by having the approval of others, thus obtaining an inward satisfaction which he could not otherwise have had. Thus, the approval of friends is to him the pledge of the truth of his convictions. In connection with these his mind first attains to a strength by means of which it is able to rise above the changing circumstances of life. General ideas are for him too

¹ *Cic. Fin.* i. 20, 67.

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abstract, too unreal. Considering individual beings as alone real, and perceptions as absolutely true, still he cannot feel quite sure of his ground, unless he finds others go with him.¹ The enjoyment which he seeks is the enjoyment of his own cultivated personality; and in all cases where others are necessary for this enjoyment, particular value is attached to the personal relations of society, and to friendship.²

Hence Epicurus expresses himself on the value and necessity of friendship in a manner quite out of proportion to the grounds on which he based it. Friendship is unconditionally the highest of earthly goods.³ It is far more important in whose company we eat and drink, than what we eat and drink.⁴ In case of emergency the wise man will not shrink from suffering the greatest pains, even death, for his friend.⁵

It is well known that the conduct of Epicurus and his followers was in harmony with these professions. The Epicurean friendship is hardly less

¹ The same need finds expression in the advice given by Epicurus (*Sen. Ep.* 11, 8; 25, 5): Let every one choose some distinguished man as his pattern, that so he may live, as it were, perpetually under his eye.

² As illustrations in modern times, the réunions of the French freethinkers, or the societies of Rousseau, Mendelssohn, Jacobi, may be mentioned. It deserves notice that in these societies, as amongst the Epicureans, an important part was played by

women.

³ *Diog.* 148: ὃν ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ βίου μακαριότητα πολὺ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἢ τῆς φιλίας κτῆσις. *Cic. Fin.* ii. 25, 80: Epicurus exalts friendship to heaven.

⁴ *Sen. Ep.* 19, 10, with the addition: Nam sine amico visceratio leonis ac lupi vita est.

⁵ *Plut. Adv. Col.* 8, 7; *Diog.* 121. We have no reason to suppose, with *Ritter*, iii. 474, that this was not the expression of a real sentiment.

celebrated than the Pythagorean.¹ There may be an insipid sweetness and a weak habit of mutual admiration prominent in the relations of Epicurus and his friends,² but of the sincerity of their feelings there can be no doubt. One single expression, that referring to the property of friends,³ is enough to prove what a high view Epicurus held of friendship; and there is evidence to show that he aimed at a higher improvement of his associates.⁴

In other respects Epicurus bore the reputation of being a kind, benevolent, and genial companion.⁵

¹ The Epicureans in *Cic. Fin.* i. 20, 65: At vero Epicurus una in domo et ea quidem angusta quam magnos quantaque amoris conspiratione consentientes tenuit amicorum greges, quod fit etiam nunc ab Epicureis. *Ibid.* ii. 25, 80.

² Instances have already occurred of the extravagant honours required by Epicurus; nor did he fail to eulogise his friends, as the fragments of his letters to Leontion, Themista, and Pythocles (*Diog.* 5) prove. When Metrodorus had tried to obtain the release of a captive friend, Epicurus applauds him (*Plut.* N. P. Sua. Viv. 15, 5): ὥς εὖ τε καὶ νεανικῶς ἐξ ἄστεως ἄλαδε κατέβη Μίθρῳ τῷ Σόρῳ βοηθήσων. *Ibid.* 15, 8, he expresses his thanks for a present: δαίῳς τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἐπιμελήθητε ἡμῶν τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σίτου κομιδὴν, καὶ οὐρανομήκη σημεῖα ἐνδέδειχθε τῆς πρὸς ἐμὲ εὐνοίας. He wrote of Pythocles before he was 18: οὐκ εἶναι φύσιν ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀμείνω, καὶ τερατικῶς αὐτὸν εὖ ἀπαγγέλλειν, καὶ πάσχειν αὐτὸ τῶν

γυναικῶν, εὐχόμενος ἀνεμέσσητα εἶναι πάντα καὶ ἀνεπίφθονα τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ νεανισκοῦ (*Plut.* Adv. Col. 29, 2); and he also said (*Philodem.* περὶ παρῆρησίας, Fr. 6): ὥς διὰ Πυθοκλέα τύχην θεώσσει παρὰ τὸ τεθεμισμένον.

³ *Diog.* 11: τὸν τε Ἐπίκουρον μὴ ἀξιοῦν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν κατατίθεσθαι τὰς οὐσίας καθάπερ τὸν Πυθαγόραν κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων λέγοντα. ἀπιστούντων γὰρ εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον· εἰ δ' ἀπίστων οὐδὲ φίλων.

⁴ *Philodem.* περὶ παρῆρησίας, Fr. 15; 72; 73, mentions Epicurus and Metrodorus as patterns of genial frankness towards friends. Probably the words in *Sen. Ep.* 28, 9—initium salutis est notitia peccati—are taken from a moral exhortation addressed to a friend.

⁵ Not only does Diogenes (9) praise his unsurpassed benevolence, his kindness to his slaves, and his general geniality, but Cicero calls him (*Tusc.* ii. 19, 44) vir optimus, and (*Fin.* ii. 25, 80) bonum virum et comem et humanum.

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His teaching, likewise, bears the same impress. It meets the inexorable sternness of the Stoics by insisting on compassion and forgiveness,¹ and supercedes its own egotism by the maxim that it is more blessed to give than to receive.² The number of such maxims on record is, no doubt, limited; nevertheless, the whole tone of the Epicurean School is a pledge of the humane and generous character of its morals.³ To this trait the Epicurean School owes its greatest importance in history. By its theory of utility it undoubtedly did much harm, being to some extent the precursor of the moral decline of the classic nations, and contributing also to bring about that result. Still, by drawing man away from the outer world within himself, by teaching him to look for happiness in that beautiful type—a cultivated mind content with itself—it contributed quite as much as Stoicism to the development and the extension of a more independent and more universal morality.

¹ *Diog.* 118: οὔτε κολάσειν οἰκέτας ἐλεήσειν μέντοι, καὶ συγγνώμην τινὶ ἐξείν τῶν σπουδαίων. 121: ἐπιχαρίσσεσθαι τινὶ ἐπὶ τῷ διορθώματι.

² *Plut.* N. P. Sua. Vi. 15, 4: αὐτοὶ δὲ δῆπου λέγουσιν ὡς τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἡδιόν ἐστι τοῦ πάσχειν. *Alex. Aphr.* Top. 123. A similar maxim is attributed by *Ælian.* V. H. xiii. 13, to Ptolemy Lagi. *Conf. Acts* xx. 35.

³ *Cic.* Fin. ii. 25, 81: Et ipse bonus vir fuit et multi Epicurei fuerunt et hodie sunt, et in amicitiiis fideles et in omni vita constantes et graves nec voluptate sed officio consilia moderantes. Atticus is a well-known example of genuine human kindness and ready self-sacrifice, and Horace may be also quoted as an illustration of the same character.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE EPICUREAN SYSTEM AS A WHOLE : ITS POSITION
IN HISTORY.

It has often been urged against the Epicurean philosophy, that it is deficient both in coherence and consistency. Nor is this objection without foundation, if by those terms a complete scientific groundwork, or a strictly logical development, is understood. After studying it, there certainly remains a feeling of dissatisfaction. It is not difficult to show in what contradictions Epicurus was involved ; in professing at one time to trust the senses wholly and entirely, and yet going beyond the senses to the hidden causes of things ; in despising logical forms and laws, and at the same time building up his whole system on deductions ; in holding that all sensations are true, but yet maintaining that a portion of the realities which they represent as belonging to things is only relative. Nor were some of his other inconsistencies less ; such for instance as his recognising at one time only natural causes and laws and ignoring any such thing as free will and imagination, and yet at another time, by the doctrine of the deviation of atoms and of the human will, elevating unexplained caprice to

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the rank of law ; his referring all pleasures and pains to bodily sensations, and yet calling mental states the higher and more important states ; nay more, his going so far as to construct on a basis of selfishness rules and precepts of humanity, justice, love, faithfulness, and devotion. It ought not, however, to be forgotten that the Stoics, to whom the claim of clear and consistent thought cannot be denied, were involved in similar difficulties. The Stoics, like the Epicureans, built up a rational system on a basis of the senses. They too constructed an ideal theory of morals on a material groundwork of metaphysics. They too declared that universal law is the only active power, whilst they maintained that reality belongs only to the world of matter. They too deduced a strict theory of virtue from the principle of self-preservation ; not to mention the inconsistent attitude which they assumed towards the popular religion. To deny to the Stoics a oneness and connectedness of system, would be felt to be doing them an injustice, notwithstanding their defects and inconsistencies. And can Epicureanism be fairly condemned, when its faults are essentially of the same kind (though a little more obvious) as those of the Stoics, without a single extenuating plea being admitted on its behalf ?

The strongest argument in favour of Epicureanism is that as a whole it does not pretend to rest upon an intellectual platform. Epicurus sought in philosophy a path to happiness, a school for practical wisdom. For him knowledge has only a secondary value, as

being subservient to this end, and indeed both the tone and the mode of his intellectual activity was decided with a view to this end. In the case of the Stoics, however, it has been already seen that the comparative subordination of Logic and Natural Science to Moral Science, the going back to the older view of nature, the vindication of the truth of the senses and of the reality of matter, grew out of their peculiarly one-sided view of the scope of philosophy. In the case of Epicurus the same results appear; and in his case it is all the more remarkable, since Epicurus did not, like the Stoics, look for happiness in subordination to a universal law, but in individual gratification or pleasure. The knowledge of a universal law had not for him the same value as for the Stoics; and consequently Epicurus did not feel the same need of a scientific method as they had done. He could therefore rest content with the impressions of the senses, regarding them as the only unfailing source of knowledge. No necessity compelled him to advance from pure materialism to a view of matter in which it is described as possessing a soul and made to be the bearer of reason. In fact, the more exclusively everything was referred by him to mechanical causes, the more easily could he regard the individual as independent of all superhuman forces in his pursuit of happiness, and as purely relying on himself and his natural powers. No system in ancient times has so exclusively taken the mechanical view of nature as that of the Atomists. None, therefore, afforded such a strong metaphysical

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support to the Epicureans. For Epicurus it was as natural to build on the teaching of Democritus as for the Stoics to build on that of Heraclitus. But Epicurus, probably more under the influence of practical than of scientific considerations, destroyed by his theory of the derivation of atoms the consistency of the theory of Democritus.

It is hardly necessary to notice here how the distinctive features of the Epicurean morals were developed out of their theory of happiness, in marked contrast to the Stoics' teaching. But the happiness of Epicurus does not depend upon sensual gratifications as such, but upon repose of mind and cheerfulness of disposition. Hence his theory of morals, notwithstanding its foundation in pleasure, bears a noble character, which is seen in its language as to the wise man's relations to the pains and desires of the body, to poverty and riches, to life and death, no less than in the mild humanity and the warm and hearty appreciation of friendship by the Epicurean School. The rationalising spirit of that School was certainly opposed to a religious belief which supposed an intervention of God in the course of the world, or the world's influence on man for weal or woe; but its appeal to the senses without criticism admitted belief in divine beings, from whom no such intervention need be feared. Nay, more, this belief seemed the most natural ground for explaining the popular belief in God. It satisfied an inborn and apparently keenly felt want by supplying an appropriate object of devotion, and a standard by which

to test the accuracy of moral ideas. Hence, notwithstanding scientific defects and contradictions, the whole system of Epicurus bears a definite stamp. All the essential parts of that system are subservient to one and the same end. The consistent working out of a scientific view of nature is looked for in vain; but there is no lack of consistency arising from an undeniable reference of the individual to a definite and practical standard.

Looking to the wider historical relations of the Epicurean system, the first point which calls for remark is the relation of that system to Stoicism. The contrast between the two Schools is obvious; attention having been already drawn to it on all the more important points. It is likewise well known that a constant rivalry existed between the two Schools during their whole careers, that the Stoics looked down on the Epicureans, and circulated many calumnies with respect to their morals. For these statements proofs may be found in the preceding pages. Nevertheless the two Schools are related in so many respects, that they can only be regarded as parallel links connected in one chain, their differences being varieties where the same main tendency exists. Both agree in the general character of their philosophy. In both practical considerations prevail over speculation. Both treat natural science and logic as sciences subsidiary to ethics—natural science specially in view of its bearing on religion. Both, however, attach more importance to natural science than to logic. If the Epicurean neglect

*B. Historical position of Epicureanism.
(1) Relation to Stoicism.*

(a) Points of agreement.

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of scientific rule forms a contrast to the care which the Stoics devoted thereto, both Schools are at least agreed in independently investigating the question as to a test of truth. By both the standard was placed in the senses; and to all appearances both were led to take this view by the same cause; appeals to the senses being a consequence of their purely practical ways of looking at things. Moreover, both employed against scepticism the same practical postulate—the argument that knowledge must be possible, or no certainty of action would be possible. They even agree in not being content with the phenomena supplied by the senses as such, although Epicurus as little approved of the Stoic theory of irresistible impressions as he did of their logical analysis of the forms of thought. With such appeals to the senses how could there be any other result but materialism both in the Stoic and Epicurean systems? But it is strange that the materialism in both Schools should be based on the same definition of reality—a definition the consequence of a practical way of looking at things.

(b) *Points
of differ-
ence.*

In the expansion and more detailed setting forth of materialistic views the systems diverge, more widely, perhaps, than the philosophers themselves, whose leading they professed to follow. These differences appear particularly on the subject of nature, the Stoics regarding nature as a system of design, the Epicureans explaining it as a mechanical product. Whilst the Stoics adhered to fatalism, and saw God everywhere, the Epicureans held the theory of atoms,

and the theory of necessity. Whilst the Stoics were speculatively orthodox the Epicureans were irreligious freethinkers. Both meet again in that branch of natural science which is most important in respect of morals—the part dealing with man. Both hold that the soul is a fiery atmospheric substance. Even the proof for this view derived from the mutual influence of body and soul is common to both. Both distinguish between the higher and the lower parts of the soul, and thus even the Epicureans in their psychology allow a belief in the superiority of reason to the senses, and in the divine origin of the soul.

The arena of the warmest dispute between the two Schools is, however, ethics. Yet, even on this ground, they are more nearly related than appears at first sight. No greater contrast appears to be possible than that between the Epicurean theory of pleasure, and the Stoic theory of virtue; and true it is that the two theories are diametrically opposite. Nevertheless, not only are both aiming at one and the same end—the happiness of mankind—but the conditions of happiness are also laid down by both in the same spirit. According to Zeno virtue, according to Epicurus pleasure, is the highest and only good; but the former making virtue consist essentially in withdrawal from the senses or insensibility, the latter seeking pleasure in repose of mind or imperturbability, are both expressing the same belief. Man can only find unconditional and enduring satisfaction, when by means of knowledge he attains to a

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condition of mind at rest with itself, and also to being independent of external attractions and misfortunes. The same unlimited appeal to personal truth is the common groundwork of both systems. Both have expanded this idea under the same form—that of the ideal wise man—for the most part with the same features. The wise man of Epicurus is, as we have seen, superior to pain and want; he enjoys an excellence which cannot be lost; and he lives among men a very God in intelligence and happiness. Thus, when worked out into details, the difference in the estimate of pleasure and virtue by the Stoics and Epicureans is seen to vanish. Neither the Stoic can separate happiness from virtue, nor the Epicurean separate virtue from happiness.

But, whilst recommending a living for society, both systems take no real interest in social life. The recognition of a natural society amongst mankind, of certain positive relations to state and family, above all, a clear enunciation of a citizenship of the world, characterise the Stoics. The pursuit of friendship, and the gentle humanity of their ethics, characterise the Epicureans. Together with these peculiarities one common feature cannot be ignored. Both have renounced the political character of the old propriety of conduct, and diverting their attention from public life, seek to find a basis for universal morality in the simple relation of man to man.

c) *The relationship greater than the difference.*

Putting together the points of resemblance and difference, there is reason for asserting that, notwithstanding their differences, the Stoics and Epi-

cureans stand on the same footing, and that the sharpness of the contrast between them is owing to their laying hold of opposite sides of one and the same principle. Abstract personality, and self-consciousness universally applied, is for both the highest aim; when compared with it not only the state of the senses, but the scientific knowledge of things, and the realisation of moral ideas in a commonwealth, are of minor importance. In this self-consciousness happiness consists. The object of philosophy is to implant it in man, and knowledge is only of value when and in as far as it ministers to this end. The two Schools are separated by their view of the conditions under which that certainty of consciousness is attained. The Stoics hope to attain it by the entire subordination of the individual to universal law. The Epicureans, on the other hand, are of opinion that man can only then be in himself content, when he is restrained by nothing external to himself. The first condition of happiness consists in liberating individual life from all dependence on others, and all disturbing causes. The former, therefore, make virtue, the latter make personal well-being or pleasure, the highest good. By the Epicureans, however, pleasure is usually conceived of as of a purely negative character, as being freedom from pain, and is referred to the whole of human life. Hence it is always made to depend on the moderation of desires, on indifference to outward ills, and the state of the senses, on prudence and actions based on prudence, in short on virtue and wisdom. Hence, too, the

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Epicureans arrive by another course at the same conclusion as the Stoics, that happiness can only be the lot of those who are altogether independent of external things, and in the enjoyment of perfect inward harmony.

(2) *Relation to Aristip-
pus.*

Towards the older philosophy Epicureanism bears nearly the same relation as Stoicism. It is true that Epicurus and his School would not recognize their obligation to either one or other of his predecessors.¹ But far from proving that previous systems had no influence on his own, this conduct only shows the personal vanity of Epicurus. Epicureanism,

¹ It has been already stated that Epicurus admitted his debt to Democritus, but with some reserve, otherwise claiming to be entirely self-taught. With this one exception, he professed to have learned nothing from the ancient teachers, and expressed himself with such conceit and scorn, as to spare neither themselves nor their writings. *Diog.* 8, besides mentioning his abuse of Nausiphanes, refers also to his calling the Platonists *Διονυσκόλακας*, Plato himself in irony the *golden* Plato, Heraclitus *κυκητής*, Democritus *Αηρόκριτος*, Antidoros *Σαινίσιππος*, the Cynics *ἐχθροὺς τῆς Ἑλλάδος*, the Dialecticians *πολυφθογγέρους*, Pyrrho *ἀμαθὴς* and *ἀπαίδευτος*, and charging Aristotle and Protagoras with vices in their youth. Diogenes refuses to allow that any of these statements are true, Epicurus' friendliness being well known. But the devotion of Epicurus to his friends and admirers does not exclude hatred

and injustice towards his predecessors, a fair estimate of whom was rendered impossible by the superficial nature of his knowledge and the one-sidedness of his point of view. *Sext. Math.* i. 2, attests *τὴν πρὸς τοὺς περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους δυσμένειαν*; *Plut.* *Adv. Col.* 26, 1, mentions a false objection to Arcesilaus; and *Cic. N. D.* i. 33, 93, says: Cum Epicurus Aristotelem vexarit contumeliosissime, Phædoni Socratico turpissime maledixerit, etc. The rude jokes mentioned by Diogenes are in harmony with a man whom *Cic. N. D.* ii. 17, 46, calls homo non aptissimus ad jocandum mi nimeque resipiens patriam. In this Epicurus was followed by his pupils. *Cic. N. D.* i. 34, 93, says of Zeno: Non eos solum, qui tunc erant, Apollodorum, Sillum, ceteros figebat maledictis, sed Socratem ipsum . . . scurrām Atticum fuisse dicebat, Chrysippum nunquam nisi Chrysippam vocabat.

like Stoicism, starts with the object of bringing down science from metaphysical speculation to the simpler form of a practical science of life. Both systems of philosophy, therefore, turn away from Plato and Aristotle, whose labours they notably neglect, to Socrates and those Socratic Schools which, without meddling with science, are content with ethics. Circumstances, however, led Epicurus to follow Aristippus as Zeno had followed Antisthenes. Not only in morals did Epicurus derive his principle of pleasure from the Cyrenaics; he likewise derived from them his theory of knowledge, that the sense-impressions are the only source of ideas, and that every feeling is true in itself. Nor can he altogether deny the assertion that only feelings furnish information respecting our personal states, and hence respecting the relative properties of things. With the Cyrenaics, too, he taught that true pleasure can only be secured by philosophic insight, and that this insight aims before all things at liberating the mind from passion, fear, and superstition. At the same time, he is by no means prepared to follow the Cyrenaics unconditionally. His theory of morals differs, as has already been seen, from the Cyrenaic theory, in this important particular, that not sensual and individual pleasure, but mental repose and the whole state of the mind is regarded as the ultimate end, and the highest good in life. It was thus impossible for him to be content with feelings only, with individual and personal impressions. He could not fail to aim at a conviction reposing on a real

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XXI.(3) *Relation to Democritus.*

knowledge of things, since only on such a conviction can an equable and certain tone of mind depend.

Epicurus, therefore, not only differed from Aristippus with regard to the nature of the senses, referring all feelings to impressions from without, and regarding impressions as the true representations of things; but he felt himself called upon to oppose the Cyrenaic contempt for theories of nature, just as the Stoics had opposed the Cynic contempt for science. To the physics of Democritus he turned for a scientific basis for his ethics, Democritus having borrowed such a basis from the system of Heraclitus. But the closer he clung to Democritus, owning the weakness of his own interest in nature, the more it appeared to him that his whole study of nature was subservient to a moral purpose, and hence of purely relative value. Accordingly, he had not the least hesitation in setting consistency at defiance by assuming the deviation of atoms and the freedom of the will. It is an altogether improbable notion that Epicurus was only a second edition of Democritus. In fact history knows of no such repetitions. A more accurate observation proves that even when the two philosophers agree in individual statements, the meaning which they attach to these assertions, and the whole spirit of their systems, is widely divergent. Democritus aimed at explaining natural phenomena by natural causes. He wished, in short, for a science of nature purely for its own sake. Epicurus wished for a view of nature able to avert disturbing influences from man's inner life. Natural science stands

with him entirely in the service of ethics. If in point of substance his system is borrowed from another system, yet its whole position and treatment supposes an entirely new view of things. The Socratic introspection, and the Sophistic change of natural philosophy into personal enlightenment has been carried back to its historical groundwork. That groundwork can only be explained by the general aversion felt for pure theory, which constitutes the common peculiarity of all the post-Aristotelian philosophy.

Excepting the systems named, Epicureanism, as far as is known, was connected with no other previous system. Even its attack upon those systems appears to have consisted of general and superficial statements. Still it must not be forgotten that Epicureanism supposes the line of thought originated by Socrates, not only in the form which it assumed among the Cyrenaics, but in the form in which it was regularly developed by Plato and Aristotle. Undoubtedly Epicurus, like Zeno, by his materialism attacks the metaphysical view of Plato and Aristotle, distinguishing the immaterial essence from the sensible appearance of things, and attributing reality only to the former; but practically he approaches very much nearer to this view in all those points in which his teaching deviates from the Cyrenaic, and resembles that of the Stoics.

It has been observed on a former occasion that that indifference to the immediate conditions of the senses, that withdrawal of the mind within itself,

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that contentment with itself of the thinking subject, which Epicurus required no less than the Stoics and cotemporary Sceptics, is nothing but a consequence of the idealism of Plato and Aristotle. Even the materialism of the post-Aristotelian systems, it is said, was by no means a going back to the old pre-Socratic philosophy of nature, but only a one-sided practical apprehension of that idealism. These systems only deny a soul in nature or a soul in man, because they look for independence of the senses in consciousness and in personal activity only. The truth of this observation may be easily proved from the Epicurean teaching, notwithstanding the hardness and abruptness of its materialism. Why was it that Epicurus banished from nature all immaterial causes and all idea of purpose? And why did he confine himself exclusively to a mechanical explanation of nature? Was it not because he felt afraid that the admission of any other but material causes would imperil the certainty of consciousness; because he feared to lose the firm groundwork of reality by admitting invisible forces, and to expose human life to influences beyond calculation if he were to allow of anything immaterial? Yet how slightly, in his view of life, does he adhere to actual facts when even his wise man is made to enjoy perfect happiness by himself alone, independent of everything external. The same ideal is reproduced in the Epicurean Gods. In their isolated contemplation of themselves what else do they resemble but the God of Aristotle, who, aloof from all intermeddling

with the world, meditates on himself alone? No doubt the independent existence of the thinking mind is held by Aristotle in a pure and dignified manner. By Epicurus it is portrayed in a sensuous, and, therefore, a contradictory form. But the connection of the views of both cannot be ignored. A similar relation exists generally between the Epicurean philosophy and that of Plato and Aristotle. No doubt the former cannot be compared with the latter in breadth and depth; but it must not, therefore, be regarded as an intellectual monstrosity. Epicureanism is a tenable though one-sided expression of a certain stage in the development of the intellect of Greece.

PART IV.

THE SCEPTICS—PYRRHO AND THE OLDER, ACADEMY.

CHAPTER XXII.

PYRRHO.

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A. *His-
torical
position of
Scepticism.
(1) Its re-
lation to
cote-
mporary
dogmatic
systems.*

STOICISM and Epicureanism are alike in one respect: they commence the pursuit of happiness with definite dogmatic statements. The Sceptic Schools, however, attempt to reach the same end by denying every dogmatic position. Varied as the paths may be, the end is in all cases the same; happiness is made to consist in the exaltation of the mind above all external objects, in the withdrawal of man within his own thinking self. Moving in the same sphere as the cotemporary dogmatic systems, the post-Aristotelian Scepticism takes a practical view of the business of philosophy, and estimates the value of theoretical enquiries by their influence on the state and happiness of man. It moreover agrees with cotemporary systems in its ethical view of life; the object at which it aims is the same as that at which those systems aim—repose of mind, and

imperturbability. It differs, however, from them, none the less; for the Epicureans and Stoics make mental repose to depend on a knowledge of the world and its laws, whereas the Sceptics believe that it can only be obtained by despairing of all knowledge. Hence, with the former, morality depends on a positive conviction as to the highest Good; with the latter, morality consists in indifference to all that appears as Good to men. Important as this difference may be, it must not therefore be forgotten that Scepticism generally revolves in the same sphere as Stoicism and Epicureanism, and that in renouncing all claim to knowledge, and all interest in the external world, it is only pushing to extremes that withdrawal of man into himself which we have seen to be the common feature of these Schools. Not only therefore do these three lines of thought belong to the same epoch, but such is their internal connection, that they may be regarded as three branches springing from a common stock.

More than one point of a kindred nature was offered to Scepticism by early philosophy. The Megarian criticism and the Cynic teaching had taken up a position subversive of all connection of ideas, and of all knowledge. Then again Pyrrho had received from the School of Democritus an impulse to doubt.¹ In particular the development of

(2) *Causes
producing
it.*

¹ Democritus had denied all truth to sensuous impressions. The same sceptical tone was held by Metrodorus (Aristocl. in *Lus.* Pr. Ev. xiv. 19, 5; *Sext.* Math. vii. 88; *Epiphan.* Exp. Fid. 1088, Δ), although he cannot be considered a full Sceptic. Scepticism appears to have passed from him to Pyrrho, by means of Anax-

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the Platonic and Aristotelian speculations by those who were not able to follow them, had made men distrustful of all speculation, until they at last doubted the possibility of all knowledge. Not seldom do sceptical theories follow times of great philosophical originality. Still stronger was the impulse which emanated from the Stoic and Epicurean systems. Related as these systems are to Scepticism by their practical tone, it was natural that they should afford fresh fuel to Scepticism. At the same time the unsatisfactory groundwork upon which they were built, and the contrast between their statements regarding morality and nature promoted destructive criticism. If, according to the Stoics and Epicureans, the particular and the universal elements in the personal soul, the isolation of the individual as an independent atom, and his being

archus, and in combination with it the Sceptical imperturbability. This doctrine of imperturbability being held by Epicurus, the pupil of Nausiphanes, it might be supposed that before Pyrrho a doctrine not unlike that of Pyrrho had been developed in the School of Democritus, from whom it was borrowed by Epicurus. The connection is, however, uncertain. We have seen that the doubts of Democritus only extended to sense-impressions, not to intellectual knowledge. The case of Metrodorus was similar. His sceptical expressions refer only to the ordinary conditions of human knowledge, that of ideas derived from the senses; greater dependence is, however, placed

on thought. We must therefore take the statement *ὅτι πάντα ἔστιν ὃ ἂν τις νοήσῃ* subject to this limitation. Anaxarchus is said to have compared the world to a stage-scene, which involves no greater scepticism than the similar expressions used by Plato as to the phenomenal world. However much, therefore, these individuals may have contributed to Pyrrhonism, a simple transference of Scepticism from Democritus to Pyrrho is not to be thought of. And as regards imperturbability, Epicurus may have borrowed the expression from Pyrrho, whom, according to *Diog.* ix. 64 and 69, he both knew and esteemed.

merged in a pantheistic universe are contrasted with one another without being harmonised; among the Sceptics this contrast has given place to neutrality. Neither the Stoic nor the Epicurean theory can assert itself; neither the unconditional value of pleasure, nor yet the unconditional value of virtue; neither the truth of the senses nor the truth of rational knowledge; neither the Atomist's view of nature, nor the Pantheistic view as it found expression in Heraclitus, can be upheld. The only thing which remains amid universal uncertainty, is abstract personality content with itself, a personality forming at once the starting-point and the goal of the two contending systems.

The important back-influence of Stoicism and Epicureanism in producing Scepticism may be best gathered from the fact that Scepticism only attained a wide extension and a more comprehensive basis after the appearance of those systems. Before that time its leading features had been indeed laid down by Pyrrho, but they had never been developed into a permanent School of Scepticism, nor given rise to an expanded theory of doubt.

Pyrrho was a native of Elis,¹ and may therefore have early made the acquaintance of the Elean and Megarian criticism—that criticism in fact which was the precursor of subsequent Scepticism. But it can

(3) *Pyrrho and his followers.*

¹ Aristocl. in *Eus. Pr. Ev.* xiv. 18, 1; *Diog.* ix. 61. We are indebted almost exclusively to Diogenes for our information about Pyrrho. Besides Antigonus the

Carystian, Apollodorus, Alexander, Polyhistor, Diocles, &c., are the chief authorities for Diogenes.

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hardly be true that Bryso was his instructor.¹ To Anaxarchus, a follower of Democritus, he attached himself, accompanying that philosopher with Alexander's army as far as India.² But he is, no doubt, less indebted to Anaxarchus for the sceptical than for the ethical parts of his teaching.³ At a later

¹ Attention has been drawn to the chronological difficulties in 'Socrates and the Socratic Schools,' p. 217, note 2. Either Pyrrho is falsely called a pupil of Bryso, or Bryso is falsely called the son of Stilpo. The former seems more probable, *Diog.* ix. 61, having derived his statement from Alexander's *διαδοχαί*.

² *Diog.* ix. 61; *Arist.* l. c. 18, 20; 17, 8. We gather from them that Pyrrho was originally a painter.

³ Besides the passage quoted from Sextus, p. 488, which is little known, we have no proof of the sceptical tone in Anaxarchus which *Sextus*, *Math.* vii. 48, ascribes to him. Anaxarchus appears to have been unjustly included among the Sceptics, like so many others who were called Sceptics by later writers on the strength of a single word or expression. According to other accounts, he belonged to the School of Democritus. *Plut.* *Tranq. An.* 4. In *Valer. Max.* viii. 14, he propounds to Alexander the doctrine of an infinite number of worlds; and *Clemens*, *Strom.* i. 287, B, quotes a fragment, in which he observes that *πολυμαθία* is only useful where it is properly made use of. Like Epicurus, Anaxarchus followed Democritus,

calling happiness the highest object of our desire; and this assertion probably gained for him the epithet *ὁ εὐδαιμονικὸς* (*Clemens*, l. c.; *Athen.* vi. 250; xii. 548, b; *Æl.* V. H. ix. 37). In other respects, he differed from Democritus. He is charged by Clearch. in *Athen.* xii. 548, b, with a luxurious indulgence far removed from the earnest and pure spirit of Democritus. According to *Plut.* *Alex.* 52, he had, when in Asia, renounced the independence of a philosopher for a life of pleasure; and Timon, in *Plut.* *Virt. Mor.* 6, says he was led away by *φθόρις ἡδονοπλήξ* contrary to his better knowledge. Again, he is said to have commended in Pyrrho (*Diog.* ix. 63) an indifference which went a good deal beyond Democritus' imperturbability; and Timon commends him for his *κένεον μένος*. He meets external pain with the haughty pride expressed in his much-admired dictum, under the blows of Nitocreon's club. *Diog.* ix. 59; *Plut.* *Virt. Mor.* c. 10; *Clemens*, *Strom.* iv. 496, D; *Valer. Max.* iii. 3; *Plin.* *Hist. Nat.* vii. 87; *Tertull.* *Apol.* 50; *Dio Chrysos.* *Or.* 37. But he treats men with the same contempt; and whilst meeting the Macedonian conqueror with an air of independence, he spoils

period he resided in his native city,¹ honoured by his fellow-citizens,² but in poor circumstances,³ which he bore with his characteristic repose of mind.⁴ He died, it would appear, at an advanced age,⁵ between 275 and 270 B.C., leaving no writings behind.⁶ Even the ancients therefore only knew his teaching by that of his pupils, among whom Timon of Philius was the most important.⁷ Besides Timon

the whole by adroit flattery. *Plut. Alex.* 52; *Ad Prin. Iner.* 4; *Qu. Conv.* ix. 1, 2, 5; *Æl.* V. H. ix. 37; *Athen.* vi. 250. His indifference was, at any rate, very much lacking in nobility.

¹ *Diog.* ix. 64; 109.

² According to *Diog.* 64, they made him head priest, and allowed to philosophers immunity from taxation on his account. According to Diocles (*Diog.* 65), the Athenians presented him with citizenship for his services in putting a Thracian prince Cotys to death.

³ *Diog.* 66; 62.

⁴ Examples in *Diog.* 67. It sounds, however, highly improbable; and doubts were expressed by Ænesidemus whether his indifference ever went to the extent described by Antigonius, *Ibid.* 62, so that he had to be preserved from danger by his friends. He must have enjoyed a special good fortune to attain the age of 90, notwithstanding such senseless conduct.

⁵ All the dates here are very uncertain. If, however, as *Diog.* 62, says, he attained the age of 90, and if he joined Anaxarchus at Alexander's first invasion of Asia, the statements above given

follows.

⁶ *Diog.* Pro. 16; 102; Aristocl. in *Eus. Pr. Ev.* xiv. 18, 1; better authorities than *Sext. Math.* i. 282.

⁷ Timon (see *Wachsmuth, De Timone Phliasio*: Leipzig, 1859) was a native of Phlius (*Diog.* ix. 109). At first a public dancer (*Diog.* 109; Aristocl. in *Eus. Pr. Ev.* xiv. 18, 12), when tired of this mode of life he repaired to Megara, to hear Stilpo (*Diog.* 109). Stilpo being alive in the third century, and Timon's birth being approximately 325-315 B.C., the connection is not an impossible one, as Wachsmuth and Preller assert. Subsequently Timon became acquainted with Pyrrho, and removed with his wife to Elis. He then appeared as a teacher in Chalcis, and, having amassed a fortune, concluded his life in Athens (*Diog.* 110; 115). It appears from *Diog.* 112 and 115, that he survived Arcesilaus (who died 241 B.C.), having attained the age of 90. His death may therefore be approximately fixed in 230, his birth in 320 B.C. For his life and character, see *Diog.* 110; 112-115; *Athen.* x. 438, a; *Æl.* V. H. ii. 41. Of his numerous

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B. Teaching of
Pyrrho.
(1) Impossibility of
knowledge

several other of his pupils are known by name.¹ His School, however, was short-lived.² Soon after Timon it seems to have become extinct.³ Those who were disposed to be sceptical now joined the New Academy, for whose founder Timon had not been able to conceal his jealousy.⁴

The little which is known of Pyrrho's teaching may be summed up in the three following statements: We can know nothing about the nature of things: Hence the right attitude towards them is to withhold judgment: The necessary result of suspending judgment is imperturbability. He who will live happily—for happiness is the starting-point with the Scep-

writings, the best known is a witty and pungent satire on previous and cotemporary philosophers. Conf. *Wachsmuth*.

¹ *Diog.* 67-69, mentions, besides Timon, a certain Eurylochus as his pupil; also Philo, an Athenian, Hecataeus of Abdera, the well-known historian; and Nausiphanes, the teacher of Epicurus. The last assertion is only tenable on the supposition that Nausiphanes appeared as a teacher only a few years after Pyrrho, for Pyrrho cannot have returned to Elis before 320 B.C., and Epicurus must have left the School of Nausiphanes before 310 B.C. According to *Diog.* 64, Epicurus must have become acquainted with Pyrrho whilst a pupil of Nausiphanes. Nausiphanes is not said to have agreed with Pyrrho, but only to have admired his character. Numenius, mentioned by *Diog.* 102, among Pyrrho's *συνήθεις*, is suspicious, Ænesidemus being named at the

same time, and both of these appear to have belonged to a later period of Scepticism.

² According to *Diog.* 115, Menodotus asserted that Timon left no successor, the School being in abeyance from Timon to Ptolemæus, i.e. until the second half of the first century B.C. Sotion and Hippobotus, however, asserted that his pupils were Dioscurides, Nicolochus, Euphranor, and Praÿlus. His son too, the physician Xanthus, likewise followed his father. *Diog.* 109. On the other hand, according to *Suid.* Πύρρων, the second Pyrrho was a changeling. If Aratus of Soli was a pupil of his, he was certainly not an adherent of his views.

³ In *Diog.* 116, Eubulus is called a pupil of Euphranor. If Ptolemæus is named as the next one after him, no philosopher of Pyrrho's ἀγωγῇ can have been known for 150 years.

⁴ *Diog.* 114.

tics—must, according to Timon, take three things into consideration: What is the nature of things? What ought our attitude to things to be? What is the gain resulting from this relation? ¹ To the first of these three questions Pyrrho can only reply by saying that things are altogether inaccessible to knowledge, and that whatever property may be attributed to a thing, we may with equal justice predicate the opposite.² In support of this statement Pyrrho appears to have argued that neither the senses nor reason furnish certain knowledge.³ The senses do not show things as they are, but only as they appear to be.⁴ Rational knowledge, even where it seems to be most certain, in the sphere of morals, does not depend upon real knowledge, but only upon tradition and habit.⁵ Against every statement the opposite may be advanced with equal justice.⁶ If, how-

¹ Aristocl. in *Eus. Pr. Ev.* xiv. 18, 2: ὁ δὲ γε μαθητὴς αὐτοῦ Τίμων φησὶ δεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα εὐδαιμονήσῃν εἰς τρία ταῦτα βλέπειν· πρῶτον μὲν ὅποια πέφυκε τὰ πράγματα· δεύτερον δὲ, τίνα χρὴ τρόπον ἡμᾶς πρὸς αὐτὰ διακείσθαι· τελευταῖον δὲ τί περιέσται τοῖς οὕτως ἔχουσιν.

² Aristocl. l. c.: τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματά φησιν αὐτὸν (Pyrrho) ἀποφαίνειν ἐπίσης ἀδιάφορα καὶ ἀστάθμητα καὶ ἀνεπικρίτα, διὰ τοῦτο [τὸ] μήτε τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡμῶν μήτε τὰς δόξας ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι. *Diog.* ix. 61: οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸδε ἢ τὸδε εἶναι ἕκαστον. *Gell.* xi. 5, 4: Pyrrho is said to have stated οὐ μᾶλλον οὕτως ἔχει τὸδε ἢ ἐκείνως ἢ οὐθ' ἐτέρως.

³ Conf. Arist. l. c. and *Diog.*

ix. 114.

⁴ Timon, in *Diog.* ix. 105: τὸ μέλι ὅτι ἐστὶ γλυκὺ οὐ τίθημι· τὸ δ' ὅτι φαίνεται ὁμολογῶ.

⁵ *Diog.* ix. 61: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔφασκεν οὔτε καλὸν οὔτε αἰσχρὸν οὔτε δίκαιον οὔτε ἄδικον, καὶ ὁμοίῳ ἐπὶ πάντων, μηδὲν εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, νόμῳ δὲ καὶ ἔθει πάντα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πράττειν, οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸδε ἢ τὸδε εἶναι ἕκαστον. *Sext. Math.* xi. 140: οὔτε ἀγαθὸν τί ἐστὶ φύσει οὔτε κακὸν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ταῦτα νόφ κέκριται κατὰ τὸν Τίμωνα.

⁶ In this sense the words of Ænesidemus, in *Diog.* ix. 106, must be understood: οὐδὲν φησιν ὀρίζειν τὸν Πύρρωνα δογματικῶς διὰ τὴν ἀντιλογίαν.

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ever, neither the senses nor reason alone can furnish trustworthy testimony, no more can the two combined, and thus the third way is barred, by which we might possibly have advanced to knowledge.¹ How many more of the arguments quoted by the later Sceptics belong to Pyrrho it is impossible to say. The short duration and narrow extension of Pyrrho's School renders it probable, that with him Scepticism was not far advanced. The same result appears to follow from its small hold in the Academy. The ten *τρόποι* or aspects under which sceptical objections were summarised, cannot with certainty be attributed to any one before Ænesidemus.² Portions of the arguments used at a later day may be borrowed from Pyrrho and his pupils,³ but it is impossible to discriminate these portions with certainty.

(2) *With-
holding of
judgment.*

Thus, if knowledge of things proves to be a failure, there only remains as possible an attitude of pure

¹ *Diog.* ix. 114, on Timon: συνεχές τε ἐπιλέγειν εἰῶθει πρὸς τοὺς τὰς αἰσθήσεις μετ' ἐπιμαρτυροῦντος τοῦ νοῦ ἐγκρίνοντας· συνῆλθεν Ἀτταγᾶς τε καὶ Νουμήνιος.

² *Diog.* ix. 79 refers these *τρόποι* to Pyrrho, without any good reason however. *Sext.* *Pyrrh.* i. 36 generally attributes them to the ancient Sceptics, under whom, according to *Math.* vii. 345, he understood Ænesidemus and his followers. Aristocles, l. c. 18, 11, refers them to Ænesidemus, and they may easily have been referred to Pyrrho by mistake, since Ænesidemus himself (*Diog.* ix. 106)

and subsequent writers (Favorin. in *Gill.* xi. 5, 5; *Philostr.* *Vit.* *Soph.* i. 491) call every kind of sceptical statement *λόγοι* or *τρόποι* Πυρρῶνιοι.

³ *Sext.* *Math.* vi. 66; x. 197 quotes an argument of Timon against the reality of time, and further states (*Math.* iv. 2) that Timon in his conflict with the philosophers of nature, maintained that no assertion should be made without proof: in other words, he denied dogmatism, every proof supposing something established, i.e. another proof, and so on for ever.

Scepticism; and therein is contained the answer to the second question. We know nothing whatever of the real nature of things, and hence can neither believe nor assert anything as to their nature. We cannot say of anything that it *is* or *is not*; but we must abstain from every opinion, allowing that of all which appears to us to be true, the opposite may with equal justice be true.¹ Accordingly, all our statements (as the Cyrenaics taught) only express individual opinions, and not absolute realities. We cannot deny that things *appear* to be of this or the other kind; but we can never say that they *are* so.² Even the assertion that things are of this or the other kind, is not an assertion, but a confession by the individual of his state of mind.³ Hence, too, the universal maxim of being undecided cannot be taken as an established principle, but only as an avowal of what is probable.⁴ It must, however, remain a

¹ Arist. l. c. 18, 3: διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ μὴδὲ πιστεύειν αὐταῖς δεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀδοξάστους καὶ ἀκλινεῖς καὶ ἀκραδάντους εἶναι περὶ ἐνὸς ἐκάστου λέγοντας ὅτι οὐ μᾶλλον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ καὶ ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ οὔτε ἔστιν οὔτ' οὐκ ἔστιν. *Diog.* ix. 61. *Ibid.* 76: οὐ μᾶλλον means, according to Timon, τὸ μὴδὲν δρίζειν ἀλλὰ ἀπροσθετεῖν.

² Ænesidem. in *Diog.* ix. 106: οὐδὲν δρίζειν τὸν Πύρρωνα δογματικῶς διὰ τὴν ἀντιλογίαν, τοῖς δὲ φαινόμεναι ἀκολουθεῖν. Timon, *Ibid.* 105.

³ *Diog.* ix. 103: περὶ μὲν ὧν ὡς ἄνθρωποι πάσχομεν ὁμολογοῦμεν . . . περὶ δὲ ὧν οἱ δογματικοὶ διαβεβαιοῦνται τῷ λόγῳ φάμενοι κατελήφθαι ἐπιχομεν περὶ τούτων ὡς

ἀδῆλων· μόνᾳ δὲ τὰ πάθη γινώσκομεν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι ὁρῶμεν ὁμολογοῦμεν καὶ τὸ ὅτι τόδε νοοῦμεν γινώσκομεν, πῶς δ' ὁρῶμεν ἢ πῶς νοοῦμεν ἀγνοοῦμεν· καὶ ὅτι τόδε λευκὸν φαίνεται διηγηματικῶς λέγομεν οὐ διαβεβαιούμενοι εἰ καὶ ὕντως ἐστὶ . . . καὶ γὰρ τὸ φαινόμενον τιθέμεθα οἷχ ὡς καὶ τοιοῦτον ὂν· καὶ ὅτι πῦρ καίει αἰσθανόμεθα· εἰ δὲ φύσιν ἔχει καυστικὴν, ἐπέχομεν.

⁴ *Diog.* l. c.: περὶ δὲ τῆς Οὐδὲν δρίζω φωνῆς καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων λέγομεν ὡς οὐ δογμάτων· οὐ γὰρ εἰσιν ὅμοια τῷ λέγειν ὅτι σφαιροειδὴς ἔστιν ὁ κόσμος· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἔδηλον, αἱ δὲ ἐξ ὁμολογήσεως εἰσίν. ἐν ᾧ οὖν λέγομεν μὴδὲν δρίζειν οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο δριζόμεθα. *Diog.*

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matter of doubt how far the captious terms of expression by which the Sceptics thought to parry the attacks of their opponents, come from Pyrrho's School. The greater part, it is clear, came into use in the struggle with the Dogmatists, which is not older than the Stoical theory of knowledge as taught by Chrysippus, and the criticism of Carneades to which it gave rise. In this despairing of anything like certain conviction consists ἀφασία, ἀκαταληψία or ἐποχή, the withholding of judgment or state of indecision which Pyrrho and Timon regard as the only true attitude in speculation,¹ and from which the whole School derived its distinctive name.²

(3) *Mental
impertur-
bability.*

From this state of indecision, Timon, in reply to the third question, argues that mental imperturbability or ἀταραξία proceeds, which can alone conduct to true happiness.³ Men are disturbed by opinions and prejudices which mislead them into efforts of passion. Only the Sceptic who has suspended all judgment is in a condition to regard things with absolute calmness, unruffled by passion or desire.⁴

states even this view in its later form, probably following *Sext.* Pyrrh. i. 197.

¹ *Diog.* ix. 61 and 107; *Arist.* l. c. The expressions ἀφασία, ἀκαταληψία, ἐποχή, invariably mean the same thing. Later writers use instead of them, ἀβρεψία, ἀγνωσία τῆς ἀληθείας, κ.τ.λ.

² Πυρρώνειοι, σκεπτικοί, ἀπορητικοί, ἰφεκτικοί, ζητητικοί. *Conf.* *Diog.* 69.

³ *Aristocl.* l. c. 2: τοῖς μέντοι διακειμένοις οὕτω περιέσεσθαι Τίμων φησὶ πρώτων μὲν ἀφασίαν

ἔπειτα δ' ἀταραξίαν. *Diog.* 107: τέλος δὲ οἱ σκεπτικοὶ φασὶ τὴν ἐποχὴν, ἥ σκιᾶς τρόπον ἐπακολουθεῖ ἡ ἀταραξία, ὥς φασιν οἱ τε περὶ τὸν Τίμωνα καὶ Αἰνεσίδημον. *Conf.* *Diog.* 108; *Cic.* *Acad.* ii. 42, 130.

⁴ Timon, in *Aristocl.* l. c. 18, 14, speaking of Pyrrho:

ἀλλ' οἷον τὸν ἄτυφον ἐγὼ ἶδον ἡδ' ἀδάμαστον
πᾶσιν, ὅσοις δάμνανται ὁμῶς ἄφα-
τοὶ τε φατοὶ τε
λαῶν ἔθνεα κοῦφα, βαρυνόμεν' ἔνθα
καὶ ἔνθα
ἐκ παθέων δόξης τε καὶ εἰκαίης νο-
μοθήκης.

He knows that it is a fond delusion to suppose that one state is preferable to another.¹ In reality only tone of mind or virtue possesses value.² Thus, by withdrawing within himself, man reaches happiness, which is the goal of all philosophy. Absolute inactivity being, however, impossible, the Sceptic will act on probabilities and hence follow custom;³ but at the same time he will be conscious that this conduct does not rest on a basis of firm conviction. To this province of uncertain opinion all positive judgments respecting good and evil belong. Only in this conditional form will Timon allow of goodness and divine goodness as the standards of conduct.⁴ The real object of Scepticism is therefore a purely negative one—indifference. Nor can it be proved⁵

Id. in *Sext. Math.* xi. 1: The Sceptic lives

ῥῆστα μεθ' ἡσυχίης
αἰεὶ ἀφροντίστως καὶ ἀκινήτως κατὰ
ταῦτά
μὴ προσέχων δειλοῖς ἡδυλόγου
σοφίης.

Id. in *Diog.* 65.

¹ *Cic.* *Fin.* ii. 13, 43: Quæ quod Aristoni et Pyrrhoni omnino visa sunt pro nihilo, ut inter optime valere et gravissime ægrota-re nihil prorsus dicerent inter-esse. iii. 3, 11: Cum Pyrrhone et Aristone qui omnia exæquent. *Acad.* ii. 42, 130: Pyrrho autem ea ne sentire quidem sapientem, quæ ἀπάθεια nominatur. *Epictet.* *Fragm.* 93: Πύρρων ἔλεγεν μηδὲν διαφέρειν ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι.

² *Cic.* *Fin.* iv. 16, 43: Pyrrho . . . qui virtute constituta nihil omnino quod appetendum sit relinquat. The same *Ibid.* ii. 13,

43; iii. 4, 12.

³ *Diog.* 105: ὁ Τίμων ἐν τῷ Πύθωνί φησι μὴ ἐκβεβηκέναι [τὸν Πύρρωνα] τὴν συνήθειαν. καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐνδαλμοῖς οὕτω λέγει· ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον παντὶ σθένει οὐπερ ἂν ἔλθῃ. *Ibid.* 106, of Pyrrho: τοῖς δὲ φαινομένοις ἀκολουθεῖν.

⁴ *Sext. Math.* xi. 20: κατὰ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον τούτων ἕκαστον ἔχο-μεν ἕθος ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ ἀδιάφορον προσαγορεύειν· καθάπερ καὶ ὁ Τίμων ἐν τοῖς ἐνδαλμοῖς εἰοικε δηλοῦν ὅταν φῇ

ἡ γὰρ ἐγὼν ἐρέω ὥς μοι καταφαί-νεται εἶναι

μῦθον ἀληθείης ὁρθὸν ἔχων κανό-να.

ὥς ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ τε φύσις καὶ τὰ γὰ θεῷ αἰεὶ,

ἐξ ὧν ισότατος γίνεται ἀνδρὶ βίος.

⁵ According to an anecdote preserved by Antigonus of Ca-

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that Pyrrho's School so far accommodated itself to life, as to make moderation rather than indifference the regulating principle for unavoidable actions and desires. On this point the School seems to have been extremely vague.

rystus (Aristocl. in c. 18, 19; *Diog.* ix. 66), Pyrrho apologised altogether. is difficult to lay aside humanity altogether. for being agitated by saying: It

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE NEW ACADEMY.

PLATO'S School was the first to lay down a solid groundwork for Scepticism, and to pursue Scepticism as a system. It is already known that under Xenocrates this School gradually deserted speculative enquiries, and limited itself to Ethics; and this new tendency was consistently adhered to, when shortly after the beginning of the third century B.C. the School took a fresh lease of life. Instead, however, of simply ignoring theoretical knowledge, as had been its previous practice, the School assumed towards knowledge the attitude of opposition, hoping to arrive at security and happiness in life by being persuaded of the impossibility of knowledge. How far this result was due to the example set by Pyrrho it is impossible to establish authoritatively. But it is not in itself probable that the learned originator of this line of thought in the Academy should have ignored the views of a philosopher whose work had been carried on at Elis in his own lifetime, and whose most distinguished pupil, a personal acquaintance of his own, was then working at Athens as a

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A. *Arce-
si-
laus.*
(1) *Denial
of know-
ledge.*

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prolific writer.¹ The whole tone and character, moreover, of the Scepticism of the New Academy betrays everywhere the presence of Stoic influences; by the confidence of its assertions it provokes contradiction and doubt, without ever necessarily suggesting relations otherwise improbable between Arcesilaus and Zeno.²

This connection of the New Academy with Stoicism can be proved in the case of its first founder,³ Arcesilaus.⁴ The doubts of this philosopher are directed

¹ Conf. *Diog.* ix. 114. Tenne-
mann's view (*Gesch. d. Phil.* iv.
190), that Arcesilaus arrived at
his conclusions independently of
Pyrrho, does not appear to be
tenable.

² Numen. in *Eus. Pr. Ev.* xiv.
5, 10; 6, 5, says that Zeno and
Arcesilaus were fellow-pupils
under Polemo, and that their
rivalry whilst at school was the
origin of the later quarrels be-
tween the Stoa and the Academy.
Conf. *Cic. Acad.* i. 9, 35, ii. 24,
76, who appeals to Antiochus.
There can be no doubt that both
Zeno and Arcesilaus were pupils
of Polemo, but it is hardly pos-
sible that they can have been
under him at the same time. If
they were, how would their re-
lations affect their Schools?

³ *Cic. De Orat.* ii. 18, 68;
Diog. iv. 28; *Eus. Pr. Ev.* xiv. 4,
16; *Sext. Pyrrh.* i. 220. *Clemens*,
Strom. i. 301, c, calls Arcesilaus
the founder of the New (second
or middle) Academy.

⁴ Arcesilaus (see *Geffers*, *De*
Arcesila. Gött. 1842, *Gymn.*
Prog.) was born at Pitane, in
Æolia (*Strabo*, xiii. 1, 67; *Diog.*

iv. 28). His birth year is not
stated; but as Lacydes (*Diog.* iv.
61) was his successor in 240 B.C.,
and he was then 75 years of age,
it must have been about 315 B.C.
Having enjoyed the instruction
of the mathematician Autolycus
in his native town, he repaired to
Athens, where he was first a
pupil of Theophrastus, but was
gained for the Academy by
Crantor (*Diog.* 29; Numen. in
Eus. xiv. 6, 2). With Crantor
he lived on the most intimate
terms; but as Polemo was the
president of the Academy, he is
usually called a pupil of Polemo
(*Cic. De Orat.* iii. 18, 67; *Fin.*
v. 31, 94; *Strabo*). On the death
of Polemo, he was probably a
pupil of Crates; but it is not
asserted by *Diog.* 33, or Numen.
in *Eus.* i. c. xiv. 5, 10, that he was
a pupil of Pyrrho, Menedemus,
or Diodorus. If the latter seems
to imply it, it would seem to be
a mistake for his having used
their teaching. Fortified with
extraordinary acuteness, pene-
trating wit, and ready speech
(*Diog.* 30; 34; 37; *Cic. Acad.* ii.
6, 18; Numen. in *Eus.* xiv. 6, 2;

not only to knowledge derived from the senses, but to rational knowledge as well.¹ The principal object of his attack was, however, the Stoic theory of irresistible impressions;² and in overthrowing that theory Arcesilaus, it would seem, believed he had dispelled every possibility of knowledge; for the Stoic appeal to the senses he regarded as the only possible form of a theory of knowledge, and the theories of Plato and Aristotle he ignored altogether. Indeed, no peculiar arguments against knowledge are referred to him. The old sceptical arguments of Plato and Socrates, of Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Democritus, Heraclitus and Parmenides are alone repeated,³

Plut. De Sanit. 7; *Qu. Conv.* vii. 5; 3, 7; ii. 1; 10, 4; *Stob.* Floril. iv. 193, 28), learned, particularly in mathematics (*Diog.* 32), and well acquainted with native poets (*Diog.* 30), he appears to have early distinguished himself. From *Plut.* Adv. Col. 26, it appears that in Epicurus' lifetime, consequently before 270 B.C., he had propounded his sceptical views with great success. Apollodorus, however, appears to have placed his career (300–296 B.C.) too early (*Diog.* 45). On the death of Crates, the conduct of the School devolved upon Arcesilaus (*Diog.* 32), who attained no small celebrity (*Strabo*, i. 2, 2; *Diog.* 37; *Numen.* in *Eus.* xiv. 6, 14). He held aloof from public matters, and lived in retirement (*Diog.* 39), esteemed even by opponents for his pure, gentle, and genial character (*Diog.* 37; vii. 171; ix. 115; *Cic.* Fin. v. 31, 94; *Plut.* De Adulat. 22; *Coh. Ira*,

13; *Ælian*, V. H. xiv. 96). On his relations to Cleanthes, conf. *Diog.* vii. 171; *Plut.* De Adulat. 11. He left no writings (*Diog.* 32; *Plut.* Alex. Virt. 4).

¹ *Cic.* De Orat. iii. 18, 67: Arcesilas primum . . . ex variis Platonis libris sermonibusque Socraticis hoc maxime arripuit, nihil esse certi quod aut sensibus aut animo percipi possit: quem ferunt . . . aspernatum esse omne animi sensusque judicium, primumque instituisse . . . non quid ipse sentiret ostendere, sed contra id, quod quisque se sentire dixisset, disputare. This is, in fact, the calumniandi licentia with which *Augustin.* c. Acad. iii. 17, 39, charges him.

² Conf. *Numen.* in *Eus.* Pr. Ev. xiv. 6, 12.

³ *Plut.* Adv. Col. 26, 2; *Cic.* Acad. i. 12, 44. Ritter's view of the latter passage (iii. 478) appears to be entirely without foundation.

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all of them being directed against the knowledge of the senses, and not against the knowledge of the reason. Nevertheless, Arcesilaus aimed at overthrowing the latter along with the former.¹ For the opinion that he only used doubt as a preparation to or means for concealing genuine Platonism,² is opposed to all credible authorities. It appears, however, all the more clearly, that to him it seemed unnecessary to refute the theory of a knowledge existing independently of the senses.

The Stoic belief in irresistible impressions Arcesilaus met by asserting that an intermediate something between knowledge and opinion, a kind of conviction common to the wise and the unwise, such as the Stoic *κατάληψις*, is inconceivable; the wise man's conviction being always knowledge, and that of the fool only opinion.³ Going then farther into the idea of *φαντασία καταληπτική*, he endeavoured to show that it contained an internal contradiction; for to conceive (*κατάληψις*) is to approve (*συγκατάθεσις*), and approval never applies to sensation, but only to thoughts and general ideas. Lastly, if the Stoic regarded force of conviction as the distinctive mark of a true or irresistible conception, and as belonging to it in distinction from every other, the Sceptic rejoined that such conceptions do not exist, and that no true conception is of such a nature, but

¹ *Cic.* De Orat. iii. 18.

² *Sext.* Pyrrh. i. 234; *Diocles* of Cnidus, in Numen. in *Eus.* Pr. Ev. xiv. 6, 5; *Augustin.* c. Acad.

iii. 17, 38. Geffers regards Arcesilaus as a true follower of the older Academy.

³ *Sext.* Math. vii. 153.

that a false one may be equally irresistible.¹ If no certainty of sensation is possible, no knowledge is possible.² And since the wise man—for on this point Arcesilaus agrees with the Stoics—must only consider knowledge, and not opinion, nothing remains for him but to abstain from all and every statement, and to despair of any certain conviction.³ It is therefore impossible to know anything, nor can we even know for certain that we do not know anything.⁴ It was quite in accordance with Arcesilaus' theory for him to lay down no definite view in his lectures, but only to refute the views of others.⁵ Even his depreciatory remarks on dialectic,⁶ sup-

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¹ *Cic. Acad. ii. 24, 27.* Zeno asserted: An irresistible conception is such a conception of a real object as could not possibly come from an unreal one. Arcesilaus endeavoured to prove nullum tale visum esse a vero, ut non ejusdem modi etiam a falso posset esse. The same view in *Sext. l. c.* To these may be added discussions on deceptions of the senses in *Sext. vii. 408.* *Cic. N. D. i. 25, 70:* Urgebat Arcesilas Zenonem, cum ipse falsa omnia diceret, quæ sensibus viderentur, Zenonem autem nonnulla visa esse falsa, non omnia. To these attacks on Zeno *Plut. De An. 1*, probably refers: ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν αἴτιον τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὡς Ἀρκεσίλαος. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνη τῆς ἐπιστήμης αἴτια φανείται. All that is here attributed to Arcesilaus is the assertion that ἐπιστητὸν is the cause of ἐπιστήμη and of a φαντασία καταληπτική. The connection in

which these statements were made by Arcesilaus was probably this: If there is such a thing as knowledge, there must be objects which produced it. But these objects do not exist.

² *Sext. 155:* μὴ οὐσης δὲ καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας οὐδὲ κατάληψις γενήσεται· ἦν γὰρ καταληπτικὴ φαντασίᾳ συγκατάθεσις. μὴ οὐσης δὲ καταλήψεως πάντα ἔσται ἀκατάληπτα.

³ *Sext. l. c.; Cic. Acad. i. 12, 45; ii. 20, 66; Plut. Adv. Col. 24, 2; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 4, 16; 6, 4.* By *Sext. Pyrrh. i. 233*, it is thus expressed: Arcesilaus regards ἐποχή as being a good in every case, συγκατάθεσις as an evil.

⁴ *Cic. Acad. i. 12, 45.*

⁵ *Cic. Fin. ii. 1, 2; v. 4, 11; De Orat. iii. 18, 67; Diog. iv. 28; Plut. C. Not. 37, 7.*

⁶ *Stob. Floril. 82, 4:* Ἀρκεσίλαος ὁ φιλόσοφος ἔφη τοὺς διαλεκτικούς εἰκέναι τοῖς ψηφοπαίκτης, οἵτινες χαριέντως παραλογίζονται;

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posing them to be genuine,¹ are not at variance with this conduct. He might consider the arguments of the Stoics and the sophisms of the Megarians as useless, whilst, at the same time, he was convinced that no real knowledge could be attained by any other means. He might even have inferred from their sterility, that thought leads to truth quite as little as the senses. There is no real difference between the result at which he arrived and that of Pyrrho.²

(2) *Probability.*

If opponents assert that by denying knowledge all possibility of action is denied,³ Arcesilaus declined to accede to this statement. No firm conviction was, as he maintained, necessary, for a decision of the will or an action to be possible. A notion influences the will immediately, leaving the question as to its truth entirely out of sight.⁴ In order to act sensibly

and, *Ibid.* 10: διαλεκτικὴν δὲ φεῦγε, συγκυκλᾷ τᾶν κάτω.

¹ The authority is a very uncertain one, particularly as Arcesilaus left nothing in writing, and the remarks would seem to apply better to the Chian Aristo. Still, if Chrysippus condemned the dialectic of the Sceptics, Arcesilaus may very well have condemned that of the Stoics and Megarians. Even *Cic. Acad.* ii. 28, 91, probably following Carneades, objects to dialectic, because it furnishes no knowledge.

² This fact is not only recognised by Numen. in *Eus. Pr. Ev.* xiv. 6, 4, but by *Sext. Pyrrh.* i. 232. Nor does the distinction apply to Arcesilaus which the later Sceptics regarded as dis-

tinguishing themselves from the Academicians, viz. that they asserted the principle of doubt tentatively, whereas the Academicians had asserted it absolutely. Even Sextus asserts it with diffidence. On account of this connection with Pyrrho, the Stoic Aristo said of Arcesilaus: πρόσθε Πλάτων, ὅπισθεν Πύρρων, μέσσους Διόδωρος. *Sext.* l. c.; Numen. in *Eus. Pr. Ev.* xiv. 5, 11; *Diog.* iv. 33.

³ It has been already seen that this was the key of the position which the Stoics and Epicureans held against the Sceptics.

⁴ *Plut. Adv. Col.* 26, 3, protecting Arcesilaus against the attacks of Kolotes, says: The opponents of Scepticism cannot

we need no knowledge. For this purpose probability is quite enough; and anyone can follow probability even though he is conscious of the uncertainty of all knowledge. Thus probability is the highest standard for practical life.¹ We are but scantily informed how Arcesilaus applied this principle to the sphere of morals, but a few of his utterances are on record,² all bearing witness to the beautiful spirit of moderation in the moral theory of the Academy—a spirit which was otherwise exemplified in his own life.

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show that *ἐποχή* leads to inactivity, for πάντα πειρώσι καὶ στρέφουσιν αὐτοῖς οὐχ ὑπήκουσεν ἡ ὁρμὴ γενέσθαι συγκατάθεσις οὐδὲ τῆς ῥοπῆς ἀρχὴν ἐδέξατο τὴν αἰσθησιν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ἀγωγὸς ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐφάνη μὴ δεομένη τοῦ προστίθεσθαι. Ideas rise and influence the will without *συγκατάθεσις*. Since this statement was controverted by Chrysippus (*Plut.* Sto. Rep. 47, 12), there can be no doubt that it was known before the time of Arcesilaus.

¹ *Sext.* Math. vii. 158: ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἔδει καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ βίου διεξαγωγῆς ζητεῖν ἢ τις οὐ χωρὶς κριτηρίου πέφυκεν ἀποδέδοσθαι, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τούτεστι τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος, ἡρτημένην ἔχει τὴν πίστιν, φησὶν δ' Ἀρκεσίλαος, ὅτι ὁ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχων καλονοεῖ τὰς αἰρέσεις καὶ φυγὰς καὶ κοινῶς τὰς πράξεις τῷ εὐλόγῳ, κατὰ τοῦτό τε προερχόμενος τὸ κριτήριον κατορθώσει· τὴν μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν περιγίνεσθαι διὰ τῆς φρονήσεως, τὴν δὲ φρόνησιν κινεῖσθαι ἐν τοῖς κατορθώμασι, τὸ δὲ κατορθῶμα εἶναι ὅπερ πραχθὲν εὐλογον ἔχει τὴν ἀπο-

λογία. ὁ προσέχων οὖν τῷ εὐλόγῳ κατορθώσει καὶ εὐδαιμονήσει. It is a mistake to suppose, with Numen. in *Eus. Pr. Ev.* xiv. 6, 4, that Arcesilaus denied probabilities.

² In *Plut.* Tran. An. 9, he gives the advice to devote attention to oneself and one's own life in preference to works of art and other external things. In *Stob.* Floril. 95, 17, he says: Poverty is burdensome, but educates for virtue. *Ibid.* 43, 91: Where there are most laws, there are most transgressions of law. *Plut.* Cons. ad Apoll. 15, has an expression about the folly of fearing death. *Id.* De Saint. 7, Qu. Conv. vii. 5, 3, 7, records a somewhat severe judgment on adulterers and prodigals. Quite unique is the statement in *Tertull.* Ad Nation. ii. 2: Arcesilaus held that there were three kinds of Gods: the Olympian, the stars, and the Titans. It implies that he criticised the belief in the Gods; and it also appears from *Plut.* C. Not. 37, 7, that his criticism extended to natural science.

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B. Carneades.

Comparing with the theory of Arcesilaus, that which was propounded by Carneades a century later, the same view is found to be underlying; but the whole system is more fully developed, and has received a firmer groundwork. Of the immediate followers of Arcesilaus¹ it can only be stated that they adhered to their teacher. It may be presumed that they did little in the way of expanding it, since the ancients are silent as to their labours, only Carneades² being mentioned as the continuer of the

¹ *Geffers*, De Arcesilæ Successoribus: Gött. 1845. Arcesilaus was succeeded by *Lacydes* of Cyrene, who died 240 B.C., after presiding over the School for 26 years, having entrusted it to the care of the Phocæans Telecles and Euandros (*Diog.* iv. 59–61). The descriptions of him in *Diog.* l. c., Numen. in *Eus.* Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, *Plut.* De Adul. 22, *Ælian*, V. H. ii. 41, *Athen.* x. 438, a, xiii. 606, c, *Plin.* H. N. x. 22, 51, referring particularly to individual peculiarities which he appears to have had, must be received with caution. *Diog.* calls him ἀνὴρ σεμνότητος καὶ οὐκ ὀλίγους ἐσχηκὼς ζηλωτὰς· φιλόπονος τε ἐκ νέου καὶ πέρης μὲν, εὐχαρις δ' ἄλλως καὶ εὐόμιλος. In doctrine, he deviated little from Arcesilaus, and, having first committed to writing the teaching of the New Academy, is said to have been its founder (*Diog.* 59). According to *Diog.* vii. 183, he appears to have taught in the Academy during Arcesilaus' lifetime. Panaretus (*Athen.* xii. 552, d; *Æl.* V. H. x. 6), Demophanes, and Ecdemus or Ecdelus (*Plutarch.*

Philopon. 1 Arab. 5, 7) are also called pupils of Arcesilaus. The most distinguished pupil of Lacydes, according to *Eus.* xiv. 7, 12, was Aristippus of Cyrene, also mentioned by *Diog.* ii. 83. Another, Paulus, is also mentioned by Timotheus, in *Clemens*, Strom. 496, D. His successors were Telecles and Euandros. Euander, it would appear, according to *Cic.* Acad. ii. 6, 16, *Diog.* 60, *Eus.* l. c., having survived his colleague, was followed by Hegesinus (*Diog.* 60; *Cic.* l. c.) or Hege-silaus (*Clemens*, Strom. p. 301, c), the immediate predecessor of Carneades.

² Carneades, the son of Epicomus or Philocomus, was born at Cyrene (*Diog.* iv. 62; *Strabo*, xvii. 3, 22; *Cic.* Tusc. iv. 3, 5), and died, according to Apollodorus (*Diog.* 65), 129 B.C.; in his 85th year. *Cic.* Acad. ii. 6, 16. *Valer. Max.* viii. 7, 5, with less probability, extends his age to 90. His birth must therefore have been in 213 B.C. Little is known of his life. He was a disciple and follower of Hegesinus, but at the same time re-

Academic Scepticism. The importance attaching to Carneades is therefore all the greater, and he is in consequence called the founder of the third or New Academy.¹ Nor is this done without reason, witness the admiration which his talents called forth among cotemporaries and posterity,² and the flourishing condition in which he left his School.³ Himself a pupil of Chrysippus, and resembling him in tone

ceived instruction in dialectic (*Cic. Acad. ii. 30, 98*) from the Stoic Diogenes, and studied with indefatigable zeal (*Diog. 62*) philosophic literature, and in particular the writings of Chrysippus (*Diog. 62; Plut. Sto. Rep. 10, 44; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 13*). In 156 B.C. he took part in the well-known association of philosophers, and produced the greatest impression on his Roman hearers by the force of his language and the boldness with which he attacked the current principles of morals. Shortly before his death he became blind (*Diog. 66*). He left no writings, the preservation of his doctrines being the work of his pupils, in particular of Clitomachus (*Diog. 66, 67; Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 98; 32, 102*). Respecting his character, we may gather from a few expressions that, whilst vigorous in disputation (*Diog. 63; Gell. N. A. vi. 14, 10*), he was not wanting in repose (*Diog. 66*). We can well believe that he was a just man, notwithstanding his speech against justice (*Quintil. xii. 1, 35*).

¹ *Sext. Pyrrh. i. 220; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 12; Lucian.; Macrobi. 20.*

² His School held him in such

esteem, that it not only considered him, together with Plato, to be a special favourite of Apollo, but that tradition said an eclipse of the moon commemorated his death; *συμπάθειαν, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, αἰνιττομένου τοῦ μεθ' ἡλίον καλλίστου τῶν ἀστρῶν (Diog. 64). Strabo, xvii. 3, 22, says of him: οὗτος δὲ τῶν ἐξ Ἀκαδημίας ἄριστος φιλοσόφων ὁμολογεῖται*; and there was only one opinion among the ancients regarding the force of his logic, and the power and attraction of his eloquence. *Plut. Garrul. 21; Diog. 63. Conf. Diog. 62; Cic. Fin. iii. 12, 41; De Orat. ii. 38, 161; iii. 18, 68; Gell. N. A. vi. 14, 10; Numen. in Eusebius, Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 2 and 5; Lactant. Inst. v. 14; Plut. Cato Maj. 22. The latter, speaking of his success at Rome, says: μάλιστα δ' ἡ Καρνεάδου χάρις, ἥς δύναμις τε πλείστη καὶ δόξα τῆς δυνάμεως οὐκ ἀποδέουσα . . . ὡς πνεῦμα τὴν πόλιν ἠχῆς ἐνέπλησε. καὶ λόγος κατεῖχεν, ὡς ἀνὴρ Ἑλλήνων εἰς ἐκπληξιν ὑπερφύης, πάντα κηλῶν καὶ χειρούμενος, ἔρωτα δεινὸν ἐμβέβληκε τοῖς νέοις, ὑφ' οἷ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν καὶ διατριβῶν ἐκπεσόντες ἐνθουσιῶσι περὶ φιλοσοφίαν.*

³ *Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16.*

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of mind, Carneades expanded not only the negative side of the Sceptical theory in all directions with an acuteness worthy of the more ancient Sceptics; but he was also the first to investigate the positive side of Scepticism, the doctrine of probability, and to determine the degrees and conditions of probability. By his labours in both ways he carried the philosophy of Scepticism to its greatest scientific perfection.

(1) *Negative side of his teaching.*

As regards the negative side of these investigations, or the refutation of dogmatism, the attacks of Carneades were directed partly against the formal possibility of knowledge, and partly against the chief actual results of the knowledge of his day, in both of which polemics he had mainly to do with the Stoics.¹

(a) *Denial of possibility of formal knowledge.*

To prove the impossibility of knowledge he appeals sometimes to experience. There is no kind of conviction which does not sometimes deceive us; consequently there is none which guarantees its own truth.² Going then further into the nature of our notions, he argues, that since notions consist in the change produced on the soul by impressions from with-

¹ *Sext. Math. vii. 159: ταῦτα καὶ ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος. ὁ δὲ Καρνεάδης οὐ μόνον τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἀντιδιείδασσεν περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου.* In *Math. ix. 1*, Sextus charges the School of Carneades with unnecessary diffuseness in discussing the fundamental principles of every system. The Stoics were, however, the chief object of its attack.

Cic. Tusc. v. 29, 82; N. D. ii. 65, 162; Plut. Garrul. 23; Augustin. c. Acad. iii. 17, 39.

² *Sext. l. c.: καὶ δὴ πρῶτος μὲν αὐτῷ καὶ κοινὸς πρὸς πάντας ἔστι λόγος καθ' ὃν παρίσταται ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἀπλῶς ἀληθείας κριτήριον, οὐ λόγος οὐκ αἰσθησις οὐ φαντασία οὐκ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα συλλήβδην διαψεύδεται ἡμᾶς.*

out, they must, to be true, not only furnish information as to themselves, but also as to the objects causing them. Now, this is by no means always the case, many notions avowedly giving a false impression of things. Hence the note of truth cannot reside in an impression as such, but only in a true impression.¹ It is, however, impossible to distinguish with certainty a true impression from one that is false. For independently of dreams, visions, and the fancies of madmen, in short from all the unfounded chimeras which force themselves on our notice under the guise of truth,² it is still undeniable that many false notions resemble true ones most unmistakably. The transition, too, from truth to falsehood is so gradual, the interval between the two is occupied by intermediate links so innumerable, and gradations so slight, that they imperceptibly go over one into the other, and it becomes impossible to draw a boundary line between the two opposite spheres.³ Not content with proving this assertion in regard to the impressions of the senses, Carneades went on to

¹ *Sext.* l. c. 160-163.

² Conf. *Sext.* vii. 403; *Cic.* Acad. ii. 15, 47; 28, 89—Carneades being undoubtedly meant, although not mentioned by name.

³ According to *Cic.* Acad. ii. 13, 40; 26, 83, the Academic system of proof rests on the four following propositions: (1) that there are false notions; (2) that notions cannot be known, i.e. be recognised as true; (3) that of two indistinguishable notions, it is impossible to know the one

and not the other; (4) that there is no true notion by the side of which a false one cannot be placed not distinguishable from it. The second and third of these propositions not being denied at all, and the first one only being denied by Epicurus in regard to impressions on the senses, all importance attaches to the fourth proposition, on which *Sextus*, vii. 164 and 402, and *Numen.* in *Eus. Pr. Ev.* xiv. 8, 4, accordingly lay great stress.

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prove it with regard to general notions based on experience and intellectual conceptions.¹ He showed that it is impossible for us to distinguish objects so much alike as one egg is from another; that at a certain distance the painted surface seems raised, and a square tower seems round; that an oar in the water seems broken, and the neck-plumage of a pigeon assumes different colours in the sun; that objects on the shore seem to be moving as we sail by, and so forth;² in all of which cases the same strength of conviction belongs to the false as to the true impressions.³ He showed further that this applies equally to purely intellectual ideas; that many logical difficulties cannot be solved;⁴ that no absolute distinction can be drawn between much and little, in short between all differences in quantity; and that it is the most natural course in all such cases to follow Chrysippus, and to avoid the dangerous inferences which may be drawn by withholding judgment.⁵ Arguing from these facts Carneades concluded at first in regard to impressions of the senses, that there is no such thing as *φαντασία καταληπτική* in the Stoic sense of the term, in other

¹ *Cic. Acad. ii. 13, 42*: Dividunt enim in partes et eas quidem magnas: primum in sensus, deinde in ea, quæ ducuntur a sensibus et ab omni consuetudine, quam obscurari volunt, tunc perveniunt ad eam partem, ut ne ratione quidem et conjectura ulla res percipi possit. Hæc autem universa etiam concidunt minutius.

² *Sext. vii. 409; Cic. Acad. ii. 26, 84; 7, 19; 25, 79; Numen.*

in *Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 5.*

³ *Sext. 402 and 408.*

⁴ The fallacy called *ψευδόμενος* is carefully investigated by *Cic. Acad. ii. 30, 95*, as an instance in point.

⁵ *Sext. 416; Cic. l. c. 29, 92.* Since Chrysippus attacked the chain-argument, it may be supposed that this fallacy had been used by Arcesilaus against the Stoics.

words, that no perception contains in itself characteristics, by virtue of which its truth may be inferred with certainty.¹ This fact being granted, the possibility is in his opinion precluded of there residing in the understanding a standard for the distinction of truth from falsehood. The understanding—and this belief was shared by his opponents—must derive its material from the senses.² Logic tests the formal accuracy of combinations of thought, but gives no insight into their import.³ Direct proofs of the uncertainty of intellectual convictions are not therefore needed. The same result may also be attained in a more personal way, by raising the question, how individuals obtain their knowledge. He can only be said to know a thing who has formed an opinion respecting it. In the mean time, until he has decided in favour of some definite opinion, he has still no knowledge. And what dependence can be placed on the judgment of one who has no knowledge?⁴

In his formal enquiries into the possibility of knowledge, Carneades had chiefly to deal with the Stoics, with whom he indeed holds a common ground in his appeal to the senses. The Stoics were likewise his chief opponents in his polemic against the actual results attained by the philosophy of his day.

(b) *Attack on the scientific knowledge of the time.*
(a) *The physical views of the Stoics attacked.*

¹ *Sext.* vii. 164; *Augustin.* c. Acad. ii. 5, 11.

² *Sext.* 165.

³ *Cic.* Acad. ii. 28, 91, who here appears to be following Philo, and, subsequently, Carneades as well. Carneades also

gives utterance to a similar view of dialectic in *Stob.* Floril. 93, 13.

⁴ *Cic.* Acad. ii. 36, 17. Carneades is not mentioned by name, but there can be no doubt that the reference is to some Academician.

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Natural science having throughout the period of the post-Aristotelian philosophy been subordinated to ethics, ethics likewise engaged more of the attention of Carneades than science.¹ In as far as he studied science, he appears to have been entirely opposed to the Stoic treatment of science, and to this circumstance we owe it, that more facts are on record regarding his investigations of science than regarding his moral views. The Stoic theories of God and of final causes² afforded ample scope for the exercise of his ingenuity, and from the ground he occupied he cannot have found it difficult to expose the weak points of that theory. In support of the belief in God the Stoics had appealed to the *consensus gentium*. How close at hand was the answer,³ that the universality of this belief was neither proved to exist, nor indeed did exist, but that in no case could anything be decided by the opinion of an ignorant multitude. The Stoics thought to find a proof of divine providence in the manner in which portents and prophecies come true. To expose the delusion no very expanded criticism of divination was necessary.⁴ But going beyond this, Carneades proceeded to call in question the real cardinal point of the Stoic system—the belief in God, the doctrine of the soul and reason of the universe, and of the presence of

¹ *Diog.* iv. 62.

² *Cic.* N. D. i. 2, 5, after a brief description of the Stoical views of God: *Contra quos Carneades ita multa disseruit, ut excitaret homines non socrudes ad*

veri investigandi cupiditatem.

³ *Cic.* N. D. i. 23, 62; iii. 4, 11. Carneades is not mentioned by name, but the reference to him is clear from the context.

⁴ *Conf. Cic.* N. D. iii. 5, 11.

design in its arrangements. How, he asks, is the presence of design manifested? Whence all the things which cause destruction and danger to men if it be true that God had made the world for the sake of man?¹ If reason is praised as the highest gift of God, is it not manifest that the majority of men only use it to make themselves worse than brutes? In bestowing such a gift God must have been taking but little care of this majority.² Even if we attribute to man direct blame for the misuse of reason, still, why has God bestowed on him a reason which can be so much abused?³ Moreover, the Stoics themselves say that a wise man can nowhere be found. They admit, too, that folly is the greatest misfortune. How, then, can they speak of the care bestowed by God on men, when on their own confession, the whole of mankind is sunk in the deepest misery?⁴ But allowing that the Gods could not bestow virtue and wisdom upon all, they must, at least, have taken care that it should go well with the good. Instead of this, however, the experience of a hundred cases shows that the upright man meets a miserable end; that crime succeeds; and that the criminal can enjoy the fruits of his misdeeds undisturbed. Where then is the agency of Pro-

¹ Academician in *Cic. Acad. ii.* 38, 120. That these arguments were used by Carneades is clear from *Plut. in Porphy.* *De Abst.* iii. 20. In answer to Chrysippus' assertion, that the final cause of a pig is to be killed, Carneades argues: A pig, therefore, by being killed, must attain the object for

which it was destined; it is always beneficial for a thing to attain its object—therefore it must be beneficial to a pig to be killed and eaten.

² *Cic. N. D.* iii. 25, 65–70.

³ *Ibid.* 31, 76.

⁴ *Ibid.* 32, 79.

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vidence? ¹ The facts being entirely different to what the Stoics suppose, what becomes of their inferences? Allowing the presence of design in the world, and granting that the world is as beautiful and good as possible, why is it inconceivable that nature should have formed the world according to natural laws without the intervention of God? Admitting, too, the connection of parts in the universe, why should not this connection be the result simply of natural forces, without a soul of the universe or a deity? ² Zeno argued that rational things are better than things irrational, that the world was the best possible, and must therefore be rational. But what, ³ replies the Academician, is to show that reason is best for the world, if it is the best for us? or that there must be a soul in nature for nature to produce a soul? What man is not able to produce, that, said Chrysippus, must have been produced by a higher being—by deity. But to this inference the same objection was raised by the Academicians as to the former one, the objection, viz., that it confounds two different points of view. There may, indeed, be a Being higher than man. But why must there needs be a rational man-like Being? Why not nature herself? ⁴ Nor did the argument seem to an Academician more conclusive, that as every house is destined to be inhabited, the world must be intended for the habitation of God. To this there was the obvious

¹ *Cic. N. D.* iii. 32, 80.

² *Cic. N. D.* iii. 8, 21; 10, 26;

³ *Cic. Acad.* ii. 38, 120; *N. D.* 11, 27.
iii. 11, 28.

⁴ *Ibid.* 10, 25.

answer: If the world were a house it might be so; but the very point at issue is whether it is a house constructed for a definite purpose, or whether it is simply an undesigned result of natural forces.

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Not content with attacking the conclusiveness of the arguments upon which the Stoics built their belief in a God, the scepticism of the Academy sought to demonstrate that the idea of God itself was an untenable one. The line of argument which Carneades struck out for this purpose is essentially the same as that used in modern times to deny the personality of God. The ordinary view of God regards Him as an infinite, but, at the same time, as an individual Being, possessing the qualities and living the life of an individual. But to this view Carneades objected, on the ground that the first assertion contradicts the second; and argues that it is impossible to apply the characteristics of personal existence to God without limiting His infinite nature. Whatever view we may take of God we must regard Him as a living Being; and every living being he maintained is composite, having parts and passions, and is hence destructible.¹ Moreover, every living being has a sense-nature. Far, however, from refusing such a nature to God, Carneades attributed to Him, in the interest of omniscience, far more organs of sense than the five we possess. Now, everything that receives impressions through the senses is capable of change; sensation, according to the definition of Chrysippus, being nothing more than a change of

(B) *Theological views of the Stoics attacked.*

¹ *Cic. N. D.* iii. 12, 29; 14, 34.

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soul; and every such being must be capable of pleasure and pain, without which, sensation is inconceivable. But whatever is capable of change is liable to destruction; whatever is susceptible to pain is also liable to deterioration, pain being caused by deterioration, and is also liable to destruction.¹ Together with perception, by means of the senses, the desire for what is in harmony with nature, and the dislike of what is opposed to nature, belong to the conditions of life. Whatever has the power of destroying any being is opposed to the nature of that being. Hence everything that lives is exposed to annihilation.² Advancing from the conception of a living being to that of a rational being, all virtues would have to be attributed to God as well as bliss. But how, asks Carneades, can any virtue be ascribed to God? Every virtue supposes an imperfection, in overcoming which it consists. He is only continent who might possibly be incontinent, and persevering who might be indulgent. To be brave, a man must be exposed to danger; to be magnanimous, he must be exposed to misfortunes. A being not feeling attraction for pleasure, nor aversion for pain and difficulties, dangers and misfortunes, would not be capable of virtue. Just as little could we predicate prudence of a being not susceptible to pleasure and pain; prudence consisting in knowing what is good, bad, and morally indifferent. But how can there be any such knowledge where there is no

¹ *Cic.* N. D. iii. 13, 32. *Sext.* Math. ix. 139-147.

² *Cic.*; *Ibid.*

susceptibility to pleasure or pain? Or how can a being be conceived of capable of feeling pleasure, but incapable of feeling pain, since pleasure can only be known by contrast with pain, and the possibility of increasing life always supposes the possibility of lessening it? Nor is it otherwise with the virtue of intelligence (*εὐβουλία*). He only is intelligent who always discovers what will subserve his purpose. If, however, he must discover it, it cannot have been previously known to him. Hence intelligence can only belong to a being who is ignorant about much. Such a being can never feel sure whether sooner or later something will not cause his ruin. He will therefore be exposed to fear. A being susceptible of pleasure and exposed to pain, a being who has to contend with dangers and difficulties, and who feels pain and fear, must inevitably, so thought Carneades, be finite and destructible. If therefore we cannot conceive of God except in this form, we cannot conceive of Him at all, our conception being self-destructive.¹

There is yet another reason, according to Carneades, why God cannot have any virtue; because virtue is above its possessor, and there can be nothing above God.² Moreover, what is the position of God

¹ *Sext.* Math. ix. 152-175, quotes the same argument for *σωφροσύνη*, and so does *Cic.* N. D. iii. 15, 38, both without mentioning Carneades by name, but clearly referring to him.

² *Sext.* ix. 176. The argument has a look of sophistry about it.

It alludes to the important question which engaged so much attention in the middle ages, viz. How the universal side is related to the individual in Deity, whether goodness and reason are for God a law independent of His will.

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in regard to speech? It was easy to show the absurdity of attributing speech to Him,¹ but to call Him speechless (*ἄφωνος*) seemed also to be opposed to the general belief.² Quite independently, however, of details, the inconceivableness of God appears, if the question is raised, whether God is limited or unlimited, material or immaterial. God cannot be unlimited; for what is unlimited is necessarily immoveable—because it has no place—and soulless—since by virtue of its boundlessness it cannot form a whole permeated by a soul; but God we ordinarily think of both as moving and as endowed with a soul. Nor can God be limited; for all that is limited is incomplete. Moreover, God cannot be incorporeal; for Carneades, like the Stoics, held that what is immaterial possesses neither soul, feeling, nor activity. Nor can he be corporeal, all composite bodies being liable to change and destruction, and simple bodies, fire, water, and the like, possessing neither life nor reason.³ If then all the forms under which we think of God are impossible, His existence cannot be asserted.

(γ) *Polytheistic views attacked.*

The criticism of polytheistic views was still easier play for the Sceptics, nor was their defence by the Stoics of much use. Among the arguments employed

¹ As Epicurus did. See p. 442.

² *Sext.* 178.

³ *Sext.* 148–151; 180. That Sextus refers to Carneades is clear from his agreement with *Cic.* N. D. 12, 29–31; 14, 34. Cicero introduces his remarks with the words: *Illa autem, quæ*

Carneades afferebat, quemadmodum dissolvitis? Sextus himself seems to refer all his arguments to Carneades when he continues, 182: *ἡρώτηνται δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Καρνεάδου καὶ σωριτικῶς τινες, κ.τ.λ.*

by Carneades certain chain-arguments stand out prominent, by which he endeavoured to show that the popular belief has no distinctive marks for the spheres of God and man. If Zeus is a God, he argues, his brother Poseidon must likewise be one, and if he is one, the rivers and streams must also be Gods. If Helios is a God, the appearance of Helios above the earth, or day, must be a God; and, consequently, month, year, morning, midday, evening, must all be Gods.¹ Polytheism is here refuted by establishing an essential similarity between what is accepted as God and what is avowedly not a God. It may readily be supposed that this was not the only proof of the acuteness of Carneades' reasoning.²

Divination, to which the Stoics attached especial importance,³ was also stoutly assailed. Carneades proved that no peculiar range of subjects belonged to it, but that in all cases admitting deliberation, experts pass a better judgment than diviners.⁴ To know accidental events beforehand is impossible; it is useless to know those that are necessary and unavoidable, nay, more, it would even be harmful.⁵ No causal connection can be conceived of between a prophecy and the ensuing realisation.⁶ If the

¹ *Sext.* 182-190. More fully in *Cic. N. D.* iii. 17, 43. Sextus also observes, 190: καὶ ἄλλους δὴ τοιοῦτους σωρείτας ἐρωτῶσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Καρνεάδην εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι θεούς.

² To him, or probably to his School, belongs the learned argument in *Cic. N. D.* iii. 21, 53, to 23, 60, proving the want of unity

in traditional myths by the multiplicity of Gods of the same name. The whole drift of this argument shows that it was borrowed from some Greek treatise.

³ See *Cic. Divin.* i. 4, 7; 7, 12.

⁴ *Ibid.* ii. 3, 9.

⁵ *Ibid.* v. 13; but Carneades is not mentioned by name.

⁶ *Ibid.* i. 13, 23; 49, 109.

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Stoics met him by pointing to fulfilled prophecies, he replied that the coincidence was accidental,¹ at the same time declaring many such stories to be false.²

(δ) *Moral
views of
the Stoics
attacked.*

Connected probably with these attacks on divination was the defence by Carneades of the freedom of the will. The Stoic fatalism he refuted by an appeal to the fact that our decision is free; and since the Stoics appealed in support of their view to the law of causality, he likewise attacked this law.³ His intention in so doing was, of course, not to assert anything positive respecting the nature of the human will, but only to attack the Stoic proposition, and if for his own part he adhered to the old Academic doctrine of a free will, he still only regarded that doctrine as probable.

Less information exists as to the arguments by which Carneades sought to assail the current principles of morality. Nevertheless, there is enough to show the course taken by his Scepticism within this sphere. In the second of the celebrated speeches which he delivered at Rome in the year 156 B.C.⁴ he denied that there is such a thing as natural right. All laws are only positive civil institutions devised by men for the sake of safety and advantage, and for the protection of the weak; and hence he is regarded as foolish who prefers justice to interest, which after all is the only unconditional end. In

¹ *Cic. Divin. ii. 21, 48.*

² *Ibid. ii. 11, 27.*

³ *Cic. De Fato, 11, 23; 14, 31.*

⁴ *Lact. Instit. v. 14; Cic. De Rep. iii. 4; Plut. Cato Maj. c. 22; Quintil. Instit. xii. 1, 35.*

support of these statements he appealed to the fact that laws change with circumstances, and are different in different countries. He pointed to the example of all great nations, such as the Romans, all of whom attained to greatness by unrighteous means. He impressed into his service the many casuistical questions raised by the Stoics, expressed the opinion that in all these cases it is better to commit the injury which brings advantage rather than to postpone advantage to right, and hence inferred that intelligence is a state of irreconcilable opposition to justice.¹

This free criticism of dogmatic views could not fail to bring Carneades to the same result as his predecessors. Knowledge is absolutely impossible. A man of sense who regards everything from all sides will invariably withhold his judgment, and so guard himself against error.² And to this conviction

¹ *Lactant.* l. c. 16; *Cic.* De Rep. iii. 8-12; 14; 17; Fin. ii. 18, 59; De Off. iii. 13; 23, 89. Probably Carneades was the cause of the study of casuistry among the later Stoics.

² *Cic.* Acad. ii. 34, 108; 31, 98. In Ad Att. xiii. 21, he compares *ἐποχή* to the drawing up of a charioteer, or to the defence of a pugilist. No doubt it is with reference to *ἐποχή* that *Alex. Aphr.* De An. 154, a, says: The Academicians consider *ἀπρωσία* the *πρώτον οἰκείον*, *πρὸς ταύτην γὰρ φασιν ἡμᾶς οἰκείως ἔχειν πρώτην, ὥστε μηδὲν προσπαίειν. ἀπρωσία* or *ἀπροπρωσία* is, according to the Stoic definition (*Diog.* vii. 46) =

ἐπιστήμη τοῦ πότε δεῖ συγκατατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ. It consists, therefore, in not giving a hasty assent to any proposition. According to the Sceptics, this is only possible, and you are only then safe from error, when you give assent to none whatever. *ἀπροσπρωσία* becomes then identical with *ἐποχή* or *ἄγνοια*, which *Max. Tyr.* Diss. 35, 7, speaks of as the ultimate end of Carneades. Hence Carneades, as Arcesilaus had done before him, spoke for and against every subject, without expressing a decided opinion. *Cic.* N. D. i. 5, 11; Acad. ii. 18, 60; *Divin.* ii. 72, 150; Rep. iii. 5, 8; *Tusc.* v. 4, 11; *Eus.* Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 12.

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(2) *Positive side of the teaching of Carneades.*
(a) *Theory of probabilities.*

he clings so resolutely that he altogether refuses to listen to the objection that, at least, the wise man must be convinced of the impossibility of any firm conviction.¹ The earlier Sceptics, far from attributing an equal value to all notions on this account, had not dispensed with reasons for actions and thoughts. This point was now taken up by Carneades, who in attempting to establish the conditions and degrees of probability, hoped to obtain a firm ground for the kind of conviction which was still permitted in his system. However much he taught we may despair of knowledge, some stimulus and groundwork for action is needed. Certain suppositions must therefore be assumed, from which the pursuit of happiness must start.² To these so much weight must be attached that they are allowed to decide our conduct, but we must be on our guard against considering them to be true, or to be something really known and conceived. Nor must we forget that the nature of true ideas is such that it does not differ from that of false ones, and that the

¹ *Cic. Acad. ii. 9, 28.*

² *Sext. Math. vii. 166: ἀπαρούμενος δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς [ὁ Καρνεάδης] τὴν κριτήριον πρὸς τὴν τοῦ βίου διεξαγωγὴν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας περὶ κτήσιν δυνάμιν ἀπαραγκάσεται καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν περὶ τούτου διατάττεσθαι, κ.τ.λ. Cic. Acad. ii. 31, 99 (of Clitomachus): Etenim contra naturam esset, si probabile nihil esset, et sequitur omnis vitæ . . . eversio. Ibid. 101; 32, 104: Nam cum placeat, eum qui de omnibus rebus con-*

tineat se de assentiendo, moveri tamen et agere aliquid, reliquit ejusmodi visa, quibus ad actionem excitemur, etc. Hence the assurance (Ibid. 103; Stob. Floril. iv. 234) that the Academicians do not wish to go into the question of perception. They accept it as a phenomenon of consciousness, and a basis of action, but they deny that it strictly furnishes knowledge. The senses are ὑγιεῖς, but not ἀκριβεῖς.

truth of ideas can never be known with certainty. Hence we shall withhold all assent, not allowing any ideas to be true, but only to have the appearance of truth (ἀληθῆ φαίνεσθαι) or probability (ἐμφασις, πιθανότης).¹ In every notion two relations need to be considered, its relation to the object represented which makes it either true or false, and its relation to the subject who has the notion, which makes it *seem* either true or false. The former relation is, for the reasons already quoted, quite beyond the compass of our judgment; the latter, the relation of a notion to ourselves, falls within the sphere of consciousness.² As long as a notion seemingly true is cloudy and indistinct, like objects contemplated from a distance, it makes no great impression on us. When, on the contrary, the appearance of truth is strong, it awakes in us a belief³ strong enough to determine us to action, although it does not come up to the impregnable certainty of knowledge.⁴

¹ *Sext. and Cic. l. c.*

² *Sext. l. c. 167-170.*

³ *Ibid. 171-173*; or, as it is expressed by Cicero: It is possible nihil percipere et tamen opinari. It is of no importance that Philo and Metrodorus said Carneades had proved this statement, whereas Clitomachus had stated, hoc magis ab eo disputatum quam probatum. *Acad. ii. 48, 148*; 21, 67, attributes the statement to Carneades, without any qualification, adding only: Ad-sensurum non percepto, i. e. opinaturum sapientem.

⁴ Conf. *Augustin. c. Acad. ii. 11, 26*: Id probabile vel veri-

simile Academici vocant, quod nos ad agendum sine adsensione potest invitare. Sine adsensione autem dico, ut id quod agimus non opinemur verum esse aut non id scire arbitremur, agamus tamen. To the same effect, *Euseb. Pr. Ev. xiv. 7, 12*: Carneades declared it impossible to withhold judgment on all points, and asserted πάντα μὲν εἶναι ἀκατάληπτα, οὐ πάντα δὲ ἄδηλα. Conf. *Cic. Acad. ii. 17, 54*, where the objection is raised to the New Academicians: Ne hoc quidem cernunt, omnia se reddere incerta, quod nolunt; ea dico incerta, quæ ἄδηλα Græci.

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Belief, however, like probability, is of several degrees. The lowest degree of probability is when a notion produces by itself an impression of truth, without being taken in connection with other notions. The next higher degree is when that impression is confirmed by the agreement of all notions which are related to it. The third and highest degree is when an investigation of all these notions results in producing the same corroboration for all. In the first case a notion is called probable (*πιθανή*); in the second probable and undisputed (*πιθανή καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος*); in the third probable, undisputed, and tested (*πιθανή καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος καὶ περιωδευμένη*).¹ Within each one of these three classes different gradations of probability are again possible.² The distinguishing marks, which must be considered in the investigation of probability, appear to have been investigated by Carneades in the spirit of the Aristotelian logic.³ In proportion to the greater or less practical importance of a question, or to the accuracy of investigation which the circumstances allow, we must adhere to one or the other degree of probability.⁴ Although no one of them is of such a nature as to exclude the possibility of error, this circumstance need not deprive us of certainty in respect to actions, provided we have once convinced ourselves that the absolute certainty of our practical premisses is not possible.⁵ Just as little shall we hesitate to

¹ *Sext.* l. c. 173; 175-182;
Pyrh. i. 227; *Cic. Acad.* ii. 11,
33; 31, 99; 32, 104.

² *Sext.* l. c. 173; 181.

³ *Ibid.* 176; 183.

⁴ *Ibid.* 184.

⁵ *Ibid.* 174; *Cic. Acad.* ii. 31,
99.

affirm or deny anything in that conditional way which is alone possible after what has been stated. Assent will be given to no notion in the sense of its being absolutely true, but to many notions in the sense that we consider them highly probable.¹

Among questions about which the greatest possible certainty is felt to be desirable, Carneades, true to his whole position, included principles of morals;² life and action being the principal things with which the theory of probability has to do.³ The fundamental question of Ethics, for instance, the question as to the highest Good, is said to have been discussed by him in detail.⁴ On this subject he distinguished six, or more strictly four, different views. If the primary object of desire can in general only consist of those things which correspond with our

(b) *Moral
and re-
ligious
view of
life.*

¹ *Cic.* l. c. 32, 103; 48, 148. This explanation does away with the charge of inconsistency which is brought against Carneades in *Cic. Acad.* ii. 18, 59; 21, 67; 24, 78, on the ground that he allowed, in contradistinction to Arcesilaus, that the wise man will sometimes follow opinion, and will give his assent to certain statements. Numen. in *Eus. Pr. Ev.* xiv. 8, 7, asserts that he expressed his own convictions to his friends in private; but this assertion is no more true of him than of Arcesilaus.

² *Sext. Pyrrh.* i. 226: ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τί φασιν εἶναι οἱ Ἀκαδημαῖκοι καὶ κακὸν, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ πεπεῖσθαι ὅτι πιθανόν ἐστι μᾶλλον ὃ λέγουσιν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ πᾶρχειν ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον; καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κακοῦ ὁμοίως.

³ See p. 504.

⁴ The question is, Whence does the Sceptic derive his conviction as to probabilities in morals? and as perception is not available for the purpose, Geffers concludes (*De Arc. Successor.* 20) that Carneades assumed a peculiar source of conviction in the mind. For such an assumption, however, our authorities give no proof. It cannot be gathered from *Cic. De Fato*, ii. 23. Nor is it, indeed, necessary that Carneades should have had any opinion on the subject. Supposing he did have it, he might have appealed to experience quite as readily or more readily than the Stoics, and have been content with the fact that certain things are agreeable or disagreeable, and either promote happiness or the contrary.

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nature, and which consequently call our emotions into exercise, the object of desire must be either pleasure, or absence of pain, or conformity with nature. In each of these three cases two opposite results are possible: either the highest Good may consist in the attainment of a purpose, or else in the activity which aims at its attainment. The latter is only the view of the Stoics, and arises from regarding natural activity or virtue as the highest Good. Hence the six possible views are practically reduced to four, which taken by themselves alone, or else in combination, include all existing views respecting the highest Good.¹ But so ambiguously did Carneades express himself as to his particular preference of any one view, that Clitomachus declared he was ignorant as to his real opinions.² It was only tentatively and for the purpose of refuting the Stoics, that he propounded the statement that the highest Good consists in the enjoyment of such things as afford satisfaction to the primary impulses of nature.³ Nevertheless, the matter has often been placed in such a light as though Carneades had propounded this statement on his own account; and the statement itself has been quoted to prove that

¹ *Cic. Fin. v.* 6, 16, to 8, 23; *Tusc. v.* 29, 84; *Ritter*, iii. 686, has hardly expressed with accuracy Carneades' division.

² *Cic. Acad. ii.* 45, 139.

³ *Ibid.* ii. 42, 131: Introducebat etiam Carneades, non quo probaret, sed ut opponeret Stoicis, summum bonum esse frui iis

rebus, quas primas natura conciliavisset (*οἰκειοῦν*). Similarly *Fin. v.* 7, 20; *Tusc. v.* 30, 84. This view differs from that of the Stoics, because it makes the highest Good consist not in natural activity as such, but in the enjoyment of natural goods.

he considered the satisfaction of natural impulses apart from virtue as an end in itself.¹ It is also asserted that he adhered to the view of Callipho, which does not appear to have been essentially different from that of the older Academy.² The same leaning to the older Academy and its doctrine of moderation appears in other recorded parts of the Ethics of Carneades. The pain caused by misfortune he wished to lessen by thinking beforehand that it might be possible ;³ and after the destruction of Carthage he deliberately asserted in the presence of Clitomachus that the wise man would never allow himself to be disturbed, not even by the downfall of his country.⁴

Putting all these statements together we obtain a view not unworthy of Carneades, and certainly quite in harmony with his position. That philosopher could not, consistently with his sceptical principles, allow scientific certainty to any of the various opinions respecting the nature and aim of moral action ; and he was in particular strongly opposed

¹ *Cic. Fin.* ii. 11, 35: Ita tres sunt fines expertes honestatis, unus Aristippi vel Epicuri (pleasure), alter Hieronymi (freedom from pain), Carneadis tertius (the satisfaction of natural instincts). *Conf. Ibid.* v. 7, 20 ; 8, 22.

² *Cic. Acad.* ii. 45, 139: Ut Calliphontem sequar, cujus quidem sententiam Carneades ita studiose defensitabat, ut eam probare etiam videretur. Callipho is reckoned among those who consider honestas cum aliqua accessione—or, as it is said, *Fin.* v.

8, 21 ; 25, 73 ; *Tusc.* v. 30, 85, voluptas cum honestate — the highest Good.

³ *Phut. Tranq. An.* 16.

⁴ *Cic. Tusc.* iii. 22, 54. Let it be observed that this view of Carneades is specially placed under the head of conviction on probabilities. It is said, he attacked the proposition, *videri fore in ægritudine sapientem patria capta*. The other statements of Carneades on ethics have nothing characteristic about them.

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to the Stoics. Their inconsistency in calling the choice of what is natural the highest business of morality, and yet not allowing to what is simply according to nature a place among goods, was so trenchantly exposed by him that Antipater is said to have been brought to admit that not the objects to which choice is directed, but the actual choice itself, is a good.¹ He even asserted that the Stoic theory of Goods was only verbally different from that of the Peripatetics; to which assertion he was probably led by the fact that the Stoic morality appeals to nature only, or perhaps by the theory therewith connected of things to be desired and things to be reprobated.² If there was any difference between the two, Stoicism, he thought, ignored the real wants of nature. The Stoics, for instance, called a good name a thing indifferent; Carneades, however, drove them so much into a corner because of this statement that they ever after (so Cicero assures us) qualified their assertion, attributing to a good name at least a secondary value among things to be desired (*προηγμένα*).³ Chrysippus, again, believed to find some consolation for the ills of life in the thought that no man is free from them. Carneades was, however, of opinion that this thought

¹ *Plut.* C. Not. 27, 14; *Stob.* Ecl. ii. 134. Plutarch, however, only quotes it as the opinion of individuals. It appears more probable that it was an opinion of Chrysippus which Antipater defended against Carneades. Carneades even practically attributes it to the Stoics.

² *Cic.* Fin. iii. 12, 41: Carneades tuus . . . rem in summum discrimen adduxit, propterea quod pugnare non destitit, in omni hac quæstione, quæ de bonis et malis appelletur, non esse rerum Stoicis cum Peripateticis controversiam, sed nominum.

Fin. iii. 17 57.

could only afford consolation to a lover of ill; for it is a real subject for sorrow that all should be exposed to so hard a fate.¹ Believing, too, that man's happiness does not depend on any theory of ethics,² he could avow without hesitation that all other views of morality do not go beyond probability; and thus the statement of Clitomachus, as far as it refers to a definite decision as to the highest good, is without doubt correct. But the denial of knowledge in general, which does not, according to the view of Carneades, exclude conviction on grounds of probability, does not exclude conviction on the subject of ethics. Here, then, is the intermediate position which was attributed to him—a position not only suggested by the traditions of the Academic School, but remaining as a last residuum after a sceptical refutation of systems so opposite as Stoicism and the theory of pleasure. The inconsistency of at one time identifying the satisfaction of natural instincts with virtue, and at another time making them distinct from virtue, which is attributed to Carneades, is an inconsistency for which probably Cicero is alone responsible. The meaning of Carneades clearly is, that virtue consists in an activity directed towards the possession of what is natural, and hence that it cannot be separated from nature³ as the highest Good. For the same reason,

¹ *Cic. Tusc.* iii. 25, 59.

² *Ibid.* v. 29, 83: Et quoniam videris hoc velle, ut, quæcumque dissentientium philosophorum sententia sit de finibus,

tamen virtus satis habeat ad vitam beatam præsidii, quod quidem Carneadem disputare solitum acceperimus, etc.

³ He explicitly says, *Fin.* v. 7.

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virtue, in his opinion, supplies all that is requisite for happiness.¹ Hence, when it is stated that notwithstanding his scepticism on moral subjects, Carneades was a thoroughly upright man,² we have not only no reason to doubt this statement as to his personal character, but we can even discern that it was a practical and legitimate consequence of his philosophy. It may appear to us inconsistent to build on a foundation of absolute doubt the certainty of practical conduct; nevertheless, it is an inconsistency deeply rooted in all the scepticism of post-Aristotelian times. That scepticism Carneades brought to completeness, and in developing his theory he even became aware of its scientific defects.

For the same reason we may also give credit to the statement that Carneades, like the later Sceptics, notwithstanding his sharp criticisms on the popular and philosophic theology of his age, never intended to deny the existence of divine agencies.³ On this

18, that as each one defines the highest good, so he determines the honestum. The view of the Stoics, he says, places the honestum and bonum in action, aiming at what is according to nature; adding that, according to the view which places it in the possession of what is according to nature, the prima secundum naturam are also prima in animis quasi virtutum igniculi et semina.

¹ *Plut.* Tranq. An. 19, where, however, the greater part seems to belong to Plutarch.

² *Quintil.* Instit. xii. 1, 35.

³ *Cic.* N. D. iii. 17, 44: Hæc Carneades aiebat, non ut Deos tolleret. Quid enim philosopho minus conveniens?—sed ut Stoicos nihil de Diis explicare vinceret. In this sense the Academician in Cicero (i. 22, 62) frequently asserts, that he would not destroy belief in God, but that he finds the arguments unsatisfactory. Likewise *Sextus*, *Pyrrh.* iii. 2: τῷ μὲν βίῳ κατακολουθοῦντες ἀδοξάστως φαιμέν εἶναι θεοὺς καὶ σέψομεν θεοὺς καὶ προνοεῖν αὐτοὺς φαιμέν.

point he acted like a true Sceptic. He expressed doubts as to whether anything could be known about God, but for practical purposes he accepted the belief in God as an opinion more or less probable and useful.

Taking all things into account, the philosophic importance of Carneades and the School of which he was head, cannot be estimated so low as has been usually thought. The New Academy cannot be merely charged with entertaining weak doubts, nor can Carneades' theory of probabilities be deduced from rhetorical rather than from philosophical considerations.¹ For the last assertion there is no ground whatever; Carneades distinctly avowed that a conviction resting on probabilities seemed indispensable for practical needs and actions. On this point, too, he is wholly in accord with all the forms of Scepticism, not only with the New Academy, but also with Pyrrho and the later Sceptics. He differs from them only in the degree of accuracy with which he investigates the varieties and conditions of probability; but a question of degree can least of all be urged against a philosopher. Nor may we venture to call doubts *weak* which even subsequent times can only very inadequately dissipate, and which throw light on several of the deepest problems of life by the critical investigations they occasioned. No doubt, in the despair of attaining to knowledge at all, and in the attempt to reduce everything

¹ Ritter, iii. 730, 694.

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to opinion more or less certain, indications may be seen of the exhaustion of the spirit of science, and of the extinction of philosophic originality. Nevertheless it must never be forgotten that the Scepticism of the New Academy was not only in harmony with the course taken by Greek philosophy as a whole—the study of nature—but that it expressed its belief with a penetration and a vigour which leave no doubt that it was a really important link in the chain of philosophic development.

C. School
of Car-
neades.

In Carneades this Scepticism attained its highest growth. The successor of Carneades, Clitomachus,¹ is known as the literary exponent of the views taught by Carneades.² At the same time we hear of his being accurately acquainted with the teaching of the Peripatetics and Stoics; and although it was no doubt his first aim to refute the dogmatism of these Schools, it would appear that Clitomachus entered into the connection of their doctrines more fully than is usually the case with opponents.³ As

¹ Clitomachus was a native of Carthage, hence called by *Max. Tyr.* Diss. 10, 3, ὁ Λίβυς, and originally bore the name of Hasdrubal. He devoted himself to study at home, and wrote several treatises in his mother tongue (τῇ ἰδίᾳ φωνῇ ἐν τῇ πατρίδι ἐφίλοσάφει). When 40 years of age, he came to Athens, was initiated by Carneades into Greek philosophy, and devoted himself to it with such zeal (*Cic. Acad.* ii. 6, 17; 31, 98; *Athen.* ix. 402, c) that he became esteemed as a philosopher and productive as a

writer (*Diog.* iv. 67). Treatises of his are mentioned by *Cic.* *Acad.* ii. 31, 98; 32, 102; *Diog.* ii. 92. He did not die before 110 B.C., since, according to *Cic.* *De Orat.* i. 11, 45, L. Crassus, during his quæstorship, met him at Athens.

² *Diog.* iv. 67; *Cic. Acad.* ii. 32, 102.

³ As the passage in *Diog.* iv. 64, proves: ἀνὴρ ἐν ταῖς τρισὶν αἰρέσεσι διατρέψας, ἐν τε τῇ Ἀκαδημαϊκῇ καὶ περιπατητικῇ καὶ στωϊκῇ.

to his fellow pupil, Charmidas (or Charmadas),¹ one wholly unimportant utterance is our only guide for determining his views.² For ascertaining the philosophy of the other pupils of Carneades,³ nothing but the scantiest fragments have been preserved. The statement of Polybius that the Academic School degenerated into empty subtleties, and thereby became an object of contempt,⁴ may deserve no great

¹ According to *Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 17; De Orat. i. 11, 45; Orator 16, 51*, Charmadas was a pupil of Carneades. He must have survived Clitomachus, since he taught at the same time with Philo. Philo, however, undertook the presidency of the School (*Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 9*). According to *Cic. De Orat. ii. 88, 360, Tusc. i. 24, 59*, he was remarkable for a good memory.

² *Cic. De Orat. i. 18, 84*: Charmadas asserted, eos qui rhetores nominabantur et qui dicendi præcepta traderent nihil plane tenere, neque posse quenquam facultatem assequi dicendi, nisi qui philosophorum inventa didicissent. *Sext. Math. ii. 20*, also mentions the hostile attitude of Clitomachus and Charmadas towards rhetoricians. His fellow-disciple Agnon drew up a treatise, according to *Quintil. ii. 17, 15*, entitled 'Charges against the rhetoricians.' Ritter's inferences, *iii. 695*, make far too much of a chance expression.

³ In addition to Clitomachus and Charmadas, *Cic. Acad. ii. 6, 16*, mentions Hagnon and Melanthius of Rhodes, the former of whom is also mentioned by Quintilian. Cicero adds that Metro-

dorus of Stratonice was considered a friend of Carneades; he had come over from the Epicureans (*Diog. x. 9*). This Metrodorus must neither be confounded with Metrodorus of Skepsis, the pupil of Charmadas, nor with the Metrodorus distinguished as a painter, 168 B.C., whom Æmilius Paulus brought to Rome (*Plin. H. N. xxxv. 11, 135*). The former must have been younger, the latter older, than Metrodorus of Stratonice. A pupil of Melanthius (*Diog. ii. 64*), and also of Carneades in his later years (*Plut. An. Sen. d. Ger. Resp. 13, 1*), was Æschines of Naples, according to *Cic. De Orat. i. 11, 45*, a distinguished teacher in the Academic School towards the close of the second century. Another pupil, Mento, was by Carneades driven from the School (*Diog. iv. 63; Numen. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 8, 7*).

⁴ *Exc. Vatic. xii. 26*: καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων [τῶν ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ] τινὲς βουλόμενοι περὶ τε τῶν προφανῶς καταληπτῶν εἶναι δοκούντων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀκαταλήπτων εἰς ἀπορίαν ἄγειν τοὺς προσμαχομένους τοιαύταις χρώνται παραδοξολογίαις καὶ τοιαύτας εὐποροῦσι πιθανότητος, ὥστε διαπορεῖν, ἀδύνατόν ἐστι,

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amount of belief; but it does seem probable that the School made no important advance on the path marked out by himself and Arcesilaus. It did not even continue true to that path for very long. Not a generation after the death of its most celebrated teacher, and even among his own pupils,¹ that

τοὺς ἐν Ἀθήναις ὄντας ὁσφραίνεσθαι τῶν ἐφομένων ὧν ἐν Ἐφέσῳ, καὶ διστάζειν, μή πω καθ' ἃν καιρὸν ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ διαλέγονται περὶ τούτων οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἄλλων ἔρ' ἐν οἴκῳ κατακείμενοι τούτους διατίθενται τοὺς λόγους· ἐξ ᾧ δι' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς παραδοξολογίας εἰς διαβολὴν ἤχασιν τὴν ὕλην αἰρεσιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰ καλῶς ἀπορούμενα παρὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰς ἀπιστίαν ἦχθαι, καὶ χωρὶς τῆς ἰδίας ἀστοχίας καὶ τοῖς νέοις τοιοῦτον ἐντετόκασιν ζηλῶν, ὥστε τῶν μὲν ἠθικῶν καὶ πραγματικῶν λόγων μηδὲ τὴν τυχεύουσαν ἐπίνοιαν ποιεῖσθαι, δι' ᾧ ὄντησις τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσι, περὶ δὲ τὰς ἀνωφελεῖς καὶ παραδόξους εὐρεσιλογίας κενοδοξοῦντες κατατρίβουσι τοὺς βίους. In the time of Carneades, whose contemporary Polybius was, and to whom the remark of the enthusiasm of youth for Sceptical teaching refers, such depreciatory language could not have been used of the Academy. The historical value, therefore, of the above passage is suspicious. It bears, besides, so entirely the mark of exaggeration, that it is no more useful as giving a view of the Academy than are the caricatures of opponents for conveying any idea of modern German philosophy.

¹ Among these pupils the tendency to lay stress on the doctrine of probabilities in relation to

Scepticism was already strong. Proof may be found not only in the accounts given us of Clitomachus and Æschines, but also in the circumstance that many of the older writers made the fourth Academy date from Philo and Charmidas, the fifth from Antiochus (*Sext. Pyrrh.* i. 220; *Eus. Pr. Ev.* xiv. 4, 16). At a still earlier date, Metrodorus is said to have departed from the teaching of Carneades. *Augustin.* c. Acad. iii. 18, 41, after speaking of Antiochus and his renunciation of Scepticism, says: Quamquam et Metrodorus id antea facere tentaverat, qui primus dicitur esse confessus, non decreto placuisse Academicis, nihil posse comprehendere, sed necessario contra Stoicos hujus modi eos arma sumsisse. Probably Augustin borrowed this passage from a lost treatise of Cicero, and hence it may be relied upon. The Metrodorus referred to is probably Metrodorus of Stratonice, mentioned by *Cic.* Acad. ii. 6, 16. Metrodorus of Skepsis might also be suggested (*Strabo*, xiii. 1, 55; xvi. 4, 16; *Plut.* Lucull. 22; *Diog.* v. 84; *Cic.* De Orat. ii. 88, 360; 90, 365; iii. 20, 75; *Tusc.* i. 24, 59; *Plin.* Hist. Nat. vii. 24, 89; *Quintil.* x. 6, 1; xi. 2, 22; *Müller*, Hist. Gr. iii. 203), who first learned rhetoric at Chalce-

eclecticism appeared, the general and simultaneous spread of which ushered in a new period in the history of the post-Aristotelian philosophy. CHAP.
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don, afterwards entered the service of Mithridates, and was put to death by his orders, B.C. 70. *Cic. De Orat.* iii. 20, 75, calls

him an Academician; and he is mentioned, *Ibid.* i. 11, 45, as a pupil of Charmadas.

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